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INTRODUCTION

Decolonization, Anticapitalist Critique, and Feminist Commitments

This volume is the product of almost two decades of engagement with feminist struggles. It is based on a deep belief in the power and significance of feminist thinking in struggles for economic and social justice. And it owes whatever clarity and insight the reader may find in these pages to a community of sisters and comrades in struggle from whom I have learned the meaning, joy, and necessity of political thinking. While many of the ideas I explore here are viewed through my own particular lenses, all the ideas belong collectively to the various feminist, antiracist, and anti-imperialist communities in which I have been privileged to be involved. In the end, I think and write in conversation with scholars, teachers, and activists involved in social justice struggles. My search for emancipatory knowledge over the years has made me realize that ideas are always communally wrought, not privately owned. All faults however, are mine, for seeking the kind of knowledge that emerges in these pages brings with it its own gaps, faults, opacities. These I accept in the hope that they too prove useful to the reader.

Feminist Commitments

Why “feminism without borders?” First, because it recalls “doctors without borders,” an enterprise and project that embodies the urgency, as well as the internationalist commitment\(^1\) that I see in the best feminist praxis. Second, because growing up as part of the post-independence generation in India meant an acute awareness of the borders, boundaries, and traces of British colonialism on the one hand, and of the unbounded promise of decolonization on the other. It also meant living the contradiction of the promise of nationalism and its various limits and failures in postcolonial India. Borders suggest both containment and safety, and women often pay a price for daring
to claim the integrity, security, and safety of our bodies and our living spaces. I choose “feminism without borders,” then, to stress that our most expansive and inclusive visions of feminism need to be attentive to borders while learning to transcend them.

Feminism without borders is not the same as “border-less” feminism. It acknowledges the fault lines, conflicts, differences, fears, and containment that borders represent. It acknowledges that there is no one sense of a border, that the lines between and through nations, races, classes, sexualities, religions, and disabilities, are real—and that a feminism without borders must envision change and social justice work across these lines of demarcation and division. I want to speak of feminism without silences and exclusions in order to draw attention to the tension between the simultaneous plurality and narrowness of borders and the emancipatory potential of crossing through, with, and over these borders in our everyday lives.

In my own life, borders have come in many guises, and I live with them inside as well as across racialized women’s communities. I grew up in Mumbai (Bombay), where the visible demarcations between India and Pakistan, Hindu and Muslim, rich and poor, British and Indian, women and men, Dalit and Brahmin were a fact of everyday life. This was the same Mumbai where I learned multiple languages and negotiated multiple cultures in the company of friends and neighbors, a Mumbai where I went to church services—not just Hindu temples—and where I learned about the religious practices of Muslims and Parsees. In the last two decades, my life in the United States has exposed some new fault-lines—those of race and sexuality in particular. Urbana, Illinois, Clinton, New York, and Ithaca, New York, have been my home places in the United States, and in all three sites I have learned to read and live in relation to the racial, class, sexual, and national scripts embedded in North American culture. The presence of borders in my life has been both exclusionary and enabling, and I strive to envision a critically transnational (internationalist) feminist praxis moving through these borders.

I see myself as an antiracist feminist. Why does antiracist feminism matter in struggles for economic and social justice in the early twenty-first century? The last century was clearly the century of the maturing of feminist ideas, sensibilities, and movements. The twentieth century was also the century of the decolonization of the Third World/South, the rise and splintering of the communist Second World, the triumphal rise and recolonization of almost the entire globe by capitalism, and of the consolidation of ethnic, national-
ist, and religious fundamentalist movements and nation-states. Thus, while feminist ideas and movements may have grown and matured, the backlash and challenges to feminism have also grown exponentially.

So in this political/economic context, what would an economically and socially just feminist politics look like? It would require a clear understanding that being a woman has political consequences in the world we live in; that there can be unjust and unfair effects on women depending on our economic and social marginality and/or privilege. It would require recognizing that sexism, racism, misogyny, and heterosexism underlie and fuel social and political institutions of rule and thus often lead to hatred of women and (supposedly justified) violence against women. The interwoven processes of sexism, racism, misogyny, and heterosexism are an integral part of our social fabric, wherever in the world we happen to be. We need to be aware that these ideologies, in conjunction with the regressive politics of ethnic nationalism and capitalist consumerism, are differentially constitutive of all of our lives in the early twenty-first century. Besides recognizing all this and formulating a clear analysis and critique of the behaviors, attitudes, institutions, and relational politics that these interwoven systems entail, a just and inclusive feminist politics for the present needs to also have a vision for transformation and strategies for realizing this vision.

Hence decolonization, anticapitalist critique, and solidarity. I firmly believe an antiracist feminist framework, anchored in decolonization and committed to an anticapitalist critique, is necessary at this time. In the chapters that follow I develop antiracist feminist frameworks or ways of seeing, interpreting, and making connections between the many levels of social reality we experience. I outline a notion of feminist solidarity, as opposed to vague assumptions of sisterhood or images of complete identification with the other. For me, such solidarity is a political as well as ethical goal.

Here is a bare-bones description of my own feminist vision: this is a vision of the world that is pro-sex and -woman, a world where women and men are free to live creative lives, in security and with bodily health and integrity, where they are free to choose whom they love, and whom they set up house with, and whether they want to have or not have children; a world where pleasure rather than just duty and drudgery determine our choices, where free and imaginative exploration of the mind is a fundamental right; a vision in which economic stability, ecological sustainability, racial equality, and the redistribution of wealth form the material basis of people's well-being. Finally, my vision is

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one in which democratic and socialist practices and institutions provide the conditions for public participation and decision making for people regardless of economic and social location. In strategic terms, this vision entails putting in place antiracist feminist and democratic principles of participation and relationality, and it means working on many fronts, in many different kinds of collectivities in order to organize against repressive systems of rule. It also means being attentive to small as well as large struggles and processes that lead to radical change—not just working (or waiting) for a revolution. Thus everyday feminist, antiracist, anticapitalist practices are as important as larger, organized political movements.

While I have no formulas or easy answers, I am a firm believer in the politics of solidarity, which I discuss in some depth in the chapters that follow. But no vision stands alone, and mine owes much to the work of numerous feminist scholars and activists around the world. A brief and very partial genealogy of feminist theoretical frames that have influenced my own thinking illustrates this debt to a vital and challenging transnational feminist community.

In the 1970s and 1980s, socialist feminist thinkers including Michelle Barrett, Mary McIntosh, Zillah Eisenstein, Dorothy Smith, and Maria Mies pointed out the theoretical limitations of an implicitly masculinist Marxism. These scholars clarified the intricate relationship between production and reproduction, the place of the “family” and the “household” in the economic and social relations of capitalist society, and the relation of capitalism to patriarchy (Zillah Eisenstein coined the term “capitalist patriarchy”). At the same time, scholars such as Gloria Joseph and Jill Lewis theorized the racialization of gender and class in their early work entitled Common Differences: Conflicts in Black and White Feminist Perspectives. And in the United Kingdom, Kumkum Bhavnani and Margaret Coulson critiqued the theoretical limitations of such socialist feminist concepts as “family” and “household” on Eurocentric grounds. Similarly, Valerie Amos and Pratibha Parmar wrote eloquently about the race blindness of “imperial feminism”—socialist, radical, and liberal. In the United States, lesbians of color such as Audre Lorde, Barbara Smith, Cherrie Moraga, Merle Woo, Paula Gunn Allen, and Gloria Anzaldúa faced head-on the profound racism and heterosexism of the women’s movement, and of U.S. radical and liberal feminist theory of the second wave of feminism. Arguments about the race, color, class, and sexual dimensions of gender in the building of feminist analysis and community took center stage in
the work of these U.S. feminists of color. The Barnard Conference in the early 1980s inaugurated the so-called sex wars, which brought the contradictions of sex, sexuality, erotica, pornography, and such marginalized sexual practices as sadomasochism to the forefront of feminist debate.

The 1980s also saw the rise of standpoint epistemology, especially through the work of Nancy Hartsock, Dorothy Smith, and Sandra Harding. This work defined the link between social location, women's experiences, and their epistemic perspectives. And then there were the feminists from Third World/South nations who had a profound influence on my own understanding of the relationship of feminism and nationalism, and of the centrality of struggles for decolonization in feminist thought. Kumari Jayawardena, Nawal El Saadawi, Fatima Mernissi, Isabel Letelier, and Achola Pala all theorized the specific place of Asian, Middle Eastern, Latin American, and African women in national struggles for liberation, and in the economic development and democratization of previously colonized countries.

More contemporaneously, the work of feminist theorists Ella Shohat, Angela Davis, Jacqui Alexander, Linda Alcoff, Lisa Lowe, Avtar Brah, bell hooks, Zillah Eisenstein, Himani Bannerji, Patricia Bell Scott, Vandana Shiva, Kumkum Sangari, Ruth Frankenberg, Inderpal Grewal, Caren Kaplan, Kimberle Crenshaw, Elizabeth Minnich, Leslie Roman, Lata Mani, Uma Narayan, Minnie Bruce Pratt, and Leila Ahmed, among many others, has charted new ground in the theorization of feminism and racism, immigration, Eurocentrism, critical white studies, heterosexism, and imperialism. While there are many scholars and activists who remain unnamed in this brief genealogy, I offer this partial history of ideas to anchor, in part, my own feminist thinking and to clarify the deeply collective nature of feminist thought as I see it. Let me now turn briefly to the limits and pitfalls of feminist practice as I see them in my own context and then move on to a discussion of decolonization and feminist anticapitalist critique. Finally, a road map introduces the reader to the organization of the book.

Feminist practice as I understand it operates at a number of levels: at the level of daily life through the everyday acts that constitute our identities and relational communities; at the level of collective action in groups, networks, and movements constituted around feminist visions of social transformation; and at the levels of theory, pedagogy, and textual creativity in the scholarly and writing practices of feminists engaged in the production of knowledge. While
the last few decades have produced a theoretically complex feminist practice (I refer to examples of these throughout the book), they have also spawned some problematic ideologies and practices under the label “feminist.”

In my own context I would identify three particular problematic directions within U.S.-based feminisms. First, the increasing, predominantly class-based gap between a vital women’s movement and feminist theorizing in the U.S. academy has led in part to a kind of careerist academic feminism whereby the boundaries of the academy stand in for the entire world and feminism becomes a way to advance academic careers rather than a call for fundamental and collective social and economic transformation. This gap between an individualized and narrowly professional understanding of feminism and a collective, theoretical feminist vision that focuses on the radical transformation of the everyday lives of women and men is one I actively work to address. Second, the increasing corporatization of U.S. culture and naturalization of capitalist values has had its own profound influence in engendering a neoliberal, consumerist (protocapitalist) feminism concerned with “women’s advancement” up the corporate and nation-state ladder. This is a feminism that focuses on financial “equality” between men and women and is grounded in the capitalist values of profit, competition, and accumulation. A protocapitalist or “free-market” feminism is symptomatic of the “Americanization” of definitions of feminism—the unstated assumption that U.S. corporate culture is the norm and ideal that feminists around the world strive for. Another characteristic of protocapitalist feminism is its unstated and profoundly individualist character. Finally, the critique of essentialist identity politics and the hegemony of postmodernist skepticism about identity has led to a narrowing of feminist politics and theory whereby either exclusionary and self-serving understandings of identity rule the day or identity (racial, class, sexual, national, etc.) is seen as unstable and thus merely “strategic.” Thus, identity is seen as either naive or irrelevant, rather than as a source of knowledge and a basis for progressive mobilization. Colonizing, U.S.- and Eurocentric privileged feminisms, then, constitute some of the limits of feminist thinking that I believe need to be addressed at this time. And some of these problems, in conjunction with the feminist possibilities and vision discussed earlier, form the immediate backdrop to my own thinking in the chapters that follow.
I define solidarity in terms of mutuality, accountability, and the recognition of common interests as the basis for relationships among diverse communities. Rather than assuming an enforced commonality of oppression, the practice of solidarity foregrounds communities of people who have chosen to work and fight together. Diversity and difference are central values here—to be acknowledged and respected, not erased in the building of alliances. Jodi Dean (1996) develops a notion of “reflective solidarity” that I find particularly useful. She argues that reflective solidarity is crafted by an interaction involving three persons: “I ask you to stand by me over and against a third” (3). This involves thematizing the third voice “to reconstruct solidarity as an inclusive ideal,” rather than as an “us vs. them” notion. Dean’s notion of a communicative, in-process understanding of the “we” is useful, given that solidarity is always an achievement, the result of active struggle to construct the universal on the basis of particulars/differences. It is the praxis-oriented, active political struggle embodied in this notion of solidarity that is important to my thinking—and the reason I prefer to focus attention on solidarity rather than on the concept of “sisterhood.” Thus, decolonization, anticapitalist critique, and the politics of solidarity are the central themes of this book. Each concept foregrounds my own commitments and emerges as a necessary component of an antiracist and internationalist feminism—without borders. In particular, I believe feminist solidarity as defined here constitutes the most principled way to cross borders—to decolonize knowledge and practice anticapitalist critique.

In what is one of the classic texts on colonization, Franz Fanon (1963) argues that the success of decolonization lies in a “whole social structure being changed from the bottom up”; that this change is “willed, called for, demanded” by the colonized; that it is a historical process that can only be understood in the context of the “movements which give it historical form and content”; that it is marked by violence and never “takes place unnoticed, for it influences individuals and modifies them fundamentally”; and finally that “decolonization is the veritable creation of new men.” In other words, decolonization involves profound transformations of self, community, and governance structures. It can only be engaged through active withdrawal of consent and resistance to structures of psychic and social domination. It is a historical and collective process, and as such can only be understood within
these contexts. The end result of decolonization is not only the creation of new kinds of self-governance but also "the creation of new men" (and women). While Fanon's theorization is elaborated through masculine metaphors (and his formulation of resistance is also profoundly gendered), the framework of decolonization that Fanon elaborates is useful in formulating a feminist decolonizing project. If processes of sexism, heterosexism, and misogyny are central to the social fabric of the world we live in; if indeed these processes are interwoven with racial, national, and capitalist domination and exploitation such that the lives of women and men, girls and boys, are profoundly affected, then decolonization at all the levels (as described by Fanon) becomes fundamental to a radical feminist transformative project. Decolonization has always been central to the project of Third World feminist theorizing—and much of my own work has been inspired by these particular feminist genealogies.

Jacqui Alexander and I have written about the significance of decolonization to feminist anticolonial, anticapitalist struggle and I want to draw on this analysis here. At that time we defined decolonization as central to the practice of democracy, and to the reenvisioning of democracy outside free-market, procedural conceptions of individual agency and state governance. We discussed the centrality of self-reflexive collective practice in the transformation of the self, reconceptualizations of identity, and political mobilization as necessary elements of the practice of decolonization. Finally, we argued that history, memory, emotion, and affectional ties are significant cognitive elements of the construction of critical, self-reflective, feminist selves and that in the crafting of oppositional selves and identities, "decolonization coupled with emancipatory collective practice leads to a rethinking of patriarchal, heterosexual, colonial, racial, and capitalist legacies in the project of feminism and, thus, toward envisioning democracy and democratic collective practice such that issues of sexual politics in governance are fundamental to thinking through questions of resistance anchored in the daily lives of women, that these issues are an integral aspect of the epistemology of anticolonial feminist struggle" (xxxviii). The chapters that follow draw on these particular formulations of decolonization in the context of feminist struggle. A formulation of decolonization in which autonomy and self-determination are central to the process of liberation and can only be achieved through "self-reflexive collective practice."

I use the term "anticapitalist critique" for two reasons. First, to draw at-
tention to the specificities of global capitalism and to name and demystify its effects in everyday life—that is, to draw attention to the anticapitalist practices we have to actively engage in within feminist communities. And second, to suggest that capitalism is seriously incompatible with feminist visions of social and economic justice. In many ways, an anticapitalist feminist critique has much in common with earlier formulations of socialist feminism. But this is a racialized socialist feminism, attentive to the specific operations and discourses of contemporary global capitalism: a socialist feminist critique, attentive to nation and sexuality—and to the globalized economic, ideological, and cultural interweaving of masculinities, femininities, and heterosexualities in capital’s search for profit, accumulation, and domination.

To specify further, an anticapitalist critique fundamentally entails a critique of the operation, discourse, and values of capitalism and of their naturalization through neoliberal ideology and corporate culture. This means demystifying discourses of consumerism, ownership, profit, and privatization—of the collapse of notions of public and private good, and the refashioning of social into consumer identities within corporate culture. It entails an anti-imperialist understanding of feminist praxis, and a critique of the way global capitalism facilitates U.S.- and Eurocentrism as well as nativism and anti-immigrant sentiment. This analysis involves decolonizing and actively combating the naturalization of corporate citizenship such that democratic, socialist, antiracist feminist values of justice, participation, redistribution of wealth and resources, commitment to individual and collective human rights and to public welfare and services, and accountability to and responsibility for the collective (as opposed to merely personal) good become the mainstay of transformed local, national, and transnational cultures. In this frame, difference and plurality emerge as genuinely complex and often contradictory, rather than as commodified variations on Eurocentric themes. Chapters 6, 7, 8, and 9 develop these ideas in some detail.

Feminism without Borders: A Road Map

The book is organized around two interlocking themes, which form the first two parts of the book: decolonizing feminism and demystifying capitalism. The questions of experience, identity, and solidarity run centrally though both parts. While they are also more or less chronologically organized in terms of my own engagement with the vicissitudes of feminist struggle, together

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the two parts take up some of the most urgent questions facing a transna-
tional feminist praxis today. A third and final part, "Reorienting Feminism,"
picks up the issues explored in chapter 1, "Under Western Eyes," and reori-
ents them in the context of feminist scholarship, pedagogy, and politics in
the early years of this century. My intellectual preoccupations in the 1980s fo-
cused on the way the "West" colonizes gender, in particular, its colored, racial,
and class dimensions. Now, almost two decades later, I am concerned with
the way that gender matters in the racial, class, and national formations of
globalization. The three parts of this book, "Decolonizing Feminism," "De-
mystifying Capitalism," and "Reorienting Feminism," mark this movement
in my own thinking. The chapters themselves encourage both a personal and
a larger, collective genealogy of feminist practice, which moves through the
enforced boundaries of race, color, nation, and class. I write in conversation
with and for progressive, left, feminist, and anti-imperialist scholars, intel-
lectuals, and activists around the world. A few intellectual themes emerge in
these chapters:

- the politics of difference and the challenge of solidarity
- the demystification of the workings of power and strategies of resistance in
  scholarship, pedagogy, grassroots movements, and academic institutions
- the decolonizing and politicizing of knowledge by rethinking self and
  community through the practice of emancipatory education
- the building of an ethics of crossing cultural, sexual, national, class, and
  racial borders
- and finally, theorizing and practicing anticapitalist and democratic cri-
tique in education, and through collective struggle.

**PART I: DECOLONIZING FEMINISM**

The practice of feminism across national and cultural divisions is the pri-
mary focus of this part of the book. The five chapters that comprise it together
stage various dialogues between "Western," First World/North and Third
World/South feminisms. These chapters offer a critique of Eurocentrism and
of Western developmentalist discourses of modernity, especially through the
lens of the racial, sexual, and class-based assumptions of Western feminist
scholarship. Simultaneously, these chapters foreground genealogies of Third
World/South feminisms, exploring the histories, experiences, and politics of
identity embedded in nonhegemonic feminist practice. Chapter 1, "Under
Western Eyes,” engages Western feminist discourses on women in the Third World, calling for a radical decolonization of feminist cross-cultural scholarship. This chapter appears in its original 1986 version and is the occasion for the reflections in part 3, “Reorienting Feminism.” Chapter 2, “Cartographies of Struggle,” was originally written as a companion piece to chapter 1, and provides an account of the emergence and consolidation of Third World women’s feminist politics in the late twentieth century. It examines issues of definition and context in the emergence of Third World feminisms, and explores the notion of “common interests” and a “common context of struggle” in crafting feminist solidarities. Chapter 2 has an organic relation to chapter 1 in that it is the critique of Eurocentrism within feminist theory that allows me to move toward the specification of Third World feminism and toward a vision of common contexts of struggle. Chapter 3, “What’s Home Got To Do with It?,” written with Biddy Martin, offers a close reading of Minnie Bruce Pratt’s autobiographical narrative “Identity: Skin, Blood, Heart” (Pratt 1984a). It poses questions dealing with the configuration of home, identity, and community in the construction of whiteness and heterosexuality. Questions of racialized and sexualized difference and the ethics and politics of crossing borders are refracted through the lens of experience, history, and struggle for community. Chapter 4, “Sisterhood, Coalition, and the Politics of Location,” continues the discussion of experience, identity, and difference, this time staging a dialogue between texts written by Robin Morgan and Bernice Johnson Reagon, which address directly the question of cross-cultural, cross-national differences among women and the politics of sisterhood and solidarity. A third, more recent text on the challenge of local feminisms by Amrita Basu (1995) serves as a counterpoint to these earlier discussions of “global sisterhood.” Finally, in chapter 5, “Genealogies of Community, Home, and Nation” I return to the issues of home, identity, and community, but this time through a more individual, personal lens. Here I craft my own personal/political genealogy through feminism and the borders of nation-states, class, race, and religion. Location, community, and collective struggle all emerge as fundamental in this analysis. Thus decolonizing feminism involves a careful critique of the ethics and politics of Eurocentrism, and a corresponding analysis of the difficulties and joys of crossing cultural, national, racial, and class boundaries in the search for feminist communities anchored in justice and equality.

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Part 2 revolves around the analysis of global capitalist relations of rule and the ideal of transnational feminist solidarity. Chapter 6, “Women Workers and the Politics of Solidarity,” is anchored in the conceptual framework of a common context of struggle, and offers a comparative feminist analysis of women workers at different ends of the global assembly line. It develops a vision of anticapitalist feminist solidarity based on the theorization of the common interests, historical location, and social identity of women workers under global capitalism. Chapters 7 and 8 turn to the U.S. academy and focus on the issues of multiculturalism, globalization, and corporatization. Chapter 7, “Privatized Citizenship, Corporate Academies, and Feminist Projects,” focuses on the landscape of the U.S. academy and analyzes the commodification of knowledge and the complex racial and gendered effects of global economic and political restructuring on the North American academy. It engages questions of experience, power, knowledge, and democracy and develops a feminist anticapitalist critique of the academy and the ethics and politics of knowledge production. Finally, chapter 8, “Race, Multiculturalism, and Pedagogies of Dissent,” examines the challenges posed to U.S. higher education by a “race industry” anchored in a corporate model of conflict management rather than in the values of social justice. It analyzes the genealogies of interdisciplinary programs such as women’s studies and race and ethnic studies and explores pedagogies of decolonization and dissent as a counter to multiculturalist discourses and practices of accommodation. The chapter delves deeper into the politics of knowledge, curricular and pedagogical practices, and their effects on marginalized communities in the academy.

Part 3 consists of one chapter, “‘Under Western Eyes’ Revisited,” which reexamines the ideas in chapter 1, “Under Western Eyes,” to deepen, widen, and move through a different, albeit related, landscape of transnational feminist struggle. Here I recast the cross-cultural feminist project I explored almost twenty years ago, by reengaging with its concerns. While I focused then on the Eurocentric assumptions of Western feminist practice and its too easy claiming of sisterhood across national, cultural, and racial differences, my concerns now focus on antiracist feminist engagement with the multiple effects of globalization and on building solidarities. I suggest that we reorient transnational feminist practice toward anticapitalist struggles, by
examining feminist pedagogies and scholarship on globalization and by exploring the implications of the absence of racialized gender and feminist politics in antiglobalization movements. This section weaves together numerous strands that run through the book: the politics of difference and solidarity, the crossing of borders, the relation of feminist knowledges and scholarship to organizing and social movements, crafting a transnational feminist anticapitalist critique, decolonizing knowledge, and theorizing agency, identity, and resistance in the context of feminist solidarity. Rather than providing a conclusion, “Reorienting Feminism” opens outward to new possibilities and maps new beginnings.

The book has a spiral structure, since chapters move in and out of similar queries, but at many different levels. I look again at genealogies and commitments of feminism defined in the closing decades of the last century. And I return time and again to the ideas, politics, and genealogies of feminism that have inspired me over the years. Whereas my concerns remain the same, my vision, my experiences, and my communities, have in part changed because of shifts in my own location, and in the post-1989 global political and economic landscape. It is this shifting and changing that I wish to share in the hope that the questions that have preoccupied me (and many other feminist comrades in struggle) over the last two decades emerge clearly and powerfully in these pages—and that my journeys through various feminist narratives, projects, and agendas prove useful to others engaged in similar struggles for social justice.

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PART ONE

Decolonizing Feminism
Any discussion of the intellectual and political construction of "Third World feminisms" must address itself to two simultaneous projects: the internal critique of hegemonic "Western" feminisms and the formulation of autonomous feminist concerns and strategies that are geographically, historically, and culturally grounded. The first project is one of deconstructing and dismantling; the second is one of building and constructing. While these projects appear to be contradictory, the one working negatively and the other positively, unless these two tasks are addressed simultaneously, Third World feminisms run the risk of marginalization or ghettoization from both mainstream (right and left) and Western feminist discourses.

It is to the first project that I address myself here. What I wish to analyze is specifically the production of the "Third World woman" as a singular, monolithic subject in some (Western) feminist texts. The definition of colonization I wish to invoke here is a predominantly discursive one, focusing on a certain mode of appropriation and codification of scholarship and knowledge about women in the Third World through the use of particular analytic categories employed in specific writings on the subject that take as their referent feminist interests as they have been articulated in the United States and Western Europe. If one of the tasks of formulating and understanding the locus of Third World feminisms is delineating the way in which they resist and work against what I am referring to as "Western feminist discourse," then an analysis of the discursive construction of Third World women in Western feminism is an important first step.

Clearly, neither Western feminist discourse nor Western feminist political practice is singular or homogeneous in its goals, interests, or analyses. However, it is possible to trace a coherence of effects resulting from the implicit
assumption of “the West” (in all its complexities and contradictions) as the primary referent in theory and praxis. My reference to “Western feminism” is by no means intended to imply that it is a monolith. Rather, I am attempting to draw attention to the similar effects of various textual strategies used by writers that codify others as non-Western and hence themselves as (implicitly) Western. It is in this sense that I use the term “Western feminist.” Similar arguments can be made about middle-class, urban African or Asian scholars who write about their rural or working-class sisters and assume their own middle-class cultures at the norm and codify working class histories and cultures as other. Thus, while this chapter focuses specifically on what I refer to as “Western feminist” discourse on women in the Third World, the critiques I offer also pertain to Third World scholars who write about their own cultures and employ identical strategies.

It ought to be of some political significance that the term “colonization” has come to denote a variety of phenomena in recent feminist and left writings in general. From its analytic value as a category of exploitative economic exchange in both traditional and contemporary Marxisms (see, in particular, Amin 1977, Baran 1962, and Gunder-Frank 1967) to its use by feminist women of color in the United States to describe the appropriation of their experiences and struggles by hegemonic white women’s movements (see especially Joseph and Lewis 1981, Moraga 1984, Moraga and Anzaldúa 1981, and Smith 1983), colonization has been used to characterize everything from the most evident economic and political hierarchies to the production of a particular cultural discourse about what is called the Third World.1 However sophisticated or problematical its use as an explanatory construct, colonization almost invariably implies a relation of structural domination and a suppression—often violent—of the heterogeneity of the subject(s) in question.

My concern about such writings derives from my own implication and investment in contemporary debates in feminist theory and the urgent political necessity of forming strategic coalitions across class, race, and national boundaries. The analytic principles discussed below serve to distort Western feminist political practices and limit the possibility of coalitions among (usually white) Western feminists, working-class feminists, and feminists of color around the world. These limitations are evident in the construction of the (implicitly consensual) priority of issues around which apparently all women are expected to organize. The necessary and integral connection between feminist scholarship and feminist political practice and organizing de-
etermines the significance and status of Western feminist writings on women in the Third World, for feminist scholarship, like most other kinds of scholarship, is not the mere production of knowledge about a certain subject. It is a directly political and discursive practice in that it is purposeful and ideological. It is best seen as a mode of intervention into particular hegemonic discourses (e.g., traditional anthropology, sociology, and literary criticism); it is a political praxis that counters and resists the totalizing imperative of age-old "legitimate" and "scientific" bodies of knowledge. Thus, feminist scholarly practices (reading, writing, critiquing, etc.) are inscribed in relations of power—relations that they counter, resist, or even perhaps implicitly support. There can, of course, be no apolitical scholarship.

The relationship between "Woman" (a cultural and ideological composite other constructed through diverse representational discourses—scientific, literary, juridical, linguistic, cinematic, etc.) and "women" (real, material subjects of their collective histories) is one of the central questions the practice of feminist scholarship seeks to address. This connection between women as historical subjects and the representation of Woman produced by hegemonic discourses is not a relation of direct identity or a relation of correspondence or simple implication. It is an arbitrary relation set up by particular cultures. I would like to suggest that the feminist writings I analyze here discursively colonize the material and historical heterogeneities of the lives of women in the Third World, thereby producing/representing a composite, singular "Third World woman"—an image that appears arbitrarily constructed but nevertheless carries with it the authorizing signature of Western humanist discourse.

I argue that assumptions of privilege and ethnocentric universality, on the one hand, and inadequate self-consciousness about the effect of Western scholarship on the Third World in the context of a world system dominated by the West, on the other, characterize a sizable extent of Western feminist work on women in the Third World. An analysis of "sexual difference" in the form of a cross-culturally singular, monolithic notion of patriarchy or male dominance leads to the construction of a similarly reductive and homogeneous notion of what I call the "Third World difference"—that stable, ahistorical something that apparently oppresses most if not all the women in these countries. And it is in the production of this Third World difference that Western feminisms appropriate and colonize the constitutive complexities that characterize the lives of women in these countries. It is in this process of discursive
homogenization and systematization of the oppression of women in the Third World that power is exercised in much of recent Western feminist discourse, and this power needs to be defined and named.

In the context of the West's hegemonic position today—the context of what Anouar Abdel-Malek (1981) calls a struggle for "control over the orientation, regulation and decision of the process of world development on the basis of the advanced sector's monopoly of scientific knowledge and ideal creativity" (145)—Western feminist scholarship on the Third World must be seen and examined precisely in terms of its inscription in these particular relations of power and struggle. There is, it should be evident, no universal patriarchal framework that this scholarship attempts to counter and resist—unless one posits an international male conspiracy or a monolithic, ahistorical power structure. There is, however, a particular world balance of power within which any analysis of culture, ideology, and socioeconomic conditions necessarily has to be situated. Abdel-Malek is useful here, again, in reminding us about the inherence of politics in the discourses of "culture":

Contemporary imperialism is, in a real sense, a hegemonic imperialism, exercising to a maximum degree a rationalized violence taken to a higher level than ever before—through fire and sword, but also through the attempt to control hearts and minds. For its content is defined by the combined action of the military-industrial complex and the hegemonic cultural centers of the West, all of them founded on the advanced levels of development attained by monopoly and finance capital, and supported by the benefits of both the scientific and technological revolution and the second industrial revolution itself. (145–46)

Western feminist scholarship cannot avoid the challenge of situating itself and examining its role in such a global economic and political framework. To do any less would be to ignore the complex interconnections between First and Third World economies and the profound effect of this on the lives of women in all countries. I do not question the descriptive and informative value of most Western feminist writings on women in the Third World. I also do not question the existence of excellent work that does not fall into the analytic traps with which I am concerned. In fact, I deal with an example of such work later on. In the context of an overwhelming silence about the experience of women in these countries, as well as the need to forge international links between women's political struggles, such work is both pathbreaking
and absolutely essential. However, I want to draw attention here both to the explanatory potential of particular analytic strategies employed by such writing and to their political effect in the context of the hegemony of Western scholarship. While feminist writing in the United States is still marginalized (except from the point of view of women of color addressing privileged white women), Western feminist writing on women in the Third World must be considered in the context of the global hegemony of Western scholarship—that is, the production, publication, distribution, and consumption of information and ideas. Marginal or not, this writing has political effects and implications beyond the immediate feminist or disciplinary audience. One such significant effect of the dominant “representations” of Western feminism is its conflation with imperialism in the eyes of particular Third World women. Hence the urgent need to examine the political implications of our analytic strategies and principles.

My critique is directed at three basic analytic principles that are present in (Western) feminist discourse on women in the Third World. Since I focus primarily on the Zed Press Women in the Third World series, my comments on Western feminist discourse are circumscribed by my analysis of the texts in this series. This is a way of focusing my critique. However, even though I am dealing with feminists who identify themselves as culturally or geographically from the West, what I say about these presuppositions or implicit principles holds for anyone who uses these methods, whether Third World women in the West or Third World women in the Third World writing on these issues and publishing in the West. Thus I am not making a culturalist argument about ethnocentrism; rather, I am trying to uncover how ethnocentric universalism is produced in certain analyses. As a matter of fact, my argument holds for any discourse that sets up its own authorial subjects as the implicit referent, that is, the yardstick by which to encode and represent cultural others. It is in this move that power is exercised in discourse.

The first analytic presupposition I focus on is involved in the strategic location of the category “women” vis-à-vis the context of analysis. The assumption of women as an already constituted, coherent group with identical interests and desires, regardless of class, ethnic, or racial location, or contradictions, implies a notion of gender or sexual difference or even patriarchy that can be applied universally and cross-culturally. (The context of analysis can be anything from kinship structures and the organization of labor to media representations.) The second analytical presupposition is evident on the method-
ological level, in the uncritical way “proof” of universality and cross-cultural validity are provided. The third is a more specifically political presupposition underlying the methodologies and the analytic strategies, that is, the model of power and struggle they imply and suggest. I argue that as a result of the two modes—or, rather, frames—of analysis described above, a homogeneous notion of the oppression of women as a group is assumed, which, in turn, produces the image of an “average Third World woman.” This average Third World woman leads an essentially truncated life based on her feminine gender (read: sexually constrained) and her being “Third World” (read: ignorant, poor, uneducated, tradition-bound, domestic, family-oriented, victimized, etc.). This, I suggest, is in contrast to the (implicit) self-representation of Western women as educated, as modern, as having control over their own bodies and sexualities and the freedom to make their own decisions.

The distinction between Western feminist representation of women in the Third World and Western feminist self-presentation is a distinction of the same order as that made by some Marxists between the “maintenance” function of the housewife and the real “productive” role of wage labor, or the characterization by developmentalists of the Third World as being engaged in the lesser production of “raw materials” in contrast to the “real” productive activity of the First World. These distinctions are made on the basis of the privileging of a particular group as the norm or referent. Men involved in wage labor, First World producers, and, I suggest, Western feminists who sometimes cast Third World women in terms of “ourselves undressed” (Rosaldo 1980), all construct themselves as the normative referent in such a binary analytic.

Women as a Category of Analysis; or, We Are All Sisters in Struggle

The phrase “women as a category of analysis” refers to the crucial assumption that all women, across classes and cultures, are somehow socially constituted as a homogeneous group identified prior to the process of analysis. This is an assumption that characterizes much feminist discourse. The homogeneity of women as a group is produced not on the basis of biological essentials but rather on the basis of secondary sociological and anthropological universals. Thus, for instance, in any given piece of feminist analysis, women are characterized as a singular group on the basis of a shared oppression. What binds women together is a sociological notion of the “sameness” of their op-
pression. It is at this point that an elision takes place between "women" as a discursively constructed group and "women" as material subjects of their own history. Thus, the discursively consensual homogeneity of women as a group is mistaken for the historically specific material reality of groups of women. This results in an assumption of women as an always already constituted group, one that has been labeled powerless, exploited, sexually harassed, and so on, by feminist scientific, economic, legal, and sociological discourses. (Notice that this is quite similar to sexist discourse labeling women as weak, emotional, having math anxiety, etc.) This focus is not on uncovering the material and ideological specificities that constitute a particular group of women as "powerless" in a particular context. It is, rather, on finding a variety of cases of powerless groups of women to prove the general point that women as a group are powerless.

In this section I focus on six specific ways in which "women" as a category of analysis is used in Western feminist discourse on women in the Third World. Each of these examples illustrates the construction of "Third World women" as a homogeneous "powerless" group often located as implicit victims of particular socioeconomic systems. I have chosen to deal with a variety of writers—from Fran Hosken, who writes primarily about female genital mutilation, to writers from the Women in International Development (WID) school, who write about the effect of development policies on Third World women for both Western and Third World audiences. The similarity of assumptions about Third World women in all these texts forms the basis of my discussion. This is not to equate all the texts that I analyze, nor is it to equalize their strengths and weaknesses. The authors I deal with write with varying degrees of care and complexity; however, the effect of their representation of Third World women is a coherent one. In these texts women are defined as victims of male violence (Fran Hosken); as universal dependents (Beverly Lindsay and Maria Cutrufellini); victims of the colonial process (Maria Cutrufellini); victims of the Arab familial system (Juliette Minces); victims of the Islamic code (Patricia Jeffery); and, finally, victims of the economic development process (Beverley Lindsay and the [liberal] WID school). This mode of defining women primarily in terms of their object status (the way in which they are affected or not affected by certain institutions and systems) is what characterizes this particular form of the use of "women" as a category of analysis. In the context of Western women writing/studying women in the Third World, such objectification (however benevolently motivated) needs to be both named
and challenged. As Valerie Amos and Pratibha Parmar argue quite eloquently, “Feminist theories which examine our cultural practices as ‘feudal residues’ or label us ‘traditional,’ also portray us as politically immature women who need to be versed and schooled in the ethos of Western feminism. They need to be continually challenged” (1984, 7).

WOMEN AS VICTIMS OF MALE VIOLENCE

Fran Hosken, in writing about the relationship between human rights and female genital mutilation in Africa and the Middle East, bases her whole discussion/condemnation of genital mutilation on one privileged premise: that the goal of this practice is to “mutilate the sexual pleasure and satisfaction of woman” (1981, 11). This, in turn, leads her to claim that woman’s sexuality is controlled, as is her reproductive potential. According to Hosken, “male sexual politics” in Africa and around the world shares “the same political goal: to assure female dependence and subservience by any and all means” (14). Physical violence against women (rape, sexual assault, excision, infibulation, etc.) is thus carried out “with an astonishing consensus among men in the world” (14). Here, women are defined consistently as the victim of male control—as the “sexually oppressed.” Although it is true that the potential of male violence against women circumscribes and elucidates their social position to a certain extent, defining women as archetypal victims freezes them into “objects-who-defend-themselves,” men into “subjects-who-perpetrate-violence,” and (every) society into powerless (read: women) and powerful (read: men) groups of people. Male violence must be theorized and interpreted within specific societies in order both to understand it better and to organize effectively to change it. Sisterhood cannot be assumed on the basis of gender; it must be forged in concrete historical and political practice and analysis.

WOMEN AS UNIVERSAL DEPENDENTS

Beverly Lindsay’s conclusion to the book Comparative Perspectives of Third World Women: The Impact of Race, Sex, and Class (1983) states that “dependency relationships, based upon race, sex, and class, are being perpetuated through social, educational, and economic institutions. These are the linkages among Third World Women.” Here, as in other places, Lindsay implies that Third World women constitute an identifiable group purely on the basis of shared dependencies. If shared dependencies were all that was needed to bind Third
World women together as a group, they would always be seen as an apolitical
group with no subject status. Instead, if anything, it is the common context
of political struggle against class, race, gender, and imperialist hierarchies
that may constitute Third World women as a strategic group at this histori-
cal juncture. Lindsay also states that linguistic and cultural differences exist
between Vietnamese and black American women, but “both groups are vic-
tims of race, sex, and class” (306). Again, black and Vietnamese women are
characterized by their victim status.

Similarly, examine statements such as “My analysis will start by stating
that all African women are politically and economically dependent” (Cutru-
felli 1983, 13); “Nevertheless, either overtly or covertly, prostitution is still the
main if not the only source of work for African women” (Cutrufelli 1983, 33).
All African women are dependent. Prostitution is the only work option for
African women as a group. Both statements are illustrative of generalizations
sprinkled liberally through Maria Cutrufelli’s book Women of Africa: Roots of Op-
pression. On the cover of the book, Cutrufelli is described as an Italian writer,
sociologist, Marxist, and feminist. Today, is it possible to imagine writing a
book entitled Women of Europe: Roots of Oppression? I am not objecting to the use
of universal groupings for descriptive purposes. Women from the continent
of Africa can be descriptively characterized as “women of Africa.” It is when
“women of Africa” becomes a homogeneous sociological grouping charac-
terized by common dependencies or powerlessness (or even strengths) that
problems arise—we say too little and too much at the same time.

This is because descriptive gender differences are transformed into the
division between men and women. Women are constituted as a group via de-
pendency relationships vis-à-vis men, who are implicitly held responsible for
these relationships. When “women of Africa” as a group (versus “men of
Africa” as a group?) are seen as a group precisely because they are generally de-
pendent and oppressed, the analysis of specific historical differences becomes
impossible, because reality is always apparently structured by divisions—two
mutually exclusive and jointly exhaustive groups, the victims and the oppres-
sors. Here the sociological is substituted for the biological, in order, however,
to create the same—a unity of women. Thus it is not the descriptive potential
of gender difference but the privileged positioning and explanatory poten-
tial of gender difference as the origin of oppression that I question. In using
“women of Africa” (as an already constituted group of oppressed peoples) as a
category of analysis, Cutrufelli denies any historical specificity to the location
of women as subordinate, powerful, marginal, central, or otherwise, vis-à-vis particular social and power networks. Women are taken as a unified “powerless” group prior to the analysis in question. Thus it is merely a matter of specifying the context after the fact. “Women” are now placed in the context of the family or in the workplace or within religious networks, almost as if these systems existed outside the relations of women with other women, and women with men.

The problem with this analytic strategy is that it assumes men and women are already constituted as sexual-political subjects prior to their entry into the arena of social relations. Only if we subscribe to this assumption is it possible to undertake analysis that looks at the “effects” of kinship structures, colonialism, organization of labor, and so on, on “women,” defined in advance as a group. The crucial point that is forgotten is that women are produced through these very relations as well as being implicated in forming these relations. As Michelle Rosaldo argues, “[W]oman's place in human social life is not in any direct sense a product of the things she does (or even less, a function of what, biologically, she is) but the meaning her activities acquire through concrete social interactions” (1980, 400). That women mother in a variety of societies is not as significant as the value attached to mothering in these societies. The distinction between the act of mothering and the status attached to it is a very important one—one that needs to be stated and analyzed contextually.

MARRIED WOMEN AS VICTIMS OF THE COLONIAL PROCESS

In Claude Lévi-Strauss’s theory of kinship structure as a system of the exchange of women, what is significant is that exchange itself is not constitutive of the subordination of women; women are not subordinate because of the fact of exchange but because of the modes of exchange instituted and the values attached to these modes. However, in discussing the marriage ritual of the Bemba, a Zambian matrilocal, matrilineal people, Cutrufelli in Women of Africa focuses on the fact of the marital exchange of women before and after Western colonization, rather than the value attached to this exchange in this particular context. This leads to her definition of Bemba women as a coherent group affected in a particular way by colonization. Here again, Bemba women are constituted rather unilaterally as victims of the effects of Western colonization.

Cutrufelli cites the marriage ritual of the Bemba as a multistage event “whereby a young man becomes incorporated into his wife’s family group as
he takes up residence with them and gives his services in return for food and maintenance" (43). This ritual extends over many years, and the sexual relationship varies according to the degree of the girl’s physical maturity. It is only after she undergoes an initiation ceremony at puberty that intercourse is sanctioned and the man acquires legal rights over her. This initiation ceremony is the more important act of the consecration of women’s reproductive power, so that the abduction of an uninitiated girl is of no consequence, while heavy penalty is levied for the seduction of an initiated girl. Cutrufelli asserts that European colonization has changed the whole marriage system. Now the young man is entitled to take his wife away from her people in return for money. The implication is that Bemba women have now lost the protection of tribal laws. The problem here is that while it is possible to see how the structure of the traditional marriage contract (versus the postcolonial marriage contract) offered women a certain amount of control over their marital relations, only an analysis of the political significance of the actual practice that privileges an initiated girl over an uninitiated one, indicating a shift in female power relations as a result of this ceremony, can provide an accurate account of whether Bemba women were indeed protected by tribal laws at all times.

It is not possible, however, to talk about Bemba women as a homogeneous group within the traditional marriage structure. Bemba women before the initiation are constituted within a different set of social relations compared to Bemba women after the initiation. To treat them as a unified group characterized by the fact of their “exchange” between male kin is to deny the sociohistorical and cultural specificities of their existence and the differential value attached to their exchange before and after their initiation. It is to treat the initiation ceremony as a ritual with no political implications or effects. It is also to assume that in merely describing the structure of the marriage contract, the situation of women is exposed. Women as a group are positioned within a given structure, but no attempt is made to trace the effect of the marriage practice in constituting women within an obviously changing network of power relations. Thus women are assumed to be sexual-political subjects prior to entry into kinship structures.

WOMEN AND FAMILIAL SYSTEMS

Elizabeth Cowie (1978), in another context, points out the implications of this sort of analysis when she emphasizes the specifically political nature of
kinship structures that must be analyzed as ideological practices that designate men and women as father, husband, wife, mother, sister, and so on. Thus, Cowie suggests, women as women are not located within the family. Rather, it is in the family, as an effect of kinship structures, that women as women are constructed, defined within and by the group. Thus, for instance, when Juliette Minces (1980) cites the patriarchal family as the basis for “an almost identical vision of women” that Arab and Muslim societies have, she falls into this very trap (see esp. 23). Not only is it problematical to speak of a vision of women shared by Arab and Muslim societies (i.e., over twenty different countries) without addressing the particular historical, material, and ideological power structures that construct such images, but to speak of the patriarchal family or the tribal kinship structure as the origin of the socioeconomic status of women is to assume again that women are sexual-political subjects prior to their entry into the family. So while, on the one hand, women attain value or status within the family, the assumption of a singular patriarchal kinship system (common to all Arab and Muslim societies) is what apparently structures women as an oppressed group in these societies! This singular, coherent kinship system presumably influences another separate and given entity, “women.” Thus, all women, regardless of class and cultural differences, are affected by this system. Not only are all Arab and Muslim women seen to constitute a homogeneous oppressed group, but there is no discussion of the specific practices within the family that constitute women as mothers, wives, sisters, and so on. Arabs and Muslims, it appears, don't change at all. Their patriarchal family is carried over from the times of the prophet Muhammad. They exist, as it were, outside history.

WOMEN AND RELIGIOUS IDEOLOGIES

A further example of the use of “women” as a category of analysis is found in cross-cultural analyses that subscribe to a certain economic reductionism in describing the relationship between the economy and factors such as politics and ideology. Here, in reducing the level of comparison to the economic relations between “developed and developing” countries, any specificity to the question of women is denied. Mina Modares (1981), in a careful analysis of women and Shiism in Iran, focuses on this very problem when she criticizes feminist writings that treat Islam as an ideology separate from and outside social relations and practices, rather than as a discourse that includes rules for economic, social, and power relations within society. Patricia Jeffery's (1979)
otherwise informative work on Pirzada women in purdah considers Islamic ideology a partial explanation for the status of women in that it provides a justification for purdah. Here, Islamic ideology is reduced to a set of ideas whose internalization by Pirzada women contributes to the stability of the system. However, the primary explanation for purdah is located in the control that Pirzada men have over economic resources and the personal security purdah gives to Pirzada women.

By taking a specific version of Islam as the Islam, Jeffery attributes a singularity and coherence to it. Modares notes: “‘Islamic Theology’ then becomes imposed on a separate and given entity called ‘women.’ A further unification is reached: Women (meaning all women), regardless of their differing positions within societies, come to be affected or not affected by Islam. These conceptions provide the right ingredients for an unproblematic possibility of a cross-cultural study of women” (63).

Marnia Lazreg (1988) makes a similar argument when she addresses the reductionism inherent in scholarship on women in the Middle East and North Africa:

A ritual is established whereby the writer appeals to religion as the cause of gender inequality just as it is made the source of underdevelopment in much of modernization theory in an uncanny way, feminist discourse on women from the Middle East and North Africa mirrors that of theologians’ own interpretation of women in Islam. The overall effect of this paradigm is to deprive women of self-presence, of being. Because women are subsumed under religion presented in fundamental terms, they are inevitably seen as evolving in nonhistorical time. They virtually have no history. Any analysis of change is therefore foreclosed. (87)

While Jeffery’s analysis does not quite succumb to this kind of unitary notion of religion (Islam), it does collapse all ideological specificities into economic relations and universalizes on the basis of this comparison.

WOMEN AND THE DEVELOPMENT PROCESS

The best examples of universalization on the basis of economic reductionism can be found in the liberal literature about women in international development. Proponents of this school seek to examine the effect of development on Third World women, sometimes from self-designated feminist perspectives. At the very least, there is an evident interest in and commitment
to improving the lives of women in "developing" countries. Scholars such as Irene Tinker and Michelle Bo Bramsen (1972), Ester Boserup (1970), and Perdita Huston (1979) have all written about the effect of development policies on women in the Third World. All four women assume "development" is synonymous with "economic development" or "economic progress." As in the case of Minces's patriarchal family, Hosken's male sexual control, and Cutru­felli's Western colonization, development here becomes the all-time equal­izer. Women are affected positively or negatively by economic development policies, and this is the basis for cross-cultural comparison.

For instance, Huston (1979) states that the purpose of her study is to de­scribe the effect of the development process on the "family unit and its indi­vidual members" in Egypt, Kenya, Sudan, Tunisia, Sri Lanka, and Mexico. She states that the "problems" and "needs" expressed by rural and urban women in these countries all center around education and training, work and wages, access to health and other services, political participation, and legal rights (116). Huston relates all these "needs" to insensitive development policies that exclude women as a group or category. For her, the solution is simple: im­plement improved development policies that emphasize training for women field-workers; use women trainees and women rural development officers; encourage women's cooperatives; and so on (119–22). Here again, women are assumed to be a coherent group or category prior to their entry into "the devel­opment process." Huston assumes that all Third World women have similar problems and needs. Thus, they must have similar interests and goals. How­ever, the interests of urban, middle-class, educated Egyptian housewives, to take only one instance, could surely not be seen as being the same as those of their uneducated, poor maids. Development policies do not affect both groups of women in the same way. Practices that characterize women's status and roles vary according to class. Women are constituted as women through the complex interaction between class, culture, religion, and other ideolog­i­cal institutions and frameworks. They are not "women"—a coherent group—solely on the basis of a particular economic system or policy. Such reductive cross-cultural comparisons result in the colonization of the specifics of daily existence and the complexities of political interests that women of different social classes and cultures represent and mobilize.

It is revealing that for Huston, women in the Third World countries she writes about have "needs" and "problems" but few if any have "choices" or the freedom to act. This is an interesting representation of women in the Third
World, one that is significant in suggesting a latent self-presentation of Western women that bears looking at. She writes, "What surprised and moved me most as I listened to women in such very different cultural settings was the striking commonality—whether they were educated or illiterate, urban or rural—of their most basic values: the importance they assign to family, dignity, and service to others" (115). Would Huston consider such values unusual for women in the West?

What is problematical about this kind of use of "women" as a group, as a stable category of analysis, is that it assumes an ahistorical, universal unity between women based on a generalized notion of their subordination. Instead of analytically demonstrating the production of women as socioeconomic political groups within particular local contexts, this analytical move limits the definition of the female subject to gender identity, completely bypassing social class and ethnic identities. What characterizes women as a group is their gender (sociologically, not necessarily biologically, defined) over and above everything else, indicating a monolithic notion of sexual difference. Because women are thus constituted as a coherent group, sexual difference becomes coterminous with female subordination and power is automatically defined in binary terms: people who have it (read: men) and people who do not (read: women). Men exploit, women are exploited. Such simplistic formulations are historically reductive; they are also ineffectual in designing strategies to combat oppressions. All they do is reinforce binary divisions between men and women.

What would an analysis that did not do this look like? Maria Mies's work illustrates the strength of Western feminist work on women in the Third World that does not fall into the traps discussed above. Mies's study (1982) of the lace-makers of Narsapur, India, attempts to analyze carefully a substantial household industry in which "housewives" produce lace doilies for consumption in the world market. Through a detailed analysis of the structure of the lace industry, production and reproduction relations, the sexual division of labor, profits and exploitation, and the overall consequences of defining women as "nonworking housewives" and their work as "leisure-time activity," Mies demonstrates the levels of exploitation in this industry and the impact of this production system on the work and living conditions of the women involved in it. In addition, she is able to analyze the "ideology of the housewife," the notion of a woman sitting in the house, as providing the necessary subjective and sociocultural elements for the creation and mainte-
nance of a production system that contributes to the increasing pauperization of women and keeps them totally atomized and disorganized as workers. Mies’s analysis shows the effect of a certain historically and culturally specific mode of patriarchal organization, an organization constructed on the basis of the definition of the lace-makers as nonworking housewives at familial, local, regional, statewide, and international levels. The intricacies and the effects of particular power networks not only are emphasized but form the basis of Mies’s analysis of how this particular group of women is situated at the center of a hegemonic, exploitative world market.

Mies’s study is a good example of what careful, politically focused, local analyses can accomplish. It illustrates how the category of women is constructed in a variety of political contexts that often exist simultaneously and overlaid on top of one another. There is no easy generalization in the direction of “women in India” or “women in the Third World”; nor is there a reduction of the political construction of the exploitation of the lace-makers to cultural explanations about the passivity or obedience that might characterize these women and their situation. Finally, this mode of local, political analysis, which generates theoretical categories from within the situation and context being analyzed, also suggests corresponding effective strategies for organizing against the exploitation faced by the lace-makers. Narsapur women are not mere victims of the production process, because they resist, challenge, and subvert the process at various junctures. Here is one instance of how Mies delineates the connections between the housewife ideology, the self-consciousness of the lace-makers, and their interrelationships as contributing to the latent resistances she perceives among the women:

The persistence of the housewife ideology, the self-perception of the lace-makers as petty commodity producers rather than as workers, is not only upheld by the structure of the industry as such but also by the deliberate propagation and reinforcement of reactionary patriarchal norms and institutions. Thus, most of the lace-makers voiced the same opinion about the rules of purdah and seclusion in their communities which were also propagated by the lace exporters. In particular, the Kapu women said that they had never gone out of their houses, that women of their community could not do any other work than housework and lace work etc., but in spite of the fact that most of them still subscribed fully to the patriarchal norms of the gosha women, there were also contradictory elements in their con-
sciousness. Thus, although they looked down with contempt upon women who were able to work outside the house—like the untouchable Mala and Madiga women or women of other lower castes—they could not ignore the fact that these women were earning more money precisely because they were not respectable housewives but workers. At one discussion, they even admitted that it would be better if they could also go out and do coolie work. And when they were asked whether they would be ready to come out of their houses and work—in one place in some sort of a factory—they said they would do that. This shows that the purdah and housewife ideology, although still fully internalized, already had some cracks, because it has been confronted with several contradictory realities. (157)

It is only by understanding the contradictions inherent in women's location within various structures that effective political action and challenges can be devised. Mies's study goes a long way toward offering such analysis. While there are now an increasing number of Western feminist writings in this tradition, there is also, unfortunately, a large block of writing that succumbs to the cultural reductionism discussed earlier.

Methodological Universalisms; or, Women's Oppression As a Global Phenomenon

Western feminist writings on women in the Third World subscribe to a variety of methodologies to demonstrate the universal cross-cultural operation of male dominance and female exploitation. I summarize and critique three such methods below, moving from the simplest to the most complex.

First, proof of universalism is provided through the use of an arithmetic method. The argument goes like this: the greater the number of women who wear the veil, the more universal is the sexual segregation and control of women (Deardon 1975, 4–5). Similarly, a large number of different, fragmented examples from a variety of countries also apparently add up to a universal fact. For instance, Muslim women in Saudi Arabia, Iran, Pakistan, India, and Egypt all wear some sort of a veil. Hence, the argument goes, sexual control of women is a universal fact in those countries (Deardon 1975, 7, 10). Fran Hosken writes, “Rape, forced prostitution, polygamy, genital mutilation, pornography, the beating of girls and women, purdah (segregation of women) are all violations of basic human rights” (1981, 15). By equating purdah with
rape, domestic violence, and forced prostitution, Hosken asserts that purdah's "sexual control" function is the primary explanation for its existence, whatever the context. Institutions of purdah are thus denied any cultural and historical specificity and contradictions, and potentially subversive aspects are totally ruled out.

In both these examples, the problem is not in asserting that the practice of wearing a veil is widespread. This assertion can be made on the basis of numbers. It is a descriptive generalization. However, it is the analytic leap from the practice of veiling to an assertion of its general significance in controlling women that must be questioned. While there may be a physical similarity in the veils worn by women in Saudi Arabia and Iran, the specific meaning attached to this practice varies according to the cultural and ideological context. In addition, the symbolic space occupied by the practice of purdah may be similar in certain contexts, but this does not automatically indicate that the practices themselves have identical significance in the social realm. For example, as is well known, Iranian middle-class women veiled themselves during the 1979 revolution to indicate solidarity with their veiled, working-class sisters, while in contemporary Iran, mandatory Islamic laws dictate that all Iranian women wear veils. While in both these instances, similar reasons might be offered for the veil (opposition to the Shah and Western cultural colonization in the first case and the true Islamization of Iran in the second), the concrete meanings attached to Iranian women wearing the veil are clearly different in both historical contexts. In the first case, wearing the veil is both an oppositional and a revolutionary gesture on the part of Iranian middle-class women; in the second case, it is a coercive, institutional mandate (see Tabari 1980 for detailed discussion). It is on the basis of such context specific differentiated analysis that effective political strategies can be generated. To assume that the mere practice of veiling women in a number of Muslim countries indicates the universal oppression of women through sexual segregation not only is analytically reductive but also proves quite useless when it comes to the elaboration of oppositional political strategy.

Second, concepts such as reproduction, the sexual division of labor, the family, marriage, household, patriarchy, and so on are often used without their specification in local cultural and historical contexts. Feminists use these concepts in providing explanations for women's subordination, apparently assuming their universal applicability. For instance, how is it possible to refer to "the" sexual division of labor when the content of this division
changes radically from one environment to the next and from one historical juncture to another? At its most abstract level, it is the fact of the differential assignation of tasks according to sex that is significant; however, this is quite different from the meaning or value that the content of this sexual division of labor assumes in different contexts. In most cases the assigning of tasks on the basis of sex has an ideological origin. There is no question that a claim such as “Women are concentrated in service-oriented occupations in a large number of countries around the world” is descriptively valid. Descriptively, then, perhaps the existence of a similar sexual division of labor (where women work in service occupations such as nursing, social work, etc., and men in other kinds of occupations) in a variety of different countries can be asserted. However, the concept of the “sexual division of labor” is more than just a descriptive category. It indicates the differential value placed on men’s work versus women’s work.

Often the mere existence of a sexual division of labor is taken to be proof of the oppression of women in various societies. This results from a confusion between and collapsing together of the descriptive and explanatory potential of the concept of the sexual division of labor. Superficially similar situations may have radically different, historically specific explanations and cannot be treated as identical. For instance, the rise of female-headed households in middle-class America might be construed as a sign of great independence and feminist progress, the assumption being that this increase has to do with women choosing to be single parents, with an increasing number of lesbian mothers, and so on. However, the recent increase in female-headed households in Latin America, which might at first be seen as indicating that women are acquiring more decision-making power, is concentrated among the poorest strata, where life choices are the most constrained economically. A similar argument can be made for the rise of female-headed families among black and Chicana women in the United States. The positive correlation between this and the level of poverty among women of color and white working-class women in the United States has now even acquired a name: the feminization of poverty. Thus, while it is possible to state that there is a rise in female-headed households in the United States and in Latin America, this rise cannot be discussed as a universal indicator of women’s independence, nor can it be discussed as a universal indicator of women’s impoverishment. The meaning of and explanations for the rise obviously vary according to the sociohistorical context.
Similarly, the existence of a sexual division of labor in most contexts cannot be sufficient explanation for the universal subjugation of women in the workforce. That the sexual division of labor does indicate a devaluation of women’s work must be shown through analysis of particular local contexts. In addition, devaluation of women must also be shown through careful analysis. In other words, the “sexual division of labor” and “women” are not commensurate analytical categories. Concepts such as the sexual division of labor can be useful only if they are generated through local, contextual analyses (see Eldhom, Harris, and Young 1977). If such concepts are assumed to be universally applicable, the resultant homogenization of class, race, religion, and daily material practices of women in the Third World can create a false sense of the commonality of oppressions, interests, and struggles between and among women globally. Beyond sisterhood there are still racism, colonialism, and imperialism.

Finally, some writers confuse the use of gender as a superordinate category of analysis with the universalistic proof and instantiation of this category. In other words, empirical studies of gender differences are confused with the analytical organization of cross-cultural work. Beverly Brown’s (1983) review of the book Nature, Culture and Gender (Strathern and McCormack 1980) best illustrates this point. Brown suggests that nature:culture and female:male are superordinate categories that organize and locate lesser categories (such as wild:domestic and biology:technology) within their logic. These categories are universal in the sense that they organize the universe of a system of representations. This relation is totally independent of the universal substantiation of any particular category. Brown’s critique hinges on the fact that rather than clarify the generalizability of nature:culture :: female:male as superordinate organization categories, Nature, Culture and Gender construes the universality of this equation to lie at the level of empirical truth, which can be investigated through fieldwork. Thus, the usefulness of the nature:culture :: female:male paradigm as a universal mode of the organization of representation within any particular sociohistorical system is lost. Here, methodological universalism is assumed on the basis of the reduction of the nature:culture :: female:male analytic categories to a demand for empirical proof of its existence in different cultures. Discourses of representation are confused with material realities, and the distinction made earlier between “Woman” and “women” is lost. Feminist work that blurs this distinction (which is, interestingly enough, often present in certain Western feminists’ self-representation)
eventually ends up constructing monolithic images of "Third World women" by ignoring the complex and mobile relationships between their historical materiality on the level of specific oppressions and political choices, on the one hand, and their general discursive representations, on the other.

To summarize: I have discussed three methodological moves identifiable in feminist (and other academic) cross-cultural work that seeks to uncover a universality in women’s subordinate position in society. The next and final section pulls together the previous ones, attempting to outline the political effects of the analytical strategies in the context of Western feminist writing on women in the Third World. These arguments are not against generalization as much as they are for careful, historically specific generalizations responsive to complex realities. Nor do these arguments deny the necessity of forming strategic political identities and affinities. Thus, while Indian women of different religions, castes, and classes might forge a political unity on the basis of organizing against police brutality toward women (see Kishwar and Vanita 1984), any analysis of police brutality must be contextual. Strategic coalitions that construct oppositional political identities for themselves are based on generalization and provisional unities, but the analysis of these group identities cannot be based on universalistic, ahistorical categories.

The Subject(s) of Power

This section returns to my earlier discussion of the inherently political nature of feminist scholarship and attempts to clarify my point about the possibility of detecting a colonialist move in the case of a hegemonic connection between the First and Third Worlds in scholarship. The nine texts in Zed Press’s Women in the Third World series that I have discussed12 focused on the following common areas in examining women’s “status” within various societies: religion, family/kinship structures, the legal system, the sexual division of labor, education, and, finally, political resistance. A large number of Western feminist writings on women in the Third World focus on these themes. Of course the Zed texts have varying emphases. For instance, two of the studies, We Shall Return: Women of Palestine (Bendt and Downing 1982) and We Will Smash This Prison: Indian Women in Struggle (Omvedt 1980), focus explicitly on female militancy and political involvement, while The House of Obedience: Women in Arab Society (Minces 1980) deals with Arab women’s legal, religious, and familial status. In addition, each text evidences a variety of methodologies and de-
degrees of care in making generalizations. Interestingly enough, however, almost all the texts assume "women" as a category of analysis in the manner designated above.

Clearly this is an analytical strategy that is neither limited to these Zed Press publications nor symptomatic of Zed Press publications in general. However, each of the texts in question assumes that "women" have a coherent group identity within the different cultures discussed, prior to their entry into social relations. Thus Gail Omvedt can talk about "Indian women" while referring to a particular group of women in the state of Maharashtra; Cutrufelli can discuss "women of Africa," and Minces can talk about "Arab women" — all as if these groups of women have some sort of obvious cultural coherence, distinct from men in these societies. The "status" or "position" of women is assumed to be self-evident because women as an already constituted group are placed within religious, economic, familial, and legal structures. However, this focus whereby women are seen as a coherent group across contexts, regardless of class or ethnicity, structures the world in ultimately binary, dichotomous terms, wherein women are always seen in opposition to men, patriarchy is always necessarily male dominance, and the religious, legal, economic, and familial systems are implicitly assumed to be constructed by men. Thus, both men and women are always apparently constituted whole populations, and relations of dominance and exploitation are also posited in terms of whole peoples — wholes coming into exploitative relations. It is only when men and women are seen as different categories or groups possessing different already constituted categories of experience, cognition, and interests as groups that such a simplistic dichotomy is possible.

What does this imply about the structure and functioning of power relations? The setting up of the commonality of Third World women's struggles across classes and cultures against a general notion of oppression (rooted primarily in the group in power — i.e., men) necessitates the assumption of what Michel Foucault (1980, 135–45) calls the "juridico-discursive" model of power, the principal features of which are "a negative relation" (limit and lack), an "insistence on the rule" (which forms a binary system), a "cycle of prohibition," the "logic of censorship," and a "uniformity" of the apparatus functioning at different levels. Feminist discourse on the Third World that assumes a homogeneous category — or group — called women necessarily operates through the setting up of originary power divisions. Power relations are structured in terms of a unilateral and undifferentiated source of power and a
cumulative reaction to power. Opposition is a generalized phenomenon created as a response to power—which, in turn, is possessed by certain groups of people.

The major problem with such a definition of power is that it locks all revolutionary struggles into binary structures—possessing power versus being powerless. Women are powerless, unified groups. If the struggle for a just society is seen in terms of the move from powerlessness to power for women as a group, and this is the implication in feminist discourse that structures sexual difference in terms of the division between the sexes, then the new society would be structurally identical to the existing organization of power relations, constituting itself as a simple inversion of what exists. If relations of domination and exploitation are defined in terms of binary divisions—groups that dominate and groups that are dominated—then surely the implication is that the accession to power of women as a group is sufficient to dismantle the existing organization of relations. But women as a group are not in some sense essentially superior or infallible. The crux of the problem lies in that initial assumption of women as a homogeneous group or category (“the oppressed”), a familiar assumption in Western radical and liberal feminisms.¹³

What happens when this assumption of “women as an oppressed group” is situated in the context of Western feminist writing about Third World women? It is here that I locate the colonialist move. By contrasting the representation of women in the Third World with what I referred to earlier as Western feminisms’ self-presentation in the same context, we see how Western feminists alone become the true “subjects” of this counterhistory. Third World women, in contrast, never rise above the debilitating generality of their “object” status.

While radical and liberal feminist assumptions of women as a sex class might elucidate (however inadequately) the autonomy of particular women's struggles in the West, the application of the notion of women as a homogeneous category to women in the Third World colonizes and appropriates the pluralities of the simultaneous location of different groups of women in social class and ethnic frameworks; in doing so it ultimately robs them of their historical and political agency. Similarly, many Zed Press authors who ground themselves in the basic analytic strategies of traditional Marxism also implicitly create a “unity” of women by substituting “women’s activity” for “labor” as the primary theoretical determinant of women’s situation. Here
again, women are constituted as a coherent group not on the basis of “natural” qualities or needs but on the basis of the sociological “unity” of their role in domestic production and wage labor (see Haraway 1985, esp. 76). In other words, Western feminist discourse, by assuming women as a coherent, already constituted group that is placed in kinship, legal, and other structures, defines Third World women as subjects outside social relations, instead of looking at the way women are constituted through these very structures.

Legal, economic, religious, and familial structures are treated as phenomena to be judged by Western standards. It is here that ethnocentric universality comes into play. When these structures are defined as “underdeveloped” or “developing” and women are placed within them, an implicit image of the “average Third World woman” is produced. This is the transformation of the (implicitly Western) “oppressed woman” into the “oppressed Third World woman.” While the category of “oppressed woman” is generated through an exclusive focus on gender difference, “the oppressed Third World woman” category has an additional attribute — the “Third World difference.” The Third World difference includes a paternalistic attitude toward women in the Third World. Since discussions of the various themes I identified earlier (kinship, education, religion, etc.) are conducted in the context of the relative “underdevelopment” of the Third World (a move that constitutes nothing less than unjustifiably confusing development with the separate path taken by the West in its development, as well as ignoring the directionality of the power relationship between the First and Third Worlds), Third World women as a group or category are automatically and necessarily defined as religious (read: not progressive), family-oriented (read: traditional), legally unsophisticated (read: they are still not conscious of their lights), illiterate (read: ignorant), domestic (read: backward), and sometimes revolutionary (read: their country is in a state of war; they must fight!). This is how the “Third World difference” is produced.

When the category of “sexually oppressed women” is located within particular systems in the Third World that are defined on a scale that is normed through Eurocentric assumptions, not only are Third World women defined in a particular way prior to their entry into social relations, but, since no connections are made between First and Third World power shifts, the assumption is reinforced that the Third World just has not evolved to the extent that the West has. This mode of feminist analysis, by homogenizing and systematizing the experiences of different groups of women in these countries, erases all mar-
ginal and resistant modes and experiences. It is significant that none of the texts I reviewed in the Zed Press series focuses on lesbian politics or the politics of ethnic and religious marginal organizations in Third World women's groups. Resistance can thus be defined only as cumulatively reactive, not as something inherent in the operation of power. If power, as Michel Foucault has argued, can be understood only in the context of resistance, this mis-conceptualization is both analytically and strategically problematical. It limits theoretical analysis as well as reinforces Western cultural imperialism. For in the context of a First/Third World balance of power, feminist analyses that perpetrate and sustain the hegemony of the idea of the superiority of the West produce a corresponding set of universal images of the Third World woman, images such as the veiled woman, the powerful mother, the chaste virgin, the obedient wife, and so on. These images exist in universal, ahistorical splendor, setting in motion a colonialist discourse that exercises a very specific power in defining, coding, and maintaining existing First/Third World connections.

To conclude, let me suggest some disconcerting similarities between the typically authorizing signature of such Western feminist writings on women in the Third World and the authorizing signature of the project of humanism in general—humanism as a Western ideological and political project that involves the necessary recuperation of the “East” and “Woman” as others. Many contemporary thinkers, including Michel Foucault (1978, 1980), Jacques Derrida (1974), Julia Kristeva (1980), Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari (1977), and Edward Said (1978), have written at length about the underlying anthropomorphism and ethnocentrism that constitute a hegemonic humanistic problematic that repeatedly confirms and legitimates (Western) man’s centrality. Feminist theorists such as Luce Irigaray (1981), Sarah Kofman (see Berg 1982), and Helene Cixous (1981) have also written about the recuperation and absence of woman/women within Western humanism. The focus of the work of all these thinkers can be stated simply as an uncovering of the political interests that underlie the binary logic of humanistic discourse and ideology, whereby, as a valuable essay puts it, “the first (majority) term (Identity, Universality, Culture, Disinterestedness, Truth, Sanity, Justice, etc.), which is, in fact, secondary and derivative (a construction), is privileged over and colonizes the second (minority) term (difference, temporality, anarchy, error, interestedness, insanity, deviance, etc.), which is, in fact, primary and originative” (Spanos 1984). In other words, it is only insofar as “woman/women” and “the East” are defined as others, or as peripheral, that (Western) man/humanism
can represent him/itself as the center. It is not the center that determines the periphery, but the periphery that, in its boundedness, determines the center. Just as feminists such as Kristeva and Cixous deconstruct the latent anthropomorphism in Western discourse, I have suggested a parallel strategy in this in uncovering a latent ethnocentrism in particular feminist writings on women in the Third World.17

As discussed earlier, a comparison between Western feminist self-presentation and Western feminist representation of women in the Third World yields significant results. Universal images of the Third World woman (the veiled woman, chaste virgin, etc.), images constructed from adding the “Third World difference” to “sexual difference,” are predicated upon (and hence obviously bring into sharper focus) assumptions about Western women as secular, liberated, and having control over their own lives. This is not to suggest that Western women are secular, liberated, and in control of their own lives. I am referring to a discursive self-presentation, not necessarily to material reality. If this were material reality, there would be no need for political movements in the West. Similarly, only from the vantage point of the West is it possible to define the Third World as underdeveloped and economically dependent. Without the overdetermined discourse that creates the Third World, there would be no (singular and privileged) First World. Without the “Third World woman,” the particular self-presentation of Western women mentioned above would be problematical. I am suggesting, then, that the one enables and sustains the other. This is not to say that the signature of Western feminist writings on the Third World has the same authority as the project of Western humanism. However, in the context of the hegemony of the Western scholarly establishment in the production and dissemination of texts, and in the context of the legitimating imperative of humanistic and scientific discourse, the definition of “the Third World woman” as a monolith might well tie into the larger economic and ideological praxis of “disinterested” scientific inquiry and pluralism that are the surface manifestations of a latent economic and cultural colonization of the “non-Western” world. It is time to move beyond the Marx who found it possible to say: they cannot represent themselves; they must be represented.

42 

Feminism without Borders
The US and the USSR are the most powerful countries in the world but only 1/8 of the world's population. African people are also 1/8 of the world's population. Of that, 1/4 is Nigerian. 1/2 of the world's population is Asian. 1/2 of that is Chinese. There are 22 nations in the middle east. Most people in the world are Yellow, Black, Brown, Poor, Female, Non-Christian and do not speak English. By the year 2000 the 20 largest cities in the world will have one thing in common none of them will be in Europe none in the United States.

— Audre Lorde, January 1, 1989

I begin this essay with Audre Lorde's words as a tribute to her courage in consistently engaging the very institutional power structures that define and circumscribe the lives of Third World women. The poem also has deep personal significance for me: Lorde read it as part of her commencement remarks at Oberlin College, where I used to teach, in May 1989. Her words provide a poetic cartography of the historical and political location of Third World peoples and document the urgency of our predicament in a Eurocentric world. Lorde's language suggests with a precise force and poignancy the contours of the world we occupy now: a world that is definable only in relational terms, a world traversed with intersecting lines of power and resistance, a world that
can be understood only in terms of its destructive divisions of gender, color, class, sexuality, and nation, a world that must be transformed through a necessary process of “pivoting the center” (to use Bettina Aptheker’s words), for the assumed center (Europe and the United States) will no longer hold. But it is also a world with powerful histories of resistance and revolution in daily life and as organized liberation movements. And it is these contours that define the complex ground for the emergence and consolidation of Third World women’s feminist politics. (I use the term “Third World” to designate geographical location and sociohistorical conjunctures. It thus incorporates so-called minority peoples or people of color in the United States.)

In fact, one of the distinctive features of contemporary societies is the internationalization of economies and labor forces. In industrial societies, the international division of economic production consisted in the geographical separation of raw material extraction (in primarily the Third World) from factory production (in the colonial capitals). With the rise of transnational corporations that dominate and organize the contemporary economic system, however, factories have migrated in search of cheap labor, and the nation-state is no longer an appropriate socioeconomic unit for analysis. In addition, the massive migration of excolonial populations to the industrial metropolises of Europe to fill the need for cheap labor has created new kinds of multi-ethnic and multiracial social formations similar to those in the United States. Contemporary postindustrial societies, thus, invite cross-national and cross-cultural analyses for explanation of their own internal features and socioeconomic constitution. Moreover, contemporary definitions of the Third World can no longer have the same geographical contours and boundaries they had for industrial societies. In the postindustrial world, systemic socioeconomic and ideological processes position the peoples of Africa, Asia, Latin America, and the Middle East, as well as “minority” populations (people of color) in the United States and Europe, in similar relationships to the state.

Thus, charting the ground for an analysis of Third World women and the politics of feminism is no easy task. First, there are the questions of definition: Who/what is the Third World? Do Third World women make up any kind of a constituency? On what basis? Can we assume that Third World women’s political struggles are necessarily “feminist”? How do we/they define feminism? And second, there are the questions about context: Which/whose history do we draw on to chart this map of Third World women’s engagement with feminism? How do questions of gender, race, and nation intersect in determining
feminisms in the Third World? Who produces knowledge about colonized peoples and from what space/location? What are the politics of the production of this particular knowledge? What are the disciplinary parameters of this knowledge? What are the methods used to locate and chart Third World women’s self and agency? Clearly, questions of definition and context overlap; in fact, as we develop more complex, nuanced modes of asking questions and as scholarship in a number of relevant fields begins to address histories of colonialism, capitalism, race, and gender as inextricably interrelated, our very conceptual maps are redrawn and transformed. How we conceive of definitions and contexts, on what basis we foreground certain contexts over others, and how we understand the ongoing shifts in our conceptual cartographies—these are all questions of great importance in this particular cartography of Third World feminisms.

I write this cartography from my own particular political, historical, and intellectual location, as a Third World feminist trained in the United States, interested in questions of culture, knowledge production, and activism in an international context. The maps I draw are necessarily anchored in my own discontinuous locations. In this chapter, then, I attempt to formulate an initial and necessarily noncomprehensive response to the above questions. Thus this chapter offers a very partial conceptual map: it touches upon certain contexts and foregrounds particular definitions and strategies. I see this as a map that will of necessity have to be redrawn as our analytic and conceptual skills and knowledge develop and transform the way we understand questions of history, consciousness, and agency. This chapter will also suggest significant questions and directions for feminist analysis—an analysis that is made possible by the precise challenges posed by “race” and postcolonial studies to the second wave of white Western feminisms, and by feminist anticapitalist critique to economic globalization and neoliberalism. I believe that these challenges suggest new questions for feminist historiography and epistemology, as well as point toward necessary reconceptualizations of ideas of resistance, community, and agency in daily life.

Definitions: Third World Women and Feminism

Unlike the history of Western (white, middle-class) feminisms, which has been explored in great detail over the last few decades, histories of Third World women’s engagement with feminism are in short supply. There is a
large body of work on "women in developing countries," but this does not necessarily engage feminist questions. A substantial amount of scholarship has accumulated on women in liberation movements, or on the role and status of women in individual cultures. However, this scholarship also does not necessarily engage questions of feminist historiography. Constructing such histories often requires reading against the grain of a number of intersecting progressive discourses (e.g., white feminist, Third World nationalist, and socialist), as well as the politically regressive racist, imperialist, sexist discourses of slavery, colonialism, and contemporary capitalism. The very notion of addressing what are often internally conflictual histories of Third World women's feminisms under a single rubric, in one chapter, may seem ludicrous—especially since the very meaning of the term "feminism" is continually contested. For, it can be argued, there are no simple ways of representing these diverse struggles and histories. Just as it is difficult to speak of a singular entity called "Western feminism," it is difficult to generalize about "Third World feminisms." But in much of my scholarship, I have chosen to foreground "Third World women" as an analytical and political category; thus I want to recognize and analytically explore the links among the histories and struggles of Third World women against racism, sexism, colonialism, imperialism, and monopoly capital. I am suggesting, then, an "imagined community" of Third World oppositional struggles—"imagined" not because it is not "real" but because it suggests potential alliances and collaborations across divisive boundaries, and "community" because in spite of internal hierarchies within Third World contexts, it nevertheless suggests a significant, deep commitment to what Benedict Anderson, in referring to the idea of the nation, calls "horizontal comradeship." 2

The idea of imagined community is useful because it leads us away from essentialist notions of Third World feminist struggles, suggesting political rather than biological or cultural bases for alliance. It is not color or sex that constructs the ground for these struggles. Rather, it is the way we think about race, class, and gender—the political links we choose to make among and between struggles. Thus, potentially, women of all colors (including white women) can align themselves with and participate in these imagined communities. However, clearly our relation to and centrality in particular struggles depend on our different, often conflictual, locations and histories. This, then, is what indelibly marks this discussion of Third World women and the politics of feminism together: imagined communities of women with divergent
histories and social locations, woven together by the political threads of opposition to forms of domination that are not only pervasive but also systemic. An example of a similar construct is the notion of "communities of resistance," which refers to the broad-based opposition of refugee, migrant, and black groups in Britain to the idea of a common nation: Europe 1992 (now the European Union). "Communities of resistance," like "imagined communities," is a political definition, not an essentialist one. It is not based on any ahistorical notion of the inherent resistance and resilience of Third World peoples. It is, however, based on a historical, material analysis of the concrete disenfranchising effects of Europe 1992 on Third World communities in Britain and the necessity of forming "resistant/oppositional" communities that fight this. However, while such imagined communities are historically and geographically concrete, their boundaries are necessarily fluid. They have to be, since the operation of power is always fluid and changing. Thus I do not posit any homogeneous configuration of Third World women who form communities because they share a "gender" or a "race" or a "nation." As history (and recent feminist scholarship) teaches us, "races" and "nations" haven't been defined on the basis of inherent, natural characteristics; nor can we define "gender" in any transhistorical, unitary way. So where does this leave us?

Geographically, the nation-states of Latin America, the Caribbean, sub-Saharan Africa, South and Southeast Asia, China, South Africa, and Oceania constitute the parameters of the non-European Third World. In addition, black, Latino, Asian, and indigenous peoples in the United States, Europe, and Australia, some of whom have historic links with the geographically defined Third World, also refer to themselves as Third World peoples. With such a broad canvas, racial, sexual, national, economic, and cultural borders are difficult to demarcate, shaped politically as they are in individual and collective practice.

Third World Women as Social Category

As I argue in chapter 1, scholars often locate "Third World women" in terms of the underdevelopment, oppressive traditions, high illiteracy, rural and urban poverty, religious fanaticism, and "overpopulation" of particular Asian, African, Middle Eastern, and Latin American countries. Corresponding analyses of "matriarchal" black women on welfare, "illiterate" Chicana
farmworkers, and "docile" Asian domestic workers also abound in the context of the United States. Besides being normed on a white, Western (read: progressive/modern) or non-Western (read: backward/traditional) hierarchy, these analyses freeze Third World women in time, space, and history. For example, in analyzing indicators of Third World women's status and roles, Momsen and Townsend (1987) designate the following categories of analysis: life expectancy, sex ratio, nutrition, fertility, income-generating activities, education, and the new international division of labor. Of these, fertility issues and Third World women's incorporation into multinational factory employment are identified as two of the most significant aspects of "women's worlds" in Third World countries.

While such descriptive information is useful and necessary, these presumably "objective" indicators by no means exhaust the meaning of women's day-to-day lives. The everyday, fluid, fundamentally historical and dynamic nature of the lives of Third World women is here collapsed into a few frozen "indicators" of their well-being. Momsen and Townsend (1987) state that in fact fertility is the most studied aspect of women's lives in the Third World (36). This particular fact speaks volumes about the predominant representations of Third World women in social-scientific knowledge production. And our representations of Third World women circumscribe our understanding and analysis of feminism as well as of the daily struggles women engage in these circumstances.

For instance, compare the analysis of fertility offered by Momsen and Townsend (as a social indicator of women's status) with the analysis of population policy and discussions on sexuality among poor Brazilian women offered by Barroso and Bruschini (1991). By analyzing the politics of family planning in the context of the Brazilian women's movement, and examining the way poor women build collective knowledge about sex education and sexuality, Barroso and Bruschini link state policy and social movements with the politics of everyday life, thus presenting us with a dynamic, historically specific view of the struggles of Brazilian women in the barrios. I address some of these methodological questions in more detail later on. For the present, however, suffice it to say that our definitions, descriptions, and interpretations of Third World women's engagement with feminism must necessarily be simultaneously historically specific and dynamic, not frozen in time in the form of a spectacle.

Thus if the above "social indicators" are inadequate descriptions/inter-
pretations of women's lives, on what basis do Third World women form any constituency? First, just as Western women or white women cannot be defined as coherent interest groups, Third World women also do not constitute any automatic unitary group. Alliances and divisions of class, religion, sexuality, and history, for instance, are necessarily internal to each of the above groups. Second, ideological differences in understandings of the social mediate any assumption of a natural bond between women. After all, there is no logical and necessary connection between being female and becoming feminist. Finally, defining Third World women in terms of their “problems” or their “achievements” in relation to an imagined free white liberal democracy effectively removes them (and the liberal democracy) from history, freezing them in time and space.

A number of scholars in the United States have written about the inherently political definition of the term “women of color” (a term often used interchangeably with “Third World women,” as I am doing here). This term designates a political constituency, not a biological or even sociological one. It is a sociopolitical designation for people of African, Caribbean, Asian, and Latin American descent, and native peoples of the United States. It also refers to “new immigrants” to the United States in the last three decades: Arab, Korean, Thai, Laotian, and so on. What seems to constitute “women of color” or “Third World women” as a viable oppositional alliance is a common context of struggle rather than color or racial identifications. Similarly, it is Third World women's oppositional political relation to sexist, racist, and imperialist structures that constitutes our potential commonality. Thus it is the common context of struggles against specific exploitative structures and systems that determines our potential political alliances. It is this common context of struggle, both historical and contemporary, that the next section charts and defines.

Why Feminism?

Before proceeding to consider the structural, historical parameters that lead to Third World women's particular politics, we should understand how women in different sociocultural and historical locations formulate their relation to feminism. The term “feminism” is itself questioned by many Third World women. Feminist movements have been challenged on the grounds of cultural imperialism and of shortsightedness in defining the meaning of
gender in terms of middle-class, white experiences, internal racism, class-
ism, and homophobia. All of these factors, as well as the falsely homogeneous 
representation of the movement by the media, have led to a very real suspi-
cion of “feminism” as a productive ground for struggle. Nevertheless, Third 
World women have always engaged with feminism, even if the label has been 
rejected in a number of instances. In the introduction to a collection of writ-
ings by black and Third World women in Britain (Charting the Journey, 1988), 
the editors are careful to focus on the contradictions, conflicts, and differ-
ences among black women, while emphasizing that the starting point for all 
contributors has been “the historical link between us of colonialism and im-
perialism” (Grewal et al. 1988, 6). The editors maintain that this book, the 
first publication of its kind, is about the “idea of Blackness” in contemporary 
Britain:

An idea as yet unmatured and inadequately defined, but proceeding along 
its path in both “real” social life and in the collective awareness of many of 
its subjects. Both as an idea and a process it is, inevitably, contradictory. 
Contradictory in its conceptualization because its linguistic expression is 
defined in terms of colour, yet it is an idea transcendent of colour. Contra-
dictory in its material movements because the unity of action, conscious 
or otherwise, of Asians, Latin Americans and Arabs, Caribbeans and Afri-
cans, gives political expression to a common “colour,” even as the State-
created fissures of ethnicity threaten to engulf and overwhelm us in islands 
of cultural exclusivity. (1)

This definition of the idea of “Blackness” in Britain, and of “the unity of 
action” as the basis for black and Third World women’s engagement with 
feminist politics, echoes the idea of a common context of struggle. British 
colonialism and the migration of colonized populations to the “home coun-
try” form the common historical context for British Third World women, 
as do, for instance, contemporary struggles against racist immigration and 
naturalization laws.6

The text that corresponds to Charting the Journey in the U.S. context was 
published a few years earlier, in 1981: This Bridge Called My Back: Writings by Rad-
cial Women of Color.7 In the introduction to this groundbreaking book, Cherrie 
Moraga and Gloria Anzaldúa delineate the major areas of concern for a broad-
based political movement of U.S. Third World women:

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- how visibility/invisibility as women of color forms our radicalism;
- the ways in which Third World women derive a feminist political theory specifically from our racial/cultural background and experience;
- the destructive and demoralizing effects of racism in the women’s movement;
- the cultural, class, and sexuality differences that divide women of color;
- Third World women’s writing as a tool for self-preservation and revolution; and
- the ways and means of a Third World feminist future. (Moraga and Anzaldúa 1983, xxiv)

A number of ideas central to Third World feminisms emerge from these two passages. Aida Hurtado (1989) adds a further layer: in discussing the significance of the idea “the personal is political” to communities of white women and women of color in the United States, she distinguishes between the relevance of the public/private distinction for American white middle- and upper-class women, and working-class women and women of color who have always been subject to state intervention in their domestic lives:

Women of Color have not had the benefit of the economic conditions that underlie the public/private distinction. Instead the political consciousness of women of Color stems from an awareness that the public is personally political. Welfare programs and policies have discouraged family life, sterilization programs have restricted reproduction rights, government has drafted and armed disproportionate numbers of people of Color to fight its wars overseas, and locally, police forces and the criminal justice system arrest and incarcerate disproportionate numbers of people of Color. There is no such thing as a private sphere for people of Color except that which they manage to create and protect in an otherwise hostile environment. (Hurtado 1989, 849)

Hurtado introduces the contemporary liberal, capitalist state as a major actor and focus of activity for women of color in the United States. Her discussion suggests that in fact, the politics of “personal life” may be differently defined for middle-class whites and for people of color. Finally, Kumari Jayawardena, writing about feminist movements in Asia in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, defines feminism as “emerging movements for equality within the current system and significant struggles that have at-
tempted to change the system” (Jayawardena 1986, 2). She goes on to assert that these movements arose in the context of the formulation and consolidation of national identities that mobilized anti-imperialist movements during independence struggles and the remaking of precapitalist religious and feudal structures in attempts to “modernize” Third World societies. Here again, the common link between political struggles of women in India, Indonesia, and Korea, for instance, is the fight against racist, colonialist states and for national independence.

To sum up, Third World women's writings on feminism have consistently focused on the idea of the simultaneity of oppressions as fundamental to the experience of social and political marginality and the grounding of feminist politics in the histories of racism and imperialism; the crucial role of a hegemonic state in circumscribing their/our daily lives and survival struggles; the significance of memory and writing in the creation of oppositional agency; and the differences, conflicts, and contradictions internal to Third World women's organizations and communities. In addition, they have insisted on the complex interrelationships between feminist, antiracist, and nationalist struggles. In fact, the challenge of Third World feminisms to white, Western feminisms has been precisely this inescapable link between feminist and political liberation movements. In fact, black, white, and other Third World women have very different histories with respect to the particular inheritance of post-fifteenth-century Euro-American hegemony: the inheritance of slavery, enforced migration, plantation and indentured labor, colonialism, imperial conquest, and genocide. Thus, Third World feminists have argued for the rewriting of history based on the specific locations and histories of struggle of people of color and postcolonial peoples, and on the day-to-day strategies of survival utilized by such peoples.

The urgency of rewriting and rethinking these histories and struggles is suggested by A. Sivanandan in his searing critique of the identity politics of the 1980s social movements in Britain, which, he argues, leads to a flight from class:

For [the poor, the black, the unemployed] the distinction between the mailed fist and the velvet glove is a stylistic abstraction, the defining limit between consent and force a middle-class fabrication. Black youth in the inner cities know only the blunt force of the state, those on income support have it translated for them in a thousand not so subtle ways. If we are to

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extend the freedoms in civil society through a politics of hegemony, those who stand at the intersection of consent and coercion should surely be our first constituency and guide—a yardstick to measure our politics by. How do you extend a “politics of food” to the hungry, a “politics of the body” to the homeless, a “politics of the family” for those without an income? How do any of these politics connect up with the Third World? . . . Class cannot just be a matter of identity, it has to be the focus of commitment. (Sivanandan 1990, 18–19)

In foregrounding the need to build our politics around the struggles of the most exploited peoples of the world, and in drawing attention to the importance of a materialist definition of class in opposition to identity based social movements and discourses, Sivanandan underscores both the significance and the difficulty of rewriting counterhegemonic histories. His analysis questions the contemporary identity-based philosophy of social movements that define “discourse” as an adequate terrain of struggle. While discursive categories are clearly central sites of political contestation, they must be grounded in and informed by the material politics of everyday life, especially the daily life struggles for survival of poor people—those written out of history.

But how do we attempt such a history based on our limited knowledges? After all, it is primarily in the last two or three decades that Third World historians have begun to reexamine and rewrite the history of slavery and colonialism from oppositional locations. The next section sketches preliminary contexts for feminist analysis within the framework of the intersecting histories of race, colonialism, and capitalism. It offers methodological suggestions for feminist analysis, without attempting definitive answers or even a comprehensive accounting of the emergence of Third World women’s struggles. It also addresses, very briefly, issues of experience, identity, and agency, focusing especially on the significance of writing for Third World feminists—the significance of producing knowledge for ourselves.

History, the State, and Relations of Rule

Do Third World feminisms share a history? Surely the rise of the post-independence women’s movement in India is historically different from the emerging feminist politics in the United Kingdom or the United States. The major analytic difference in the writings on the emergence of white, Western,
middle-class liberal feminism and the feminist politics of women of color in the United States is the contrast between a singular focus on gender as a basis for sexual rights and a focus on gender in relation to race and/or class as part of a broader liberation struggle. Often the singular focus of the former takes the form of definitions of femininity and sexuality in relation to men (specifically white privileged men). Hurtado's (1989) analysis of the effects of the different relationships of white middle- and upper-class women and working-class women and women of color to privileged white men is relevant here in understanding the conditions of possibility of this singular focus on gender. Hurtado argues that it is the (familial) closeness of white (heterosexual) women to white men and the corresponding social distance of women of color from white men that lead to the particular historical focus of white women's feminist movements. Since the relationships of women of color to white men are usually mediated by state institutions, they can never define feminist politics without accounting for this mediation. For example, in the arena of reproductive rights, because of the race- and class-based history of population control and sterilization abuse, women of color have a clearly ambivalent relation to the abortion rights platform. For poor women of color, the notion of a “woman's right to choose” to bear children has always been mediated by a coercive, racist state. Thus, abortion rights defined as a woman's right versus men's familial control can never be the only basis of feminist coalitions across race and class lines. For many women of color, reproductive rights conceived in its broadest form, in terms of familial male/female relationships, but also, more significantly, in terms of institutional relationships and state policies, must be the basis for such coalitions. Thus, in this instance, gender defined as male/female domestic relations cannot be a singular focus for feminists of color. However, while Hurtado's suggestion may explain partially the exclusive focus on gender relationships in (heterosexual) white women's movements, this still does not mean that this unitary conceptualization of gender is an adequate ground for struggle for white middle- and upper-class feminists.

In fact, in terms of context, the history of white feminism is not very different from the history of the feminisms of Third World women: all of these varied histories emerge in relation to other struggles. Rich, layered histories of the second wave of white feminism in the United States incorporate its origins in the civil rights and new left movements. However, often in discussing such origins, feminist historians focus on “gender” as the sole basis of
struggle (the feminist part) and omit any discussion of the racial consolidation of the struggle (the white part). The best histories and analyses of the second wave of U.S. white feminism address the construction of whiteness in relation to the construction of a politicized gender consciousness. Thus, it is not just Third World women who are or should be concerned about race, just as feminism is not just the purview of women (but of women and men).

Above all, gender and race are relational terms: they foreground a relationship (and often a hierarchy) between races and genders. To define feminism purely in gendered terms assumes that our consciousness of being “women” has nothing to do with class, race, class, nation, or sexuality, just with gender. But no one “becomes a woman” (in Simone de Beauvoir’s sense) purely because she is female. Ideologies of womanhood have as much to do with class and race as they have to do with sex. Thus, during the period of American slavery, constructions of white womanhood as chaste, domesticated, and morally pure had everything to do with corresponding constructions of black slave women as promiscuous, available plantation workers. It is the intersections of the various systemic networks of class, race, (hetero)sexuality, and nation, then, that position us as “women.” Herein lies a fundamental challenge for feminist analysis once it takes seriously the location and struggles of Third World women, and this challenge has implications for the rewriting of all hegemonic history, not just the history of people of color.

The notion of an interdependent relationship between theory, history, and struggle is not new. What I want to emphasize, however, is the urgent need for us to appreciate and understand the complex relationality that shapes our social and political lives. First and foremost this suggests relations of power, which anchor the “common differences” between and among the feminist politics of different constituencies of women and men. The relations of power I am referring to are not reducible to binary oppositions or oppressor/oppressed relations. I want to suggest that it is possible to retain the idea of multiple, fluid structures of domination that intersect to locate women differently at particular historical conjunctures, while insisting on the dynamic oppositional agency of individuals and collectives and their engagement in “daily life.” It is this focus on dynamic oppositional agency that clarifies the intricate connection between systemic relationships and the directionality of power. In other words, systems of racial, class, and gender domination do not have identical effects on women in Third World contexts. However, systems of domination operate through the setting up of (in Dorothy Smith’s terms)
particular, historically specific “relations of ruling” (Smith 1987, 2). It is at the intersections of these relations of ruling that Third World feminist struggles are positioned. It is also by understanding these intersections that we can attempt to explore questions of consciousness and agency without naturalizing either individuals or structures.

Dorothy Smith introduces the concept of relations of ruling while arguing for a feminist sociology that challenges the assumed coincidence of the standpoint of men and the standpoint of ruling by positing “the everyday world as problematic”:

“Relations of ruling” is a concept that grasps power, organization, direction, and regulation as more pervasively structured than can be expressed in traditional concepts provided by the discourses of power. I have come to see a specific interrelation between the dynamic advance of the distinctive forms of organizing and ruling contemporary capitalist society and the patriarchal forms of our contemporary experience. When I write of “ruling” in this context I am identifying a complex of organized practices, including government, law, business and financial management, professional organization, and educational institutions as well as discourses in texts that interpenetrate the multiple sites of power. (Smith 1987, 3)

Although Smith’s analysis pertains specifically to Western (white) capitalist patriarchies, I find her conceptualization of “relations of ruling” a significant theoretical and methodological development, which can be used to advantage in specifying the relations between the organization and experience of sexual politics and the concrete historical and political forms of colonialism, imperialism, racism, and capitalism. Smith’s concept of relations of ruling foregrounds forms of knowledge and organized practices and institutions, as well as questions of consciousness, and agency. Rather than posit any simple relation of colonizer and colonized, or capitalist and worker, the concept “relations of ruling” posits multiple intersections of structures of power and emphasizes the process or form of ruling, not the frozen embodiment of it (as, for instance, in the notion of “social indicators” of women’s status), as a focus for feminist analysis. In fact, I think this concept makes possible an analysis that takes seriously the idea of simultaneous and historicized exploitation of Third World women without suggesting an arithmetic or even a geometric analysis of gender, race, sexuality, and class (which are inadequate in the long run). By emphasizing the practices of ruling (or domination), it makes
possible an analysis that examines, for instance, the very forms of colonialism and racism, rather than one that assumes or posits unitary definitions of them. I think this concept could lead us out of the binary, often ahistorical binds of gender, race, and class analyses.

Thus I use Dorothy Smith’s definition of relations of rule to suggest multiple contexts for the emergence of contemporary Third World feminist struggles. I discuss the following socioeconomic, political, and discursive configurations: (1) colonialism, class, and gender, (2) the state, citizenship, and racial formation, (3) multinational production and social agency, (4) anthropology and the Third World woman as “native,” and (5) consciousness, identity, and writing. The first three configurations focus on state rule at particular historical junctures, identifying historically specific political and economic shifts such as decolonization and the rise of national liberation movements; the constitution of white, capitalist states through a liberal gender regime and racialized immigration and naturalization laws; and the consolidation of a multinational economy as both continuous and discontinuous with territorial colonization. I want to suggest that these shifts, in part, constitute the conditions of possibility for Third World women’s engagement with feminism. The fourth configuration identifies one hegemonic mode of discursive colonization of Third World women, anthropology, and outlines the contours of academic, disciplinary knowledge practices as a particular form of rule which scholarly Third World feminist praxis attempts to understand and take apart. The last configuration briefly introduces the question of oppositional practice, memory, and writing as a crucial aspect of the creation of self-knowledges for Third World feminists. The first two are developed in more detail than the last three, and all the configurations are intentionally provisional. My aim is to suggest ways of making connections and asking better questions rather than to provide a complete theory or history of Third World women’s engagement with feminisms.

**COLONIALISM, CLASS, GENDER**

The case might be argued that imperial culture exercised its power not so much through physical coercion, which was relatively minimal though always a threat, but through its cognitive dimension: its comprehensive symbolic order which constituted permissible thinking and action and prevented other worlds from emerging. — Helen Callaway, *Gender, Culture, and Empire*

57 Cartographies of Struggle
The history of feminism in India . . . is inseparable from the history of antifemi-
nism. —Kumkum Sangari and Sudesh Vaid, Recasting Women

Colonial states and imperial cultures in the nineteenth century were con-
solidated through specific relations of ruling involving forms of knowledge
and institutions of sexual, racial, and caste/class regulation—institutions,
which, in turn, solicited their own modes of individual and collective resis-
tance. Here, I briefly discuss the following symptomatic aspects of the opera-
tion of imperial rule: (1) the ideological construction and consolidation of
white masculinity as normative and the corresponding racialization and sexu-
alization of colonized peoples; (2) the effects of colonial institutions and poli-
cies in transforming indigenous patriarchies and consolidating hegemonic
middle-class cultures in metropolitan and colonized areas; and (3) the rise
of feminist politics and consciousness in this historical context within and
against the framework of national liberation movements. I draw on British
colonial rule partly because it is impossible to make generalizations about
all colonial cultures, but mainly because I am interested in providing an ex-
ample of a historically specific context for the emergence of feminist politics
(in this case, to a large extent, I draw on material about India) rather than in
claiming a singular history for the emergence of feminisms in Third World
contexts. However, I believe this analysis suggests methodological directions
for feminist analysis that are not limited to the British-Indian context.

Dorothy Smith describes the ruling apparatus in this way:

The ruling apparatus is that familiar complex of management, government
administration, professions, and intelligentsia, as well as the textually me-
diated discourses that coordinate and interpenetrate it. Its special capacity
is the organization of particular places, persons, and events into general-
ized and abstracted modes vested in categorical systems, rules, laws, and
conceptual practices. The former thereby become subject to an abstracted
and universalized system of ruling mediated by texts. (Smith 1987, 108)

Smith is referring to a capitalist ruling apparatus, but the idea of abstract-
ing particular places, people, and events into generalized categories, laws,
and policies is fundamental to any form of ruling. It is in this very process
of abstraction that the colonial state legislates racial, sexual, and class/caste
ideologies. For instance, in drawing racial, sexual, and class boundaries in
terms of social, spatial, and symbolic distance, and actually formulating these
as integral to the maintenance of colonial rule, the British defined authority and legitimacy through the difference rather than commonality of rulers and “natives.” This, in turn, consolidated a particular, historically specific notion of the imperial ruler as a white, masculine, self-disciplined protector of women and morals.

In recent years, feminist scholars have examined the constitution of this imperial (white) masculine self in the project of Western colonialism. The institutions of direct control of colonial rule—the military, the judiciary, and, most important, the administrative service—have always been overwhelmingly masculine. White men in colonial service embodied rule by literally and symbolically representing the power of the empire. There was no work/leisure distinction for colonial officers; they were uniformed and “on duty” at all times. As Helen Callaway (1987) states in her study of European women in colonial Nigeria, white women did not travel to the colonies until much later, and then too they were seen as “subordinate and unnecessary appendages,” not as rulers (6). Thus, the British colonial state established a particular form of rule through the bureaucratization of gender and race specifically in terms of the institution of colonial service. This particular ruling apparatus made certain relations and behaviors visible, for instance, the boundaries of the relations between white men in the colonial bureaucracy and “native” men and women, and the behavior of imperial rulers who seemed to “rule without actually exerting power.”

Thus, the embodiment of the power of empire by officers in colonial service led to particular relations of rule and forms of knowledge. This was accomplished through the creation of the “English gentleman” as the natural and legitimate ruler—a creation based on a belief system that drew on social Darwinism, evolutionary anthropology, chivalry myths, Christianity, medical and “scientific” treatises, and the literary tradition of empire.

Institutionally, colonial rule operated by setting up visible, rigid, and hierarchical distinctions between the colonizers and the colonized. The physical and symbolic separation of the races was deemed necessary to maintain social distance and authority over subject peoples. In effect, the physical details (e.g., racial and sexual separation) of colonial settings were transmuted to a moral plane: the ideal imperial agent embodied authority, discipline, fidelity, devotion, fortitude, and self-sacrifice. This definition of white men as “naturally” born to rule is grounded in a discourse of race and sexuality that necessarily defined colonized peoples, men and women, as incapable of self-government.
The maintenance of strong sexual and racial boundaries was thus essential to the distinctions that were made between “legitimate rulers” and “childlike subjects.” These boundaries were evident in the explicit and implicit regulation against the intermingling of the races in colonized countries as well as, for instance, in another, very different colonial context, in the miscegenation laws of American plantation slavery. South African apartheid was also founded on the delineation of these kinds of boundaries.

In 1909 a confidential circular was issued by Lord Crewe to colonialists in Africa. This circular, which became known as the “Concubinage Circular,” stated moral objections to officers’ consorting with native women, claiming that this practice diminished the authority of colonials in the eyes of the natives, thus lowering their effectiveness as administrators (Callaway 1987). The last copy of this circular was destroyed in 1945, but its contents were kept alive as folklore, as unwritten rules of conduct. Here is an excellent example of the bureaucratization of gender and race through a particular form of colonial rule. The circular constructs and regulates a specific masculinity of rulers—a masculinity defined in relation to “nativewomen” (forbidden sexuality) and to “native men” (the real object of British rule). Furthermore, it is a masculinity also defined in relation to white women, who, as the real consorts of colonial officers, supposedly legitimate and temper the officers’ authority as administrators (rulers) capable of restraint and also form the basis of the Victorian code of morality.

The effect of the consolidation of this bureaucratic masculinity was of course not necessarily restraint. Sexual encounters between white men and native women often took the form of rape. This racialized, violent masculinity was in fact the underside of the sanctioned mode of colonial rule. In fact, it is only in the last two decades that racialized sexual violence has emerged as an important paradigm or trope of colonial rule. Jacqui Alexander argues this point in a different postcolonial context, Trinidad and Tobago. Her analysis (1991) of the racialized construction of masculinity, in part through state legislation in the form of the Sexual Offences Bill, substantiates the historical continuity between colonial and postcolonial tropes of (hetero)sexuality and conjugal relations. Similarly, Angela Gilliam’s discussion in her essay (1991) on rape and the issue of sex/color lines in Latin America specifies the relation of racialized violent masculinity to the class/gender system.

Thus colonial states created racially and sexually differentiated classes conducive to a ruling process fundamentally grounded in economic surplus ex-
traction. And they did this by institutionalizing ideologies and knowledges that legitimated these practices of ruling. Clearly, one such form of knowledge fundamental to colonial rule in Asia, Africa, and Latin America was/is the discourse of race and racism. Racism in the context of colonialism and imperialism takes the form of simultaneous naturalization and abstraction. It works by erasing the economic, political, and historical exigencies that necessitate the essentialist discourse of race as a way to legitimate imperialism in the first place. The effects of this discourse, specifically its enforcement through the coercive institutions of colonial rule (e.g., police and legal systems), has been documented by a number of Third World intellectuals, including Frantz Fanon, Albert Memmi, W. E. B. Du Bois, and Zora Neale Hurston. But colonial rule did not operate purely at the level of discourse. All forms of ruling operate by constructing, and consolidating as well as transforming, already existing social inequalities. In addition to the construction of hegemonic masculinities as a form of state rule, the colonial state also transformed existing patriarchies and caste/class hierarchies.

Historians and critics have examined the operation of colonial rule at the level of institutional practices, policies, and laws. There are numerous studies on the effect of colonial policies on existing sexual divisions of labor, or on sexually egalitarian relations. One of the best analyses of the relation of caste/class hierarchies to patriarchies under British colonialism is offered by KumKum Sangari and Sudesh Vaid in their introduction to a book of essays on Indian colonial and postcolonial history (1989, 1–26). Sangari and Vaid begin by stating that patriarchies are not systems that are added on to class and caste but are intrinsic to the very formation of and transformations within these categories. In other words, they establish a dynamic, necessary relation between understandings of class/caste and patriarchies under British rule. An example of this is a rich analysis of colonial regulation of agrarian relations.

Analysis of agrarian regulations usually focuses on the construction, transformation, and management of class/caste relations. However, by drawing on essays that analyze British intervention (rules and laws) in land settlements as well as in local patriarchal practices, Sangari and Vaid are able to point to the effect of agrarian regulation on the process of the restructuring and reconstitution of patriarchies across class/caste hierarchies. For instance, some of the effects of colonial policies and regulations are the reempowering of landholding groups, the granting of property rights to men, the exclusion of women from ownership, and the “freezing” of patriarchal practices of mar-
riage, succession, and adoption into laws. The cumulative effect of these particular institutions of colonial rule is thus, at least partially, an aggravation of existing inequalities as well as the creation of "new" ones.

The complex relationship between the economic interests of the colonial state and gender relations in rural Indian society are examined by Prem Chowdhry (in Sangari and Vaid 1989). Writing about colonial Haryana (then in the province of Punjab), Chowdhry demonstrates how the "apparent contradiction in the coexistence of indices of high status and low status" for Haryanavi peasant women is explainable in terms of the agrarian political economy. Peasant women were much sought after as partners in agricultural labor, and physically strong women were much in demand as brides. Scriptural sanctions against widow remarriage were, understandably, generally disregarded; indeed, such remarriage was encouraged by custom and folk proverbs. But since widows could inherit their husband's property, there was considerable restriction placed on whom they could marry. The primary interest was in retaining the land in the family, and thus male elders circumvented the law by forcing them to remarry within the family (a practice known as karewa).

The colonial state, which had an economic interest in seeing landholdings stable (to ensure revenue collection), actively discouraged unmarried widows from partitioning landholdings. It even strengthened karewa, ostensibly in the name of the avowed policy of "preserving the village community" and the "cohering [of] tribes." Even when the patriarchal custom was challenged legally by the widows themselves, the colonial state sanctified the custom by depending on a "general code of tribal custom." The official British argument was that although this was a "system of polyandry[,] . . . probably the first stage in development of a savage people after they have emerged from a mere animal condition of promiscuity" (Rohtak District Gazetteer, quoted in Chowdhry 1989, 317), the rural population of Haryana itself did not follow either the Hindu or the Muslim law and should therefore be allowed to determine "its" own customs. But the catch was that these customs were complied with and codified (as Chowdhry points out) "in consultation with the village headmen of each landowning tribe in the district, these being acknowledg edly 'men of most influential families in the village' " (317). Thus patriarchal practices were shaped to serve the economic interests of both the landowning classes and the colonial state; even the seemingly progressive customs such as widow remarriage had their limits determined within this gendered political economy.14

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Another effect of British colonial rule in India was the consolidation of public and private spheres of the Indian middle class in the nineteenth century, a process that involved a definite project of sexualization. In their introduction, Sangari and Vaid (1989, 1–26) draw on the work of Partha Chatterjee and Sumanta Banerjee to discuss the creation of the middle-class “private” sphere of the Bhadralok. The Bhadralok notion of middle-class Indian womanhood draws on Victorian ideas of the purity and homebound nature of women but is specifically constructed in opposition to both Western materialism and lower-caste/class sexual norms. For instance, the process of the “purification” of the vernacular language in the early nineteenth century was seen as simultaneous Sanskritization and Anglicization. Similarly, nineteenth-century versions of female emancipation arose through the construction of middle-class Indian womanhood and were inextricably tied to national regeneration. Sangari and Vaid maintain that the formation of desired notions of spirituality (caste/class-related) and of womanhood (gender-related) is part of the formation of the middle class itself.

This, then, is the historical context in which middle-class Indian feminist struggles arise: nationalist struggles against an imperial state, religious reform and “modernization” of the Indian bourgeoisie, and the consolidation of an Indian middle class poised to take over as rulers. In fact it is Indian middle-class men who are key players in the emergence of “the woman question” within Indian nationalist struggles. Male-led social reform movements were thus preoccupied with legislating and regulating the sexuality of middle-class women, and selectively encouraging women’s entry into the public sphere, by instituting modes of surveillance that in turn controlled women’s entry into the labor force and into politics. This particular configuration also throws up the question of the collusion of colonialist and nationalist discourses in constructions of Indian middle-class womanhood.

The early history of the emergence of women’s struggles in India thus encapsulates tensions between progressive and conservative ideas and actions. After all, histories of feminism also document histories of domination and oppression. No noncontradictory or “pure” feminism is possible. In India, the middle-class women’s movement essentially attempted to modernize earlier patriarchal regulation of women and pave the way for middle-class women to enter the professions and participate in political movements. On the other hand, what Sangari and Vaid call “democratizing” women’s movements focused on gender equality in the home and workplace and questioned both
feudal and colonial structures but were nevertheless partially tied to middle-class familial ideologies and agendas as well as to feudal patriarchal norms. This formulation is of course a partial one and illustrates one mode of examining the relations of colonialism, class, and gender as a significant context for the emergence of the organized struggles of, in this case, Indian women against a racist, paternal, imperial state (Britain) and a paternal, middle-class, national liberation movement.

In outlining the operation of relations of ruling at this historical moment, I am attempting to suggest a way of understanding and a mode of feminist inquiry that is grounded in the relations among gender, race, class, and sexuality at a particular historical moment. Feminist struggles are waged on at least two simultaneous, interconnected levels: an ideological, discursive level that addresses questions of representation (womanhood/femininity), and a material, experiential, daily-life level that focuses on the micropolitics of work, home, family, sexuality, and so on. Colonial relations of rule form the backdrop for feminist critiques at both levels, and it is the notion of the practice of ruling that may allow for an understanding of the contradictory sex, race, class, and caste positioning of Third World women in relation to the state, and thus may suggest ways of formulating historically the location of Third World women’s feminist struggles.

THE STATE, CITIZENSHIP, AND RACIAL FORMATION

Unlike the colonial state, the gender and racial regimes of contemporary liberal capitalist states operate through the ostensibly “unmarked” discourses of citizenship and individual rights. In contrast to the visible racialized masculinity of nineteenth- and early twentieth-century territorialist imperialism, white capitalist patriarchies institute relations of rule based on a liberal citizenship model with its own forms of knowledge and impersonal bureaucracies. According to R. W. Connell, the contemporary Euro-American state operates through the setting up of a “gender regime”: a regime whereby the state is the primary organizer of the power relations of gender. In other words, the state delimits the boundaries of personal/domestic violence, protects property, criminalizes “deviant” and “stigmatized” sexuality, embodies masculinized hierarchies (e.g., the gendered bureaucracy of state personnel), structures collective violence in the police force, prisons, and wars, and sometimes allows or even invites the countermobilization of power.

While imperial rule was constructed on the basis of a sharp sexual division
of labor whereby (white) masculinity was inseparable from social authority and masculine adventure was followed by masculinized rule, the notion of citizenship created by bourgeois liberal capitalism is predicated on an impersonal bureaucracy and a hegemonic masculinity organized around the themes of rationality, calculation, and orderliness. Thus, Connell argues, contemporary liberal notions of citizenship are constitutively dependent on and supported by the idea of the patriarchal household, and formulated around the notion of a "rationalized" hegemonic masculinity (in contrast to the violent masculinity of colonial rule or of the military). This rationalized masculinity is evident in the bureaucratic sexual division of labor of people employed by the state: 80 to 90 percent of the political elite, civil service bureaucracy (railways, maritime services, power, and construction), judiciary, and military are male, while women are overwhelmingly employed in the human services (education, nursing, social work, etc.) and secretarial arms of the state.

Besides instituting this particular gender regime, the state also regulates gender and sexual relations by instituting policies pertaining to the family, population, labor force and labor management, housing, sexual behavior and expression, provision of child care and education, taxation and income redistribution, and the creation and use of military forces.

However, to return to Connell, this complex analysis of the gender and sexualized regime of the state excludes any discussion of racial formation. Thus, Connell provides at best a partial analysis of citizenship. White liberal capitalist patriarchies have always been the focus of feminist resistance. But to fully appreciate and mobilize against the oppressive rule of this state, the relations of rule of the state must be understood and analyzed in terms of gender, class, and sexual as well as racial formation. In fact, this is essential if we are to explain why the state is a significant nexus for the mobilization of feminist constituencies in overwhelmingly racialized cultures.

A conceptualization of race and racism is thus essential to any contemporary discussion of feminist politics in, for instance, the United States and Britain. In the U.S. context, Elizabeth Higginbotham (1983) defines racism as an ideology within which people of color in the United States have to live. It is an ideology that legitimizes the exclusion of nonwhite people from particular areas of social and economic life, simultaneously promoting a tolerance of these inequities on the part of the ruling class. In effect, at the economic level, the definition of labor ("free" vs. "slave"), the differential allocation of workers, the composition of the "underclass" and "welfare recipients," are
all constitutively dependent on race as an organizing principle. In addition, race is a primary consideration in the definition of ideas of “citizenship” and the regulation of these through immigration and naturalization laws. Drawing on three specific contexts, the United States, Britain, and South Africa, Higginbotham’s discussion briefly delineates the relations of rule of the state and racial formation through immigration and nationality laws. Her analysis of historicized ideologies of gendered and racialized citizenship in these countries illustrates a particular form of rule of contemporary (white) capitalist states and, taken in conjunction with Connell’s discussion of the state as the arbiter of patriarchies, simultaneously defines an important context for contemporary Third World feminist struggles. Higginbotham’s discussion is thus an extension of the earlier discussion of Connell’s argument regarding the gender regime of the state.

Historically, (white) feminist movements in the West have rarely engaged questions of immigration and nationality (one exception is Britain, which has a long history of black feminist organizing around such issues). In any event, I would like to suggest that analytically these issues are the contemporary metropolitan counterpart of women’s struggles against colonial occupation in the geographical Third World. In effect, the construction of immigration and nationality laws, and thus of appropriate racialized, gendered citizenship, illustrates the continuity between relationships of colonization and white, masculinist, capitalist state rule.

In an important study of U.S. racial trajectories, Michael Omi and Howard Winant introduce the idea of “racial formation,” which “refer[s] to the process by which social, economic and political forces determine the content and importance of racial categories, and by which they are in turn shaped by racial meanings” (Omi and Winant 1986, 61). Omi and Winant maintain that in the contemporary United States, race is one of the central axes of understanding the world. Particular racial myths and stereotypes change, but the underlying presence of a racial meaning system seems to be an anchoring point of American culture. While racial formation is a matter of the dynamic between individual identities and collective social structures, the racial parameters of the United States include citizenship and naturalization laws, and social and welfare policies and practices that often arise as a response to oppositional movements. Historically, citizenship and immigration laws and social policies have always been connected to economic agendas and to the search for cheap labor. These state practices are anchored in the institutions of slavery,
capitalist neocolonialism, and, more recently, monopoly and multinational capitalism. Thus, racism is often the product of a colonial situation, although it is not limited to it. Blacks and Latinos in the United States, Asians and West Indians in Britain, and North Africans in France, all share similarly oppressive conditions and the status of second-class citizens.

A comparison of the history of the immigration of white people and of the corresponding history of slavery and indentured labor of people of color in the United States indicates a clear pattern of racialization tied to the ideological and economic exigencies of the state. White men were considered "free labor" and could take a variety of jobs. At the same time, black men and women were used as slave labor to develop the agriculture of the South, and Mexican-Americans were (and still are) paid much lower wages than whites for their work in mines, railroads, lumber camps, oil extraction, and agriculture in the Southwest. These relations of inequality are the context for the entry of women of color into the U.S. labor force—usually in domestic or laundry work, or labor in the fields. In part it is this history of low-wage, exploitative occupations that have been the lot of U.S. Third World women and that contributes to the racist definitions they must endure vis-à-vis a dominant white, middle-class, professional culture.

In effect, then, citizenship and immigration laws are fundamentally about defining insiders and outsiders. The U.S. Naturalization Law of 1790, the state's original attempt to define citizenship, maintained that only free, "white" immigrants could qualify. It took the Walter-McCarran Act of 1952 to grant Japanese Americans U.S. citizenship. Racial categorization has remained very fluid and dependent on labor needs throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. For instance, in the nineteenth century there were three racial categories: white, Negro, and Indian. Mexicans were legally accorded the status of "free white persons" after the 1848 treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, while the California supreme court ruled in 1854 that the Chinese, who were a major source of cheap labor on the west coast, were to be considered "Indian" (Omi and Winant 1986, 75).

The most extensive work on feminism and racial formation in the U.S. concerns black-white relations and history. In fact, the recent historiography on slavery and contemporary black feminist thought is one of the most exciting, insightful, and well-documented fields in feminist and antiracist scholarship. Historians such as Eugene Genovese (1979), Elizabeth Fox-Genovese (1988), John Blassingame (1979), Paula Giddings (1984), and Jacqueline Jones (1985)
and critics such as bell hooks (1984, 1988), Hortense Spillers (1987), Judith Rollins (1987), and Audre Lorde (1984) laid down the groundwork with their analyses of the intersection of racial formations with sexual, class, and economic structures (see also Okihiro 1986). Instead of summarizing their work, I would like to look closely at a different context of racialization in the United States: the history of immigration and naturalization, which parallels the process of racialization that has occurred through the history of slavery and civil rights (black-white relations). Some of the history of slavery and contemporary racism in the United States is encapsulated by Barbara Smith (1983). In analyzing the representation of black lesbians in the work of Alice Walker, Gloria Naylor, and Audre Lorde, Smith reads against the grain of both racist, patriarchal texts and the texts of black feminists, discussing in some detail historical constructions of black womanhood, specifically the conjuncture of racist and heterosexist characterizations of black women.

A chronological listing of the U.S. Exclusion Acts illustrates the intersection of morality and race, class, gender, and sexuality in the construction of Asian peoples as the “yellow peril.” It was the 1870 hearings on Chinese prostitution that led to “An Act to Prevent the Kidnapping and Importation of Mongolian, Chinese, and Japanese Females for Criminal and Demoralizing Purposes.” This act granted immigration officers the right to determine if women who chose to immigrate were “persons of correct habits and good character.” It also assumed that all “Oriental women” wanting to immigrate would engage in “criminal and demoralizing acts.” While the general purpose of the exclusion acts is clear — to keep Asians (and possibly other non-European “foreigners”) out — the focus on defining the morality of Asian women as a basis for entry into the country indicates the (hetero)sexism and racism underlying U.S. immigration and naturalization laws. The purpose of the prostitution acts may well be different from that of the exclusion acts. However, both are fundamentally anchored in definitions of gender, race, and sexuality. The ideological definition of women’s morality thus has significant material effects in this situation.

The first law explicitly based on nationality was the 1882 Chinese Act. Following this act were the 1907 Gentlemen’s Agreement, which curtailed Japanese and Korean immigration; a 1917 act that restricted Asian Indian immigration; the 1924 Oriental Exclusion Act, which terminated all labor immigration from mainland Asia; and the 1934 Tydings-McDuffie Act, which restricted Filipino immigration to the United States. Citizenship through
naturalization was denied to all Asians from 1924 to 1943. Beginning in 1943, and until the mid-1960s, when immigration laws were liberalized, the state instituted a quota system for Asian immigrants. Quotas were available only for professionals with postsecondary education, technical training, and specialized experience. Thus, the replacement of the “yellow peril” stereotype by a “model minority” stereotype is linked to a particular history of immigration laws that are anchored in the economic exigencies of the state and systemic inequalities.

In the contemporary American context, the black-white line is rigidly enforced. This is evident in the 1980s legal cases on affirmative action, where the basis for affirmative action as a form of collective retribution has been challenged on grounds of “reverse discrimination,” an argument based on individual rather than collective demands. These arguments have been made and upheld in spite of the ostensibly liberal, pluralist claims of the American state. On the other hand, racial categorization in Brazil varies along a black-white color continuum which signifies status and privilege differences. Similarly, in South Africa under apartheid, Chinese people had the same status as Asians (or “coloreds”), while Japanese were referred to as “honorary whites.” Omi and Winant’s (1986) notion of racial formation allows us to account for the historical determinants of these ideological definitions of race.

The most developed discussion of the state’s regulation of Third World peoples through immigration and naturalization laws can be found in the United Kingdom. Third World feminists in Britain position the racist state as a primary focus of struggle. British nationality and immigration laws define and construct “legitimate” citizenship—an idea that is constitutively racialized and gender-based. Beginning in the 1950s, British immigration laws were written to prevent black people (Commonwealth citizens from Africa, Asia, the Far East, Cyprus, and the Caribbean) from entering Britain, thus making the idea of citizenship meaningless. These laws were entirely constructed around a racist, classist ideology of a patriarchal nuclear family, where women are never accorded subject status but are always assumed to be legal appendages of men. For instance, the 1968 Commonwealth Immigrants Act, in which ancestry was decisive, permitted only black men with work permits to enter Britain and assumed that men who were the “heads of families” could send for their “wives,” but not vice versa. The focus on familial configurations also indicates the implicit heterosexual assumptions written into these laws. Women can be defined only in relation to men and through the heterosexual
nuclear family model. Similarly, the 1981 British Nationality Act translated immigration legislation into nationality law whereby three new kinds of race- and gender-specific citizenships were created: British citizenship, dependent territories citizenship, and British overseas citizenship.

The effects of this act on women's citizenship were substantial: it took away the automatic right of women married to British men to register as citizens; it disenfranchised all children born in Britain who were originally entitled to automatic citizenship (children were entitled to citizenship only if one of their parents was born or settled in Britain); and it allowed British women to pass on citizenship to children born abroad for the first time in history. Thus, as the Women, Immigration and Nationality Group (WING) argues, immigration and nationality laws in Britain are feminist issues, as they explicitly reflect the ideology of (white) women as the reproducers of the nation. The construction of such legislation thus is a central form of state rule and clearly a crucial location for black women's struggles. The WING group describes the significance of the laws thus:

The intermeshed racism and sexism of British immigration legislation affects black and immigrant women in all areas of their lives. As wives, they are assumed to live wherever their husbands reside and to be dependent on them. As mothers, particularly single mothers, they have difficulty in bringing their children to join them. As workers, they are forced to leave their families behind. . . . It is this system of immigration control which legitimizes institutionalized racism in Britain today. It has far-reaching effects not only for black and third world people seeking to enter Britain but also for those living here who are increasingly subject to internal immigration controls. (WING 1985, 148)

Finally, racial formation took its most visibly violent and repressive form in apartheid South Africa. Here, the very language of apartheid (and of course the denial of "citizenship" to black people)—"separate but equal development," "white areas" and "Bantustans" (which comprised less than 13 percent of the land), black women workers as superfluous appendages—captured the material force of ideological definitions of race. Working-class solidarity across racial lines was impossible under apartheid because of racialization, as Sivanandan notes: "[T]he racist ideology of South Africa is an explicit, systematic, holistic ideology of racial superiority—so explicit that it makes clear that the White working class can only maintain its standard of living on the basis
of a Black underclass, so systemic as to guarantee that the White working class will continue to remain a race for itself, so holistic as to ensure that the color line is the power line is the poverty line" (Sivanandan 1981, 300). Sivanandan's equation of the color line with the power line with the poverty line encapsulates the contours of racial formation under apartheid, and it is this context that determined the particular emergence of the struggles of South African women: struggles around racial, political, and economic liberation, work, domestic life, housing, food, and land rights. Racist ideology has the hegemonic capacity to define the terms whereby people understand themselves and their world. The project of decolonization thus involves the specification of race in political, economic, and ideological terms, for the meanings of race are necessarily shaped as much in collective and personal practice (identity politics) as by the state (colonial or contemporary capitalist).

In this discussion of immigration, naturalization, and nationality laws I have sketched the relationships between the liberal capitalist state and gender and racial formations. By analyzing the discourse and concept of citizenship as constructed through immigration and nationality laws, I have attempted to specify the gender and racial regime of the contemporary Euro-American liberal democratic state and its relations of rule. The fact that notions of sexuality (morality of women), gender (familial configurations), and race ("Oriental") are implicitly written into these laws indicates the reason why this particular aspect of the contemporary state is a crucial context for Third World women's feminist struggles, and provides a method of feminist analysis that is located at the intersections of systemic gender, race, class, and sexual paradigms as they are regulated by the liberal state. My examination of these issues also demonstrates the relationships between the economic exigencies of the state (the original reason for migration/immigration) and its gender and racial regimes.

MULTINATIONAL PRODUCTION AND SOCIAL AGENCY

Questions of gender and race take on a new significance at the turn of the century, when, as a consequence of the massive incorporation of Third World women into a multinational labor force and into domestic service, feminist theorists have had to rethink such fundamental concepts as the public/private distinction in explanations of women's oppression. Indeed, questions pertaining to the situation of "Third World" women (both domestic and international), who are often the most exploited populations, are some of the most
urgent theoretical challenges facing the social and political analysis of gender and race in postindustrial contexts. Of course, no discussion of the contemporary contexts of Third World women's engagement with feminism could omit a sketch of the massive incorporation and proletarianization of these women in multinational factories. While this location is not just a social indicator of Third World women's economic and social status (Momsen and Townsend 1987), it is a significant determinant of the micropolitics of daily life and self-constructions of massive numbers of Third World women employed in these factories. In fact, the 1960s expansion of multinational export-processing labor-intensive industries to the Third World and the U.S.-Mexican border is the newest pernicious form of economic and ideological domination.

World market factories relocate in search of cheap labor and find a home in countries with unstable (or dependent) political regimes, low levels of unionization, and high unemployment. What is significant about this particular situation is that it is young Third World women who overwhelmingly constitute the labor force. And it is these women who embody and personify the intersection of sexual, class, and racial ideologies.

Numerous feminist scholars have written about the exploitation of Third World women in multinational corporations. While a number of studies provide information on the mobilization of racist and (hetero)sexist stereotypes in recruiting Third World women into this labor force, relatively few address questions of the social agency of women who are subjected to a number of levels of capitalist discipline. In other words, few studies have focused on women workers as subjects — as agents who make choices, have a critical perspective on their own situations, and think and organize collectively against their oppressors. Most studies of Third World women in multinationals locate them as victims of multinational capital as well as of their own "traditional" sexist cultures.

Aihwa Ong (1987) provides an analysis that goes against the grain of constructing Third World women workers as pure victims. Ong's analysis illustrates (1) how the lives of factory women in Malaysia are determined in part by economic and ideological assumptions on an international scale, (2) the historical links of the colonial (British) and the postcolonial state in the construction of a social space for women workers, and (3) the construction of Third World women's resistance and subjectivities in the context of deep material and structural transformations in their lives.

Tracing the introduction of new relations of production and exchange
from the days of British colonial administration, Ong analyzes a corresponding construction of Malay identity in relation to subsistence agriculture, land, and other social structures. She goes on to delineate the role of the contemporary Malaysian state as the manager of different structures of power where multinational corporate investments were incorporated into ideological state apparatuses that policed the new Malay working-class women:

[This study] discussed novel power configurations in domains such as the family, factory, kampung, and state institutions which reconstructed the meanings of Malay female gender and sexuality. In Japanese factories, the experiences of Malay women workers could be understood in terms of their use as “instruments of labor,” as well as reconstitution by discursive practices as sexualized subjects. Discipline was exercised not only through work relations but also through surveillance and the cooperation of village elders in managing the maidens and their morality. Assailed by public doubts over their virtue, village-based factory women internalized these disparate disciplinary schemes, engaging in self- and other-monitoring on the shopfloor, in kampung society and within the wider society. (Ong 1987, 220)

Ong’s work illustrates the embodiment of sexist, racist stereotypes in the recruitment of young Malay village women into factory work, and delineates factors pertaining to their subjectivities. Thus, Malay women face economic exploitation, sexual harassment, and various levels of discipline and surveillance as workers. Ong’s discussion of their sexuality and morality recall earlier discussions of the morality of immigrant women in the United States. These particular constructions of morality to which Third World women are subject inform their notions of self, their organizing, and their day-to-day resilience.

The counterparts to world market factories in Third World countries are garment sweatshops in U.S. cities and electronics industries in the Silicon Valley in California. These sweatshops operate illegally to avoid unemployment insurance, child labor laws, and regulations. For instance, 90 percent of garment workers are women, the majority being immigrants from the Caribbean, Latin America, and Asia. They have few alternatives—as heads of households, mothers without daycare, women on welfare—in other words, they are poor Third World women. Like the Malaysian factory workers, these women are subject to racist and sexist stereotypes such as “sewing is a women’s job,” and “Third World women are more docile and obedient.” Here again, a number of
scholars have detailed the effects of this particular proletarianization of Third World women in the United States. Suffice it to say that constructions of self and agency in this context too are based on indigenous social and ideological transformations managed by the state in conjunction with multinational corporate capitalism. Within this framework of multinational employment, it is through an analysis of the ideological construction of the “Third World woman worker” (the stereotypical [ideal] worker employed by world market factories) that we can trace the links of sexist, racist, class-based structures internationally. It is also this particular context and juncture that suggest a possible coalition among Third World women workers.22

Thus an analysis of the employment of Third World women workers by multinational capital in terms of ideological constructions of race, gender, and sexuality in the very definition of “women’s work” has significant repercussions for feminist cross-cultural analysis. In fact, questions pertaining to the social agency of Third World women workers may well be some of the most challenging questions facing feminist organizing today. By analyzing the sexualization and racialization of women’s work in multinational factories and relating this to women’s own ideas of their work and daily life, we can attempt a definition of self and collective agency that takes apart the idea of “women’s work” as a naturalized category. Just as notions of “motherhood” and “domesticity” are historical and ideological rather than “natural” constructs, in this particular context, ideas of “Third World women’s work” have their basis in social hierarchies stratified by sex/gender, race, and class. Understanding these constructions in relation to the state and the international economy is crucial because of the overwhelming employment of Third World women in world market factories, sweatshops, and home work. Thus, this forms another important context for understanding the systemic exploitation of poor Third World women, and provides a potential space for cross-national feminist solidarity and organizing. These questions are elaborated in more detail in chapter 6.

ANTHROPOLOGY AND THE THIRD WORLD WOMAN AS “NATIVE”

One of the most crucial forms of knowledge produced by, indeed born of, colonial rule is the discipline of anthropology. While I do not intend to offer a comprehensive analysis of the origins of this discipline in the racialized and
sexualized relations of colonial rule, a brief example of these links clarifies my point. I want to suggest that anthropology is an important discursive context in this cartography and that it is an example of disciplinary knowledge that signifies the power of naming and the contests over meaning of definitions of the self and other. Trinh T. Minh-ha (1989) formulates the racial and sexual basis of the “object of anthropological study” thus:23

It seems clear that the favorite object of anthropological study is not just any man but a specific kind of man: the Primitive, now elevated to the rank of the full yet needy man, the Native. Today, anthropology is said to be “conducted in two ways: in the pure state and in the diluted state.” . . . The “conversation of man with man” is, therefore, mainly a conversation of “us” with “us” about “them,” of the white man with the white man about the primitive-native man. The specificity of these three “man” grammatically leads to “men”; a logic reinforced by the modern anthropologist who, while aiming at the generic “man” like all his colleagues, implies elsewhere that in this context, man’s mentality should be read as men’s mentalities. (Trinh 1989, 64–65)

The quotation illustrates both the fundamentally gendered and racial nature of the anthropological project during colonial rule and the centrality of the white, Western masculinity of the anthropologist. A number of anthropologists have engaged the discursive and representational problems of classical anthropology in recent years. In fact, one of the major questions feminist anthropology has had to address is precisely the question of both representing Third World women in anthropological texts (as a corrective to masculinist disciplinary practices) and simultaneously speaking for Third World women.24 As Trinh states, we must be concerned with the question of Third World women:

Why do we have to be concerned with the question of Third World women? After all it is only one issue among others. Delete “Third World” and the sentence immediately unveils its value-loaded cliches. Generally speaking, a similar result is obtained through the substitution of words like racist for sexist, or vice versa, and the established image of the Third World Woman in the context of (pseudo-) feminism readily merges with that of the Native in the context of (neo-colonialist) anthropology. The problems are interconnected. (Trinh 1989, 85)
Here Trinh suggests that there is a continuity between definitions of the "Native" (male) and the "Third World Woman." Both draw on sexist and racist stereotypes to consolidate particular relations of rule. In both cases, gender and race (white men and white women) are central to the definition of superior/inferior. This, then, is an example of the interconnectedness of the processes of racialization and sexualization in the production of knowledge conducive to colonial rule. Anthropology and its "nativization" of Third World women thus forms a significant context for understanding the production of knowledge "about" Third World women. Knowledge production in literary and social-scientific disciplines is clearly an important discursive site for struggle. The practice of scholarship is also a form of rule and of resistance, and constitutes an increasingly important arena of Third World feminisms. After all, the material effects of this knowledge production have ramifications for institutions (e.g., laws, policies, educational systems) as well as the constitution of selves and of subjectivities. For instance, Rey (1991) addresses such paradigms when she suggests that Chinese women "disappear" in popular and academic discourses on China, only to reappear in "case studies" or in the "culture garden." Similarly, in chapter 1, I discuss the discursive production of the "Third World woman" in the discourse of international development studies. Questions of definition and self-definition inform the very core of political consciousness in all contexts, and the examination of a discourse (anthropology) that has historically authorized the objectification of Third World women remains a crucial context to map Third World women as subjects of struggle.

CONSCIOUSNESS, IDENTITY, WRITING

Numerous texts on Third World women's political struggles have focused on their participation in organized movements, whether in nationalist or antiracist liberation struggles, organized peasant working-class movements, middle-class movements pertaining to the legal, political, and economic rights of women, or struggles around domestic violence. In fact, the focus of the three previous sections detailing historical and contextual issues (colonialism, class, gender; citizenship, the state, and racial formation; and multinational production and social agency) has also been on such macrostructural phenomena and organized movements. However, not all feminist struggles can be understood within the framework of "organized" movements. Questions of political consciousness and self-identity are a crucial aspect of de-
fining Third World women's engagement with feminism. And while these questions have to be addressed at the level of organized movements, they also have to be addressed at the level of everyday life in times of revolutionary upheaval as well as in times of "peace."

This section foregrounds the interconnections of consciousness, identity, and writing and suggests that questions of subjectivity are always multiply mediated through the axes of race, class/caste, sexuality, and gender. I do not provide a critique of identity politics here, but I do challenge the notion "I am, therefore I resist!" That is, I challenge the idea that simply being a woman, or being poor or black or Latino, is sufficient ground to assume a politicized oppositional identity. In other words, while questions of identity are crucially important, they can never be reduced to automatic self-referential, individualist ideas of the political (or feminist) subject.

This section focuses on life story-oriented written narratives, but this is clearly only one, albeit important, context in which to examine the development of political consciousness. Writing is itself an activity marked by class and ethnic position. However, testimonials, life stories, and oral histories are a significant mode of remembering and recording experience and struggles. Written texts are not produced in a vacuum. In fact, texts that document Third World women's life histories owe their existence as much to the exigencies of the political and commercial marketplace as to the knowledge, skills, motivation, and location of individual writers.

For example, critics have pointed to the proliferation of experientially oriented texts by Third World women as evidence of "diversity" in U.S. feminist circles. Such texts now accompany "novels" by black and Third World women in women's studies curricula. However, in spite of the fact that the growing demand among publishers for culturally diverse life (hi)stories indicates a recognition of plural realities and experiences as well as a diversification of inherited Eurocentric canons, often this demand takes the form of the search for more "exotic" and "different" stories in which individual women write as truth-tellers and authenticate "their own oppression," in the tradition of Euro-American women's autobiography. In other words, the mere proliferation of Third World women's texts, in the West at least, owes as much to the relations of the marketplace as to the conviction to "testify" or "bear witness." Thus, the existence of Third World women's narratives in itself is not evidence of decentering hegemonic histories and subjectivities. It is the way in which they are read, understood, and located institutionally that is of para-

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mount importance. After all, the point is not just to record one’s history of struggle, or consciousness, but how they are recorded; the way we read, receive, and disseminate such imaginative records is immensely significant. It is this very question of reading, theorizing, and locating these writings that I touch on in the examples below.

The consolidation and legitimation of testimonials as a form of Latin American oral history (history from below) owes as much to the political imperatives of such events as the Cuban revolution as to the motivations and desires of the intellectuals and revolutionaries who were/are the agents of these testimonials. The significance of representing “the people” as subjects of struggle is thus encapsulated in the genre of testimonials, a genre that is, unlike traditional autobiography, constitutively public, and collective (for and of the people).25

Similarly, in the last two decades, numerous publishing houses in different countries have published autobiographical or life story-oriented texts by Third World feminists. This is a testament to the role of publishing houses and university and trade presses in the production, reception, and dissemination of feminist work, as well as to the creation of a discursive space where (self-)knowledge is produced by and for Third World women. Feminist analysis has always recognized the centrality of rewriting and remembering history, a process that is significant not merely as a corrective to the gaps, erasures, and misunderstandings of hegemonic masculinist history but because the very practice of remembering and rewriting leads to the formation of politicized consciousness and self-identity. Writing often becomes the context through which new political identities are forged. It becomes a space for struggle and contestation about reality itself. If the everyday world is not transparent and its relations of rule—its organizations and institutional frameworks—work to obscure and make invisible inherent hierarchies of power (Smith 1987), it becomes imperative that we rethink, remember, and utilize our lived relations as a basis of knowledge. Writing (discursive production) is one site for the production of this knowledge and this consciousness.

Written texts are also the basis of the exercise of power and domination. This is clear in Barbara Harlow’s (1989) delineation of the importance of literary production (narratives of resistance) during the Palestinian intifada. Harlow argues that the Israeli state has confiscated both the land and the childhood of Palestinians, since the word “child” has not been used for twenty years in the official discourse of the Israeli state. This language of the state
disallows the notion of Palestinian “childhood,” thus exercising immense military and legal power over Palestinian children. In this context, Palestinian narratives of childhood can be seen as narratives of resistance, which write childhood, and thus selfhood, consciousness, and identity, back into daily life. Harlow’s analysis also indicates the significance of written or recorded history as the basis of the constitution of memory. In the case of Palestinians, the destruction of all archival history, the confiscation of land, and the rewriting of historical memory by the Israeli state mean not only that narratives of resistance must undo hegemonic recorded history, but that they must also invent new forms of encoding resistance, of remembering. Honor Ford-Smith, in her introduction to a book on “life stories of Jamaican women,” encapsulates the significance of this writing:

The tale-telling tradition contains what is most poetically true about our struggles. The tales are one of the places where the most subversive elements of our history can be safely lodged, for over the years the tale tellers convert fact into images which are funny, vulgar, amazing or magically real. These tales encode what is overtly threatening to the powerful into covert images of resistance so that they can live on in times when overt struggles are impossible or build courage in moments when it is. To create such tales is a collective process accomplished within a community bound by a particular historical purpose. . . . They suggest an altering or re-defining of the parameters of political process and action. They bring to the surface factors which would otherwise disappear or at least go very far underground. (Sistren with Ford-Smith 1987, 3–4)

I quote Ford-Smith’s remarks because they suggest a number of crucial elements of the relation of writing, memory, consciousness, and political resistance: the codification of covert images of resistance during nonrevolutionary times; the creation of a communal (feminist) political consciousness through the practice of storytelling; and the redefinition of the very possibilities of political consciousness and action through the act of writing. One of the most significant aspects of writing against the grain in both the Palestinian and the Jamaican contexts is thus the invention of spaces, texts, and images for encoding the history of resistance. Therefore, one of the most significant challenges here is the question of decoding these subversive narratives. Thus, history and memory are woven through numerous genres: fictional texts, oral history, and poetry, as well as testimonial narratives—not just what counts as scholarly
or academic ("real"? ) historiography. An excellent example of the recuperation and rewriting of this history of struggle is the 1970s genre of U.S. black women's fiction that collectively rewrites and encodes the history of American slavery and the oppositional agency of African American slave women. Toni Morrison's *Beloved* and Gayl Jones's *Corregidora* are two examples that come to mind.

Ford-Smith's discussion also suggests an implicit challenge to the feminist individualist subject of much of liberal feminist theory, what Norma Alarcon, in a different context, calls "the most popular subject of Anglo-American feminism . . . an autonomous, self-making, self-determining subject who first proceeds according to the logic of identification with regard to the subject of consciousness, a notion usually viewed as the purview of man, but now claimed for women" (Alarcon 1989, 3). Alarcon goes on to define what she calls the "plurality of self" of women of color as subjects in the book *This Bridge Called My Back* (1981) in relation to the feminist subject of Anglo-American feminism. Both Ford-Smith and Alarcon suggest the possibility, indeed the necessity, of conceptualizing notions of collective selves and consciousness as the political practice of historical memory and writing by women of color and Third World women. This writing/speaking of a multiple consciousness, one located at the juncture of contests over the meanings of racism, colonialism, sexualities, and class, is thus a crucial context for delineating Third World women's engagement with feminisms. This is precisely what Gloria Anzaldúa refers to as a "mestiza consciousness" (Anzaldúa 1987). A mestiza consciousness is a consciousness of the borderlands, a consciousness born of the historical collusion of Anglo and Mexican cultures and frames of reference. It is a plural consciousness in that it requires understanding multiple, often opposing ideas and knowledges, and negotiating these knowledges, not just taking a simple counterstance:

At some point, on our way to a new consciousness, we will have to leave the opposite bank, the split between the two mortal combatants somewhat healed so that we are on both shores at once, and at once see through the serpent and the eagle eyes. . . . The work of mestiza consciousness is to break down the subject-object duality that keeps her a prisoner and to show in the flesh and through the images in her work how duality is transcended. The answer to the problem between the white race and the colored, between males and females, lies in healing the split that origi-
nates in the very foundation of our lives, our culture, our languages, our thoughts. A massive uprooting of dualistic thinking in the individual and collective consciousness is the beginning of a long struggle, but one that could, in our best hopes, bring us to the end of rape, of violence, of war. (Anzaldúa 1987, 78–80)

This notion of the uprooting of dualistic thinking suggests a conceptualization of consciousness, power, and authority that is fundamentally based on knowledges that are often contradictory. For Anzaldúa, a consciousness of the borderlands comes from a recentering of these knowledges—from the ability to see ambiguities and contradictions clearly, and to act collectively, with moral conviction. Consciousness is thus simultaneously singular and plural, located in a theorization of being “on the border.” Not any border, but a historically specific one: the United States–Mexican border. Thus, unlike a Western, postmodernist notion of agency and consciousness that often announces the splintering of the subject, and privileges multiplicity in the abstract, this is a notion of agency born of history and geography. It is a theorization of the materiality and politics of the everyday struggles of Chicanas.

Some of these questions are also taken up by Lourdes Torres in her 1991 essay on the construction of the self in U.S. Latina autobiographies. Torres speaks of the multiple identities of Latinas and of the way particular autobiographical narratives create a space to theorize the intersection of language and sexuality, and to examine and define the historical and cultural roots of survival in Anglo society.

Finally, the idea of plural or collective consciousness is evident in some of the revolutionary testimonials of Latin American women, speaking from within rather than for their communities. Unlike the autobiographical subject of Anglo-American feminism characterized by Alarcon, testimonials are strikingly nonheroic and impersonal. Their primary purpose is to document and record the history of popular struggles, foreground experiential and historical “truth” which has been erased or rewritten in hegemonic, elite, or imperialist history, and bear witness in order to change oppressive state rule. Thus testimonials do not focus on the unfolding of a singular woman’s consciousness (in the hegemonic tradition of European modernist autobiography); rather, their strategy is to speak from within a collective, as participants in revolutionary struggles, and to speak with the express purpose of bringing about social and political change. As Doris Sommer argues, testimonials are
written so as to produce complicity in the reader. Thus they are fundamentally about constructing relationships between the self and the reader, in order to invite and precipitate change (revolution). Sommer identifies the “plural” or “collective” self of Latin American women’s testimonials as “the possibility to get beyond the gap between public and private spheres and beyond the often helpless solitude that has plagued Western women even more than men since the rise of capitalism” (Sommer 1988, 110).

Alarcon, Ford-Smith, Anzaldúa, and Sommer thus together pose a serious challenge to liberal humanist notions of subjectivity and agency. In different ways, their analyses foreground questions of memory, experience, knowledge, history, consciousness, and agency in the creation of narratives of the (collective) self. They suggest a conceptualization of agency that is multiple and often contradictory but always anchored in the history of specific struggles. It is a notion of agency that works not through the logic of identification but through the logic of opposition. This is a complex argument that I want to introduce rather than work through here.

At the furthest limit of the question of oppositional agency is a problem addressed by Rosalind O’Hanlon (1988) in her analysis of the work of the South Asian subaltern studies group which focuses on the histories of peasants, agricultural laborers, factory workers, and tribals. In her examination of the “history from below” project of Subaltern Studies, O’Hanlon suggests the crux of the difficulty in defining and understanding the subjectivity of the subaltern as outside the purview of liberal humanism:

In speaking of the presence of the subaltern, we are, of course, referring primarily to a presence which is in some sense resistant: which eludes and refuses assimilation into the hegemonic, and so provides our grounds for rejecting elite historiography’s insistence that the hegemonic itself is all that exists with the social order. Our question, therefore, must in part be what kind of presence, what kind of practice, we would be justified in calling a resistant one: what is the best figure for us to cast it in, which will both reflect its fundamental alienness, and yet present it in a form which shows some part of that presence at least to stand outside and momentarily to escape the constructions of dominant discourse. (O’Hanlon 1988, 219)

O’Hanlon suggests one aspect of the dilemma with which I began this discussion: how do we theorize and locate the links between history, consciousness, identity, and experience in the writings of Third World women, writ-
ings and narratives that are constitutively about remembering and creating alternative spaces for survival, which figure self- and political consciousness? If, as I suggested earlier, certain narratives by Third World women operate not through a logic of identification but through one of opposition, how is domination and resistance theorized? Firstly, resistance clearly accompanies all forms of domination. However, it is not always identifiable through organized movements; resistance inheres in the very gaps, fissures, and silences of hegemonic narratives. Resistance is encoded in the practices of remembering, and of writing. Agency is thus figured in the small, day-to-day practices and struggles of Third World women. Coherence of politics and of action comes from a sociality that itself perhaps needs to be rethought. The very practice of remembering against the grain of "public" or hegemonic history, of locating the silences and the struggle to assert knowledge that is outside the parameters of the dominant, suggests a rethinking of sociality itself.

Perhaps Dorothy Smith's concept of relations of rule can provide a way of linking institutions and structures with the politics of everyday life that is the basis of this formulation of struggle and agency. For instance, the notion "the personal is political" must be rethought if we take seriously the challenge of collective agency posed by these narratives. Similarly, the definition of personal/public life as it has been formulated in feminist theoretical work has to undergo a radical reexamination. I introduce these questions here in an attempt to suggest that we need to renegotiate how we conceive of the relation of self- and collective consciousness and agency; and specifically the connections between this and historical and institutional questions. These narratives are thus an essential context in which to analyze Third World women's engagement with feminism, especially since they help us understand the epistemological issues which arise through the politicization of consciousness, our daily practices of survival and resistance.

To summarize, the first part of this chapter delineates the urgency and necessity to rethink feminist praxis and theory within a cross-cultural, international framework, and discusses the assumption of Third World women as a social category in feminist work and definitions and contests over feminism among Third World women. The second part suggests five provisional contexts for understanding Third World women's engagement with feminism. The first three chart political and historical junctures: decolonization and national liberation movements in the Third World, the consolidation of white, liberal capitalist patriarchies in Euro-America, and the operation
of multinational capital within a global economy. The last two contexts for understanding Third World women's engagement with feminism focus on discursive contexts: first, on anthropology as an example of a discourse of dominance and self-reflexivity, and second, on storytelling or autobiography (the practice of writing) as a discourse of oppositional consciousness and agency. Again, these are necessarily partial contexts meant to be suggestive rather than comprehensive—this is, after all, one possible cartography of contemporary struggles. And it is admittedly a cartography which begs numerous questions and suggests its own gaps and fissures. However, I write it in an attempt to “pivot” the center of feminist analyses, to suggest new beginnings and middles, and to argue for more finely honed historical and context-specific feminist methods. I also write out of the conviction that we must be able and willing to theorize and engage the feminist politics of women, for these are the very understandings we need to respond seriously to the challenges of race, class, and our postcolonial condition.
Biddy Martin and I began working on this project after visiting our respective “homes” in Lynchburg, Virginia, and Mumbai, in the fall of 1984—visits fraught with conflict, loss, memories, and desires that we both considered to be of central importance in thinking about our relationship to feminist politics. In spite of significant differences in our personal histories and academic backgrounds and in the displacements we both experience, the political and intellectual positions we share made it possible for us to work on, indeed to write, this essay together. Our separate readings of Minnie Bruce Pratt’s autobiographical narrative “Identity: Skin Blood Heart” (1984a) became the occasion for thinking through and developing more precisely some of the ideas about feminist theory and politics that have occupied us. We are interested in the configuration of home, identity, and community; more specifically, in the power and appeal of “home” as a concept and a desire, its occurrence as metaphor in feminist writings, and its challenging presence in the rhetoric of the New Right.

Both leftists and feminists have realized the importance of not handing over notions of home and community to the Right. Far too often, however, both male leftists and feminists have responded to the appeal of a rhetoric of home and family by merely reproducing the most conventional articulations of those terms in their own writings. In her work, Zillah Eisenstein (1984) identifies instances of what she labels revisionism within liberal, radical, and socialist feminist writings: texts by women such as Betty Friedan, Andrea Dworkin, and Jean Bethke Elshtain, in which the pursuit of safe places and ever-narrower conceptions of community relies on unexamined notions of home, family, and nation, and severely limits the scope of the feminist inquiry and struggle. The challenge, then, is to find ways of conceptualizing community differently without dismissing its appeal and importance.
It is significant that the notion of “home” has been taken up in a range of writings by women of color, who cannot easily assume “home” within feminist communities as they have been constituted. Bernice Johnson Reagon’s (1984) critique of white feminists’ incorporation of “others” into their “homes” is a warning to all feminists that “we are going to have to break out of little barred rooms” and cease holding tenaciously to the invisible and only apparently self-evident boundaries around that which we define as our own, “if we are going to have anything to do with what makes it into the next century.” Reagon does not deny the appeal and the importance of “home” but challenges us to stop confusing it with political coalition and suggests that it takes what she calls an old-age perspective to know when to engage and when to withdraw, when to break out and when to consolidate.

For our discussion of the problematics of “home,” we chose a text that demonstrates the importance of both narrative and historical specificity in the attempt to reconceptualize the relations between “home,” “identity,” and political change. The volume in which Pratt’s essay appears, Yours in Struggle: Three Feminist Perspectives on Anti-Semitism and Racism, is written by Elly Bulkin, Minnie Bruce Pratt, and Barbara Smith, each of whom ostensibly represents a different experience and identity and consequently a different (even if feminist) perspective on racism and anti-Semitism. What makes this text unusual, in spite of what its title may suggest, is its questioning of the all-too-common conflation of experience, identity, and political perspective.

What we have tried to draw out of this text is the way in which it unsettles not only any notion of feminism as an all-encompassing home but also the assumption that there are discrete, coherent, and absolutely separate identities—homes within feminism, so to speak—based on absolute divisions between various sexual, racial, or ethnic identities. What accounts for the unsettling of boundaries and identities, and the questioning of conventional notions of experience, is the task that the contributors have set for themselves: to address certain specific questions and so to situate themselves in relation to the tensions between feminism, racism, and anti-Semitism. The “unity” of the individual subject, as well as the unity of feminism, is situated and specified as the product of the interpretation of personal histories; personal histories that are themselves situated in relation to the development within feminism of particular questions and critiques.

Pratt’s autobiographical narrative is the narrative of a woman who identifies herself as white, middle-class, Christian-raised, southern, and lesbian.
She makes it very clear that unity through incorporation has too often been the white middle-class feminist's mode of adding on difference without leaving the comfort of home. What Pratt sets out to explore are the exclusions and repressions that support the seeming homogeneity, stability, and self-evidence of "white identity," which is derived from and dependent on the marginalization of differences within as well as "without."

Our decision to concentrate on Pratt's narrative has to do with our shared concern that critiques of what is increasingly identified as "white" or "Western" feminism unwittingly leave the terms of West/East, white/nonwhite polarities intact; they do so, paradoxically, by starting from the premise that Western feminist discourse is inadequate or irrelevant to women of color or Third World women. The implicit assumption here, which we wish to challenge, is that the terms of a totalizing feminist discourse are adequate to the task of articulating the situation of white women in the West. We would contest that assumption and argue that the reproduction of such polarities only serves to concede "feminism" to the "West" all over again. The potential consequence is the repeated failure to contest the feigned homogeneity of the West and what seems to be a discursive and political stability of the hierarchical West-East divide.

Pratt's essay enacts as much as it treats the contradictory relations between skin, blood, heart, and identity and between experience, identity, and community in ways that we would like to analyze and discuss in more detail. Like the essays by Smith and Bulkin that follow it, it is a form of writing that not only anticipates and integrates diverse audiences or readers but also positions the narrator as reader. The perspective is multiple and shifting, and the shifts in perspective are enabled by the attempts to define self, home, and community that are at the heart of Pratt's enterprise. The historical grounding of shifts and changes allows for an emphasis on the pleasures and terrors of interminable boundary confusions, but insists, at the same time, on our responsibility for remapping boundaries and renegotiating connections. These are partial in at least two senses of the word: politically partial, and without claim to wholeness or finality.

It is this insistence that distinguishes the work of a Reagon or a Pratt from the more abstract critiques of "feminism" and the charges of totalization that come from the ranks of antihumanist intellectuals. For without denying the importance of their vigilante attacks on humanist beliefs in "man" and Absolute Knowledge wherever they appear, it is equally important to point out the

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political limitations of an insistence on "indeterminacy" that implicitly, when not explicitly, denies the critic's own situatedness in the social, and in effect refuses to acknowledge the critic's own institutional home.

Pratt, on the contrary, succeeds in carefully taking apart the bases of her own privilege by resituating herself again and again in the social, by constantly referring to the materiality of the situation in which she finds herself. The form of the personal historical narrative forces her to reanchor herself repeatedly in each of the positions from which she speaks, even as she works to expose the illusory coherence of those positions. For the subject of such a narrative, it is not possible to speak from, or on behalf of, an abstract indeterminacy. Certainly, Pratt's essay would be considered a "conventional" (and therefore suspect) narrative from the point of view of contemporary deconstructive methodologies, because of its collapsing of author and text, its unreflected authorial intentionality, and its claims to personal and political authenticity.

Basic to the (at least implicit) disavowal of conventionally realist and autobiographical narrative by deconstructionist critics is the assumption that difference can emerge only through self-referential language, that is, through certain relatively specific formal operations present in the text or performed upon it. Our reading of Pratt's narrative contends that a so-called conventional narrative such as Pratt's is not only useful but essential in addressing the politically and theoretically urgent questions surrounding identity politics. Just as Pratt refuses the methodological imperative to distinguish between herself as actual biographical referent and her narrator, we have at points allowed ourselves to let our reading of the text speak for us.

It is noteworthy that some of the American feminist texts and arguments that have been set up as targets to be taken apart by deconstructive moves are texts and arguments that have been critiqued from within "American" feminist communities for their homogenizing, even colonialist gestures; they have been critiqued, in fact, by those most directly affected by the exclusions that have made possible certain radical and cultural feminist generalizations. Antihumanist attacks on "feminism" usually set up "American feminism" as a "straw man" and so contribute to the production—or, at the very least, the reproduction—of an image of "Western feminism" as conceptually and politically unified in its monolithically imperialist moves.

We do not wish to deny that too much of the conceptual and political work of "Western" feminists is encumbered by analytic strategies that do indeed
homogenize the experiences and conditions of women across time and culture; nor do we wish to deny that “Western” feminists have often taken their own positions as referent, thereby participating in the colonialist moves characteristic of traditional humanist scholarship. However, such critiques run the risk of falling into culturalist arguments, and these tend to have the undesired effect of solidifying the identification of feminism with the West rather than challenging the hegemony of specific analytic and political positions. The refusal to engage in the kind of feminist analysis that is more differentiated, more finely articulated, and more attentive to the problems raised in poststructuralist theory makes “bad feminism” a foil supporting the privilege of the critics’ “indeterminacy.” Wary of the limitations of an antihumanism that refuses to rejoin the political, we purposely chose a text that speaks from within “Western feminist discourse” and attempts to expose the bases and supports of privilege even as it renegotiates political and personal alliances.

One of the most striking aspects of “Identity: Skin Blood Heart” is the text’s movement away from the purely personal, visceral experience of identity suggested by the title to a complicated working out of the relationship between home, identity, and community that calls into question the notion of a coherent, historically continuous, stable identity and works to expose the political stakes concealed in such equations. An effective way of analyzing Pratt’s conceptualization of these relationships is to focus on the manner in which the narrative works by grounding itself in the geography, demography, and architecture of the communities that are her “homes”; these factors function as an organizing mode in the text, providing a specific concreteness and movement for the narrative.

Correspondingly, the narrative politicizes the geography, demography, and architecture of these communities—Pratt’s homes at various times of her history—by discovering local histories of exploitation and struggle. These are histories quite unlike the ones she is familiar with, the ones with which she grew up. Pratt problematizes her ideas about herself by juxtaposing the assumed histories of her family and childhood, predicated on the invisibility of the histories of people unlike her, to the layers of exploitation and struggles of different groups of people for whom these geographical sites were also home. Each of the three primary geographical locations—Alabama (the home of her childhood and college days), North Carolina (the place of her marriage and coming out as a lesbian), and Washington, D.C. (characterized by her acute awareness of racism, anti-Semitism, class, and global politics)—
is constructed on the tension between two specific modalities: being home and not being home. "Being home" refers to the place where one lives within familiar, safe, protected boundaries; "not being home" is a matter of realizing that home was an illusion of coherence and safety based on the exclusion of specific histories of oppression and resistance, the repression of differences even within oneself. Because these locations acquire meaning and function as sites of personal and historical struggles, they work against the notion of an unproblematic geographic location of home in Pratt's narrative. Similarly, demographic information functions to ground and concretize race, class, and gender conflicts. Illusions of home are always undercut by the discovery of the hidden demographics of particular places, as demography also carries the weight of histories of struggle.

Pratt speaks of being "shaped" in relation to the buildings and streets in the town in which she lived. Architecture and the layouts of particular towns provide concrete, physical anchoring points in relation to which she both sees and does not see certain people and things in the buildings and on the streets. However, the very stability, familiarity, and security of these physical structures are undermined by the discovery that these buildings and streets witnessed and obscured particular race, class, and gender struggles. The realization that these "growing-up places" are home towns where Pratt's eye "has only let in what I have been taught to see" politicizes and undercuts any physical anchors she might use to construct a coherent notion of home or her identity in relation to it.

Each of us carries around those growing-up places, the institutions, a sort of backdrop, a stage set. So often we act out the present against the backdrop of the past, within a frame of perception that is so familiar, so safe that it is terrifying to risk changing it even when we know our perceptions are distorted, limited, constricted by that old view.

The traces of her past remain with her but must be challenged and reinterpreted. Pratt's own histories are in constant flux. There is no linear progression based on "that old view," no developmental notion of her own identity or self. There is instead a constant expansion of her "constricted eye," a necessary reevaluation and return to the past in order to move forward to the present. Geography, demography, and architecture, as well as the configuration of her relationships to particular people (her father, her lover, her workmate), serve to indicate the fundamentally relational nature of identity and the negations on which the assumption of a singular, fixed, and essential self
is based. For the narrator, such negativity is represented by a rigid identity such as that of her father, which sustains its appearance of stability by defining itself in terms of what it is not: not black, not female, not Jewish, not Catholic, not poor, and so on. The “self” in this narrative is not an essence or truth concealed by patriarchal layers of deceit and lying in wait of discovery, revelation, or birth.4

It is this very conception of self that Pratt likens to entrapment, constriction, a bounded fortress that must be transgressed, shattered, opened onto that world that has been made invisible and threatening by the security of home. While Pratt is aware that stable notions of self and identity are based on exclusion and secured by terror, she is also aware of the risk and terror inherent in breaking through the walls of home. The consciousness of these contradictions characterizes the narrative.

In order to indicate the fundamentally constructive, interpretive nature of Pratt’s narrative, we have chosen to analyze the text following its own narrative organization in three different scenarios: scenarios that are characterized not by chronological development but by discontinuous moments of consciousness. The scenarios are constructed around moments in Pratt’s own history which propel her in new directions through their fundamental instability and built-in contradictions.

Scenario 1

I live in a part of Washington, D.C that white suburbanites called “the jungle” during the uprising of the ’60s—perhaps still do, for all I know. When I walk the two-and-a-half blocks to H St. NE, to stop in at the bank, to leave my boots off at the shoe-repair-and-lock shop, I am most usually the only white person in sight. I’ve seen two other whites, women, in the year I’ve lived here. [This does not count white folks in cars, passing through. In official language, H St. NE, is known as “The H Street Corridor,” as in something to be passed through quickly, going from your place, on the way to elsewhere.] (II)

This paragraph of the text locates Minnie Bruce Pratt in a place that does not exist as a legitimate possibility for home on a white people’s map of Washington, D.C.: H Street N.E., “the jungle,” “the H. Street Corridor as in something to be passed through quickly, going from your place to elsewhere” (II). That,
then, is potentially Pratt’s home, the community in which she lives. But this “jungle,” this corridor, is located at the edge of homes of white folk. It is a place outside the experience of white people, where Pratt must be the outsider because she is white. This “being on the edge” is what characterizes her “being in the world as it is,” as opposed to remaining within safe bounded places with their illusion of acceptance. “I will try to be at the edge between my fear and outside, on the edge at my skin, listening, asking what new thing will I hear, will I see, will I let myself feel, beyond the fear,” she writes. It is her situation on the edge that expresses the desire and the possibility of breaking through the narrow circle called home without pretense that she can or should “jump out of her skin” or deny her past.

The salience of demography, a white woman in a black neighborhood, afraid to be too familiar and neighborly with black people, is acutely felt. Pratt is comforted by the sounds of the voices of black people, for they make her “feel at home” and remind her of her father’s southern voice, until she runs into Mr. Boone, the janitor with the downcast head and the “yes ma’ams,” and Pratt responds in “the horrid cheerful accents of a white lady.” The pain is not just the pain of rejection by this black man; it is the pain of acknowledging the history of the oppression and separation of different groups of people that shatters the protective boundaries of her self and renders her desire to speak with others problematic. The context of this personal interaction is set immediately in terms of geographical and political history. Mr. Boone’s place of origin (hometown) is evoked through the narration of the history of local resistance struggles in the region from which he comes. He’s a dark, red-brown man from the Yemessee in South Carolina — that swampy land of Indian resistance and armed communities of fugitive slaves, that marshy land at the headwaters of the Combahee, once site of enormous rice plantations and location of Harriet Tubman’s successful military action that freed many slaves.

This history of resistance has the effect of disrupting forever all memories of a safe, familiar southern home. As a result of this interaction, Pratt now remembers that home was repressive space built on the surrendering of all responsibility. Pratt’s self-reflection, brought on by a consciousness of difference, is nourished and expanded by thinking contextually of other histories and of her own responsibility and implication in them. What we find extraordinary about Pratt as narrator (and person) is her refusal to allow guilt to trap her within the boundaries of a coherent “white” identity. It is this very refusal that makes it possible for her to make the effort to educate herself
about the histories of her own and other peoples—an education that indicates to her her own implication in those histories. Pratt's approach achieves significance in the context of other white feminists' responses to the charge of racism in the women's movement. An all-too-common response has been self-paralyzing guilt and/or defensiveness; another has been the desire to be educated by women of color. The problem is exacerbated by the tendency on the part of some women of color to assume the position of ultimate critic or judge on the basis of the authenticity of their personal experience of oppression. An interesting example of the assignment of fixed positions—the educator/critic (woman of color) and the guilty and silent listener (white woman)—is an essay by Elizabeth Spelman and Maria Lugones (1983). The dynamics set up would seem to exempt both parties from the responsibilities of working through the complex historical relations between and among structures of domination and oppression.

In this scenario, the street scene is particularly effective, both spatially and metaphorically. The street evokes a sense of constant movement, change, and temporality. For instance, Pratt can ask herself why the young black woman did not speak to her, why she herself could not speak to the professional white woman in the morning but does at night, why the woman does not respond—all in the space of one evening's walk down three blocks. The meetings on the street also allow for a focus on the racial and ethnic demography of the community as a way of localizing racial, sexual, and class tensions. Since her present location is nowhere (the space does not exist for white people), she constantly has to problematize and define herself anew in relation to people she meets in the street. There is an acute consciousness of being white, woman, lesbian, and Christian-raised and of which of these aspects is salient in different "speaking": "Instead, when I walk out in my neighborhood, each speaking to another person has become fraught for me, with the history of race and sex and class; as I walk I have a constant interior discussion with myself, questioning how I acknowledge the presence of another, what I know or don't know about them, and what it means how they acknowledge me" (12). Thus, walking down the street and speaking to various people—a young white man, young black woman, young professional white woman, young black man, older white woman are all rendered acutely complex and contradictory in terms of actual speakings, imagined speakings, and actual and imagined motivations, responses, and implications—there is no possibility of a coherent self with a continuity of responses across these different
"speaking-to's." History intervenes. For instance, a respectful answer from a young black man might well be "the response violently extorted by history." The voices, sounds, hearing, and sight in particular interactions or within "speaking-to's" carry with them their own particular histories; this narrative mode breaks the boundaries of Pratt's experience of being protected, of being a majority.

Scenario 2

Yet I was shaped by my relation to those buildings and to the people in the buildings, by ideas of who should be in the Board of Education, of who should be in the bank handling money, of who should have the guns and the keys to the jail, of who should be in the jail; and I was shaped by what I didn't see, or didn't notice, on those streets. (17)

The second scenario is constructed in relation to Pratt's childhood home in Alabama and deals very centrally with her relation to her father. Again, she explores that relationship to her father in terms of the geography, demography, and architecture of the hometown; again, she reconstructs it by uncovering knowledges, not only the knowledge of those others who were made invisible to her as a child but also the suppressed knowledge of her own family background. The importance of her elaborating the relation to her father through spatial relations and historical knowledges lies in the contextualization of that relation, and the consequent avoidance of any purely psychological explanation. What is affected, then, is the unsettling of any self-evident relation between blood, skin, heart. And yet, here as elsewhere, the essential relation between blood, skin, heart, home, and identity is challenged without dismissing the power and appeal of those connections.

Pratt introduces her childhood home and her father in order to explain the source of her need to change what she was born into to explain what she, or any person who benefits from privileges of class and race, has to gain from change. This kind of self-reflexivity characterizes the entire narrative and takes the form of an attempt to avoid the roles and points of enunciation that she identifies as the legacy of her culture: the roles of judge, martyr, preacher, and peacemaker, and the typically white, Christian, middle-class, and liberal pretense of a concern for others, an abstract moral or ethical concern for what is right. Her effort to explain her own need to change is elabo-
rated through the memory of childhood scenes, full of strong and suggestive architectural/spatial metaphors that are juxtaposed with images suggesting alternative possibilities. The effort to explain her motivation for change reminds her of her father: “When I try to think of this, I think of my father” (16). Pratt recounts a scene from her childhood in which her father took her up the marble steps of the courthouse in the center of the town, the courthouse in which her grandfather had judged for forty years, to the clock tower in order to show her the town from the top and the center. But the father’s desire to have her see as he saw, to position her in relation to her town and the world as he was positioned, failed. She was unable, as a small child, to make it to the top of the clock tower and could not see what she would have seen had she been her father or taken his place.

From her vantage point as an adult, she is now able to reconstruct and analyze what she would have seen and would not have seen from the center and the top of the town. She would have seen the Methodist church and the Health Department, for example, and she would not have seen the sawmill of Four Points, where the white mill folks lived, or the houses of blacks in the Veneer Mill quarters. She had not been able to take that height because she was not her father and could not become like him: she was a white girl, not a boy. This assertion of her difference from the father is undercut, however, in a reversal characteristic of the moves enacted throughout the essay, when she begins a new paragraph by acknowledging: “Yet I was shaped by my relation to those buildings and to the people in the buildings.”

What she has gained by rejecting the father’s position and vision, by acknowledging her difference from him, is represented as a way of looking, a capacity for seeing the world in overlapping circles, “like movement on the millpond after a fish has jumped, instead of the courthouse square with me at the middle, even if I am on the ground.” The contrast between the vision that her father would have her learn and her own vision, her difference and “need,” emerges as the contrast between images of constriction, of entrapment, or ever-narrowing circles with, on the one hand, a bounded self at the center—the narrow steps to the roof of the courthouse, the clock tower with a walled ledge—and, on the other hand, the image of the millpond with its ever-shifting centers. The apparently stable, centered position of the father is revealed to be profoundly unstable, based on exclusions, and characterized by terror.

Change, however, is not a simple escape from constraint to liberation.
There is no shedding the literal fear and figurative law of the father and no reaching a final realm of freedom. There is no new place, no new home. Since neither her view of history nor her construction of herself through it is linear, the past, home, and the father leave traces that are constantly reabsorbed into a shifting vision. She lives, after all, on the edge. Indeed, that early experience of separation and difference from the father is remembered not only in terms of the possibility of change but also in relation to the pain of loss, the loneliness of change, the undiminished desire for home, for familiarity, for some coexistence of familiarity and difference. The day she couldn’t make it to the top of the tower “marks the last time I can remember us doing something together, just the two of us; thereafter, I knew on some level that my place was with women, not with him, not with men.”

This statement would seem to make the divisions simple, would seem to provide an overriding explanation of her desire for change, for dealing with racism and anti-Semitism, would seem to make her one of a monolithic group of others in relation to the white father. However, this division, too, is not allowed to remain stable and so to be seen as a simple determinant of identity.

Near the end of her narrative, Pratt recounts a dream in which her father entered her room carrying something like a heavy box, which he put down on her desk. After he left, she noticed that the floor of her room had become a field of dirt with rows of tiny green seed just sprouting. We quote from her narration of the dream, her ambivalence about her father’s presence, and her interpretation of it:

He was so tired; I flung my hands out angrily, told him to go, back to my mother; but crying, because my heart ached; he was my father and so tired. . . . The box was still there, with what I feared: my responsibility for what the men of my culture have done. . . . I was angry: why should I be left with this: I didn’t want it: I’d done my best for years to reject it: I wanted no part of what was in it: the benefits of my privilege, the restrictions, the injustice, the pain, the broken urgings of the heart, the unknown horrors. And yet it is mine: I am my father’s daughter in the present, living in a world he and my folks helped create. A month after I dreamed this he died; I honor the grief of his life by striving to change much of what he believed in: and my own grief by acknowledging that I saw him caught in the grip of racial, sexual, cultural fears that I still am trying to understand in myself. (53)
Only one aspect of experience is given a unifying and originating function in the text: that is her lesbianism and love for other women, which has motivated and continues to motivate her efforts to reconceptualize and recreate both her self and home. A careful reading of the narrative demonstrates the complexity of lesbianism, which is constructed as an effect, as well as a source, of her political and familial positions—its significance, that is, is demonstrated in relation to other experiences rather than assumed as essential determinant.

What lesbianism becomes as the narrative unfolds is that which makes “home” impossible, which makes her self nonidentical, which makes her vulnerable, removing her from the protection afforded those women within privileged races and classes who do not transgress a limited sphere of movement. Quite literally, it is her involvement with another woman that separates the narrator not only from her husband but from her children as well. It is that which threatens to separate her from her mother, and that which remains a silence between herself and her father. That silence is significant, since, as she points out—and this is a crucial point—her lesbianism is precisely what she can deny, and indeed must deny, in order to benefit fully from the privilege of being white and middle-class and Christian. She can deny it, but only at great expense to herself. Her lesbianism is what she experiences most immediately as the limitation imposed on her by the family, culture, race, and class that afforded her both privilege and comfort, at a price. Learning at what price privilege, comfort, home, and secure notions of self are purchased, the price to herself and ultimately to others is what makes lesbianism a political motivation as well as a personal experience.

It is significant that lesbianism is neither marginalized nor essentialized but constructed at various levels of experience and abstraction. There are at least two ways in which lesbianism has been isolated in feminist discourse: the homophobic oversight and relegation of it to the margins, and the lesbian-feminist centering of it, which has had at times the paradoxical effect of removing lesbianism and sexuality from their embeddedness in social relations. In Pratt’s narrative, lesbianism is that which exposes the extreme limits of what passes itself off as simply human, as universal, as unconstrained by identity, namely, the position of the white middle class. It is also a positive source of solidarity, community, and change. Change has to do with the transgression of boundaries, those boundaries so carefully, so tenaciously, so invisibly drawn around white identity. Change has to do with the transgression of those boundaries.

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The insight that white, Christian, middle-class identity, as well as comfort and home, is purchased at a high price is articulated very compellingly in relation to her father. It is significant that there is so much attention to her relation to her father, from whom she describes herself as having been estranged—significant and exemplary of what we think is so important about this narrative. What gets articulated are the contradictions in that relation, her difference from the father, her rejection of his positions, and at the same time her connections to him, her love for him, the ways in which she is his daughter. The complexity of the father-daughter relationship and Pratt’s acknowledgment of the differences within it—rather than simply between herself and her father—make it impossible to be satisfied with a notion of difference from the father, literal or figurative, which would (and in much feminist literature does) exempt the daughter from her implication in the structures of privilege/oppression, structures that operate in ways much more complex than the male/female split itself. The narrator expresses the pain, the confusion attendant upon this complexity.

The narrative recounts the use of threat and of protections to consolidate home, identity, community, and privilege, and in the process exposes the underside of the father’s protection. Pratt recalls a memory of a night, during the height of the civil rights demonstrations in Alabama, when her father called her in to read her an article in which Martin Luther King Jr. was accused of sexually abusing young teenage girls. “I can only guess that he wanted me to feel that my danger, my physical, sexual danger, would be the result of the release of others from containment. I felt frightened and profoundly endangered, by King, by my father: I could not answer him. It was the first, the only time, I could not answer him. It was the first the only time he spoke of sex, in any way, to me” (36–37).

What emerges is the consolidation of the white home in response to a threatening outside. The rhetorics of sexual victimization or vulnerability of white women is used to establish and enforce unity among whites and to create the myth of the black rapist. Once again, her experience within the family is reinterpreted in relation to the history of race relations in an “outside” in which the family is implicated. What Pratt integrates in the text at such points is a wealth of historical information and analysis of the ideological and social/political operations beyond her “home.” In addition to the historical information she unearths both about the atrocities committed in the name of protection, by the Ku Klux Klan and white society in general, and about the
resistance to those forms of oppression, she points to the underside of the rhetoric of home, protection, and threatening others that were promoted by Reagan and the New Right. “It is this threatening protection’ that white Christian men in the U.S. are now offering” (38).

When one conceives of power differently, in terms of its local, institutional, discursive formations, of its positiveness, and in terms of the production rather than suppression of forces, then unity is exposed to be a potentially repressive fiction. It is at the moment at which groups and individuals are conceived as agents, as social actors, as desiring subjects that unity, in the sense of coherent group identity, commonality, and shared experience, becomes difficult. Individuals do not fit neatly into unidimensional, self-identical categories. Hence the need for a new sense of political community that gives up the desire for the kind of home where the suppression of positive differences underwrites familial identity. Pratt’s narrative makes it clear that connections have to be made at levels other than abstract political interests. And the ways in which intimacy and emotional solidarity figure in notions of political community avoid an all-too-common trivialization of the emotional, on the one hand, and romanticization of the political, on the other.

Scenario 3

Every day I drove around the market house, carrying my two boys between home and grammar school and day care. To me it was an impediment to the flow of traffic, awkward, anachronistic. Sometimes in early spring light it seemed quaint. I had no knowledge and no feeling of the sweat and blood of people’s lives that had been mortared into its bricks: nor of their independent joy apart from that place. (21)

The third scenario involves Pratt’s life in an eastern rural North Carolina town, to which she came in 1974 with her husband and two children. Once again Pratt characterizes her relation to the town, as well as to her husband and children, by means of demographic and architectural markers and metaphors that situate her at the periphery of this “place which is so much like home”: a place in which everything would seem to revolve around a stable center, in this case the market house: “I drove around the market house four times a day, traveling on the surface of my own life: circular, repetitive, like one of the games at the county fair” (22). Once again she is invited to view her home
town from the top and center, specifically from the point of view of the white "well-to-do folks," for whom the history of the market house consisted of the fruits, the vegetables, and the tobacco exchanged there. “But not slaves, they said” (21). However, the black waiter serving the well-to-do in the private club overlooking the center of town contests this account, providing facts and dates of the slave trade in that town. This contradiction leaves a trace but does not become significant to her view of her life in that town, a town so much like the landscape of her childhood. It does not become significant, that is, until her own resistance to the limitations of home and family converges with her increasing knowledge of the resistance of other people; converges but is not conflated with those other struggles. What Pratt uncovers of the town histories is multilayered and complex. She speaks of the relation of different groups of people to the town and their particular histories of resistance—the breaking up of Klan rallies by Lumbee Indians, the long tradition of black culture and resistance, Jewish traditions of resistance, anti-Vietnam protest, and lesbians’ defiance of military codes—with no attempt to unify or equate the various struggles under a grand polemics of oppression. The coexistence of these histories gives the narrative its complex, rich texture. Both the town and her relation to it change as these histories of struggle are narrated. Indeed, there is an explicit structural connection between moments of fear and loss of former homes with the recognition of the importance of interpretation and struggle. From our perspectives, the integrity of the narrative and the sense of self have to do with the refusal to make easy divisions and with the unrelenting exploration of the ways in which the desire for home, for security, for protection—and not only the desire for them, but the expectation of a right to these things—operates in Pratt’s own conception of political work. She describes her involvement in political work as having begun when feminism swept through the North Carolina town in which she was living with husband and her two sons in the 1970s, a period in her life when she felt threatened as a woman and was forced to see herself as part of a class of people; that she describes as anathema to the self-concept of middle-class white people who would just like to “be,” unconstrained by labels, by identities, by consignment to a group, and would prefer to ignore the fact that their existence and social place are anything other than self-evident, natural, human.

What differentiates Pratt’s narration of her development from other feminist narratives of political awakening is its tentativeness, its consisting of fits and starts, and the absence of linear progress toward a visible end. This nar-
rator pursues the extent and the ways in which she carries her white, middle-
class conceptions of home around with her and the ways in which they in-
form her relation to politics. There is an irreconcilable tension between the
search for a secure place from which to speak, within which to act, and the
awareness of the price at which secure places are bought, the awareness of
the exclusions, the denials, the blindesses on which they are predicated.

The search for a secure place is articulated in its ambivalence and com-
plexity through the ambiguous use of the words “place” and “space” in pre-
cisely the ways they have become commonplace within feminist discourse.
The moments of terror when she is brought face to face with the fact that
she is “homesick with nowhere to go,” that she has no place, the “kind of
vertigo” she feels upon learning of her own family’s history of racism and
slaveholding, the sensation of her body having no fixed place to be, are re-
membered concurrently with moments of hope, when “she thought she had
the beginning of a place for myself.”

What she tried to recreate as a feminist, a woman aware of her position
vis-à-vis men as a group, is critiqued as a childish place:

Raised to believe that I could be where I wanted and have what I wanted,
as a grown woman I thought I could simply claim what I wanted, even the
making of a new place to live with other women. I had no understanding
of the limits that I lived within, nor of how much my memory and my ex-
perience of a safe space to be was based on places secured by omission,
exclusions or violence, and on my submitting to the limits of that place.

(25–26)

The self-reflexiveness that characterizes the narrative becomes especially
clear in her discussion of white feminists’ efforts at outreach in her North
Carolina community. She and her National Organization for Women fellow
workers had gone forward “to a new place”: “Now we were throwing back
safety lines to other women, to pull them in as if they were drowning. What I
felt, deep down, was hope that they would join me in my place, which would
be the way I wanted it. I didn’t want to have to limit myself” (30).

However, it is not only her increasing knowledge of her exclusion of others
from that place that initiates her rethinking. What is most compelling is her
account of her realization that her work in NOW was also based on the exclu-
sion of parts of herself, specifically her lesbianism. Those moments when
she would make it the basis of a sameness with other women, a sameness

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that would make a new place too, is undercut by her seeing the denials, the exclusions, and the violence that are the conditions of privilege and indeed of love in its Christian formulation. The relationship between love and the occlusion or appropriation of the other finds expression in her description of her attempts to express her love for her Jewish lover in a poem filled with images from the Jewish tradition, a way of assuming, indeed insisting upon, their similarity by appropriating the other's culture.

The ways in which appropriation or stealth, in the colonial gesture, reproduces itself in the political positions of white feminists is formulated convincingly in a passage about what Pratt calls "cultural impersonation," a term that refers to the tendency among white women to respond with guilt and self-denial to the knowledge of racism and anti-Semitism, and to borrow or take on the identity of the other in order to avoid not only guilt but pain and self-hatred.¹¹ It is Pratt's discussion of the negative effects, political and personal, of cultural impersonation that raises the crucial issue of what destructive forms a monolithic (and overly theoretical) critique of identity can take. The claim to a lack of identity or positionality is itself based on privilege, on a refusal to accept responsibility for one's implication in actual historical or social relations, on a denial that positionalities exist or that they matter, the denial of one's own personal history and the claim to a total separation from it. What Minnie Bruce Pratt refuses over and over is the facile equation of her own situation with that of other people:

When, after Greensboro, I groped toward an understanding of injustice done to others, injustice done outside my narrow circle of being, and to folks not like me, I began to grasp, through my own experience, something of what that injustice might be. But I did not feel that my new understanding simply moved me into a place where I joined others to struggle with them against common injustices. Because I was implicated in the doing of some of these injustices, and I held myself, and my people, responsible. (35)

The tension between the desire for home, for synchrony, for sameness, and the realization of the repressions and violence that make home, harmony, sameness imaginable, and that enforce it, is made clear in the movement of the narrative by very careful and effective reversals that do not erase the positive desire for unity, for oneness, but destabilize and undercut it. The relation
between what Teresa de Lauretis has called the negativity of theory and the positivity of politics is a tension enacted over and over again by this text. The possibility of recreating herself and of creating new forms of community not based on "home" depends for Minnie Bruce Pratt upon work and upon knowledge, not only of the traditions and culture of others but also of the positive forms of struggle within her own. It depends on acknowledging not only her ignorance and her prejudices but also her fears, above all the fear of loss that accompanies change.

The risk of rejection by one's own kind, by one's family, when one exceeds the limits laid out or the self-definition of the group, is not made easy; again, the emphasis on her profoundly ambivalent relationship to her father is crucial. When the alternatives would seem to be either the enclosing, encircling, constraining circle of home, or nowhere to go, the risk is enormous. The assumption of, or desire for, another safe place like "home" is challenged by the realization that "unity"—interpersonal as well as political—is itself necessarily fragmentary, itself that which is struggled for, chosen, and hence unstable by definition; it is not based on "sameness," and there is no perfect fit. But there is agency as opposed to passivity.

The fear of rejection by one's own kind refers not only to the family of origin but also to the potential loss of a second family, the women's community, with its implicit and often unconscious replication of the conditions of home. When we justify the homogeneity of the women's community in which we move on the basis of the need for community, the need for home, what, Pratt asks, distinguishes our community from the justifications advanced by women who have joined the Klan for "family, community, and protection"? The relationship between the loss of community and the loss of self is crucial. To the extent that identity is collapsed with home and community and based on homogeneity and comfort, on skin, blood, and heart, the giving up of home will necessarily mean the giving up of self and vice versa.

Then comes the fear of nowhere to go: no old home with family: no new one with women like ourselves: and no place to be expected with folks who have been systematically excluded by ours. And with our fear comes the doubt: Can I maintain my principles against my need for the love and presence of others like me? It is lonely to be separated from others because of injustice, but it is also lonely to break with our own in opposition to that injustice. (50)

What's Home Got to Do with It?
The essay ends with a tension between despair and optimism over political conditions and the possibilities for change. Pratt walks down Maryland Avenue in Washington, D.C. — the town that is now her “hometown” — protesting against U.S. invasions, Grenada, the marines in Lebanon, the war in Central America, the acquittals of the North Carolina Klan and Nazi perpetrators. The narrative has come full circle, and her consciousness of her “place” in this town — the capital — encompasses both local and global politics and her own implication in them. The essay ends with the following statement: “I continue the struggle with myself and the world I was born in” (57).

Pratt’s essay on feminism, racism, and anti-Semitism is not a litany of oppression but an elaboration, indeed an enactment, of careful and constant differentiations that refuses the all-too-easy polemic that opposes victims to perpetrators. The exposure of the arbitrariness and the instability of positions within systems of oppression evidences a conception of power that refuses totalizations and can therefore account for the possibility of resistance. “The system” is revealed to be not one but multiple, overlapping, intersecting systems or relations that are historically constructed and recreated through everyday practices and interactions and that implicate the individual in contradictory ways. All of that without denying the operations of actual power differences, overdetermined though they may be, reconceptualizing power without giving up the possibility of conceiving power.

Community, then, is the product of work, of struggle; it is inherently unstable, contextual; it has to be constantly reevaluated in relation to critical political priorities; and it is the product of interpretation, interpretation based on an attention to history, to the concrete, to what Foucault (1980) has called subjugated knowledges. There is also, however, a strong suggestion that community is related to experience, to history. For if identity and community are not the product of essential connections, neither are they merely the product of political urgency or necessity. For Pratt, they are a constant reconceptualizing of the relationship between personal/group history and political priorities.

It is crucial, then, to avoid two traps, the purely experiential and the theoretical oversight of personal and collective histories. In Pratt’s narrative, personal history acquires a materiality in the constant rewriting of herself in relation to shifting interpersonal and political contexts. This rewriting is an interpretive act which is itself embedded in social and political practice:
In this city where I am no longer of the majority by color or culture, I tell myself every day: In this world you aren't the superior race or culture, and never were, whatever you were raised to think: and are you getting ready to be in this world?

And I answer myself back: I'm trying to learn how to live, to have the speaking-to extend beyond the moment's word, to act so as to change the unjust circumstances that keep us from being able to speak to each other; I'm trying to get a little closer to the longed-for but unrealized world, where we each are able to live, but not by trying to make someone less than us, not by someone else's blood or pain. Yes, that's what I'm trying to do with my living now. (13)

We have used our reading of this text to open up the question of how political community might be reconceptualized within feminist practice. We do not intend to suggest that Pratt's essay, or any single autobiographical narrative, offers an answer. Indeed, what this text has offered is a pretext for posing questions. The conflation of Pratt the person with the narrator and subject of this text has led us and our students to want to ask, for example, how such individual self-reflection and critical practice might translate into the building of political collectivity. And to consider more specifically the possible political implications and effects of a white middle-class woman's "choice" to move to H Street N.E. Certainly, we might usefully keep in mind that the approach to identity, to unity, and to political alliances in Pratt's text is itself grounded in and specific to her complex positionalities in a society divided very centrally by race, gender, class, ethnicity, and sexualities.
Feminist and antiracist struggles now face some of the same urgent questions encountered in the 1970s. After decades of feminist political activism and scholarship in a variety of sociopolitical and geographical locations, questions of difference (sex, race, class, nation), experience, and history remain at the center of feminist analysis. Only, at least in the U.S. academy, feminists no longer have to contend as they did in the 1970s with phallocentric denials of the legitimacy of gender as a category of analysis. Instead, the crucial questions now concern the construction, examination, and, most significantly, the institutionalization of difference within feminist discourses. It is this institutionalization of difference that concerns me here. Specifically, I ask the following question: how does the politics of location in the United States of the late twentieth and early twenty-first century determine and produce experience and difference as analytical and political categories in feminist “cross-cultural” work? By the term “politics of location” I refer to the historical, geographical, cultural, psychic, and imaginative boundaries that provide the ground for political definition and self-definition for contemporary U.S. feminists.¹

Since the 1970s, there have been key paradigm shifts in Western feminist theory. These shifts can be traced to political, historical, methodological, and philosophical developments in our understanding of questions of power, struggle, and social transformation. Feminists have drawn on decolonization movements around the world, on movements for racial equality, on peasant struggles, and on gay and lesbian movements, as well as on the methodologies of Marxism, psychoanalysis, deconstruction, and poststructuralism to situate our thinking. While these developments have often led to progressive, indeed radical, analyses of sexual difference, the focus on questions of subjectivity and identity that is a hallmark of contemporary feminist theory
has also had some problematic effects in the area of race and Third World/postcolonial studies. One problematic effect of the postmodern critique of essentialist notions of identity has been the dissolution of the category of race—however, this is often accomplished at the expense of a recognition of racism. Another effect has been the generation of discourses of diversity and pluralism grounded in an apolitical, often individualized identity politics. Here, questions of historical interconnection are transformed into questions of discrete and separate histories (or even herstories) and into questions of identity politics (this is different from recognizing the significance of the politics of identity). I work through some of the effects here by suggesting the importance of analyzing and theorizing difference in the context of feminist cross-cultural work. Through this theorization of experience, I suggest that historicizing and locating political agency is a necessary alternative to formulations of the “universality” of gendered oppression and struggles. This universality of gender oppression is problematic, based as it is on the assumption that the categories of race and class have to be invisible for gender to be visible. Claiming universality of gender oppression is not the same as arguing for the universal rights of women based on the particularities of our experiences. I argue that the challenges posed by black and Third World feminists can point the way toward a more precise, transformative feminist politics based on the specificity of our historical and cultural locations and our common contexts of struggle. Thus, the juncture of feminist and antiracist/Third World/postcolonial studies is of great significance, materially as well as methodologically.

Feminist analyses that attempt to cross national, racial, and ethnic boundaries produce and reproduce difference in particular ways. This codification of difference occurs through the naturalization of analytic categories that are supposed to have cross-cultural validity. I attempt an analysis of two feminist texts that address the turn of the century directly. Both texts also foreground analytic categories that address questions of cross-cultural, cross-national differences among women. Robin Morgan’s “Planetary Feminism: The Politics of the 21st Century” and Bernice Johnson Reagon’s “Coalition Politics: Turning the Century” are both movement texts and are written for diverse mass audiences. Morgan’s essay forms the introduction to her 1984 book, Sisterhood is Global: The International Women’s Movement Anthology, while Reagon’s piece was first given as a talk at the West Coast Women’s Music Festival in 1981 and has since been published in Barbara Smith’s 1983 anthology, Home Girls:
A Black Feminist Anthology. Both essays construct contesting notions of experience, difference, and struggle within and across cultural boundaries. I stage an encounter between these texts because they represent for me, despite their differences from each other, an alternative presence—a thought, an idea, a record of activism and struggle—that can help me both locate and position myself in relation to “history.” Through this presence, and with these texts, I can hope to approach the new century and not be overwhelmed.

The status of “female” or “woman/women’s” experience has always been a central concern in feminist discourse. After all, it is on the basis of shared experience that feminists of different political persuasions have argued for unity or identity among women. Teresa de Lauretis, in fact, gives this question a sort of foundational status: “The relation of experience to discourse, finally, is what is at issue in the definition of feminism” (1986, 5). Feminist discourses, critical and liberatory in intent, are not thereby exempt from inscription in their internal power relations. Thus the recent definition, classification, and assimilation of categories of experientially based notions of “woman” (or analogously, in some analyses, “lesbian”) to forge political unity require our attention and careful analysis. Gender is produced as well as uncovered in feminist discourse, and definitions of experience, with attendant notions of unity and difference, form the very basis of this production. For instance, gender inscribed within a purely male/female framework reinforces what Monique Wittig (1980, 103-10) has called the heterosexual contract. Here difference is constructed along male/female lines, and it is being female (as opposed to male) that is at the center of the analysis. Identity is seen as either male or female. A similar definition of experience can also be used to craft lesbian identity. Katie King’s analysis indicates this:

The construction of political identity in terms of lesbianism as a magical sign forms the pattern into which the feminist taxonomic identities of recent years attempt to assimilate themselves. . . . Identifying with lesbianism falsely implies that one knows all about heterosexism and homophobia magically through identity or association. The “experience” of lesbianism is offered as salvation from the individual practice of heterosexism and homophobia and the source of intuitive institutional and structural understanding of them. The power of lesbianism as a privileged signifier makes analysis of heterosexism and homophobia difficult since it obscures the need for counter-intuitive challenges to ideology. (1986, 85)
King's analysis calls into question the authority and presence of "experience" in constructing lesbian identity. She criticizes feminist analyses in which difference is inscribed simply within a lesbian/heterosexual framework, with "experience" functioning as an unexamined, catch-all category. This is similar to the female/male framework Wittig calls attention to, for although the terms of the equation are different, the status and definition of "experience" are the same. The politics of being "woman" or "lesbian" are deduced from the experience of being woman or lesbian. Being female is thus seen as naturally related to being feminist, where the experience of being female transforms us into feminists through osmosis. Feminism is not defined as a highly contested political terrain; it is the mere effect of being female. This is what one might call the feminist osmosis thesis: females are feminists by association and identification with the experiences that constitute us as female.

The problem is, however, that we cannot avoid the challenge of theorizing experience. For most of us would not want to ignore the range and scope of the feminist political arena, one characterized quite succinctly by de Lauretis: "[F]eminism defines itself as a political instance, not merely a sexual politics but a politics of everyday life, which later . . . enters the public sphere of expression and creative practice, displacing aesthetic hierarchies and generic categories, and . . . thus establishes the semiotic ground for a different production of reference and meaning" (1986, 10). It is this recognition that leads me to an analysis of the status of experience and difference and the relation of this to political praxis in Morgan's and Reagon's texts.

"A Place on the Map Is Also a Place in History"

The last three decades have witnessed the publication of numerous feminist writings on what is generally referred to as an international women's movement, and we have its concrete embodiment in Sisterhood Is Global, a text that describes itself as "The international women's movement anthology." There is considerable difference between international feminist networks organized around specific issues such as sex tourism and multinational exploitation of women's work, and the notion of an international women's movement that, as I hope to demonstrate, implicitly assumes global or universal sisterhood. But it is best to begin by recognizing the significance and value of the publication of an anthology such as this. The value of documenting the indigenous histories of women's struggles is unquestionable. Morgan
states that the book took twelve years in conception and development, five years in actual work, and innumerable hours in networking and fundraising. It is obvious that without Morgan's vision and perseverance this anthology would not have been published. The range of writing represented is truly impressive. At a time when most of the globe seems to be taken over by religious fundamentalism and big business, and the colonization of space takes precedence over survival concerns, an anthology that documents women's organized resistances has significant value in helping us envision a better future. In fact, it is because I recognize the value and importance of this anthology that I am concerned about the political implications of Morgan's framework for cross-cultural comparison. Thus my comments and criticisms are intended to encourage a greater internal self-consciousness within feminist politics and writing, not to lay blame or induce guilt.

Universal sisterhood is produced in Morgan's text through specific assumptions about women as a cross-culturally singular, homogeneous group with the same interests, perspectives, and goals and similar experiences. Morgan's definitions of "women's experience" and history lead to a particular self-presentation of Western women, a specific codification of differences among women, and eventually to what I consider to be problematic suggestions for political strategy. Since feminist discourse is productive of analytic categories and strategic decisions that have material effects, the construction of the category of universal sisterhood in a text that is widely read deserves attention. In addition, Sisterhood Is Global is still the only text that proclaims itself as the anthology of the international women's movement. It has been distributed worldwide, and Morgan herself has earned the respect of feminists everywhere. And since authority is always charged with responsibility, the discursive production and dissemination of notions of universal sisterhood are together a significant political event that perhaps solicits its own analysis.

Morgan's explicit intent is "to further the dialogue between and solidarity of women everywhere" (1984, 8). This is a valid and admirable project to the extent that one is willing to assume, if not the reality, then at least the possibility, of universal sisterhood on the basis of shared good will. But the moment we attempt to articulate the operation of contemporary imperialism with the notion of an international women's movement based on global sisterhood, the awkward political implications of Morgan's task become clear. Her particular notion of universal sisterhood seems predicated on the erasure of the
history and effects of contemporary imperialism. Robin Morgan seems to situate all women (including herself) outside contemporary world history, leading to what I see as her ultimate suggestion, that transcendence rather than engagement is the model for future social change. This, I think, is a model with dangerous implications for women who do not and cannot speak from a location of white, Western, middle-class privilege. A place on the map (New York City) is, after all, also a locatable place in history.

What is the relation between experience and politics in Morgan's text? In her opening essay, "Planetary Feminism," the category of "women's experience" is constructed within two parameters: woman as victim, and woman as truth-teller. Morgan suggests that it is not mystical or biological commonalities that characterize women across cultures and histories but, rather, a common condition and worldview:

The quality of feminist political philosophy (in all its myriad forms) makes possible a totally new way of viewing international affairs, one less concerned with diplomatic postures and abstractions, but focused instead on concrete, unifying realities of priority importance to the survival and betterment of living beings. For example, the historical, cross-cultural opposition women express to war and our healthy skepticism of certain technological advances (by which most men seem overly impressed at first and disillusioned at last) are only two instances of shared attitudes among women which seem basic to a common worldview. Nor is there anything mystical or biologically deterministic about this commonality. It is the result of a common condition which, despite variations in degree, is experienced by all human beings who are born female. (1984, 4)

This may be convincing up to a point, but the political analysis that underlies Morgan's characterization of the commonality among women is shaky at best. At various points in her essay, the "common condition" that women share is referred to as the suffering inflicted by a universal "patriarchal mentality" (1), women's opposition to male power and androcentrism, and the experience of rape, battery, labor, and childbirth. For Morgan, the magnitude of suffering experienced by most of the women in the world leads to their potential power as a world political force, a force constituted in opposition to Big Brother in the United States, Western and Eastern Europe, China, Africa, the Middle East, and Latin America. The assertion that women constitute a potential world political force is suggestive; however, Big Brother is not exactly the same even...
in, say, the United States and Latin America. Despite the similarity of power interests and location, the two contexts present significant differences in the manifestations of power and hence of the possibility of struggles against it. I part company with Morgan when she seems to believe that Big Brother is the same the world over because “he” simply represents male interests, notwithstanding particular imperial histories or the role of monopoly capital in different countries.

In Morgan’s analysis, women are unified by their shared perspective (for example, opposition to war), shared goals (betterment of human beings), and shared experience of oppression. Here the homogeneity of women as a group is produced not on the basis of biological essentials (Morgan offers a rich, layered critique of biological materialism), but rather through the psychologization of complex and contradictory historical and cultural realities. This leads in turn to the assumption of women as a unified group on the basis of secondary sociological universals. What binds women together is an ahistorical notion of the sameness of their oppression and, consequently, the sameness of their struggles. Thus in Morgan’s text cross-cultural comparisons are based on the assumption of the singularity and homogeneity of women as a group. This homogeneity of women as a group is, in turn, predicated on a definition of the experience of oppression where difference can only be understood as male/female. Morgan assumes universal sisterhood on the basis of women’s shared opposition to androcentrism, an opposition that, according to her, grows directly out of women’s shared status as its victims. The analytic elision between the experience of oppression and the opposition to it (which has to be based on an interpretation of experience) illustrates an aspect of what I referred to earlier as the feminist osmosis thesis: being female and being feminist are one and the same; we are all oppressed and hence we all resist. Politics and ideology as self-conscious struggles, and choices necessarily get written out of such an analysis.

Assumptions about the relation of experience to history are evident in Morgan’s discussion of another aspect of women’s experience: woman as truth-teller. According to her, women speak of the “real” unsullied by “rhetoric” or “diplomatic abstractions.” They, as opposed to men (also a coherent singular group in this analytic economy), are authentic human beings whose “freedom of choice” has been taken away from them: “Our emphasis is on the individual voice of a woman speaking not as an official representative of her country, but rather as a truth-teller, with an emphasis on reality as opposed to
rhetoric" (xvi). In addition, Morgan asserts that women social scientists are "freer of androcentric bias" and "more likely to elicit more trust and . . . more honest responses from female respondents of their studies" (xvii). There is an argument to be made for women interviewing women, but I do not think this is it. The assumptions underlying these statements indicate to me that Morgan thinks women have some kind of privileged access to the "real," the "truth," and can elicit "trust" from other women purely on the basis of their being not-male. There is a problematic conflation here of the biological and the psychological with the discursive and the ideological. "Women" are collapsed into the "suppressed feminine" and men into the dominant ideology. The fact that truth (as well as the "real") is always mediated and dependant on the interpretative framework used is lost in this framework, as is the notion that feminist frameworks are predicated on self-conscious political choices and interpretive frames of the world and why being women matters in particular ways.

Thus these oppositions are possible only because Morgan implicitly erases from her account the possibility that women might have acted, that they were anything but pure victims. For Morgan, history is a male construction; what women need is herstory, separate and outside of his-story. The writing of history (the discursive and the representational) is confused with women as historical actors. The fact that women are representationally absent from history does not mean that they are/were not significant social actors in history. However, Morgan's focus on herstory as separate and outside history not only hands over all of world history to the boys but potentially suggests that women have been universally duped, not allowed to "tell the truth," and robbed of all agency. The implication of this is that women as a group seem to have forfeited any kind of material referentiality.

What, then, does this analysis suggest about the status of experience in this text? In Morgan's account, women have a sort of cross-cultural coherence as distinct from men. The status or position of women is assumed to be self-evident. However, this focus on the position of women whereby women are seen as a coherent group in all contexts, regardless of class or ethnicity, structures the world in ultimately Manichean terms, where women are always seen in opposition to men, patriarchy is always essentially the invariable phenomenon of male domination, and the religious, legal, economic, and familial systems are implicitly assumed to be constructed by men. Here, men and women are seen as whole groups with already constituted experiences as groups, and
questions of history, conflict, and difference are formulated from what can only be this privileged location of knowledge.

I am bothered, then, by the fact that Morgan can see contemporary imperialism only in terms of a “patriarchal mentality” that is enforced by men as a group. Women across class, race, and national boundaries are participants to the extent that we are “caught up in political webs not of our making which we are powerless to unravel” (25). Since women as a unified group are seen as unimplicated in the process of history and contemporary imperialism, the logical strategic response for Morgan appears to be political transcendence: “To fight back in solidarity, however, as a real political force requires that women transcend the patriarchal barriers of class and race, and furthermore, transcend even the solutions the Big Brothers propose to the problems they themselves created” (18). Morgan’s emphasis on women’s transcendence is evident in her discussions of women’s deep opposition to nationalism as practiced in patriarchal society and women’s involvement in peace and disarmament movements across the world, because, in her opinion, they desire peace (as opposed to men, who cause war). Thus, the concrete reality of women’s involvement in peace movements is substituted by an abstract “desire” for peace that is supposed to transcend race, class, and national conflicts among women. Tangible responsibility and credit for organizing peace movements is replaced by an essentialist and psychological unifying desire. The problem is that in this case women are not seen as political agents; they are merely allowed to be well-intentioned. Although Morgan does offer some specific suggestions for political strategy that require resisting “the system,” her fundamental suggestion is that women transcend the Left, the Right, and the Center, the law of the father, God, and the system. Since women have been analytically constituted outside real politics or history, progress for them can only be seen in terms of transcendence.

The experience of struggle is thus defined as both personal and ahistorical. In other words, the political is limited to the personal and all conflicts among and within women are flattened. If sisterhood itself is defined on the basis of personal intentions, attitudes, or desires, conflict is also automatically constructed on only the psychological level. Experience is thus written in as simultaneously individual (that is, located in the individual body/psyche of woman) and general (located in women as a preconstituted collective). There seem to be two problems with this definition. First, experience is seen as being immediately accessible, understood, and named. The complex relationship...
between behavior and its representation are either ignored or made irrelevant; experience is collapsed into discourse and vice versa. Second, since experience has a fundamentally psychological status, questions of history and collectivity are formulated on the level of attitude and intention. In effect, the sociality of collective struggles is understood in terms of something like individual group relations, relations that are commonsensically seen as detached from history. If the assumption of the sameness of experience is what ties woman (individual) to women (group), regardless of class, race, nation, and sexualities, the notion of experience is anchored firmly in the notion of the individual self, a determined and specifiable constituent of European modernity. However, this notion of the individual needs to be self-consciously historicized if as feminists we wish to go beyond the limited bourgeois ideology of individualism, especially as we attempt to understand what cross-cultural sisterhood might be made to mean.

Toward the end of “Planetary Feminism” Morgan talks about feminist diplomacy:

What if feminist diplomacy turned out to be simply another form of the feminist aphorism “the personal is political”? Danda writes here of her own feminist epiphany, Amanda of her moments of despair, La Silenciada of personally bearing witness to the death of a revolution’s ideals. Tinne confides her fears, Nawal addresses us in a voice direct from prison, Hilkla tells us about her family and childhood; Ama Ata confesses the anguish of the woman artist, Stella shares her mourning with us, Mahnaz communicates her grief and her hope, Nell her daring balance of irony and lyricism, Paola the story of her origins and girlhood. Manjula isn’t afraid to speak of pain, Corrine traces her own political evolution along-side that of her movement. Maria de Lourdes declares the personal and the political inseparable. Motlalepula still remembers the burning of a particular maroon dress, Ingrid and Renate invite us into their private correspondence, Manelouise opens herself in a poem, Elena appeals personally to us for help. Gwendoline testifies about her private life as a public figure. . . . And do we not, after all, recognize one another? (35–36)

It is this passage more than any other that encapsulates Morgan’s individualized and essentially equalizing notion of universal sisterhood and its corresponding political implications. The lyricism, the use of first names (the one and only time this is done) and the insistence that we must easily “recognize
one another” indicate what is left unsaid: we must identify with all women. But it is difficult to imagine such a generalized identification predicated on the commonality of women’s interests and goals across very real divisive class and ethnic lines—especially, for example, in the context of the mass proletarianization of Third World women by corporate capital based in the United States, Europe, and Japan.11

Universal sisterhood, defined as the transcendence of the “male” world, thus ends up being a middle-class, psychologized notion that effectively erases material and ideological power differences within and among groups of women, especially between First and Third World women (and, paradoxically, removes us all as actors from history and politics). It is in this erasure of difference as inequality and dependence that the privilege of Morgan’s political “location” might be visible. Ultimately in this reductive utopian vision, men participate in politics while women can only hope to transcend it. Morgan’s notion of universal sisterhood does construct a unity. However, for me, the real challenge arises in being able to craft a notion of political unity without relying on the logic of appropriation and incorporation and, just as significantly, a denial of agency. I believe the unity of women is best understood not as given, on the basis of a natural/psychological commonality; it is something that has to be worked for, struggled toward—in history. What we need to do is articulate ways in which the historical forms of oppression relate to the category “women” and not to try to deduce one from the other. And it is here that a formulation of feminist solidarity or coalition makes sense (in contrast to a notion of universal sisterhood). In other words, it is Morgan’s formulation of the relation of synchronous, alternative histories (herstories) to a diachronic, dominant historical narrative (History) that is problematic.

One of the tasks of feminist analysis is uncovering alternative, nonidentical histories that challenge and disrupt the spatial and temporal location of a hegemonic history. However, attempts to uncover and locate alternative histories sometimes code these very histories either as totally dependent on and determined by a dominant narrative or as isolated and autonomous narratives, untouched in their essence by the dominant figurations. In these rewritings, what is lost is the recognition that it is the very coimplication of histories with History that helps us situate and understand oppositional agency.12 In Morgan’s text, it is the move to characterize alternative herstories as separate and different from history that results in a denial of feminist agency. And it is this potential repositioning of the relation of oppositional histories/spaces to a
dominant historical narrative that I find valuable in Reagon's (1983) discussion of coalition politics.

"It Ain't Home no More": Rethinking Unity

While Morgan uses the notion of sisterhood to construct a cross-cultural unity of women and speaks of "planetary feminism as the politics of the 21st century," Bernice Johnson Reagon uses coalition as the basis to talk about the cross-cultural commonality of struggles, identifying survival, rather than shared oppression, as the ground for coalition. She begins with this valuable political reminder: "You don't go into coalition because you like it. The only reason you would consider trying to team up with somebody who could possibly kill you, is because that's the only way you can figure you can stay alive" (1983, 357).

The governing metaphor Reagon uses to speak of coalition, difference, and struggle is that of a "barred room." However, whereas Morgan's barred room might be owned and controlled by the Big Brothers in different countries, Reagon's internal critique of the contemporary Left focuses on the barred rooms constructed by oppositional political movements such as feminist, civil rights, gay and lesbian, and Chicano/a political organizations. She maintains that these barred rooms may provide a "nurturing space" for a little while, but they ultimately provide an illusion of community based on isolation and the freezing of difference. Thus, while sameness of experience, oppression, culture, and so on, may be adequate to construct this space, the moment we "get ready to clean house" this very sameness in community is exposed as having been built on a debilitating ossification of difference.

Reagon is concerned with differences within political struggles and the negative effects, in the long run, of a nurturing, "nationalist" perspective: "At a certain stage nationalism is crucial to a people if you are going to ever impact as a group in your own interest. Nationalism at another point becomes reactionary because it is totally inadequate for surviving in the world with many Peoples" (358). This is similar to Gramsci's 1971 analysis of oppositional political strategy in terms of the difference between wars of maneuver (separation and consolidation) and wars of position (reentry into the mainstream in order to challenge it on its own terms). Reagon's insistence on breaking out of barred rooms and struggling for coalition is a recognition of the importance—indeed the inevitable necessity—of wars of position. It is based, I
think, on a recognition of the need to resist the imperatives of an expansionist U.S. state and of imperial history. It is also, however, a recognition of the limits of a narrow identity politics. For, once you open the door and let others in, "the room don't feel like the room no more. And it ain't home no more" (Reagon 1983, 359).

The relation of coalition to home is a central metaphor for Reagon. She speaks of coalition as opposed, by definition, to home. In fact, the confusion of home with coalition is what concerns her as an urgent problem, and it is here that the status of experience in her text becomes clear. She criticizes the idea of enforcing "women-only" or "woman-identified" space by using an "in-house" definition of woman. What concerns her is not a sameness that allows us to identify with one another as women but the exclusions particular normative definitions of "woman" enforce. It is the exercise of violence in creating a legitimate inside and an illegitimate outside in the name of identity that is significant to her—in other words, the exercise of violence when unity or coalition is confused with home and used to enforce a premature sisterhood or solidarity. According to Reagon this comes from "taking a word like 'women' and using it as a code" (360). The experience of being woman can create an illusory unity, for it is not the experience of being woman, but the meanings attached to gender, race, class, and age at various historical moments that is of strategic significance. In other words, it is the kind of interpretive frame we use to analyze experiences anchored in gender, race, class, and sexual oppression that matters.

Thus, by calling into question the term "woman" as the automatic basis of unity, Reagon wants to splinter the notion of experience suggested by Morgan. Her critique of nationalist and culturalist positions, which after an initial necessary period of consolidation work in harmful and exclusionary ways, provides us with a fundamentally political analytic space for an understanding of experience. By always insisting on an analysis of the operations and effects of power in our attempts to create alternative communities, Reagon foregrounds our strategic locations and positionings. Instead of separating experience and politics and basing the latter on the former, she emphasizes the politics that always define and inform experience (in particular, in left, anti-racist, and feminist communities). By examining the differences and potential divisions within political subjects as well as collectives, Reagon offers an implicit critique of totalizing theories of history and social change. She under-
scores the significance of the traditions of political struggle, what she calls an “old-age perspective”—and this is, I would add, a transnational or cross-cultural perspective. What is significant, however, is that the transnational or cross-cultural is forged on the basis of memories and counternarratives, not on an ahistorical universalism. For Reagon, cross-cultural, old-age perspectives are founded on humility, the gradual chipping away of our assumed, often ethnocentric centers of self/other definitions.

Thus, her particular location and political priorities lead her to emphasize a politics of engagement (a war of position) and to interrogate totalizing notions of difference and the identification of exclusive spaces as “homes.” Perhaps it is partly also her insistence on the urgency and difficult nature of political struggle that leads Reagon to talk about difference in terms of racism, while Morgan often formulates difference in terms of cultural pluralism. This is Reagon’s way of “throwing yourself into the next century”:

Most of us think that the space we live in is the most important space there is, and that the condition we find ourselves in is the condition that must be changed or else. That is only partially the case. If you analyze the situation properly, you will know that there might be a few things you can do in your personal, individual interest so that you can experience and enjoy change. But most of the things that you do, if you do them right, are for people who live long after you are forgotten. That will happen if you give it away. . . . The only way you can take yourself seriously is if you can throw yourself into the next period beyond your little meager human-body-mouth-talking all the time. (365)

We take ourselves seriously only when we go “beyond” ourselves, valuing not just the plurality of the differences among us but also the massive presence of the Difference that our recent planetary history has installed. This “Difference” is what we see only through the lenses of our present moment, our present struggles. And this “Difference” emerges in the presence of global capitalism at this time in history.

I have looked at two feminist texts and argued that feminist discourse must be self-conscious in its production of notions of experience and difference. The rationale for staging an encounter between the two texts, written by a white and black activist respectively, was not to identify “good” and “bad” feminist texts. Instead, I was interested in foregrounding questions of cross-
cultural analysis that permeate "movement" or popular (not just academic) feminist texts and in indicating the significance of a politics of location in the United States of the late twentieth century. Instead of privileging a certain limited version of identity politics, it is the current intersection of antiracist, anti-imperialist, and gay and lesbian struggles that we need to understand to map the ground for feminist political strategy and critical analysis.15

A text that acquired a place in feminist discourse in the 1990s similar to the one that Sisterhood Is Global occupied in the 1980s is The Challenge of Local Feminisms: Women's Movements in Global Perspective, edited by Amrita Basu.16 The contrast of local/global in the titles of the Morgan and Basu books indicate a significant shift in perspective. The analytic basis of The Challenge of Local Feminisms is the networking across local specificities toward universal objectives, not assumptions of universal sisterhood or experiential “unity” among women across cultures. Basu and the other contributors writing about women's movements in Asia, Africa, the Middle East, Latin America, Russia, Europe, and the United States are critical of the kind of “universalizing feminism” exemplified in Morgan's essay. They focus instead on finding common ground across regions, politics, and issues. The “local” is thus privileged but always in relation to the “global.”

A reading of the Morgan and Reagan texts opens up for me a temporality of struggle, which disrupts and challenges the logic of linearity, development, and progress that are the hallmarks of European modernity. But why focus on a temporality of struggle? And how do I define my place on the map? For me, the notion of a temporality of struggle defies and subverts the logic of European modernity and the “law of identical temporality.” It suggests an insistent, simultaneous, nonsynchronous process characterized by multiple locations, rather than a search for origins and endings, which, as Adrienne Rich says, “seems a way of stopping time in its tracks” (1986, 227). The year 2000 was the end of the Christian millennium, and Christianity is certainly an indelible part of postcolonial history. But we cannot afford to forget those alternative, resistant spaces occupied by oppositional histories and memories. For instance, the year 2000 was also the year 5760 in the Hebrew calendar and year 1420 in the Arabic calendar. It was 6240 according to the Egyptian calendar, and 4677 according to the Chinese calendar. And it was “just another day” according to Oren Lyons, the Faithkeeper of the Onondaga Nation in New York. By not insisting on a history or a geography but focusing on a

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temporality of struggle, I create the historical ground from which I can define myself in the United States of the twenty-first century, a place from which I can speak to the future—not the end of an era but the promise of many.

The United States of America is a geopolitical power seemingly unbounded in its effects, peopled with "natives" struggling for land and legal rights, and "immigrants" with their own histories and memories. Alicia Dujovne Ortiz writes about Buenos Aires as "the very image of expansiveness" (1986–87, 76). This is also how I visualize the United States. Ortiz writes of Buenos Aires:

A city without doors. Or rather, a port city, a gateway which never closes. I have always been astonished by those great cities of the world which have such precise boundaries that one can say exactly where they end. Buenos Aires has no end. One wants to ring it with a beltway, as if to point an index finger, trembling with uncertainty and say: "You end there. Up to this point you are you. Beyond that, God alone knows!"... a city that is impossible to limit with the eye or the mind. So, what does it mean to say that one is a native of Buenos Aires? To belong to Buenos Aires, to be Porteno—to come from this Port? What does this mean? What or who can we hang onto? Usually we cling to history or geography. In this case, what are we to do? Here geography is merely an abstract line that marks the separation of the earth and sky. (76)

If the logic of imperialism and the logic of modernity share a notion of time, they also share a notion of space as territory. In the North America of the twenty-first century, geography seems more and more like "an abstract line that marks the separation of the earth and sky." Witness the struggle for control over oil in the name of "democracy and freedom" in Saudi Arabia. Witness especially, the "war against terrorism" after the events of 11 September 2001. The borders and autonomy of nation-states, the geographies of nationhood are irrelevant in this war, which can justify imperialist aggression in the name of the "homeland security" of the United States. Even the boundaries between space and outer space are not binding any more. In this expansive and expanding continent, how do I locate myself? And what does location as I have inherited it have to do with self-conscious, strategic location as I choose it now?

A National Public Radio news broadcast announces that all immigrants to the United States have to undergo mandatory AIDS testing. I am reminded
very sharply of the twenty some years of my immigrant status in this country, of the plastic identification card that was proof of my legitimate location in the United States. My location has shifted dramatically now since I am a U.S. citizen—a change necessitated by my adoption from India of my daughter Uma in 1998. But location, for feminists, necessarily implies self—as well as collective definition, since meanings of the self are inextricably bound up with our understanding of collectives as social agents. For me, a comparative reading of Morgan’s and Reagon’s documents of activism precipitates the recognition that experience of the self, which is often discontinuous and fragmented, must be historicized before it can be generalized into a collective vision. In other words, experience must be historically interpreted and theorized if it is to become the basis of feminist solidarity and struggle, and it is at this moment that an understanding of the politics of location proves crucial.

In this country I am, for instance, subject to a number of legal/political definitions: “postcolonial,” “immigrant,” “Third World,” and now “citizen of color.” These definitions, while in no way comprehensive, do trace an analytic and political space from which I can insist on a temporality of struggle. Movement among cultures, languages, and complex configurations of meaning and power have always been the territory of the colonized. It is this process, what Caren Kaplan in her discussion of the reading and writing of home/exile has called “a continual reterritorialization, with the proviso that one moves on” (1986–87, 98), that I am calling a temporality of struggle. It is this process, this reterritorialization through struggle, that allows me a paradoxical continuity of self, mapping and transforming my political location. It suggests a particular notion of political agency, since my location forces and enables specific modes of reading and knowing the dominant. The struggles I choose to engage in are then an intensification of these modes of knowing—an engagement on a different level of knowledge. There is, quite simply no transcendental location possible in the United States today.

I have argued for a politics of engagement rather than a politics of transcendence, for the present and the future. I know—in my own nonsynchronous temporality—that the antiglobalization movements of the past five years will gain momentum, that the resistance to and victory over the efforts of the U.S. government and multinational mining conglomerates to relocate the Navajo and Hopi reservations from Big Mountain, Arizona, will be written into elementary school textbooks, and the Palestinian homeland will no longer be referred to as the “Middle East question”—it will be a reality in the next few
years. But that is my preferred history: what I hope and struggle for, I garner as my knowledge, create it as the place from where I seek to know. After all, it is the way in which I understand, define, and engage in feminist, anti-imperialist, and antiracist collectives and movements that anchors my belief in the future and in the efficacy of struggles for social change.
Why craft genealogies in conversations about “transnational multicultural feminism?” At a time when globalization (and monoculturalism) is the primary economic and cultural practice to capture and hold hostage the material resources and economic and political choices of vast numbers of the world’s population, what are the concrete challenges for feminists of varied genealogies working together? Within the context of the history of feminist struggle in the United States, the 1980s were a period of euphoria and hope for feminists of color, gay and lesbian, and antiracist, white feminists. Excavating subjugated knowledges and histories in order to craft decolonized, oppositional racial and sexual identities and political strategies that posed direct challenges to the gender, class, race, and sexual regimes of the capitalist U.S. nation-state anchored the practice of antiracist, multicultural feminisms.

At the start of this century, however, I believe the challenges are somewhat different. Globalization, or the unfettered mobility of capital and the accompanying erosion and reconstitution of local and national economic and political resources and of democratic processes, the post-cold war U.S. imperialist state, and the trajectories of identity-based social movements in the 1980s and 1990s constitute the ground for transnational feminist engagement in the twenty-first century. Multicultural feminism that is radical, antiracist, and nonheterosexist thus needs to take on a hegemonic capitalist regime and conceive of itself as also crossing national and regional borders. Questions of “home,” “belonging,” “nation,” and community” thus become profoundly complicated.

One concrete task that feminist educators, artists, scholars, and activists face is that of historicizing and denaturalizing the ideas, beliefs, and values of global capital such that underlying exploitative social relations and structures are made visible. This means being attentive not only to the grand nar
rative or “myth” of capitalism as “democracy” but also to the mythologies that feminists of various races, nations, classes, and sexualities have inherited about one another. I believe one of the greatest challenges we (feminists) face is this task of recognizing and undoing the ways in which we colonize and objectify our different histories and cultures, thus colluding with hegemonic processes of domination and rule. Dialogue across differences is thus fraught with tension, competitiveness, and pain. Just as radical or critical multiculturalism cannot be the mere sum or coexistence of different cultures in a profoundly unequal, colonized world, multicultural feminism cannot assume the existence of a dialogue among feminists from different communities without specifying a just and ethical basis for such a dialogue.

Undoing ingrained racial and sexual mythologies within feminist communities requires, in Jacqui Alexander’s words, that we “become fluent in each other’s histories.” It also requires seeking “unlikely coalitions” (Davis 1998, 299) and, I would add, clarifying the ethics and meaning of dialogue. What are the conditions, the knowledges, and the attitudes that make a noncolonized dialogue possible? How can we craft a dialogue anchored in equality, respect, and dignity for all peoples? In other words, I want to suggest that one of the most crucial challenges for a critical multicultural feminism is working out how to engage in ethical and caring dialogues (and revolutionary struggles) across the divisions, conflicts, and individualist identity formations that interweave feminist communities in the United States. Defining genealogies is one crucial element in creating such a dialogue.

Just as the very meaning and basis for dialogue across difference and power needs to be analyzed and carefully crafted, the way we define genealogies also poses a challenge. Genealogies that not only specify and illuminate historical and cultural differences but also envision and enact common political and intellectual projects across these differences constitute a crucial element of the work of building critical multicultural feminism.

To this end I offer a personal, anecdotal meditation on the politics of gender and race in the construction of South Asian identity in North America. My location in the United States is symptomatic of large numbers of migrants, nomads, immigrants, workers across the globe for whom notions of home, identity, geography, and history are infinitely complicated in the twenty-first century. Questions of nation(ality), and of “belonging” (witness the situation of South Asians in Africa) are constitutive of the Indian diaspora.
On a TWA flight on my way back to the United States from a conference in the Netherlands, the white professional man sitting next to me asks which school I go to and when I plan to go home—all in the same breath. I put on my most professorial demeanor (somewhat hard in crumpled blue jeans and cotton T-shirt) and inform him that I teach at a small liberal arts college in upstate New York and that I have lived in the United States for over twenty years. At this point, my work is in the United States, not in India. (This is no longer entirely true—my work is also with feminists and grassroots activists in India, but he doesn’t need to know this.) Being “mistaken” for a graduate student seems endemic to my existence in this country: few Third World women are granted professional (i.e., adult) and/or permanent (one is always a student) status in the United States, even if we exhibit clear characteristics of adulthood such as gray hair and facial lines. The man ventures a further question: what do I teach? On hearing “women’s studies,” he becomes quiet and we spend the next eight hours in polite silence. He has decided that I do not fit into any of his categories, but what can you expect from a feminist (an Asian one) anyway? I feel vindicated and a little superior, even though I know he doesn’t really feel “put in his place.” Why should he? He claims a number of advantages in this situation: white skin, maleness, and citizenship privileges. Judging by his enthusiasm for expensive “ethnic food” in Amsterdam, and his J. Crew clothes, I figured class difference (economic or cultural) wasn’t exactly a concern in our interaction. We both appeared to have similar social access as “professionals.”

I have been asked the “home” question (when are you going home?) periodically for twenty years now. Leaving aside the subtly racist implications of the question (go home, you don’t belong), I am still not satisfied with my response. What is home? The place I was born? Where I grew up? Where my parents live? Where I live and work as an adult? Where I locate my community, my people? Who are “my people”? Is home a geographical space, a historical space, an emotional, sensory space? Home is always so crucial to immigrants and migrants—I even write about it in scholarly texts (perhaps to avoid addressing it, as an issue that is also very personal?). What interests me is the meaning of home for immigrants and migrants. I am convinced that this question—how one understands and defines home—is a profoundly political one.
Since settled notions of territory, community, geography, and history don't work for us, what does it really mean to be “South Asian” in the United States? Obviously, I was not South Asian in India: I was Indian. What else could one be but “Indian” at a time when a successful national independence struggle had given birth to a socialist democratic nation-state? This was the beginning of the decolonization of the Third World. Regional geography (South Asia) appeared less relevant as a mark of identification than citizenship in a postcolonial independent nation on the cusp of economic and political autonomy. However, in North America, identification as South Asian (in addition to Indian, in my case) takes on its own logic. “South Asian” refers to folks of Indian, Pakistani, Sri Lankan, Bangladesh, Kashmiri, and Burmese origin. Identifying as South Asian rather than Indian adds numbers and hence power within the U.S. state. Besides, regional differences among those from different South Asian countries are often less relevant than the commonalities based on our experiences and histories of immigration, treatment, and location in the United States.

Let me reflect a bit on the way I identify myself, and the way the U.S. state and its institutions categorize me. Perhaps thinking through the various labels will lead me to the question of home and identity. In 1977, I arrived in the United States on a F1 visa (a student visa). At that time, my definition of myself—a graduate student in education at the University of Illinois—and the “official” definition of me (a student allowed into the country on a F1 visa) obviously coincided. Then I was called a “foreign student” and expected to go “home” (to India, even though my parents were in Nigeria at the time) after getting my Ph.D. This is the assumed trajectory for a number of Indians, especially the postindependence (my) generation, who come to the United States for graduate study.

However, this was not to be my trajectory. I quickly discovered that being a foreign student, and a woman at that, meant being either dismissed as irrelevant (the quiet Asian woman stereotype), or treated in racist ways (my teachers asked if I understood English and if they should speak slower and louder so that I could keep up—this in spite of my inheritance of the Queen's English and British colonialism) or celebrated and exoticized (“You are so smart! Your accent is even better than that of Americans”—a little Anglophilia at work here, even though all my Indian colleagues insist we speak English the Indian way).

The most significant transition I made at that time was the one from “for-
eign student” to “student of color.” Once I was able to “read” my experiences in terms of race, and to read race and racism as they are written into the social and political fabric of the United States, practices of racism and sexism became the analytic and political lenses through which I was able to anchor myself here. Of course, none of this happened in isolation: friends, colleagues, comrades, classes, books, films, arguments, and dialogues were constitutive of my political education as a woman of color in the United States.

In the late 1970s and early 1980s feminism was gaining momentum on American campuses: it was in the air, in the classrooms, on the streets. However, what attracted me wasn’t feminism as the mainstream media and white women’s studies departments defined it. Instead, it was a very specific kind of feminism, the feminism of U.S. women of color and Third World women, that spoke to me. In thinking through the links among gender, race, and class in their U.S. manifestations, I was for the first time able to think through my own gendered, classed, postcolonial history. In the early 1980s, reading Audre Lorde, Nawal el Sadaawi, Angela Davis, Cherrie Moraga, bell hooks, Gloria Joseph, Paula Gunn Allen, Barbara Smith, Merle Woo, and Mitsuye Yamada, among others, generated a sort of recognition that was intangible but very inspiring. A number of actions, decisions, and organizing efforts at that time led me to a sense of home and community in relation to women of color in the United States: home, not as a comfortable, stable, inherited, and familiar space but instead as an imaginative, politically charged space in which the familiarity and sense of affection and commitment lay in shared collective analysis of social injustice, as well as a vision of radical transformation. Political solidarity and a sense of family could be melded together imaginatively to create a strategic space I could call “home.” Politically, intellectually, and emotionally I owe an enormous debt to feminists of color—especially to the sisters who have sustained me over the years. A number of us, including Barbara Smith, Papusa Molina, Jacqui Alexander, Gloria Joseph, Mitsuye Yamada, Kesho Scott, among others, met in 1984 to discuss the possibility of a Women of Color Institute for Radical Research and Action. Even though our attempt to start the institute fell through, the spirit of this vision, and the friendships it generated, still continue to nurture me and keep alive the idea of founding such an institute one day.

For me, engagement as a feminist of color in the United States made possible an intellectual and political genealogy of being Indian that was radically challenging as well as profoundly activist. Notions of home and community
began to be located within a deeply political space where racialization and
gender and class relations and histories became the prism through which
I understood, however partially, what it could mean to be South Asian in
North America. Interestingly, this recognition also forced me to reexamine
the meanings attached to home and community in India.

What I chose to claim, and continue to claim, is a history of anticolonialist,
feminist struggle in India. The stories I recall, the ones that I retell and claim
as my own, determine the choices and decisions I make in the present and
the future. I did not want to accept a history of Hindu chauvinist (bourgeois)
upward mobility (even though this characterizes a section of my extended
family). We all choose partial, interested stories/histories—perhaps not as
deliberately as I am making it sound here, but, consciously or unconsciously,
these choices about our past(s) often determine the logic of our present.

Having always kept my distance from conservative, upwardly mobile
Indian immigrants, to whom the South Asian world in the United States was
divided into green card holders and non-green card holders, the only South
Asian links I allowed and cultivated were with South Asians with whom I
shared a political vision. This considerably limited my community. Racist and
sexist experiences in graduate school and after made it imperative that I under­
stand the United States in terms of its history of racism, imperialism, and
patriarchal relations, specifically in relation to Third World immigrants. After
all, we were then into the Reagan-Bush years, when the neoconservative back­
lash made it impossible to ignore the rise of racist, antifeminist, and homo­
phobic attitudes, practices, and institutions. Any purely culturalist or nostal­
gic sentimental definition of being “Indian” or “South Asian” was inadequate.
Such a definition fueled the “model minority” myth. And this subsequently
constituted us as “outsiders/foreigners” or as interest groups that sought or
had obtained the American dream.

In the 1980s, the labels changed: I went from being a “foreign student”
to being a “resident alien.” I have always thought that this designation was a
stroke of inspiration on the part of the U.S. state, since it accurately names
the experience and status of immigrants, especially immigrants of color. The
flip side of “resident alien” is “illegal alien,” another inspired designation.
One can be either a resident or illegal immigrant, but one is always an alien.
There is no confusion here, no melting pot ideology or narratives of assimila­
tion: one’s status as an “alien” is primary. Being legal requires identity papers.
(It is useful to recall that the “passport”—and by extensions the concept of

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nation-states and the sanctity of their borders—came into being after World War 1.)

One must be stamped as legitimate (that is, not gay or lesbian and not communist) by the Immigration and Naturalization Service. The INS is one of the central disciplinary arms of the U.S. government. It polices the borders and controls all border crossings, especially those into the United States. In fact, the INS is also one of the primary forces that institutionalizes race differences in the public arena, thus regulating notions of home, legitimacy, and economic access to the "American dream" for many of us. For instance, carrying a green card documenting resident alien status in the United States is clearly very different from carrying an American passport, which is proof of U.S. citizenship. The former allows one to enter the United States with few hassles; the latter often allows one to breeze through the borders and ports of entry of other countries, especially countries that happen to be trading partners (much of Western Europe and Japan, among others) or in an unequal relationship with the United States (much of the noncommunist Third World). At a time when notions of a capitalist free-market economy is seen (falsely) as synonymous with the values attached to democracy, an American passport can open many doors. However, just carrying an American passport is no insurance against racism and unequal and unjust treatment within the United States.

A comparison of the racialization of South Asian immigrants to second-generation South Asian Americans suggests one significant difference between these two generations: experiencing racism as a phenomenon specific to the United States, versus growing up in the ever-present shadow of racism in the case of South Asians born in the United States. This difference in experience would suggest that the psychic effects of racism would also be be different for these two constituencies. In addition, questions of home, identity, and history take on very different meanings for South Asians born in North America. But this comparison requires a whole other reflection that is beyond the scope of this chapter.

Home/Nation/Community:
The Politics of Being Nri (Nonresident Indian)

Rather obstinately, I refused to give up my Indian passport and chose to remain a resident alien in the United States for many years.¹ This leads me to

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reflect on the complicated meanings attached to holding Indian citizenship while making a life for myself in the United States. In India, what does it mean to have a green card or U.S. passport, to be an expatriate? What does it mean to visit Mumbai (Bombay) every two to four years and still call it home? Why does speaking in Marathi (my mother tongue) become a measure and confirmation of home? What are the politics of being a part of the majority and the “absent elite” in India, while being a minority and a racialized “other” in the United States? And do feminist politics, or advocating feminism, have the same meanings and urgencies in these different geographical and political contexts?

Some of these questions hit me smack in the face during a visit to India in December 1992, after the infamous destruction of the Babri Masjid in Ayodhya by Hindu fundamentalists on 6 December 1992. (Horribly, these deadly clashes between Hindus and Muslims took a new turn in March 2002, with Muslims burning a train full of Hindus returning from Ayodhya, inaugurate yet another continuing bloodbath.) In my earlier, rather infrequent visits (once every four or five years was all I could afford), my green card designated me as an object of envy, privilege, and status within my extended family. Of course, the same green card has always been viewed with suspicion by leftist and feminist friends, who (quite understandably) demand evidence of my ongoing commitment to a socialist and democratic India. During my 1992 visit, however, with emotions running high within my family, my green card marked me as an outsider who couldn't possibly understand the “Muslim problem” in India. I was made aware of being an “outsider” in two profoundly troubling shouting matches with my uncles, who voiced the most hostile sentiments against Muslims. Arguing that India was created as a secular state and that democracy had everything to do with equality for all groups (majority and minority) got me nowhere. The very fundamentals of democratic citizenship in India were being undermined and redefined as “Hindu.”

Mumbai was one of the cities hardest hit with waves of communal violence following the events of Ayodhya. The mobilization of Hindu fundamentalists, even paramilitary organizations, over the last century and especially since the mid-1940s, had brought Mumbai to a juncture at which the most violently racist discourse about Muslims seemed to be woven into the fabric of acceptable daily life. Racism was normalized in the popular imagination such that it became almost impossible to raise questions in public about the ethics or injustice of racial/ethnic/religious discrimination. I could not as-
sume a distanced posture toward religion anymore. Too many injustices were being committed in my name.

Although born into a Hindu family, I have always considered myself a non-practicing Hindu—religion had always felt rather repressive when I was growing up. I enjoyed the rituals but resisted the authoritarian hierarchies of organized Hinduism. However, the Hinduism touted by fundamentalist organizations like the RSS (Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh, a paramilitary Hindu fundamentalist organization founded in the 1930s) and the Shiv Sena (a Maharashtrian chauvinist, fundamentalist, fascist political organization that has amassed a significant voice in Mumbai politics and government) was one that even I, in my ignorance, recognized as reactionary and distorted. But this discourse was real—hate-filled rhetoric against Muslims appeared to be the mark of a “loyal Hindu.” It was heart-wrenching to see my hometown become a war zone, with streets set on fire and a daily death count to rival any major territorial border war. The smells and textures of my beloved Mumbai, of home, which had always comforted and nurtured me, were violently disrupted. The scent of fish drying on the lines at the fishing village in Danda was submerged in the smell of burning straw and grass as whole bastis (chawls) were burned to the ground. The very topography, language, and relationships that constituted “home” were exploding. What does community mean in this context?

December 1992 both clarified as well as complicated for me the meanings attached to being an Indian citizen, a Hindu, an educated woman feminist, and a permanent resident in the United States in ways that I have yet to resolve. After all, it is often moments of crisis that make us pay careful attention to questions of identity. Sharp polarizations force one to make choices (not in order to take sides, but in order to accept responsibility) and to clarify one’s own analytic, political, and emotional topographies.

I learned that combating the rise of Hindu fundamentalism was a necessary ethical imperative for all socialists, feminists, and Hindus of conscience. Secularism, if it meant absence of religion, was no longer a viable position. From a feminist perspective, it became clear that the battle for women’s minds and hearts was very much center stage in the Hindu fundamentalist rhetoric and social position of women. (Two journals, the Economic and Political Weekly of India and Manushi, are good sources for this work.)

Religious fundamentalist constructions of women embody the nexus of morality, sexuality, and nation—a nexus of great importance for feminists.
As in Christian, Islamic, and Jewish fundamentalist discourses, the construction of femininity and masculinity, especially in relation to the idea of the nation, are central to Hindu fundamentalist rhetoric and mobilizations. Women are not only mobilized in the “service” of the nation, but they also become the ground on which discourses of morality and nationalism are written. For instance, the RSS mobilizes primarily middle-class women in the name of a family-oriented Hindu nation, much as the Christian Right does in the United States. But discourses of morality and nation are also embodied in the normative policing of women’s sexuality (witness the surveillance and control of women’s dress in the name of morality by the contemporary Iranian state and Taliban-ruled Afghanistan). Thus, one of the central challenges Indian feminists face at this time is how to rethink the relationship of nationalism and feminism in the context of religious identities. In addition to the fundamentalist mobilization that is tearing the country apart, the recent incursions of the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, with their structural adjustment programs that are supposed to “discipline” the Indian economy, are redefining the meaning of postcoloniality and of democracy in India. Categories such as gender, race, caste/class are profoundly and visibly unstable at such times of crisis. These categories must thus be analyzed in relation to contemporary reconstructions of womanhood and manhood in a global arena increasingly dominated by religious fundamentalist movements, the IMF, the World Bank, and the relentless economic and ideological colonization of much of the world by multinationals based in the United States, Japan, and Europe. In all these global economic and cultural/ideological processes, women occupy a crucial position.

In India, unlike most countries, the sex ratio has declined since the early 1900s. According to the 1991 census, the ratio was 929 women to 1,000 men, one of the lowest sex ratios in the world. Women produce 70 to 80 percent of all the food in India and have always been the hardest hit by environmental degradation and poverty. The contradictions between civil law and Hindu and Muslim personal laws affect women but rarely men. Horrific stories about the deliberate genocide of female infants as a result of sex determination procedures such as amniocentesis and recent incidents of sati (self-immolation by women on the funeral pyres of their husbands) have even hit the mainstream American media. Gender and religious (racial) discrimination are thus urgent, life-threatening issues for women in India. Over the last decade or so, a politically conscious Indian citizenship has necessitated taking such fun-
damentally feminist issues seriously. In fact, these are the very same issues South Asian feminists in the United States need to address. My responsibility to combat and organize against the regressive and violent repercussions of Hindu fundamentalist mobilizations in India extends to my life in North America. After all, much of the money that sustains the fundamentalist movement is raised and funneled through organizations in the United States.

**On Race, Color, and Politics: Being South Asian in North America**

It is a number of years since I wrote the bulk of this chapter, and as I re-read it, I am struck by the presence of the journeys and border-crossings that weave into and anchor my thinking about genealogies. The very crossing of regional, national, cultural, and geographical borders seems to enable me to reflect on questions of identity, community, and politics. In the past years I have journeyed to and lived among peoples in San Diego, California; Albuquerque, New Mexico; London, England; and Cuttack, India. My appearance as a brown woman with short, dark, graying hair remained the same, but in each of these living spaces I learned something slightly different about being South Asian in North America; about being a brown woman in the midst of other brown women with different histories and genealogies.

I want to conclude with a brief reflection on my journeys to California and New Mexico, since they complicate further the question of being South Asian in North America. A rather obvious fact, which had not been experimentally visible to me earlier, is that the color line differs depending on one's geographical location in the United States. Having lived on the East Coast for many years, my designation as "brown," "Asian," "South Asian," "Third World," and "immigrant" has everything to do with definitions of "blackness" (understood specifically as African American). However, San Diego, with its histories of immigration and racial struggle, its shared border with Mexico, its predominantly brown (Chicano and Asian-American) color line, and its virulent anti-immigrant culture unsettled my East Coast definitions of race and racialization. I could pass as Latina until I spoke my "Indian" English, and then being South Asian became a question of (in)visibility and foreignness. Being South Asian here was synonymous with being alien, non-American.

Similarly, in New Mexico, where the normative meanings of race and color find expression in the relations between Native American, Chicano, and Anglo
communities, being South Asian was a matter of being simultaneously visible and invisible as a brown woman. Here, too, my brownness and facial structure marked me visibly as sometimes Latina, sometimes Native American (evidenced by being hailed numerous times in the street as both). Even being Asian, as in being from a part of the world called “Asia,” had less meaning in New Mexico, especially since “Asian” was synonymous with “East Asian”: the “South” always fell out. Thus, while I could share some experiences with Latinas and Native American women, for instance, the experience of being an “alien”—an outsider within, a woman outside the purview of normalized U.S. citizenship—my South Asian genealogy also set me apart. Shifting the color line by crossing the geography and history of the American West and Southwest thus foregrounded questions about being South Asian in a space where, first, my brownness was not read against blackness, and second, Asian was already definitively cast as East Asian. In this context, what is the relation of South Asian to Asian American (read: East Asian American)? And why does it continue to feel more appropriate, experientially and strategically, to call myself a woman of color or Third World woman? Geographies have never coincided with the politics of race. And claiming racial identities based on history, social location, and experience is always a matter of collective analysis and politics. Thus, while geographical spaces provide historical and cultural anchors (Marathi, Mumbai, and India are fundamental to my sense of myself), it is the deeper values and strategic approach to questions of economic and social justice and collective anticapitalist struggle that constitute my feminism. Perhaps this is why journeys across the borders of regions and nations always provoke reflections of home, identity, and politics for me: there is no clear or obvious fit between geography, race, and politics for someone like me. I am always called on to define and redefine these relationships—“race,” “Asianness,” and “brownness” are not embedded in me, whereas histories of colonialism, racism, sexism, and nationalism, as well as of privilege (class and status) are involved in my relation to white people and people of color in the United States.

Let me now circle back to the place I began: defining genealogies as a crucial aspect of crafting critical multicultural feminist practice and the meanings I have come to give to home, community, and identity. By exploring the relationship between being a South Asian immigrant in America and an expatriate Indian citizen (NRI) in India, I have tried, however partially and anecdotally, to clarify the complexities of home and community for this particular
feminist of color/South Asian in North America. The genealogy I have created for myself here is partial and deliberate. It is a genealogy that I find emotionally and politically enabling—it is part of the genealogy that underlies my self-identification as an educator involved in a pedagogy of liberation. Of course, my history and experiences are in fact messier and not at all as linear as this narrative makes them sound. But then the very process of constructing a narrative for oneself—of telling a story—imposes a certain linearity and coherence that is never entirely there. That is the lesson, perhaps, especially for us immigrants and migrants: that home, community, and identity all fit somewhere between the histories and experiences we inherit and the political choices we make through alliances, solidarities, and friendships.

One very concrete effect of my creating this particular space for myself has been my involvement in two grassroots organizations, one in India and the other in the United States. The former, an organization called Awareness, is based in Orissa and works to empower the rural poor. The group's focus is political education (similar to Paolo Freire's notion of "conscientization"), and its members have also begun very consciously to organize rural women. The U.S. organization I worked with is Grassroots Leadership of North Carolina. It is a multiracial group of organizers (largely African American and white) working to build a poor and working people's movement in the American South. While the geographical, historical, and political contexts are different in the case of these two organizations, my involvement in them is very similar, as is my sense that there are clear connections to be made between the work of the two organizations. In addition, I think that the issues, analyses, and strategies for organizing for social justice are also quite similar. This particular commitment to work with grassroots organizers in the two places I call home is not accidental. It is very much the result of the genealogy I have traced here. After all, it took me over a decade to make these commitments to grassroots work in both spaces. In part, I have defined what it means to be South Asian by educating myself about, and reflecting on, the histories and experiences of African American, Latina, West Indian, African, European American, and other constituencies in North America. Such definitions and understandings do provide a genealogy, but a genealogy that is always relational and fluid as well as urgent and necessary.
PART TWO

Demystifying Capitalism
CHAPTER SIX

Women Workers and the Politics of Solidarity

We dream that when we work hard, we'll be able to clothe our children decently, and still have a little time and money left for ourselves. And we dream that when we do as good as other people, we get treated the same, and that nobody puts us down because we are not like them. . . . Then we ask ourselves, “How could we make these things come true?” And so far we've come up with only two possible answers: win the lottery, or organize. What can I say, except I have never been lucky with numbers. So tell this in your book: tell them it may take time that people think they don't have, but they have to organize! . . . Because the only way to get a little measure of power over your own life is to do it collectively, with the support of other people who share your needs. — Irma, a Filipina worker in the Silicon Valley, California (1993)

Irma's dreams of a decent life for her children and herself, her desire for equal treatment and dignity on the basis of the quality and merit of her work, her conviction that collective struggle is the means to “get a little measure of power over your own life,” succinctly capture the struggles of poor women workers in the global capitalist arena. In this chapter I want to focus on the exploitation of poor Third World women, on their agency as workers, on the common interests of women workers based on an understanding of shared location and needs, and on the strategies/practices of organizing that are anchored in and lead to the transformation of the daily lives of women workers.

This has been an especially difficult chapter to write—perhaps because the almost total saturation of the processes of capitalist domination makes it hard to envision forms of feminist resistance that would make a real difference in the daily lives of poor women workers. However, as I began to sort through the actions, reflections, and analyses by and about women workers (or wage laborers) in the capitalist economy, I discovered the dignity of women workers' struggles in the face of overwhelming odds. From these struggles
we can learn a great deal about processes of exploitation and domination as well as about autonomy and liberation.

A study tour to Tijuana, Mexico, organized by Mary Tong of the San Diego-based Support Committee for Maquiladora Workers, confirmed my belief in the radical possibilities of cross-border organizing, especially in the wake of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). Exchanging ideas, experiences, and strategies with Veronica Vasquez, a twenty-one-year-old Maquila worker fighting for her job, for better working conditions, and against sexual harassment, was as much of an inspiration as any in writing this chapter. Veronica Vasquez, along with ninety-nine former employees of the Tijuana factory Exportadora Mano de Obra, S.A. de C.V., filed an unprecedented lawsuit in Los Angeles, California, against the U.S. owner of Exportadora, National o-Ring of Downey, demanding that it be forced to follow Mexican labor laws and provide workers with three months' back pay after shutting down company operations in Tijuana in November 1994. The courage, determination, and analytical clarity of these young Mexican women workers in launching the first case to test the legality of NAFTA suggest that in spite of the global saturation of processes of capitalist domination, 1995 was a moment of great possibility for building cross-border feminist solidarity.2

Over the years I have been preoccupied with the limits as well as the possibilities of constructing feminist solidarities across national, racial, sexual, and class divides. Women's lives as workers, consumers, and citizens have changed radically with the triumphal rise of capitalism in the global arena. The common interests of capital (e.g., profit, accumulation, exploitation) are somewhat clear at this point. But how do we talk about poor Third World women workers' interests, their agency, and their (in)visibility in so-called democratic processes? What are the possibilities for democratic citizenship for Third World women workers in the contemporary capitalist economy?

These are some of the questions driving this chapter. I hope to clarify and analyze the location of Third World women workers and their collective struggles in an attempt to generate ways to think about mobilization, organizing, and conscientization transnationally.

This chapter extends the arguments I have made in chapter 2 regarding the location of Third World women as workers in a global economy.3 I write from my own discontinuous locations: as a South Asian anticapitalist feminist in the United States committed to working on a truly liberatory feminist practice that theorizes and enacts the potential for a cross-cultural, international
politics of solidarity; as a Third World feminist teacher and activist for whom the psychic economy of "home" and of "work" has always been the space of contradiction and struggle; and as a woman whose middle-class struggles for self-definition and autonomy outside the definitions of daughter, wife, and mother mark an intellectual and political genealogy that led me to this particular analysis of Third World women's work.

Here, I want to examine the analytical category of "women's work," and to look at the historically specific naturalization of gender and race hierarchies through this category. An international division of labor is central to the establishment, consolidation, and maintenance of the current world order: global assembly lines are as much about the production of people as they are about "providing jobs" or making profit. Thus naturalized assumptions about work and the worker are crucial to understanding the sexual politics of global capitalism. I believe that the relation of local to global processes of colonization and exploitation, and the specification of a process of cultural and ideological homogenization across national borders, in part through the creation of the consumer as "the" citizen under advanced capitalism, must be crucial aspects of any comparative feminist project. In fact it is this very notion of the citizen-consumer that I explore later in the context of the U.S. academy and higher education in general. I argue that this definition of the citizen-consumer depends to a large degree on the definition and disciplining of producers/workers on whose backs the citizen-consumer gains legitimacy. It is the worker-producer side of this equation that I address here. Who are the workers that make the citizen-consumer possible? What role do sexual politics play in the ideological creation of this worker? How does global capitalism, in search of ever-increasing profits, utilize gender and racialized ideologies in crafting forms of women's work? And does the social location of particular women as workers suggest the basis for common interests and potential solidarities across national borders?

As global capitalism develops and wage labor becomes the hegemonic form of organizing production and reproduction, class relations within and across national borders have become more complex and less transparent. Thus, issues of spatial economy—the manner in which capital utilizes particular spaces for differential production and the accumulation of capital and, in the process, transforms these spaces (and peoples)—gain fundamental importance for feminist analysis. In the aftermath of feminist struggles around the right to work and the demand for equal pay, the boundaries between
home/family and work are no longer seen as inviolable (of course these boundaries were always fluid for poor and working-class women). Women are (and have always been) in the workforce, and we are here to stay. In this chapter, I offer an analysis of certain historical and ideological transformations of gender, capital, and work across the borders of nation states and, in the process, develop a way of thinking about the common interests of Third World women workers, and in particular about questions of agency and the transformation of consciousness.

Drawing specifically on case studies of the incorporation of Third World women into a global division of labor at different geographical ends of the current world order, I argue for a historically delineated category of “women’s work” as an example of a productive and necessary basis for feminist transnational analysis. The idea I am interested in invoking here is not “the work that women do” or even the occupations that they happen to be concentrated in, but rather the ideological construction of jobs and tasks in terms of notions of appropriate femininity, domesticity, (hetero)sexuality, and racial and cultural stereotypes. I am interested in mapping these operations of capitalism across different divides, in tracing the naturalization of capitalist processes, ideologies, and values through the way women’s work is constitutively defined—in this case, in terms of gender and racial parameters. One of the questions I explore pertains to the way gender identity (defined in domestic, heterosexual, familial terms) structures the nature of the work women are allowed to perform or precludes women from being “workers” altogether.

While I base the details of my analysis in geographically anchored case studies, I am suggesting a comparative methodology that moves beyond the case study approach and illuminates global processes that inflect and draw upon indigenous hierarchies, ideologies, and forms of exploitation to consolidate new modes of colonization (or “recolonization”). The local and the global are indeed connected through parallel, contradictory, and sometimes converging relations of rule that position women in different and similar locations as workers. I agree with feminists who argue that class struggle, narrowly defined, can no longer be the only basis for solidarity among women workers. The fact of being women with particular racial, ethnic, cultural, sexual, and geographical histories has everything to do with our definitions and identities as workers. A number of feminists have analyzed the division between production and reproduction, and the construction of ideologies of womanhood in terms of public/private spheres. Here, I want to highlight...
the persistence of patriarchal definitions of womanhood in the arena of wage labor; (2) the versatility and specificity of capitalist exploitative processes providing the basis for thinking about potential common interests and solidarity between Third World women workers; and (3) the challenges for collective organizing in a context where traditional union methods (based on the idea of the class interests of the male worker) are inadequate as strategies for empowerment.

If, as I suggest, the logic of a world order characterized by a transnational economy involves the active construction and dissemination of an image of the “Third World/racialized, or marginalized woman worker” that draws on indigenous histories of gender and race inequalities, and if this worker’s identity is coded in patriarchal terms that define her in relation to men and the heterosexual, conjugal family unit, then the model of class conflict between capitalists and workers needs to be recrafted in terms of the interests (and perhaps identities) of Third World women workers. Patriarchal ideologies, which sometimes pit women against men within and outside the home, infuse the material realities of the lives of Third World women workers, making it imperative to reconceptualize the way we think about working-class interests and strategies for organizing. Thus, while this is not an argument for just recognizing the “common experiences” of Third World women workers, it is an argument for recognizing (concrete, not abstract) “common interests” and the potential bases of cross-national solidarity—a common context of struggle. In addition, while I choose to focus on the “Third World” woman worker, my argument holds for white women workers who are also racialized in similar ways. The argument then is about a process of gender and race domination, rather than the content of “Third World.” Making Third World women workers visible in this gender, race, class formation involves engaging a capitalist script of subordination and exploitation. But it also leads to thinking about the possibilities of emancipatory action on the basis of the reconceptualization of Third World women as agents rather than victims.

But why even use “Third World,” a somewhat problematic term that many now consider outdated? And why make an argument that privileges the social location, experiences, and identities of Third World women workers, as opposed to any other group of workers, male or female? Certainly, there are problems with the term “Third World.” It is inadequate in comprehensively characterizing the economic, political, racial, and cultural differences within the borders of Third World nations. But in comparison with other similar for-
mulations such as “North/South” and “advanced/underdeveloped nations,” “Third World” retains a certain heuristic value and explanatory specificity in relation to the inheritance of colonialism and contemporary neocolonial economic and geopolitical processes that the other formulations lack.⁹

In response to the second question, I would argue that at this time in the development and operation of a “new” world order, Third World women workers (defined in this context as both women from the geographical Third World and immigrant and indigenous women of color in the United States and Western Europe) occupy a specific social location in the international division of labor that illuminates and explains crucial features of the capitalist processes of exploitation and domination. These are features of the social world that are usually obfuscated or mystified in discourses about the “progress” and “development” (e.g., the creation of jobs for poor, Third World women as the marker of economic and social advancement) that is assumed to “naturally” accompany the triumphal rise of global capitalism. I do not claim to explain all the relevant features of the social world or to offer a comprehensive analysis of capitalist processes of recolonization. However, I am suggesting that Third World women workers have a potential identity in common, an identity as workers in a particular division of labor at this historical moment. And I believe that exploring and analyzing this potential commonality across geographical and cultural divides provides both a way of reading and understanding the world and an explanation of the consolidation of inequities of gender, race, class, and (hetero)sexuality, which are necessary to envision and enact transnational feminist solidarity.¹⁰

The argument that multinationals position and exploit women workers in certain ways does not originate with me. I want to suggest, however, that in interconnecting and comparing some of these case studies, a larger theoretical argument can be made about the category of women’s work, specifically about the Third World woman as worker, at this particular historical moment. This intersection of gender and work, where the very definition of work draws upon and reconstructs notions of masculinity, femininity, and sexuality, offers a basis of cross-cultural comparison and analysis that is grounded in the concrete realities of women’s lives. I am not suggesting that this basis for comparison exhausts the totality of women’s experience cross-culturally. In other words, because similar ideological constructions of “women’s work” make cross-cultural analysis possible, this does not automatically mean women’s lives are the same, but rather that they are comparable. I argue for a notion
of political solidarity and common interests, defined as a community or collectivity among women workers across class, race, and national boundaries that is based on shared material interests and identity and common ways of reading the world. This idea of political solidarity in the context of the incorporation of Third World women into a global economy offers a basis for cross-cultural comparison and analysis that is grounded in history and social location rather than in an ahistorical notion of culture or experience. I am making a choice here to focus on and analyze the continuities in the experiences, histories, and strategies of survival of these particular workers. But this does not mean that differences and discontinuities in experience do not exist or that they are insignificant. The focus on continuities is a strategic one—it makes possible a way of reading the operation of capital from a location (that of Third World women workers) that, while forming the bedrock of a certain kind of global exploitation of labor, remains somewhat invisible and undertheorized.

Gender and Work: Historical and Ideological Transformations

“Work makes life sweet,” says Lola Weixel, a working-class Jewish woman in Connie Field's film The Life and Times of Rosie the Riveter. Weixel is reflecting on her experience of working in a welding factory during World War II, at a time when large numbers of U.S. women were incorporated into the labor force to replace men who were away fighting the war. In one of the most moving moments in the film, she draws attention to what it meant to her and to other women to work side by side, to learn skills and craft products, and to be paid for the work they did, only to be told at the end of the war that they were no longer needed and should go back to being girlfriends, housewives, and mothers. While the U.S. state propaganda machine was especially explicit on matters of work for men and women, and the corresponding expectations of masculinity/femininity and domesticity in the late 1940s and 1950s, this is no longer the case. Shifting definitions of public and private, and of workers, consumers, and citizens no longer define wage work in visibly masculine terms. However, the dynamics of job competition, loss, and profit making in the early years of this century are still part of the dynamic process that spelled the decline of the mill towns of New England in the early 1900s and that now pits “American” against “immigrant” and “Third World” workers along the U.S.-Mexico border or in the Silicon Valley in California. Similarly, there are con-
tinuities between the women-led New York garment-workers strike of 1909, the Bread and Roses (Lawrence textile) strike of 1912, Lola Weixel’s role in union organizing during World War II, and the frequent strikes in the 1980s and 1990s of Korean textile and electronic workers, most of whom are young, single women. While the global division of labor looks quite different now from what it was in the 1950s, ideologies of women’s work, the meaning and value of work for women, and women workers’ struggles against exploitation remain central issues for feminists around the world. After all, women’s labor has always been central to the development, consolidation, and reproduction of capitalism in the United States and elsewhere.

In the United States, histories of slavery, indentured servitude, contract labor, self-employment, and wage work are also simultaneously histories of gender, race, and (hetero)sexuality, nested within the context of the development of capitalism (i.e., of class conflict and struggle). Thus, women of different races, ethnicities, and social classes had profoundly different, though interconnected, experiences of work in the economic development from nineteenth-century economic and social practices (slave agriculture in the South, emergent industrial capitalism in the Northeast, the hacienda system in the Southwest, independent family farms in the rural Midwest, Native American hunting/gathering and agriculture) to wage labor and self-employment (including family businesses) in the late twentieth century. In the early years of this century, a hundred years after the Lowell girls lost their jobs when textile mills moved South to attract nonunionized labor, feminists are faced with a number of profound analytical and organizational challenges in different regions of the world. The material, cultural, and political effects of the processes of domination and exploitation that sustain what is called the new world order (Brecher 1993, 3–12) are devastating for the vast majority of people in the world—and most especially for impoverished and Third World women. Maria Mies argues that the increasing division of the world into consumers and producers has a profound effect on Third World women workers, who are drawn into the international division of labor as workers in agriculture; in large-scale manufacturing industries like textiles, electronics, garments, and toys; in small-scale manufacturing of consumer goods like handicrafts and food processing (the informal sector); and as workers in the sex and tourist industries (Mies 1986, 114–15).

The values, power, and meanings attached to being either a consumer or a producer/worker vary enormously depending on where and who we happen to
be in an unequal global system. From at least the 1990s onward, multinational corporations have been the hallmark of global capitalism. In an analysis of the effects of these corporations on the new world order, Richard Barnet and John Cavanagh characterize the global commercial arena in terms of four intersecting webs: the global cultural bazaar (which creates and disseminates images and dreams through films, television, radio, music, and other media), the global shopping mall (a planetary supermarket that sells things to eat, drink, wear, and enjoy through advertising, distribution, and marketing networks), the global workplace (a network of factories and workplaces where goods are produced, information processed, and services rendered), and, finally, the global financial network (the international traffic in currency transactions, global securities, etc.) (Barnet and Cavanagh 1994, esp. 25–41). In each of these webs, racialized ideologies of masculinity, femininity, and sexuality play a role in constructing the legitimate consumer, worker, and manager. Meanwhile, the psychic and social disenfranchisement and impoverishment of women continues. Women’s bodies and labor are used to consolidate global dreams, desires, and ideologies of success and the good life in unprecedented ways.

Feminists have responded directly to the challenges of globalization and capitalist modes of recolonization by addressing the sexual politics and effects on women of religious fundamentalist movements within and across the boundaries of the nation-state; structural adjustment policies; militarism, demilitarization, and violence against women; environmental degradation and land/sovereignty struggles of indigenous and native peoples; and population control, health, and reproductive policies and practices. In each of these cases, feminists have analyzed the effects on women as workers, sexual partners, mothers and caretakers, consumers, and transmitters and transformers of culture and tradition. Analysis of the ideologies of masculinity and femininity, of motherhood and (hetero)sexuality and the understanding and mapping of agency, access, and choice are central to this analysis and organizing. Thus, while my characterization of capitalist processes of domination and recolonization may appear somewhat overwhelming, I want to draw attention to the numerous forms of resistance and struggle that have also always been constitutive of the script of colonialism/capitalism. Capitalist patriarchies and racialized, class/caste-specific hierarchies are a key part of the long history of domination and exploitation of women, but struggles against these practices and vibrant, creative, collective forms of mobilization
and organizing have also always been a part of our histories. In fact, I attempt to articulate an emancipatory discourse and knowledge, one that furthers the cause of feminist liberatory practice. After all, part of what needs to change within racialized capitalist patriarchies is the very concept of work/labor, as well as the naturalization of heterosexual masculinity in the definition of “the worker.”

Teresa Amott and Julie Matthaei (1991), in analyzing the U.S. labor market, argue that the intersection of gender, class, and racial-ethnic hierarchies of power has had two major effects:

First, disempowered groups have been concentrated in jobs with lower pay, less job security, and more difficult working conditions. Second, workplaces have been places of extreme segregation, in which workers have worked in jobs only with members of their same racial-ethnic, gender, and class group, even though the particular racial-ethnic group and gender assigned to a job may have varied across firms and regions. (316–17)

While Amott and Matthaei draw attention to the sex-and-race typing of jobs, they do not theorize the relationship between this job typing and the social identity of the workers concentrated in these low-paying, segregated, often unsafe sectors of the labor market. While the economic history they chart is crucial to any understanding of the race-and-gender basis of U.S. capitalist processes, their analysis begs the question of whether there is a connection (other than the common history of domination of people of color) between how these jobs are defined and who is sought after for the jobs.

By examining two instances of the incorporation of women into the global economy (women lacemakers in Narsapur, India, and women in the electronics industry in the Silicon Valley) I want to delineate the interconnections among gender, race, and ethnicity, and the ideologies of work that locate women in particular exploitative contexts. The contradictory positioning of women along class, race, and ethnic lines in these two cases suggests that, in spite of the obvious geographical and sociocultural differences between the two contexts, the organization of the global economy by contemporary capital positions these workers in very similar ways, effectively reproducing and transforming locally specific hierarchies. There are also some significant continuities between homework and factory work in these contexts, in terms of both the inherent ideologies of work as well as the experiences and social identities of women as workers. This tendency can also be seen in the case
studies of black women workers (of Afro-Caribbean, Asian, and African origin) in Britain, especially women engaged in homework, factory work, and family businesses.

**HOUSEWIVES AND HOMEWORK: THE LACEMAKERS OF NARSAPUR**

Maria Mies's 1982 study of the lacemakers of Narsapur, India, is a graphic illustration of how women bear the impact of development processes in countries where poor peasant and tribal societies are being "integrated" into an international division of labor under the dictates of capital accumulation. Mies's study illustrates how capitalist production relations are built upon the backs of women workers defined as housewives. Ideologies of gender and work and their historical transformation provide the necessary ground for the exploitation of the lacemakers. But the definition of women as housewives also suggests the heterosexualization of women's work—women are always defined in relation to men and conjugal marriage. Mies's account of the development of the lace industry and the corresponding relations of production illustrates fundamental transformations of gender, caste, and ethnic relations. The original caste distinctions between the feudal warrior castes (the landowners) and the Narsapur (poor Christians) and Serepalam (poor Kapus/Hindu agriculturalists) women are transformed through the development of the lace industry, and a new caste hierarchy is effected.

At the time of Mies's study, there were sixty lace manufacturers, with some 200,000 women in Narsapur and Serepalam constituting the workforce. Lace-making women worked six to eight hours a day and ranged in age from six to eighty. Mies argues that the expansion of the lace industry between 1970 and 1978 and its integration into the world market led to class/caste differentiation within particular communities, with a masculinization of all non-production jobs (trade) and the complete feminization of the production process. Thus, men sold women's products and lived on profits from women's labor. The polarization between men and women's work, where men actually defined themselves as exporters and businessmen who invested in women's labor, bolstered the social and ideological definition of women as housewives and their work as "leisure time activity." In other words, work, in this context, was grounded in sexual identity, in concrete definitions of femininity, masculinity, and heterosexuality.

Two particular indigenous hierarchies, those of caste and gender, inter-
acted to produce normative definitions of “women’s work.” Where, at the onset of the lace industry, Kapu men and women were agricultural laborers and it was the lower-caste Harijan women who were lacemakers, with the development of capitalist relations of production and the possibility of caste/class mobility, it was the Harijan women who were agricultural laborers while the Kapu women undertook the “leisure time” activity of lace-making. The caste-based ideology of seclusion and purdah was essential to the extraction of surplus value. Since purdah and the seclusion of women is a sign of higher caste status, the domestication of Kapu laborer women where their (lace-making) activity was tied to the concept of the “women sitting in the house” was entirely within the logic of capital accumulation and profit. Now, Kapu women, not just the women of feudal, landowning castes, are in purdah as housewives producing for the world market.

I ideologies of seclusion and the domestication of women are clearly sexual, drawing as they do on masculine and feminine notions of protectionism and property. They are also heterosexual ideologies, based on the normative definition of women as wives, sisters, and mothers—always in relation to conjugal marriage and the “family.” Thus, the caste transformation and separation of women along lines of domestication and non-domestication (Kapu housewives vs. Harijan laborers) effectively links the work that women do with their sexual and caste/class identities. Domestication works, in this case, because of the persistence and legitimacy of the ideology of the housewife, which defines women in terms of their place within the home, conjugal marriage, and heterosexuality. The opposition between definitions of the “laborer” and of the “housewife” anchors the invisibility (and caste-related status) of work; in effect, it defines women as nonworkers. By definition, housewives cannot be workers or laborers; housewives make male breadwinners and consumers possible. Clearly, ideologies of “women’s place and work” have real material force in this instance, where spatial parameters construct and maintain gendered and caste-specific hierarchies. Thus, Mies’s study illustrates the concrete effects of the social definition of women as housewives. Not only are the lacemakers invisible in census figures (after all, their work is leisure), but their definition as housewives makes possible the definition of men as “breadwinners.” Here, class and gender proletarianization through the development of capitalist relations of production, and the integration of women into the world market, is possible because of the history and transformation of indigenous caste and sexual ideologies.
Reading the operation of capitalist processes from the position of the housewife/worker who produces for the world market makes the specifically gendered and caste/class opposition between laborer and the nonworker (housewife) visible. Moreover, it makes it possible to acknowledge and account for the hidden costs of women’s labor. And finally, it illuminates the fundamentally masculine definition of laborer/worker in a context where, as Mies says, men live off women who are the producers. Analyzing and transforming this masculine definition of labor, which is the mainstay of capitalist patriarchal cultures, is one of the most significant challenges we face. The effect of this definition of labor is not only that it makes women’s labor and its costs invisible, but that it undercuts women’s agency by defining them as victims of a process of pauperization or of “tradition” or “patriarchy,” rather than as agents capable of making their own choices.

In fact, the contradictions raised by these choices are evident in the lacemakers’ responses to characterizations of their own work as “leisure activity.” While the fact that they did “work” was clear to them and while they had a sense of the history of their own pauperization (with a rise in prices for goods but no corresponding rise in wages), they were unable to explain how they came to be in the situation they found themselves. Thus, while some of the contradictions between their work and their roles as housewives and mothers were evident to them, they did not have access to an analysis of these contradictions that could lead to seeing the complete picture in terms of their exploitation, strategizing and organizing to transform their material situations, or recognizing their common interests as women workers across caste/class lines. As a matter of fact, the Serepelam women defined their lace-making in terms of “housework” rather than wage work, and women who had managed to establish themselves as petty commodity producers saw what they did as entrepreneurial: they saw themselves as selling products rather than labor. Thus, in both cases, women internalized the ideologies that defined them as nonworkers. The isolation of the work context (work done in the house rather than in a public setting) as well as the internalization of caste and patriarchal ideologies thus militated against organizing as workers, or as women. However, Mies suggests that there were cracks in this ideology: the women expressed some envy toward agricultural laborers, whom the lacemakers saw as enjoying working together in the fields. What seems necessary in such a context, in terms of feminist mobilization, is a recognition of the fact that the identity of the housewife needs to be transformed into the identity of a

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“woman worker or working woman.” Recognition of common interests as housewives is very different from recognition of common interests as women and as workers.

**IMMIGRANT WIVES, MOTHERS, AND FACTORY WORK: ELECTRONICS WORKERS IN THE SILICON VALLEY**

My discussion of the U.S. end of the global assembly line is based on studies by Naomi Katz and David Kemnitzer (1983 and 1986) and Karen Hossfeld (1990) of electronics workers in the so-called Silicon Valley in California. An analysis of production strategies and processes indicates a significant ideological redefinition of normative ideas of factory work in terms of the Third World, immigrant women who constitute the primary workforce. While the lacemakers of Narsapur were located as housewives and their work defined as leisure time activity in a very complex international world market, Third World women in the electronics industry in the Silicon Valley are located as mothers, wives, and supplementary workers. Unlike the search for the “single” woman assembly worker in Third World countries, it is in part the ideology of the “married woman” that defines job parameters in the Valley, according to Katz and Kemnitzer’s data.

Hossfeld also documents how existing ideologies of femininity cement the exploitation of the immigrant women workers in the Valley and how the women often use this patriarchal logic against management. Assumptions of “single” and “married” women as the ideal workforce at the two geographical ends of the electronics global assembly line (which includes South Korea, Hong Kong, China, Taiwan, Thailand, Malaysia, Japan, India, Pakistan, the Philippines, and the United States, Scotland, and Italy [Women Working Worldwide 1993]) are anchored in normative understandings of femininity, womanhood, and sexual identity. The labels are predicated on sexual difference and the institution of heterosexual marriage and carry connotations of a “manageable” (docile?) labor force.13

Katz and Kemnitzer’s data indicates a definition and transformation of women’s work that relies on gender, race, and ethnic hierarchies already historically anchored in the United States. Further, their data illustrates that the construction of “job labels” pertaining to Third World women’s work is closely allied with their sexual and racial identities. While Hossfeld’s more recent study reinforces some of Katz and Kemnitzer’s conclusions, she focuses more specifically on how “contradictory ideologies about sex, race, class, and
nationality are used as forms of both labor control and labor resistance in the capitalist workplace today" (Hossfeld 1990, 149). Her contribution lies in charting the operation of gendered ideologies in the structuring of the industry and in analyzing what she calls "refeminization strategies" in the workplace.

Although the primary workforce in the Valley consists of Third World and newly immigrant women, substantial numbers of Third World and immigrant men are also employed by the electronics industry. In the early 1980s, 70,000 women held 80 to 90 percent of the operative or labor jobs on the shop floor. Of these, 45 to 50 percent were Third World, especially Asian, immigrants. White men held either technician or supervisory jobs (Katz and Kemnitzer 1983, 333). Hossfeld's study was conducted between 1983 and 1986, at which time she estimates that up to 80 percent of the operative jobs were held by people of color, with women constituting up to 90 percent of the assembly workers (1990, 154). Katz and Kemnitzer maintain that the industry actively seeks sources of cheap labor by deskilling production and by using race, gender, and ethnic stereotypes to "attract" groups of workers who are "more suited" to perform tedious, unrewarding, poorly paid work. When interviewed, management personnel described the jobs as unskilled (as easy as following a recipe); requiring tolerance for tedious work (Asian women are therefore more suited); and supplementary activity for women whose main tasks were mothering and housework (1983, 335).

It may be instructive to unpack these job labels in relation to the immigrant and Third World (married) women who perform these jobs. The job labels recorded by Katz and Kemnitzer need to be analyzed as definitions of women's work, specifically as definitions of Third World/immigrant women's work. First, the notion of "unskilled" as easy (like following a recipe) and the idea of tolerance for tedious work both have racial and gendered dimensions. Both draw upon stereotypes that infantalize Third World women and initiate a nativist discourse of "tedium" and "tolerance" as characteristics of non-Western, primarily agricultural, premodern (Asian) cultures. Secondly, defining jobs as supplementary activity for mothers and housewives adds a further dimension: sexual identity and appropriate notions of heterosexual femininity as marital domesticity. These are not part-time jobs, but they are defined as supplementary. Thus, in this particular context, (Third World) women's work needs are defined as temporary.

While Hossfeld's analysis of management logic follows similar lines, she
offers a much more nuanced understanding of how the gender and racial stereotypes prevalent in the larger culture infuse worker consciousness and resistance. For instance, she draws attention to the ways in which factory jobs are seen by the workers as "unfeminine" or not "ladylike." Management exploits and reinforces these ideologies by encouraging women to view femininity as contradictory to factory work, by defining their jobs as secondary and temporary and by asking women to choose between defining themselves as women or as workers (Hossfeld 1990, 168). Womanhood and femininity are thus defined along a domestic, familial model, with work seen as supplemental to this primary identity. Significantly, although 80 percent of the immigrant women in Hossfeld's study were the largest annual income producers in their families, they still considered men to be the breadwinners (1963).

Thus, as with the exploitation of Indian lacemakers as "housewives," Third World/immigrant women in the Silicon Valley are located as "mothers and homemakers" and only secondarily as workers. In both cases, men are seen as the real breadwinners. While (women's) work is usually defined as something that takes place in the "public" or production sphere, these ideologies clearly draw on stereotypes of women as home-bound. In addition, the invisibility of work in the Indian context can be compared to the temporary/secondary nature of work in the Valley. As in the 1982 Mies study, the data compiled by Hossfeld and Katz and Kemnitzer indicate the presence of local ideologies and hierarchies of gender and race as the basis for the exploitation of the electronics workers. The question that arises is: How do women understand their own positions and construct meanings in an exploitative job situation?

Interviews with electronics workers indicate that, contrary to the views of management, women do not see their jobs as temporary but as part of a lifetime strategy of upward mobility. Conscious of their racial, class, and gender status, they combat their devaluation as workers by increasing their income: by job-hopping, overtime, and moonlighting as piece workers (1983, 337). Note that, in effect, the "homework" that Silicon Valley workers do is performed under conditions very similar to the lace-making of Narsapur women. Both kinds of work are done in the home, in isolation, with the worker paying her own overhead costs (like electricity and cleaning), with no legally mandated protections (such as a minimum wage, paid leave, or health benefits). However, clearly the meanings attached to the work differ in both contexts, as does the way we understand them.
For Katz and Kemnitzer the commitment of electronics workers to class mobility is an important assertion of self (1983: 335–36). Thus, unlike in Narsapur, in the Silicon Valley, homework has an entrepreneurial aspect for the women themselves. In fact, in Narsapur, women’s work turns the men into entrepreneurs. In the Valley, women take advantage of the contradictions of the situations they face as individual workers. While in Narsapur, it is purdah and caste/class mobility that provides the necessary self-definition required to anchor women’s work in the home as leisure activity, in the Silicon Valley, it is a specifically North American notion of individual ambition and entrepreneurship that provides the necessary ideological anchor for Third World women.

Katz and Kemnitzer maintain that this underground economy produces an ideological redefinition of jobs, allowing them to be defined as other than the basis of support of the historically stable, “comfortable,” white, metropolitan working class (1983, 342). In other words, there is a clear connection between low wages and the definition of the job as supplementary, and the fact that the lifestyles of people of color are defined as different and cheaper. Thus, according to Katz and Kemnitzer, women and people of color continue to be “defined out” of the old industrial system and become targets and/or instruments of the ideological shift away from class toward national/ethnic/gender lines (1983, 341). In this context, ideology and popular culture emphasize the individual maximization of options for personal success. Individual success is thus severed from union activity, political struggle, and collective relations. Similarly, Hossfeld suggests that it is the racist and sexist management logic of the needs of “immigrants” that allows the kind of exploitative labor processes that she documents (1990, 157–58). However, in spite of Katz and Kemnitzer’s complex analysis of the relationship of modes of production, social relations of production, culture, and ideology in the context of the Silicon Valley workers, they do not specify why it is Third World women who constitute the primary labor force. Similarly, while Hossfeld provides a nuanced analysis of the gendering of the workplace and the use of racial and gendered logic to consolidate capitalist accumulation, she also sometimes separates “women” and “minority workers” (176), and does not specify why it is women of color who constitute the major labor force on the assembly lines in the Valley. In distinguishing between women and people of color, Katz and Kemnitzer tend to reproduce the old conceptual divisions of gender and race, where women are defined primarily in terms of their gender and people of

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color in terms of race. What is excluded is an interactive notion of gender and race, whereby women's gendered identity is grounded in race and people of color's racial identities are gendered.

I would argue that the data compiled by Katz and Kemnitzer and Hossfeld does, in fact, explain why Third World women are targeted for jobs in electronics factories. The explanation lies in the redefinition of work as temporary, supplementary, and unskilled, in the construction of women as mothers and homemakers, and in the positioning of femininity as contradictory to factory work. In addition, the explanation also lies in the specific definition of Third World, immigrant women as docile, tolerant, and satisfied with substandard wages. It is the ideological redefinition of women's work that provides the necessary understanding of this phenomenon. Hossfeld describes some strategies of resistance in which the workers utilize against management the very gendered and racialized logic that management uses against them. However, while these tactics may provide some temporary relief on the job, they build on racial and gender stereotypes that, in the long run, can be and are used against Third World women.

DAUGHTERS, WIVES, AND MOTHERS:
MIGRANT WOMEN WORKERS IN BRITAIN

Family businesses have been able to access minority women's labor power through mediations of kinship and an appeal to ideologies which emphasize the role of women in the home as wives and mothers and as keepers of family honor. — Sallie Westwood and Parminder Bhachu, *Enterprising Women*, 1988

In a collection of essays exploring the working lives of black and minority women inside and outside the home, Sallie Westwood and Parminder Bhachu (1988) focus on the benefits afforded the British capitalist state by the racial and gendered aspects of migrant women's labor. They point to the fact that what has been called the "ethnic economy" (the way migrants draw on resources to survive in situations where the combined effects of a hostile, racist environment and economic decline serve to oppress them) is also fundamentally a gendered economy. Statistics indicate that Afro-Caribbean and non-Muslim Asian women have a higher full-time labor participation rate than white women in the United Kingdom. Thus, while the perception that black women (defined, in this case, as women of Afro-Caribbean, Asian, and African origin) are mostly concentrated in part-time jobs is untrue, the forms and pat-
terns of their work lives—within the context of homework and family firms, businesses where the entire family is involved in earning a living, either inside or outside the home—bears examination. Work by British feminist scholars (Phizacklea 1983, Westwood 1984 and 1988, Josephides 1988, and others) suggests that familial ideologies of domesticity and heterosexual marriage cement the economic and social exploitation of black women's labor within family firms. Repressive patriarchal ideologies, which fix the woman's role in the family, are grounded in inherited systems of inequality and oppression in black women's cultures of origin. And these very ideologies are reproduced and consolidated in order to provide the glue for profit making in the context of the racialized British capitalist state.

For instance, Annie Phizacklea's (1983) work on Bangladeshi homeworkers in the clothing industry in the English West Midlands illuminates the extent to which family and community ties, maintained by women, are crucial in allowing this domestic subcontracting in the clothing industry to undercut the competition in terms of wages and long work-days and its cost to women workers. In addition, Sallie Westwood's (1984) work on Gujarati women factory workers in the East Midlands hosiery industry suggests that the power and creativity of the shop floor culture that draws on cultural norms of femininity, masculinity, and domesticity, while generating resistance and solidarity among the Indian and white women workers, is, in fact, anchored in Gujarati cultural inheritances. Discussing the contradictions in the lives of Gujarati women within the home and the perception that male family members have of their work as an extension of their family roles (not as a path to financial independence), Westwood elaborates on the continuities between the ideologies of domesticity within the household, which are the result of (often repressive) indigenous cultural values and practices, and the culture of the shop floor. Celebrating each other as daughters, wives, and mothers is one form of generating solidarity on the shop floor, but it is also a powerful refeminization strategy, to use Hossfeld's term.

Finally, family businesses, which depend on the cultural and ideological resources and loyalties within the family to transform ethnic "minority" women into workers committed to common familial goals, are also anchored in women's roles as daughters, wives, mothers, and keepers of family honor (Josephides 1988, Bhachu 1988). Women's work in family business is unpaid and produces dependencies that are similar to those of homeworkers, whose labor, although paid, is invisible. Both are predicated on ideologies of domes-
ticity and womanhood that infuse the spheres of production and reproduction. In discussing Cypriot women in family firms, Sasha Josephides (1988) cites the use of familial ideologies of "honor" and the construction of a "safe" environment outside the public sphere as the bases for a definition of femininity and womanhood (the perfect corollary to a paternal, protective definition of masculinity) that allows Cypriot women to see themselves as workers for their family, rather than as workers for themselves. All conflict around the question of work is thus accommodated within the context of the family. This is an important instance of the privatization of work and of the redefinition of the identity of women workers in family firms as doing work that is a "natural extension" of their familial duties (not unlike the lacemakers). It is their identity as mothers, wives, and family members that stands in for their identity as workers. Parminder Bhachu's (1988) work with Punjabi Sikhs also illustrates this fact. Citing the growth of small-scale entrepreneurship among South Asians as a relatively new trend in the British economy, Bhachu states that women workers in family businesses often end up losing autonomy and reenter more traditional forms of patriarchal dominance, where men control all or most of the economic resources within the family: "By giving up work, these women not only lose an independent source of income, and a large network of often female colleagues, but they also find themselves sucked back into the kinship system which emphasizes patrilaterality" (85). Women thus lose a "direct relationship with the productive process," thereby raising the issue of the invisibility (even to themselves) of their identity as workers.

This analysis of migrant women's work in Britain illustrates the parallel trajectory of their exploitation as workers within a different metropolitan context than the United States. To summarize, all these case studies indicate ways in which ideologies of domesticity, femininity, and race form the basis of the construction of the notion of "women's work" for Third World women in the contemporary economy. In the case of the lacemakers, this is done through the definition of homework as leisure time activity and of the workers themselves as housewives. As discussed earlier, indigenous hierarchies of gender and caste/class make this definition possible. In the case of the electronics workers, women's work is defined as unskilled, tedious, and supplementary activity for mothers and homemakers. It is a specifically American ideology of individual success, as well as local histories of race and ethnicity that constitute this definition. We can thus contrast the invisibility of the lacemakers
as workers to the temporary nature of the work of Third World women in the Silicon Valley. In the case of migrant women workers in family firms in Britain, work becomes an extension of familial roles and loyalties and draws upon cultural and ethnic/racial ideologies of womanhood, domesticity, and entrepreneurship to consolidate patriarchal dependencies. In all these cases, ideas of flexibility, temporality, invisibility, and domesticity in the naturalization of categories of work are crucial in the construction of Third World women as an appropriate and cheap labor force. All of the above ideas rest on stereotypes about gender, race, and poverty, which, in turn, characterize Third World women as workers in the contemporary global arena.

Eileen Boris and Cynthia Daniels (1989) claim that “homework belongs to the decentralization of production that seems to be a central strategy of some sectors and firms for coping with the international restructuring of production, consumption, and capital accumulation.” Homework assumes a significant role in the contemporary capitalist global economy. The discussion of homework performed by Third World women in the three geographical spaces discussed above—India, the United States, and Britain—suggests something specific about capitalist strategies of recolonization at this historical juncture. Homework emerged at the same time as factory work in the early nineteenth century in the United States, and, as a system, it has always reinforced the conjoining of capitalism and patriarchy. Analyzing the homeworker as a wage laborer (rather than an entrepreneur who controls both her labor and the market for it) dependent on the employer for work that is carried out usually in the “home” or domestic premises, makes it possible to understand the systematic invisibility of this form of work. What allows this work to be so fundamentally exploitative as to be invisible as a form of work are ideologies of domesticity, dependency, and (hetero)sexuality, which designate women—in this case, Third World women—as primarily housewives/mothers and men as economic supporters/breadwinners. Homework capitalizes on the equation of home, family, and patriarchal and racial/cultural ideologies of femininity/masculinity with work. This is work done at home, in the midst of doing housework, childcare, and other tasks related to “homemaking,” often work that never ceases. Characterizations of “housewives,” “mothers,” and “homemakers” make it impossible to see homeworkers as workers earning regular wages and entitled to the rights of workers. Thus, not just their production, but homeworkers' exploitation as workers, can, in fact, also remain

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invisible, contained within domestic, patriarchal relations in the family. This is a form of work that often falls outside accounts of wage labor, as well as accounts of household dynamics (Allen 1989).

Family firms in Britain represent a similar ideological pattern, within a different class dynamic. Black women imagine themselves as entrepreneurs (rather than as wage laborers) working for the prosperity of their families in a racist society. However, the work they do is still seen as an extension of their familial roles and often creates economic and social dependencies. This does not mean that women in family firms never attain a sense of autonomy, but that, as a system, the operation of family business exploits Third World women's labor by drawing on and reinforcing indigenous hierarchies in the search for upward mobility in the (racist) British capitalist economy. What makes this form of work in the contemporary global capitalist arena so profoundly exploitative is that its invisibility (both to the market, and sometimes to the workers themselves) is premised on deeply ingrained sexist and racist relationships within and outside heterosexual kinship systems. This is also the reason why changing the gendered relationships that anchor homework and organizing homeworkers becomes such a challenge for feminists.

The analysis of factory work and family business in Britain and of homework in all three geographical locations raises the question of whether homework and factory work would be defined in these particular ways if the workers were single women. In this case, the construct of the worker is dependant on gender ideologies. In fact, the idea of work or labor as necessary for the psychic, material, and spiritual survival and development of women workers is absent. Instead, it is the identity of women as housewives, wives, and mothers (identities also defined outside the parameters of work) that is assumed to provide the basis for women's survival and growth. These Third World women are defined out of the labor/capital process as if work in their case isn't necessary for economic, social, psychic autonomy, independence, and self-determination—a nonalienated relation to work is a conceptual and practical impossibility in this situation.

Common Interests/Different Needs: Collective Struggles of Poor Women Workers

Thus far, this chapter has charted the ideological commonalities of the exploitation of (mostly) poor Third World women workers by global capitalist
economic processes in different geographical locations. The analysis of the
continuities between factory work and homework in objectifying and domes-
ticating Third World women workers such that their very identity as workers
is secondary to familial roles and identities, and predicated on patriarchal
and racial/ethnic hierarchies anchored in local/indigenous and transnational
processes of exploitation exposes the profound challenges posed in organiz-
ing women workers on the basis of common interests. Clearly, these women
are not merely victims of colonizing, exploitative processes—the analysis of
the case studies indicates different levels of consciousness of their own ex-
ploration, different modes of resistance, and different understandings of the
contradictions they face and of their own agency as workers. While the chap-
ter thus far lays the groundwork for conceptualizing the common interests
of women workers based on an understanding of shared location and needs,
the analysis foregrounds processes of repression rather than forms of oppo-
sition. How have poor Third World women organized as workers? How do
we conceptualize the question of "common interests" based in a "common
context of struggle," such that women are agents who make choices and deci-
sions that lead to the transformation of consciousness and of their daily lives
as workers?

As discussed earlier, with the current domination in the global arena of
the arbitrary interests of the market and of transnational, capital, older sign-
posts and definitions of capital/labor or of "the worker" or even of "class
struggle" are no longer totally accurate or viable conceptual or organizational
categories. It is, in fact, the predicament of poor working women and their
experiences of survival and resistance in the creation of new organizational
forms to earn a living and improve their daily lives that offers new possibili-
ties for struggle and action. In this instance, then, the experiences of Third
World women workers are relevant for understanding and transforming the
work experiences and daily lives of poor women everywhere. The rest of this
chapter explores these questions by suggesting a working definition of the
question of the common interests of Third World women workers in the con-
temporary global capitalist economy, drawing on the work of feminist politi-
cal theorist Anna G. Jonasdottir.

Jonasdottir explores the concept of women's interests in participatory
democratic political theory. She emphasizes both the formal and the content
aspects of a theory of social and political interests that refers to "different
layers of social existence: agency and the needs/desires that give strength and
meaning to agency" (Jonasdottir 1988, 57). Adjudicating between political analysts who theorize common interests in formal terms (i.e., the claim to actively “be among,” to choose to participate in defining the terms of one’s own existence, or acquiring the conditions for choice) and those who reject the concept of interests in favor of the concept of (subjective) individualized and group-based “needs and desires” (the consequences of choice), Jonasdottir formulates a concept of the common interests of women that emphasizes the former but is a combination of both perspectives. She argues that the formal aspect of interest (an active “being among”) is crucial: “Understood historically, and seen as emerging from people’s lived experiences, interests about basic processes of social life are divided systematically between groups of people in so far as their living conditions are systematically different. Thus historically and socially defined, interests can be characterized as ‘objective’ ” (41). In other words, there are systematic material and historical bases for claiming that Third World women workers have common interests. However, Jonasdottir suggests that the second aspect of theorizing interest, the satisfaction of needs and desires (she distinguishes between agency and the result of agency) remains an open question. Thus, the content of needs and desires from the point of view of interest remains open for subjective interpretation. According to Jonasdottir, feminists can acknowledge and fight on the basis of the (objective) common interests of women in terms of active representation and choices to participate in a democratic polity, while at the same time not reducing women’s common interests (based on subjective needs and desires) to this formal “being among” aspect of the question of interest. This theorization allows us to acknowledge common interests and potential agency on the basis of systematic aspects of social location and experience, while keeping open what I see as the deeper, more fundamental question of understanding and organizing around the needs, desires, and choices (the question of critical, transformative consciousness) in order to transform the material and ideological conditions of daily life. The latter has a pedagogical and transformative dimension that the former does not.

How does this theorization relate to conceptualizations of the common interests of Third World women workers? Jonasdottir’s distinction between agency and the result of agency is a very useful one in this instance. The challenges for feminists in this arena are (1) understanding Third World women workers as having objective interests in common as workers (they are thus agents and make choices as workers); and (2) recognizing the contradictions
and dislocations in women's own consciousness of themselves as workers and thus of their needs and desires—which sometimes militate against organizing on the basis of their common interests (the results of agency). Thus, work has to be done here in analyzing the links between the social location and the historical and current experiences of domination of Third World women workers, on the one hand, and in theorizing and enacting the common social identity of Third World women workers, on the other. Reviewing the forms of collective struggle of poor, Third World women workers in relation to the above theorization of common interests provides a map of where we are in this project.

In the case of women workers in the free-trade zones in a number of countries, trade unions have been the most visible forum for expressing the needs and demands of poor women. The sexism of trade unions, however, has led women to recognize the need for alternative, more democratic organizational structures, and to form women's unions (as in Korea, China, Italy, and Malaysia [see Women Working Worldwide 1993]) or to turn to community groups, church committees, or feminist organizations. In the United States, Third World immigrant women in electronics factories have often been hostile to unions that they recognize as clearly modeled in the image of the white, male, working-class American worker. Thus, church involvement in immigrant women workers struggles has been an important form of collective struggle in the United States (Women Working Worldwide, 1993, 38).

Women workers have developed innovative strategies of struggle in women's unions. For instance, in 1989, the Korean Women Workers Association staged an occupation of the factory in Masan. They moved into the factory and lived there, cooked meals, guarded the machines and premises, and effectively stopped production (Women Working Worldwide 1993, 31). In this form of occupation of the work premises, the processes of daily life become constitutive of resistance (also evident in the welfare rights struggles in the United States) and opposition is anchored in the systematic realities of the lives of poor women. It expresses not only their common interests as workers, but acknowledges their social circumstance as women for whom the artificial separation of work and home has little meaning. This "occupation" is a strategy of collective resistance that draws attention to poor women workers' building community as a form of survival.

Kumudhini Rosa makes a similar argument in her analysis of the "habits of resistance" of women workers in free trade zones (FTZ) in Sri Lanka, Malay-
sia, and the Philippines (Rosa 1994, esp. 86). The fact that women live and work together in these FTZs is crucial in analyzing the ways in which they build community life, share resources and dreams, provide mutual support and aid on the assembly line and in the street, and develop individual and collective habits of resistance. Rosa claims that these forms of resistance and mutual aid are anchored in a “culture of subversion” in which women living in patriarchal, authoritarian households where they are required to be obedient and disciplined, acquire practice in “concealed forms of rebelling” (86). Thus, women workers engage in “spontaneous” strikes in Sri Lanka, “wildcat” strikes in Malaysia, and “sympathy” strikes in the Philippines. They also support each other by systematically lowering the production target or helping slow workers meet the production targets on assembly lines. Rosa’s analysis illustrates recognition of the common interests of women workers at a formal “being among” level. While women are conscious of the contradictions of their daily lives as women and as workers and enact their resistance, they have not organized actively to identify their collective needs and to transform the conditions of their daily lives.

While the earlier section on the ideological construction of work in terms of gender and racial/ethnic hierarchies discussed homework as one of the most acute forms of exploitation of poor Third World women, it is also the area in which some of the most creative and transformative collective organizing has occurred. The two most visibly successful organizational efforts in this arena are the Working Women’s Forum (WWF) and the Self Employed Women’s Association (SEWA) in India, both registered as independent trade unions, and focusing on incorporating homeworkers, as well as petty traders, hawkers, and laborers in the informal economy into their membership (Mitter 1994, esp. 33).

There has also been a long history of organizing homeworkers in Britain. Discussing the experience of the West Yorkshire Homworking Group in the late 1980s, Jane Tate states that “a homework campaign has to work at a number of levels, in which the personal interconnects with the political, the family situation with work, lobbying Parliament with small local meetings. . . . In practical terms, the homeworking campaigns have adopted a way of organising that reflects the practice of many women’s groups, as well as being influenced by the theory and practice of community work. It aims to bring out the strength of women, more often in small groups with a less formal structure and organisation than in a body such as a union” (Tate 1994, 164) 

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Issues of race, ethnicity, and class are central in this effort since most of the homeworkers are of Asian or Third World origin. Tate identifies a number of simultaneous strategies used by the West Yorkshire Group to organize homeworkers: pinpointing and making visible the “real” employer (or the real enemy), rather than directing organizational efforts only against local subsidiaries; consumer education and pressure, which links the buying of goods to homeworker struggles; fighting for a code of work practice for suppliers by forming alliances between trade unions, women’s, and consumer groups; linking campaigns to the development of alternative trade organizations (for instance, SEWA); fighting for visibility in international bodies like the International Labour Organisation; and, finally, developing transnational links between local grassroots homeworker organizations—thus, sharing resources, strategies, and working toward empowerment. The common interests of homeworkers are acknowledged in terms of their daily lives as workers and as women—there is no artificial separation of the “worker” and the “homemaker” or the “housewife” in this context. While the West Yorkshire Homworking Group has achieved some measure of success in organizing homeworkers, and there is a commitment to literacy, consciousness raising, and empowerment of workers, this is still a feminist group that organizes women workers (rather than women workers organizing themselves, with the impetus for organization emerging from the workers). It is in this regard that SEWA and WWF emerge as important models for poor women workers organizations.

Swasti Mitter discusses the success of SEWA and WWF in terms of: (1) their representing the potential for organizing powerful women workers’ organizations (the membership of WWF is 85,000 and that of SEWA is 46,000 workers) when effective strategies are used; and (2) making these “hidden” workers visible as workers to national and international policy makers. Both WWF and SEWA address the demands of poor women workers, and both include a development plan for women that includes leadership training, child care, women’s banks, and producer’s cooperatives that offer alternative trading opportunities. Renana Jhabvala, SEWA’s secretary, explains that, while SEWA was born in 1972 in the Indian labor movement and drew inspiration from the women’s movement, it always saw itself as a part of the cooperative movement, as well (Jhabvala 1994). Thus, struggling for poor women workers’ rights always went hand in hand with strategies to develop alternative economic systems. Jhabvala states, “SEWA accepts the co-operative prin-
ciples and sees itself as part of the co-operative movement attempting to ex-
tend these principles to the poorest women. ... SEWA sees the need to bring
poor women into workers' co-operatives. The co-operative structure has to
be revitalised if they are to become truly workers' organisations, and thereby
mobilise the strength of the co-operative movement in the task of organis-
ing and strengthening poor women" (Jhabvala 1994, 116). This emphasis on
the extension of cooperative (or democratic) principles to poor women, the
focus on political and legal literacy, education for critical and collective con-
sciousness, and developing strategies for collective (and sometimes militant)
struggle and for economic, social, and psychic development makes SEWA's
project a deeply feminist, democratic, and transformative one. Self-employed
women are some of the most disenfranchised in Indian society— they are vul-
nerable economically, in caste terms, physically, sexually, and in terms of their
health, and, of course, they are socially and politically invisible. Thus they are
also one of the most difficult constituencies to organize. The simultaneous
focus on collective struggle for equal rights and justice (struggle against)
coupled with economic development on the basis of cooperative, democratic
principles of sharing, education, self-reliance, and autonomy (struggle for)
is what is responsible for SEWA's success at organizing poor, home-based,
women workers. Jhabvala summarizes this when she says, "The combin-
ation of trade union and co-operative power makes it possible not only to de-
fend members but to present an ideological alternative. Poor women's co-
operatives are a new phenomenon. SEWA has a vision of the co-operative as
a form of society that will bring about more equal relationships and lead to a
new type of society" (135).

SEWA appears to come closest to articulating the common interests and
needs of Third World women workers in the terms that Jonasdottir elabor-
ates. The association organizes on the basis of the objective interests of poor
women workers— both the trade union and cooperative development aspect
of the organizational strategies illustrate this. The status of poor women
workers as workers and as citizens entitled to rights and justice is primary.
But SEWA also approaches the deeper level of the articulation of needs and
desires based on recognition of subjective, collective interests. As discussed
earlier, it is this level of the recognition and articulation of common interest
that is the challenge for women workers globally. While the common inter-
ests of women workers as workers have been variously articulated in the forms
of struggles and organizations reviewed above, the transition to identifying
common needs and desires (the content aspect of interest) of Third World women workers, which leads potentially to the construction of the identity of Third World women workers, is what remains a challenge—a challenge that perhaps SEWA comes closest to identifying and addressing.

I have argued that the particular location of Third World women workers at this moment in the development of global capitalism provides a vantage point from which to (1) make particular practices of domination and recolonization visible and transparent, thus illuminating the minute and global processes of capitalist recolonization of women workers, and (2) understand the commonalities of experiences, histories, and identity as the basis for solidarity and in organizing Third World women workers transnationally. My claim, here, is that the definition of the social identity of women as workers is not only class-based but, in fact, in this case, must be grounded in understandings of race, gender, and caste histories and experiences of work. In effect, I suggest that homework is one of the most significant, and repressive, forms of “women’s work” in contemporary global capitalism. In pointing to the ideology of the “Third World woman worker” created in the context of a global division of labor, I am articulating differences located in specific histories of inequality, that is, histories of gender and caste/class in the Narsapur context and histories of gender, race, and liberal individualism in the Silicon Valley and in Britain.

However, my argument does not suggest that these are discrete and separate histories. In focusing on women’s work as a particular form of Third World women’s exploitation in the contemporary economy, I also want to foreground a particular history that Third and First World women seem to have in common: the logic and operation of capital in the contemporary global arena. I maintain that the interests of contemporary transnational capital and the strategies employed enable it to draw upon indigenous social hierarchies and to construct, reproduce, and maintain ideologies of masculinity/femininity, technological superiority, appropriate development, skilled/unskilled labor, and so on. Here I have argued this in terms of the category of “women’s work,” which I have shown to be grounded in an ideology of the Third World women worker. Thus, analysis of the location of Third World women in the new international division of labor must draw upon the histories of colonialism and race, class and capitalism, gender and patriarchy, and sexual and familial figurations. The analysis of the ideological definition and redefinition of women’s work thus indicates a political basis for common
struggles and it is this particular forging of the political unity of Third World women workers that I would like to endorse. This is in opposition to ahistorical notions of the common experience, exploitation, or strength of Third World women or between Third and First World women, which serve to naturalize normative Western feminist categories of self and other. If Third World women are to be seen as the subjects of theory and of struggle, we must pay attention to the specificities of their/our common and different histories.

In summary, this chapter highlights the following analytic and political issues pertaining to Third World women workers in the global arena: it writes a particular group of women workers into history and into the operation of contemporary capitalist hegemony; it charts the links and potential for solidarity between women workers across the borders of nation-states, based on demystifying the ideology of the masculinized worker; it exposes a domesticated definition of Third World women's work to be in actuality a strategy of global capitalist recolonization; it suggests that women have common interests as workers, not just in transforming their work lives and environments, but in redefining home spaces so that homework is recognized as work to earn a living rather than as leisure or supplemental activity; it foregrounds the need for feminist liberatory knowledge as the basis of feminist organizing and collective struggles for economic and political justice; it provides a working definition of the common interests of Third World women workers based on theorizing the common social identity of Third World women as women/workers; and finally, it reviews the habits of resistance, forms of collective struggle, and strategies of organizing of poor, Third World women workers. Irma is right when she says that “the only way to get a little measure of power over your own life is to do it collectively, with the support of other people who share your needs” (quoted in Hossfeld 1993, 51). The question of defining common interests and needs such that the identity of Third World women workers forms a potentially revolutionary basis for struggles against capitalist recolonization, and for feminist self-determination and autonomy, is a complex one. However, as maquiladora worker Veronica Vasquez and the women in SEWA demonstrate, women are already waging such struggles. The beginning of the twenty-first century may be characterized by the exacerbation of the sexual politics of global capitalist domination and exploitation, but it is also suggestive of the dawning of a renewed politics of hope and solidarity.

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The universities were places for self-perfection, places for the highest education in life. Everyone taught everyone else. All were teachers, all were students. The sages listened more than they talked; and when they talked it was to ask questions that would engage endless generations in profound and perpetual discovery.

The universities and the academies were also places where people sat and meditated and absorbed knowledge from the silence. Research was a permanent activity, and all were researchers and appliers of the fruits of research. The purpose was to discover the hidden unified law of all things, to deepen the spirit, to make more profound the sensitivities of the individual to the universe, and to become more creative. — Ben Okri, Astonishing the Gods, 1995

Ben Okri’s beautifully lyrical vision of the university highlights lifelong, collective learning, the importance of listening, silence and meditation as forms of learning, the connection of intellectual and spiritual labor to creativity, and the process of research and knowledge acquisition as the discovery of the principles and values of human existence in the context of a larger physical and cosmic environment. In the context of the U.S. academy of the late twentieth and early twenty-first century, however, Okri’s description of the purpose and pedagogy of university life seem impossibly utopian. Nonetheless, I begin with this vision of the university community precisely because it is utopian and draws attention to the visionary aspects of the work of many teachers and scholars in academic settings around the world. It is also this vision of ethical pedagogy and true knowledge-seeking, in part, that compels me to write about the increasingly corporate U.S. academy and its profound significance for feminist struggle.
The academy has always been the site of feminist struggle. It is that contradictory place where knowledges are colonized but also contested—a place that engenders student mobilizations and progressive movements of various kinds. It is one of the few remaining spaces in a rapidly privatized world that offers some semblance of a public arena for dialogue, engagement, and visioning of democracy and justice. Although these spaces are shrinking rapidly, dialogue, disagreement, and controversy are still possible and sanctioned in the academy. I believe the U.S. academy is one of a handful of contested sites crucial to feminist struggle in the United States. And it is one of the most significant sites in recent history for antiglobalization student movements, and post-11 September 2001, one of the major sites of antiwar organizing. Thus the increasing privatization of U.S. institutions of higher education has significant effects for feminist work in the academy, and antiracist feminists need to theorize our work in relation to this restructured academy.

It is thus in the spirit of clarifying the limits and possibilities of emancipatory work in the academy that I undertake this analysis. This chapter offers an antiracist, feminist critique of what Stanley Aronowitz (2000) calls “The Knowledge Factory,” and others have variously referred to as “the corporate university” (Giroux and Myrsiades 2001), “digital diploma mills” (Noble 2001), “academic capitalism” (Slaughter and Leslie 1997), and “the academic globalization of North American universities” (Currie 1998). I attempt this analysis for two reasons—because I believe the discursive and pedagogical critiques of a Eurocentric, masculinist knowledge base have to be anchored in the larger institutional context in which many feminist academics work, and because although there is a growing body of left scholarship on the debilitating effects of a privatized, corporate academy, this scholarship by and large either ignores or erases questions of racialized gender. After all the Marxist-feminist, antiracist theorizing of the past few decades, we continue to inherit a left critique unmarked by racialized gender in terms of its theoretical presuppositions. On the other hand, feminist scholars have made great inroads in discursive, curricular, and pedagogical terms within and across academic disciplines, but we rarely link these concerns to a serious anticapitalist critique of the corporate academy—an academy that determines the everyday material and ideological conditions of our work as teachers and scholars in the United States of America.

Chapter 8 addresses the politics of knowledge, curricular and pedagogical
practices and their effects on the location and experiences of marginalized communities in the academy. Here I analyze the political economy of the U.S. academy (or U.S. higher education in general) and the commoditization of knowledge in the context of global restructuring and economic and political realignments of power. Again, questions of power, difference, knowledge, and democratic struggles dominate this analysis of my own primary place of work and struggle for the last two decades: questions about potential solidarities, and about borders and their underlying relations of power preoccupy me here as well, questions about where the unseen borders in the academy lie and how we can make them visible, about who crosses these borders and who cannot, about the kinds of passports/credentials needed to cross borders, and the building of communities of dialogue and dissent that democratize and decolonize these borders so that all constituencies can access and utilize the knowledges each need for autonomy and self-definition.

Globalization is a slogan, an overused and underunderstood concept, and it characterizes real shifts and consolidation of power around the world. Institutions, and people in power, rule and maintain inequality in part by hiding or mystifying the workings of power. Understanding the political economy of higher education at the beginning of the twenty-first century is about seeing and making visible the shifts and mystifications of power at a time when global capitalism reigns supreme. I focus here on globalization as a process that combines a market ideology with a set of material practices drawn from the business world. In this context the politics of difference, the production of knowledge about (and the disciplining/colonizing of) difference, how we know what we know, and the consequences of our “knowing” on different realities and communities of people around the world is one of the ways we can trace the effects of globalization in the academy. Feminist literacy necessitates learning to see (and theorize) differently—to identify and challenge the politics of knowledge that naturalizes global capitalism and business-as-usual in North American higher education. Specifically it involves making racialized gender visible and acknowledging its centrality to processes of governance in the “new” corporate academy. While we have access to a wealth of feminist and antiracist, multicultural scholarship on curricular and pedagogical issues in U.S. higher education,¹ there is very little scholarship that connects pedagogical and curricular questions to those of governance, administration, and educational policy; it is this link that this chapter explores.
Globalization, Academic Capitalism, and Democratic Education

One of the most obvious ways in which globalization is understood is in terms of the production of an epoch of "borderlessness." The mobility, and borderlessness, of technology (e.g., the Internet), financial capital, environmental wastes, modes of governance (e.g., the World Trade Organization), as well as cross-national political movements (e.g., struggles against the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund) characterizes globalization at the beginning of the twenty-first century. In 1989, Jonathan Feldman argued persuasively that U.S. universities are "part of a complex web of intervention and militarism." Feldman showed how the university "participates in both the U.S. war system and the transnational economy" (5; see also Soley 1995). What was referred to in the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s as the "military-industrial complex" has now transmogrified into the "military/prison/cyber/corporate complex." Zillah Eisenstein's argument (1998) linking cyber-media-corporate power and Angela Davis's analysis (in James 1998) of the new "prison-industrial complex" provides the analytical basis for my formulation of the "military/prison/cyber/corporate complex." What concerns me here is the place (literal and metaphorical) of U.S. universities in this complex. Along with many other scholars, I believe that the U.S. university is one of the "scapes" (to use John Urry's [1998] term for networks of technologies, machines, organizations, texts, and actors) connected to this complex. Borderlessness in these terms engenders profound questions about power, access, justice, and accountability. After all, inequality can also be mobile in this particular world.

John Urry suggests that new machines and technologies shrink time-space, creating scapes that partially transcend social control and regulation. These machines and technologies include "fiber-optic cables, jet planes, audio-visual transmissions, digital TV, computer networks including the Internet, satellites, credit cards, faxes, electronic point-of-sale terminals, cell phones, electronic stock exchanges, high speed trains, and virtual reality. There are also large-scale increases in nuclear, chemical and conventional military technologies and weapons, as well as new waste products and health risks" (6).

Is the North American university a similar global scape involved in the business of economic and political capitalist rule? Evidence for this proposition can be found in the increasingly close link between what Etzkowitz, Web-
ster, and Healey (1998) call science policy and economic development policy (21). Etzkowitz and his colleagues claim that since the 1980s, universities have been undergoing a "second revolution" (the first being the humanities-based revolution of the late nineteenth and early twentieth century that introduced a research mission into the university). This second academic revolution is science-based and is "the translation of research findings into intellectual property, a marketable commodity, and economic development" (21). Note the reference to property, commodity exchange, and economic development—all fundamental aspects of global capitalism. The moment we tie university-based research to economic development—and describe this research as fundamentally driven by market forces—it becomes possible to locate the university as an important player in capitalist rule. Etzkowitz and colleagues talk about the "triple helix" model of knowledge "capitalization" in the sciences—with the university, industry, and the state forming the three strands of interdependency. The capitalization of knowledge here refers to the "translation of knowledge into commercial property in the literal sense of capitalizing on one's intellectual (scientific) assets; more generally, it refers to the way in which society at large draws on, uses, and exploits its universities, government-funded research labs, and so on to build the innovative capacity of the future" (9). This capitalization of knowledge is one of the most profound ways that universities serve as a catalyst for the onward march of global capitalism—a march ably facilitated by knowledge and information technologies in the early years of this century.

There is now a wide-ranging university/corporate alliance that sustains and supports the military/prison/cyber/corporate complex. Thus immense power as well as oppression is dispersed, funneled through, recycled, consolidated, and above all justified through the daily operation of U.S. universities newly restructured through the processes of economic globalization. It is this link between the university and other scopes of global capitalism that recycle and exacerbate gender, race, class, and sexual hierarchies that concerns me.

As scholars and critics of the effects of globalization on the university have argued, the last few decades have witnessed a profound shift in the vision and mission of the nineteenth-century public university to the model of an entrepreneurial, corporate university in the business of naturalizing capitalist, privatized citizenship. The ideology of the market and of the consumer as the global and North American citizen par excellence is actively consolidated in the restructured U.S. university—and this is bad news indeed for educa-
tors and citizens concerned with social and economic justice. Further, it is the racialized, and sexualized, systems of exploitation that underlie and consolidate the everyday material workings of the corporatized university, and of the production of consumer-citizens. These systems include unequal relations of labor, exclusionary systems of access, Eurocentric canons and curricular structures, sexist and racist campus cultures, and the simultaneous marginalization and cooptation of feminist, race and ethnic, and gay/lesbian/queer studies agendas in the service of the corporate academy.

The values and ideologies underlying the corporate, entrepreneurial university directly contradict the values and vision of a democratic, public university engaged in crafting democratic citizenship though the practice of higher education. Amy Gutmann in her now classic work on democratic education (1987) argues that the university is particularly well suited for a type of education in which young people learn how to think critically and carefully about political problems, and about how to articulate their own views and defend them before people with whom they disagree. Historically, the relative autonomy of the university was rooted in its primary democratic purpose — protection against the threat of tyranny. Gutmann clarifies the “freedom of the academy” and the “academic freedom of scholar” in this way:

Control of the creation of ideas—whether by a majority or a minority—subverts the ideal of conscious social reproduction at the heart of democratic education and democratic politics. As institutional sanctuaries for free scholarly inquiry, universities can help prevent such subversion. They can provide a realm where new and unorthodox ideas are judged on their intellectual merits; where men and women who defend such ideas, provided they defend them well, are not strangers but valuable members of the community. Universities thereby serve democracy as sanctuaries of non-repression. (174)

The idea of the university as a sanctuary for “free scholarly inquiry” suggests the necessity of the relative autonomy of the university community in relation to the state and the market. Also, it is this autonomy and commitment to democratic practice within the university that allows it to be a “sanctuary of nonrepression.” Furthermore, it is their role as sanctuaries of nonrepression that provides universities their unique place in the crafting of democratic citizenship. Thus, if we contrast this vision of democratic citizenship fostered by universities with Etzkowitz et al.’s analysis of the capitalization of scientific
knowledge and the now normalized ties between university research and in-
dustry, we are faced with a major contradiction in the role of the new academy
in crafting citizenship. In the context of the university/corporate complex,
universities can no longer be heralded as sanctuaries of nonrepression—nor
can they be sites for “free scholarly inquiry,” that is, free from the pressures
of state or industrial and corporate profit making.

However since universities are about knowledge production and dissemi-
nation, they remain sites of struggle and contestation, thus making the corpo-
rate academy a crucial locus of feminist engagement. In recent years there has
been a backlash against women and especially feminist scholars and teachers
in academia. Feminist scholars are denied tenure on the basis of the “political”
or unconventional nature of their work; university administrators claim that
it is difficult to find “qualified” women and minority candidates to fill perma-
nent positions, while the revolving door policy for women, especially women
of color, is firmly in place (see Sidhu 2001). This backlash needs to be analyzed
not just in the context of the hegemony of conservative and neoliberal dis-
courses and practices in the academy but also in terms of the corporatization
of the academy.

Gutmann’s sketch of democratic education (1987) is further complicated
if we add the values of justice and equality to the mission of the university in a
democratic, just society. Here Iris Marion Young (1990) is especially helpful.
Claiming that interest group politics are defective in that “the privatized form
of representation and decision making it encourages does not require these
expressions of interests to justice, and second that inequality of resources,
organization, and power allows some interests to dominate while others have
little or no voice,” (92) Young argues eloquently, that “democratic participa-
tion has an intrinsic value over and above the protection of interests, in pro-
viding important means for the development and exercise of capacities” (92).
This is similar to Gutmann’s argument about the university providing a space
for the practice and development of democratic capacities by defining them-
selves as sanctuaries of nonrepression (i.e., not participating in interest group
politics). However, unlike Gutmann, Young introduces justice and equality,
especially as they arise in relation to historically oppressed and marginalized
peoples, as fundamental to conceiving democracy. Here is how Young defines
the link between democratic citizenship and social justice: “A goal of social
justice, I will assume, is social equality. Equality refers not primarily to the dis-
tribution of social goods, though distributions are certainly entailed by social

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equality. It refers primarily to the full participation and inclusion of everyone in a society's major institutions, and the socially supported substantive opportunity for all to develop and exercise their capacities and realize their choices" (173).

Thus, for Young, democratic citizenship in higher education would not just entail working to create a space for free scholarly inquiry and exchange in a nonrepressive environment; it would also entail the just and equal participation of all social groups in the institutions that effect their lives. This just and equal participation is necessary for everyone to develop their capacities and exercise their choices. Young thus argues for attentiveness to gender, race, class, and sexual difference and inequality in theorizing democratic citizenship. Like Ben Okri's vision, this idea of democratic citizenship in higher education is fundamentally opposed to the ideas and values of the restructured, entrepreneurial university. Clarifying this particular contradiction in the vision and mission of the university then opens up some unexpected spaces for antiracist feminist engagement.

If antiracist feminist agendas in the academy are predicated on the creation and consolidation of democratic spaces attentive to questions of access, opportunities, power, and voice of different racial, sexual, class-based communities, the privatized, restructured university becomes an urgent locus of struggle. The restructuring of the university occurs on several levels: (1) the nature of jobs for faculty are restructured leading to a major shift in relations of labor among different faculty constituencies; (2) the nature of jobs for support personnel and administrative personal also change and take on new and often reduced dimensions; (3) there are corresponding shifts in the organization and delivery of knowledge, that is, curricular priorities and pedagogical strategies undergo realignment; and (4) the place of the university in relation to corporate interests and priorities, on the one hand, and to national/state interests and priorities, on the other, undergoes some realignment as well. The glue that works to bind all this is the increasing privatization of the university, resulting in the erosion of public spaces and decreased accountability, responsibility, and autonomy of the university.

Privatization, the transfer of public assets and services owned and performed by the government to businesses and individuals in the private sector, is one of the most explicit forms taken by economic and political globalization in the United States. Privatization in the United States is the flip side of the Structural Adjustment Programs Third World/South countries are subjected
to by the IMF and the World Bank. And the privatization of higher education is linked to the privatization of prisons, hospitals, media, and so on. Thus the discussion of universities and globalization needs to be framed within the larger context of the military/prison/cyber/corporate complex. Perhaps one of the only ways to fight the corporatization of the university (which has lead to the rollback of affirmative action and the recolonization of marginalized peoples and our knowledges) is to link this struggle to other anticorporatization struggles (e.g., the anti-World Trade Organization movement).

Privatization, Labor, and the Entrepreneurial University

Privatization as it operates in the United States can mean dismantling welfare and social security, the sale or lease of public parks, recreation areas, hospitals, and prisons, or simply contracting out landscaping, school bus driving, or data processing services. In a university setting it can mean contracting out food and janitorial services, as well as the contracting out of teaching and curricular projects. It can mean the commoditization of higher education (the deliberate transformation of the educational process into commodity form for the purpose of profit making), as David Noble (2001) argues, through, for instance, prepackaged distance learning programs.

Ideologically, privatization is rooted in the economic theory of Milton Friedman and the Chicago School of Economics, which since the 1980s has developed a conservative rhetoric of efficiency, cost savings, and the dismantling of corrupt, intrusive, and ineffective big government. This ideology is applied to public policy and influenced by conservative, right-wing think tanks such as the Heritage Foundation, the John Locke Foundation, the Reason Foundation, the Cato Institute, and the American Enterprise Institute. The fundamental ethical shift that occurs as a result of the ideology of privatization is the replacement of public participation and institutional responsibility and accountability with a profit motive. Privatization recasts the principles of democratic governance into the principles of the capitalist marketplace and turns citizens into consumers. It is about the abdication of responsibility, and it necessitates looking at who benefits (corporations and the neoconservative movement) and who is adversely affected—workers of all kinds, people of color, poor women, and anyone concerned about democracy and citizenship.

Sheila Slaughter and Larry Leslie (1997) argue that the American university has been undergoing a restructuring like that of the U.S. economy, sub-

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ject to government deregulation and increasing privatization in the name of efficiency and cost cutting. In the early 1990s two-thirds of U.S. public research institutions faced substantial cuts and many private universities engaged in various forms of retrenchment. Thus, like the U.S. economy, higher education had to restructure to deal with this retrenchment. Restructuring has usually taken the form of “academic capitalism,” where universities have moved closer to the market ideologically, financially, and in terms of policy and practice, creating more links with industry, establishing commercial arms, selling education to foreign students, and restructuring campuses. Academic capitalism is entirely commensurate with the ideology and politics of privatization, and it lays the groundwork for a market-based capitalist citizenship.

In her work on universities and globalization (1998), Jan Currie argues thus: “The major factor affecting universities has been the economic ideology prevalent in globalization that calls for the primacy of the market, privatization, and a reduced role for the public sphere. It deregulates the economy and restructures work, which leads to an intensification of work for the remaining ‘core’ workers” (15). A global markets focus replaces commitments to sexual, racial, and class equality. The “management” of race, gender, sexual, and class conflict stands in for an active commitment to struggle against these inherited and disabling structures (that is, for social justice). One effect of this substitution is that while the discourse of multiculturalism is in full force in the academy these days, the practice of multiculturalism actually facilitates the recolonization of communities marginalized on the basis of class, and racialized gender. The practice and pedagogy of accommodation is profoundly different if not incommensurate with the practice and pedagogy of dissent and transformation. And a management perspective is profoundly different from a social justice perspective, one that takes the weight of history seriously and is anchored in a commitment to racial, gender, sexual, and class equity.

The restructuring (privatization) of the academy as we know it results in a truncated professoriate, since the commoditization of the educational process requires shifting attention from educators to the products of education that can now be sold in discrete units. Another result is a growing division between a small core group of workers with higher pay, job security, and benefits, and a larger group of peripheral contract workers, predominantly women, with lower pay, job insecurity, and no benefits. Almost 30 percent of
all classes nationally are now taught by part-time faculty, while 45 percent of all undergraduate faculty are part-time. In contrast, in 1970 only 22 percent of faculty worked part-time. This shift in employment status marks the creation of a permanent underclass of professional workers in higher education. Once again, the familiar story of this stage of contemporary global capitalism: women workers of all colors in U.S. higher education are the hardest hit (National Center for Educational Statistics 2001). This is a slow but inexorable shift in roles, intellectual project, and identity for faculty in higher education—and making the shift visible is an important way to read the operation of power and relations of rule in the academy. Here is one place where borders are being redrawn and discourses of retrenchment, funding, and efficiency mystify and cover-up the drawing of the lines in the sand. Thus citizenship is actively redefined for university faculty through this restructuring of academic labor, making the corporate academy an important area of struggle for feminist, antiracist intellectuals and educators. For instance, Department of Education statistics summarized in the Chronicle of Higher Education Almanac 2001 indicate that there has been no change since 1977 in the percent of women professors that have tenure, and full professors across all schools and disciplines are 79 percent male, and almost 90 percent white. And since 1995, the year its report was published, the disparities between the salaries of men and women academics has actually increased (Sidhu 2001, 38). In terms of faculty of color, the percentage of black faculty has remained the same in the last thirty years—less than 5 percent, with half of these at historically black institutions. Asian faculty constitute 5.5 percent and Latinos 2.6 percent of the total faculty in the U.S. academy. In contrast, in 2001, the student body in the United States was 56 percent women, 11 percent African American, 8 percent Latino, and 6 percent Asian American (see Chait and Trower 2001).

In addition to the restructuring of academic labor, many scholars of education and globalization predict another alarming set of changes. Currie (1998) summarizes these: “an intensification of work practices, a loss of autonomy, closer monitoring and appraisal, less participation in decision-making, and a lack of personal development through work” (15). The current popularity of distance learning, and the rush to technologize and commodify curricula on the part of large state universities such as Wisconsin and California (Berkeley) is one example of the profound changes in intellectual labor. Noble (2001) argues that distance learning parallels an earlier incarnation of commodified education in the late nineteenth century—correspondence education:
For-profit commercial firms are once again emerging to provide vocational training to working people via computer-based distance education. Universities are once again striving to meet the challenge of these commercial enterprises, generate new revenue streams, and extend the range and reach of their offerings. And although trying somehow to distinguish themselves from their commercial rivals—while collaborating even more closely with them, they are once again coming to resemble them, this time as digital diploma mills. (5)

Noble examines the involvement of the Universities of Wisconsin, California, Columbia, and Chicago in the creation of these new digital diploma mills. Recently, Cornell University joined this illustrious list through the creation of a for-profit distance learning corporation, e-Cornell. Distance learning shifts the focus from the actors in the educational process to the products (syllabi, lectures, etc.) of educational labor, which are then classified and marketed for profit. Education is thus transformed into “a set of deliverable commodities, and the end of education has become not self-knowledge but the making of money” (3). In other words, pedagogy as we know it becomes obsolete.

In a 2001 radio interview David Noble spoke about a Clinton-Gore initiative that offered distance education for active duty military personnel through the Department of Defense. Now the Department of Defense is the largest consumer of distance learning programs—another clear connection between changing educational priorities and the governing functions of the U.S. state—since this is a tax payer–supported (military) market.4 The role of teachers has shifted radically in this process from being educators with control over our own labor and the products of our labor to commodity producers and deliverers. Correspondingly, students have become consumers of yet another commodity—education. This is then a formula for the “deprofessionalization” or “proletarianization” of the professoriate.

William Readings (1996) discusses the “proletarianization of the professoriate” with the deskilling of faculty, and administrators not professors driving the curriculum. Reading’s provocative thesis deserves attention. He argues that as an effect of economic globalization, the university is becoming a transnational bureaucratic corporation either tied to transnational governing bodies such as the European Economic Union, or analogous to transnational corporations that operate outside the purview of national accountability. Thus the twenty-first-century university is no longer called upon to craft citizen-
subjects of the United States (this was the task of the nineteenth-century vision of the university). The end of the cold war means that national culture no longer needs to be legitimated.

This is an important argument about citizenship. What Readings argues is that with the demise of the vision of the university as tied to the creation of citizens of a democratic nation, the corresponding vision of the university as a corporation is put in place. How do we understand citizenship in the context of corporations? In the context of corporate culture and values, citizenship is defined not in terms of civil rights or democratic participation or shared vision but in terms of financial stakes and the ability to consume goods and services. As Readings and Noble state, students at the corporate university are citizen-consumers. Citizen-consumers, a proletarianized professoriate, and newly empowered corporate administrators are thus the result of the restructuring of the university. As Edward Berman notes, in his extensive analysis of the transformation of the University of Louisville into a model entrepreneurial university, “Today’s higher education system operates within a market economy distinguished by fierce competition among many purveyors (colleges and universities) of similar products (singly, a course; collectively, an education), which vie with one another for increasingly fickle and demographically changing consumers (students)” (Berman 1998, 213).

In his study, Berman suggests three examples of university/corporate alliances between some of the most influential universities and the most powerful corporations that raise fundamental ethical questions about the role of the university in the military/prison/cyber/corporate complex. First he analyzes alliances such as Carnegie Mellon and Westinghouse in robotics research, Harvard University with Dupont and Monsanto in chemical and genetic research, and Stanford’s multiple alliances with, among other corporations, IBM, Texas Instruments, and General Electric. MIT recently established a “New Products Program” in which corporations pay a specified fee in exchange for new products to be developed over the next two years. Endowed professorships linked to the corporate world also generate revenue for universities. Thus, there are new chairs to honor corporate executives or the free enterprise system such as the “Reliance Professorship of Private Enterprise” at the University of Pennsylvania, where it is stipulated that the chair holder be a “spokesperson for the free enterprise system.” Berman also discusses how athletic programs generate revenue for the university, as for instance at the University of Wisconsin, which has a contract with Reebok to use Reebok
clothing and gear in exchange for $2.3 million for scholarships, payments to coaches, sports programming, and community service projects. There are no similar corporate-sponsored “chairs” in feminist studies yet.

Etzkowitz, Webster, and Healey (1998) develop the corporate/industry/university links even more explicitly by drawing attention to the way in the field of sciences, “universities assume entrepreneurial tasks such as marketing knowledge and creating companies even as firms take on an academic dimension, sharing knowledge among each other” (6). It is this increasing link between creating knowledge and creating wealth (profit) that raises profound ethical questions about the privatized university. Etzkowitz and his colleagues further argue that “universities and firms have become more alike in that both are involved in translating knowledge into marketable products, even though they still retain their distinctive missions for education and research on the one hand, and production and research on the other” (8).

Thus there is a growing conflict of interest between the public and private interests of scientific research. The expectations and standards of the academy are in direct conflict with those of private enterprise. This is most evident in the biotechnology field and specifically in the context of the Human Genome Project, which led to a huge increase in academic-based firms working on the research and knowledge needs of the project.

Why do these alliances matter? And why worry about the “entrepreneurial” university? Besides the ethics of profit making and corporate influence on knowledge production at the university, the alliances raise some profound questions about the role and accountability of governments in funding and sustaining public institutions. Privatization of higher education results in the State of California allotting 18 percent of its budget to prisons, and only 1 percent to education. It leads to a 25 percent reduced state appropriation for the University of California over a five-year period, and a corresponding 25 percent tuition hike (Martinez 1998, chs. 14, 15, and 16). Privatization of public institutions of higher education essentially implies institutional governance by the market, which, contrary to the rhetoric of the privatization movement, usually leads to monopoly and a reduction of choice.

**Capitalist Citizenship and Feminist Projects**

What does it mean to speak about a notion of capitalist citizenship? How is this idea different from democratic citizenship? Why privilege capitalist so-
cial relations and values—why not focus on "sexist" or "racist" citizenship? The answer to these questions lies in my belief that capitalism is a foundational principle of social organization at this time (see Dirlik 1997). This does not mean that capitalism functions as a "master narrative" or that all forms of domination are reducible to capitalist hierarchies, or that the temporal and spatial effects of capital are the same around the globe. It does mean that at this particular stage of global capitalism, the particularities of its operation (unprecedented deterritorialization, abstraction and concentration of capital, transnationalization of production and mobility through technology, consolidation of supranational corporations that link capital flows globally, etc.) necessitate naming capitalist hegemony and culture as a foundational principle of social life. To do otherwise is to obfuscate the way power and hegemony function in the world—and certainly at the university. Thus, an anticapitalist feminist critique is the logical way to go here. Also, there are questions to be raised regarding the place of programs such as women's studies, race and ethnic studies, and so on, in the corporate university. How are these programs marketed? How do we/they collude in this restructuring of the university? How do we benefit, and what have we lost as a result of these changes. For instance, many schools assume that so long as there is a women's studies program there is no need to hire feminist scholars in other departments (Sidhu 2001, 38). In conjunction with the backlash against feminist scholars and the revolving door policy for hiring us, these are difficult times for many of us in the academy. With the simultaneous downsizing, commodification, and technicization of education in the corporate university, it is likely that interdisciplinary programs, and humanities and arts curricula will be slowly phased out because our "role in the market will be seen as ornamental" (Giroux 2001, 40). Anticapitalist feminism links capitalism as an economic system and culture of consumption centrally to racist, sexist, heterosexist, and nationalist relations of rule in the production of capitalist/corporate citizenship.

How does one theorize capitalist citizenship? And how is the university implicated in engendering this kind of citizenship? To draw on the above discussion about privatization and the entrepreneurial university, one of the most significant shifts in what Etzkowitz and his colleagues call the "second academic revolution" is the growing link between money, the ability to consume and own goods, and participation in public life (democratic citizenship). If the market provides the ethical and moral framework for university life, educators and students exercise choices as consumers in a marketplace, not as citizens.
in a democratic polity (Starr 1987; Emspak 1997). This is a desiccated vision of democratic politics where “free choice” in the market is available only to those with economic capacities. Private sector decision making is private—citizens have no rights to discuss and make policy. Thus, wealth determines citizenship. Instead of people governing, markets govern—it is not citizens who make decisions, it is consumers. So those who lack economic capacities are noncitizens. This results in a profound recolonization of historically marginalized communities, usually poor women and people of color.

Capitalist corporate culture thus privatizes citizenship, defining the values, rights, and responsibilities of citizenship as a private good, substituting the language of personal responsibility and private initiative for the commitments to social responsibility and public service. Henry Giroux argues similarly:

> I use the term corporate culture to refer to an ensemble of ideological and institutional forces that function politically and pedagogically both to govern organizational life though senior managerial control and to produce compliant workers, depoliticized consumers, and passive citizens. Within the language and images of corporate culture, citizenship is portrayed as an utterly privatized affair whose aim is to produce competitive self-interested individuals vying for their own material and ideological gain. (Giroux 2001, 30)

To summarize, capitalist or corporate models of citizenship craft loyalty to the nation in the image of capitalist market relations, folding the ideas of democracy and freedom into the logic of the market. Ideas of the public good, collective service and responsibility, democratic rights, freedom, and justice are privatized and crafted into commodities to be exchanged via the market. The institutionalization of capitalist citizenship at the corporate university thus profoundly transforms the vision of the university as a democratic public space, a sanctuary for nonrepression (in Amy Gutmann’s terms [1987, 174]). Neoliberalism, linked to corporate culture thus emerges as the master narrative in the U.S. academy. In the context of this redefinition of the public sphere and of democratic citizenship in the academy, what are the stakes for antiracist feminist and radical educators?

Specifically, the shift in the ideologies and institutional practices of the university from liberal democratic notions of citizenship to corporate client/consumer notions of citizenship situates students as clients and consumers, faculty as service providers, and administrators as conflict managers and na-
scent capitalists whose work involves marketing and generating profit for the
university. This reinvention of the vision of the public university ties into the
larger military/prison/cyber/corporate complex, since the corporate univer-
sity now generates the knowledges needed to keep this complex in place.
The effects of this rerafted vision of the university on the construction of
curricula, distribution of knowledge, and self-image of the university, not to
mention the shift in relations of labor and educational access and opportuni-
ties for marginalized communities thus become urgent sites of struggle for
anticapitalist, antiracist feminists as well as other radical educators.

This critique maps my understanding of anticapitalist feminist struggle
in the U.S. academy, a struggle that fundamentally entails a critique of the
discourse and values of capitalism and their naturalization through a corpo-
rate culture and discourses of neoliberalism. It involves an anti-imperialist
understanding of feminist praxis, that is, a critique of the way global capital-
ism has facilitated corporate citizenship, Eurocentrism, and nativism in the
academy. In addition to decolonizing and actively challenging discourses of
consumerism, privatization and ownership, the collapse of public into private
good, and the refashioning of social into consumer identities, feminist anti-
capitalist critique at this site involves theorizing difference and pluralism as
genuinely complex and contradictory rather than as commodified variations
on Eurocentric themes.

I do not privilege a purist notion of the university in making this critique.
This is not an argument against all forms of joint corporate/education ven-
tures — but in the absence of a strong, democratic, civil society the hegemony
of corporate cultures in the academy necessitate serious attention and debate.
Also, I want to draw attention to the ethics and politics of decision making
when American higher education undergoes this kind of fundamental re-
structuring in response to economic globalization trends. Analyzing the re-
structuring of higher education and the deeply naturalized effects of capitalist
processes provides a rich point of entry into seeing (and theorizing) the power
shifts and consolidations at the beginning of the twenty-first century. Here I
have tried to make this shift visible for antiracist feminist scholars and teach-
ers so that we can reflect on our particular place and accountability in this new
vision of the university and determine how we can create dialogic spaces of
dissent and transformation in this institutional climate. Now we can address
the questions about borders and border crossings posed at the beginning of
this chapter. In the context of the analysis above, it is clear which commu-
nities can cross which borders and which communities are held in place by relations of domination/recolonization. This focus on the political economy of the U.S. university thus illustrates that it is crucial for feminist academics to connect our pedagogical and curricular initiatives to larger institutional and administrative concerns of the corporate university.

If American higher education is in the process of undergoing a fundamental restructuring such that yet again it is women and people of color who are at risk (peripheral workers), not to mention the restructuring of knowledge bases so that curricular decisions become dependant on corporate funding and priorities, surely this is a crisis deserving our attention. The rhetoric of educational policy makers however, would have us believe that the challenges of globalization lie in “internationalizing” curricula so that American education can provide “global competency.” But the most powerful push to globalize comes from outside the academy—from business and government critiques of the (ir)relevance of U.S. higher education.

In fact, going “global” has led to U.S. education’s becoming export-oriented to global markets: redesigning, repackaging, managing, and delivering educational “products” at offshore sites and for consumers in foreign markets. This is the opposite of the traditional practice, in which foreign students came to the United States for higher education (Gagliano 1992, 325–34). Some of these questions of pedagogy, curriculum, and difference in the context of the corporate academy are explored in the next chapter.

Postscript: The Stakes for Radical Education

To conclude, I reflect on the “dangerous territories” encountered by radical educators in new globalized, Eurocentric academies at this time. Specifically, I am interested in the question of cultures and politics of dissent in increasingly conservative national and transnational educational locations. What is at stake in the way intellectual, institutional, pedagogical, and relational territories are drawn, legitimated, regulated, and consolidated in educational institutions and systems? What dangers inhere in these cartographies? To whom? What knowledges and identities are legitimated/delegitimized as a result of the struggles over territorial boundaries and borders?

Struggles over difference and equality in education clearly matter. The struggles against domination and for social justice have to be waged situationally and regionally as well as globally, and the very basic ethical and moral
notions of citizenship, belonging, and democracy are at stake here. Self-critical hard work is necessary to transform these unjust educational regimes. However, cultures of dissent exist and can be nurtured. Of course the danger and the risks continue to exist. Speaking truth to power continues to be dangerous.

In this postscript I reflect on the political, intellectual, and institutional stakes involved in carving and defending curricular, disciplinary, and relational borders in academic sites. It originates in an experience that serves to locate me, as well as to raise larger political and epistemological questions pertinent to the project of the next chapter and the book as a whole. The experience (a visit to the Netherlands, to attend the 1993 European Women's Studies Conference) focuses on the potential pitfalls and danger of our intellectual and curricular practices around “multiculturalism,” difference and justice, and illustrates the significance of borders in understanding the relations of power/knowledge in the consolidation of particular regimes of gender, race, class, and sexuality. It also foregrounds for me the significance of the “idea” of Europe, and the “idea” of America (nation making) in the construction of knowledge, curricula, and citizenship in the 1990s and beyond. The African American philosopher W. E. B. Du Bois spoke of the problem of the twentieth century being the problem of “the color line.” We carry this “problem” into the twenty-first century. What analytical and strategic knowledges and conceptual tools do we need to not relive the violence of our inherited histories?

A week before I left for the Netherlands I discovered I needed a visa to enter the country. I was then an Indian citizen and a permanent resident of the United States. Procuring a visa involved a substantial fee (sixty dollars), a letter from my employer (the letter of invitation from the conference organizers was inadequate) indicating I had a permanent job in the United States, that I was going to Utrecht for a professional conference, that my employer would be financially responsible for me while I was in the Netherlands, and last but not least, a notarized copy of my green card, which was the “proof” of my permanent residency in the United States. The process of legitimation required of me encapsulated the dilemmas of citizenship, (im)migration, work, and economic privilege that underlie the concept and power of the European Union—and for that matter, the idea of American “multicultural” democracy. National (and perhaps racial and imperial) borders are reconsolidated at the same time as economic borders dissolve in the name of a greater Europe. While earlier I had worried about whether my experiences and thinking about
feminist studies in the United States would seem significant in this context, after this process of being constructed as an illegitimate outsider who needed proof of employment, citizenship, residency, and economic viability, I decided it wasn't all that different from a number of different border crossings—even disciplinary ones in the academy. Defining insiders and outsiders is what nation-states and other credentialing institutions do.

The challenges of an antiracist, anticapitalist feminist praxis that is genuinely and ethically cross-cultural are similar in both the European and North American context, however one is defined in terms of racialized gender. Practices of ruling and domination may vary across geographical and historical landscapes, but the effects of these practices and forms of opposition or resistance to them are related and similar. Thus one of the major challenges in constructing a European women's studies curriculum that is radically international rather than merely the sum of its national parts (British/French/Dutch, etc.) is the very challenge that faces women's studies programs in the United States. How do we reconcile the economic ascendancy of the European Union with the very history of imperialism and colonialism that made this ascendancy possible? How do we rewrite/undo "Britishness," "Dutchness," "whiteness" so that the practice of feminist studies is a fundamentally antiracist, anticapitalist practice? What would it take to create a radically transnational feminist practice attentive to the unequal histories of rule in the European Union countries? Leslie Roman and Timothy Stanley's discussion (1997) of the construction of a "nationalist" curriculum in Canada (the creation of the image of a fictive, harmonious family ruled by civility) provides a disturbing example of a counterpoint to this argument. How does a nationalist curriculum connect with a transnational oppositional feminist practice?

This is the very same challenge we face in the North American academy—how do we undermine the notions of multiculturalism as melting pot, or multiculturalism as cultural relativism that so permeate U.S. consumer culture and that are mobilized by the corporate academy as a form of containment, and practice a multiculturalism that is about the decolonization of received knowledges, histories and identities, a multiculturalism that foregrounds questions of social justice and material interests, which actively combats the hegemony of global capital. One of the primary questions feminist teachers and scholars have to face in the European Union women's studies network, is the meaning of "community"—who are the insiders and the out-
siders in this community? What notions of legitimacy and gendered and racialized citizenship are being actively constructed within this community?

This struggle and other similar struggles are fundamentally about redefining borders, about including "outsiders" and reformulating what counts as the inside. Borders, especially those drawn to mark legitimate and illegitimate knowledges are often porous. While the geographical and cultural borders of nation-states since World War II and the decolonization of the Third World were carefully drawn, economic, political, and ideological processes always operated as if these borders were porous. The academy operates in similar ways. While the boundaries around and inside institutions of higher learning are invisibly but carefully drawn, the economic, cultural, and ideological imperatives of the academy establish relations of rule that consolidate and naturalize the dominant values of a globalized capitalist consumer culture where the new citizen of the world is a consumer par excellence.

If economic and cultural globalization creates a context where material, economic, and even psychic borders are porous, no longer neatly contained within the geographical boundaries of nation-states, then questions of democracy and citizenship also cannot be neatly charted within these boundaries. Thus questions of difference and equality in education take on a certain urgency in a world where the fate of First World citizens is inextricably tied to the fate of the refugees, exiles, migrants, immigrants in the First World/North and of similar constituencies in the rest of the world. The struggle over representation is always also a struggle over knowledge. What knowledges do we need for education to be the practice of liberation? What does it mean for educators to create a democratic public space in this context? And what kinds of intellectual, scholarly, and political work would it take to actively work against the privatization of the academy, and for social and economic justice? Finally, how do we hold educational institutions, our daily pedagogic practices, and ourselves accountable to the truth? These then are some of my questions for an anticapitalist feminist project in the context of the corporate U.S. academy.
CHAPTER EIGHT

Race, Multiculturalism, and Pedagogies of Dissent

Preamble

Growing up in India, I was Indian; teaching high school in Nigeria, I was a foreigner (still Indian), albeit a familiar one. As a graduate student in Illinois, I was first a “Third World” foreign student, and then a person of color. Doing research in London, I was black. As a professor at an American university, I am an Asian woman—although South Asian racial profiles fit uneasily into the “Asian” category—and because I choose to identify myself as such, an anti-racist feminist of color. In North America I was also a “resident alien” with an Indian passport—I am now a U.S. citizen whose racialization has shifted dramatically (and negatively) since the attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon on 11 September 2001.

Of course through all these journeys into and across the borders of countries, educational institutions, and social movements, I was and am a feminist. But along with the changing labels and self-identifications came new questions and contradictions which I needed to understand. Paying attention to the processes of my own racialization, for instance, transformed my understandings of the meaning of feminist praxis. Was being a feminist in India the same as being a feminist in the United States of America? In terms of personal integrity, everyday political and personal practices, and the advocacy of justice, equity and autonomy for women, yes. But in terms of seeing myself as a woman of color (not just Indian, but of Indian origin) and being treated as one, there are vast differences in how I engage in feminist praxis. After all, living as an immigrant, conscious of and engaged with the script of American racism and imperialism is quite different from living as a “color blind” foreigner.

Difference, diversity, multiculturalism, globalization, and how we think about them complicate my intellectual and political landscape in the United
States, and I turn to theory, and to the potential of political education, for some way to link my “personal” story with larger stories. For a way to understand the profoundly collective and historical context within which my personal story and journey through difference, and through the inequities of power, privilege, discrimination, marginalization, exclusion, colonization, and oppression, make sense. I am speaking of how I came to recognize, understand, think through, and organize against sexism, racism, heterosexism, xenophobia, and elitism in the United States.

I “do” feminist and antiracist theory as a scholar, teacher, and activist in the U.S. academy—so how do I understand the significance of theory and analysis? I believe that meanings of the “personal” (as in my story) are not static, but that they change through experience, and with knowledge. I am not talking about the personal as “immediate feelings expressed confessionally” but as something that is deeply historical and collective—as determined by our involvement in collectivities and communities and through political engagement. In fact it is this understanding of experience and of the personal that makes theory possible. So for me, theory is a deepening of the political, not a moving away from it: a distillation of experience, and an intensification of the personal. The best theory makes personal experience and individual stories communicable. I think this kind of theoretical, analytical thinking allows us to mediate between different histories and understandings of the personal. One of the fundamental challenges of “diversity” after all is to understand our collective differences in terms of historical agency and responsibility so that we can understand others and build solidarities across divisive boundaries.

Even if we think we are not personally racist or sexist, we are clearly marked by the burdens and privileges of our histories and locations. So what does it mean to think through, theorize, and engage questions of difference and power? It means that we understand race, class, gender, nation, sexuality, and colonialism not just in terms of static, embodied categories but in terms of histories and experiences that tie us together—that are fundamentally interwoven into our lives. So “race” or “Asianness” or “brownness” is not embodied in me, but a history of colonialism, racism, sexism, as well as of privilege (class and status) is involved in my relation to white people as well as people of color in the United States.

This means untangling whiteness, Americanness, as well as blackness in the United States, in trying to understand my own story of racialization. So the theoretical insights I find useful in thinking about the challenges posed by
a radical multiculturalism in the United States—as well as, in different ways, early twenty-first century India—are the need to think relationally about questions of power, equality, and justice, the need to be inclusive in our thinking, and the necessity of our thinking and organizing being contextual, deeply rooted in questions of history and experience. The challenge of race and multiculturalism now lies in understanding a color line that is global—not contained anymore within the geography of the United States, if it ever was. I begin with this preamble because it locates my own intellectual and political genealogy in a chapter that addresses questions of curricular, pedagogical, policy, and institutional practices around antiracist feminist education.

**Feminism and the Language of Difference**

"Isn’t the whole point to have a voice?" This is the last sentence of an essay by Marnia Lazreg on writing as a woman on women in Algeria (1988, 81–107). Lazreg examines academic feminist scholarship on women in the Middle East and North Africa in the context of what she calls a "Western gynocentric" notion of the difference between First and Third World women. Arguing for an understanding of "intersubjectivity" as the basis for comparison across cultures and histories, Lazreg formulates the problem of ethnocentrism and the related question of voice in this way:

To take intersubjectivity into consideration when studying Algerian women or other Third World women means seeing their lives as meaningful, coherent, and understandable instead of being infused "by us" with doom and sorrow. It means that their lives like "ours" are structured by economic, political, and cultural factors. It means that these women, like "us," are engaged in the process of adjusting, often shaping, at times resisting and even transforming their environment. It means they have their own individuality; they are "for themselves" instead of being "for us." An appropriation of their singular individuality to fit the generalizing categories of "our" analyses is an assault on their integrity and on their identity. (98)

In my own work I have argued in a similar way against the use of analytic categories and political positioning in feminist studies that discursively present Third World women as a homogeneous, undifferentiated group leading truncated lives, victimized by the combined weight of their traditions, cultures, and beliefs, and "our" (Eurocentric) history. In examining particular
assumptions of feminist scholarship that are uncritically grounded in Western humanism and its modes of “disinterested scholarship,” I have tried to demonstrate that this scholarship inadvertently produces Western women as the only legitimate subjects of struggle, while Third World women are heard as fragmented, inarticulate voices in (and from) the dark. Arguing against a hastily derived notion of “universal sisterhood” that assumes a commonality of gender experience across race and national lines, I have suggested the complexity of our historical (and positional) differences and the need for creating an analytical space for understanding Third World women as the “subjects” of our various struggles “in history.” I posit solidarity rather than sisterhood as the basis for mutually accountable and equitable relationships among different communities of women. Other scholars have made similar arguments, and the question of what we might provisionally call “Third World women’s voices” has begun to be addressed seriously in feminist scholarship.

In the last few decades there has been a blossoming of feminist discourse around questions of “racial difference” and “pluralism.” While this work is often an important corrective to earlier middle-class (white) characterizations of sexual difference, the goal of the analysis of difference and the challenge of race was not pluralism as the proliferation of discourse on ethnicities as discrete and separate cultures. The challenge of race resides in a fundamental reconceptualization of our categories of analysis so that differences can be historically specified and understood as part of larger political processes and systems. The central issue, then, is not one of merely “acknowledging” difference; rather, the most difficult question concerns the kind of difference that is acknowledged and engaged. Difference seen as benign variation (diversity), for instance, rather than as conflict, struggle, or the threat of disruption, bypasses power as well as history to suggest a harmonious, empty pluralism. On the other hand, difference defined as asymmetrical and incommensurate cultural spheres situated within hierarchies of domination and resistance cannot be accommodated within a discourse of “harmony in diversity.” A strategic critique of the contemporary language of difference, diversity, and power thus would be crucial to a feminist project concerned with revolutionary social change.

In the best, self-reflexive traditions of feminist inquiry, the production of knowledge about cultural and geographical others is no longer seen as apolitical and disinterested. But while feminist activists and progressive scholars have made a significant dent in the colonialist and colonizing feminist
scholarship of the late seventies and eighties, this does not mean that ques-
tions of what Lazreg calls “intersubjectivity” or of history vis-à-vis Third
World peoples have been successfully articulated.4

In any case, “scholarship”—feminist, Marxist, postcolonial, or Third
World—is not the only site for the production of knowledge about Third
World women/peoples.5 The very same questions (as those suggested in re-
lation to scholarship) can be raised in relation to our teaching and learning
practices in the classroom, as well as the discursive and managerial practices
of U.S. colleges and universities. Feminists writing about race and racism have
had a lot to say about scholarship, but perhaps our pedagogical and institu-
tional practices and their relation to scholarship have not been examined with
quite the same care and attention. Radical educators have long argued that
the academy and the classroom itself are not mere sites of instruction. They
are also political and cultural sites that represent accommodations and con-
testations over knowledge by differently empowered social constituencies.6
Thus teachers and students produce, reinforce, recreate, resist, and transform
ideas about race, gender, and difference in the classroom. Also, the academic
institutions in which we are located create similar paradigms, canons, and
voices that embody and transcribe race and gender.

It is this frame of institutional and pedagogical practice that I examine
in this chapter. Specifically, I analyze the operation and management of dis-
courses of race and difference in two educational sites: the women’s studies
classroom and the workshops on “diversity” for upper-level (largely white)
administrators. The links between these two educational sites lie in the (often
active) creation of discourses of “difference.” In other words, I suggest that
educational practices as they are shaped and reshaped at these sites cannot
be analyzed as merely transmitting already codified ideas of difference. These
practices often produce, codify, and even rewrite histories of race and colo-
nialism in the name of difference. Chapter 7 discussed the corporatization of
the academy and the production of privatized citizenship. Here I begin the
analysis from a different place, with a brief discussion of the academy as the
site of political struggle and radical transformation.

Knowledge and Location in the U.S. Academy

A number of educators, Paulo Freire among them, have argued that edu-
cation represents both a struggle for meaning and a struggle over power re-
lations. Thus, education becomes a central terrain where power and politics operate out of the lived culture of individuals and groups situated in asymmetrical social and political spaces. This way of understanding the academy entails a critique of education as the mere accumulation of disciplinary knowledges that can be exchanged on the world market for upward mobility. There are much larger questions at stake in the academy these days, not the least of which are questions of self- and collective knowledge of marginal peoples and the recovery of alternative, oppositional histories of domination and struggle. Here, disciplinary parameters matter less than questions of power, history, and self-identity. For knowledge, the very act of knowing, is related to the power of self-definition. This definition of knowledge is central to the pedagogical projects of fields such as women’s studies, black studies, and ethnic studies. By their very location in the academy, fields such as women’s studies are grounded in definitions of difference, difference that attempts to resist incorporation and appropriation by providing a space for historically silenced peoples to construct knowledge. These knowledges have always been fundamentally oppositional, while running the risk of accommodation and assimilation and consequent depoliticization in the academy. It is only in the late twentieth century, on the heels of domestic and global oppositional political movements, that the boundaries dividing knowledge into its traditional disciplines have been shaken loose, and new, often heretical, knowledges have emerged, modifying the structures of knowledge and power as we have inherited them. In other words, new analytic spaces have been opened up in the academy, spaces that make possible thinking of knowledge as praxis, of knowledge as embodying the very seeds of transformation and change. The appropriation of these analytic spaces and the challenge of radical educational practice are thus to involve the development of critical knowledges (what women’s, black, and ethnic studies attempt) and, simultaneously, to critique knowledge itself.

Education for critical consciousness or critical pedagogy, as it is sometimes called, requires a reformulation of the knowledge-as-accumulated-capital model of education and focuses instead on the link between the historical configuration of social forms and the way they work subjectively. This issue of subjectivity represents a realization of the fact that who we are, how we act, what we think, and what stories we tell become more intelligible within an epistemological framework that begins by recognizing existing hegemonic histories. The issue of subjectivity and voice thus concerns the effort to under-
stand our specific locations in the educational process and in the institutions through which we are constituted. Resistance lies in self-conscious engagement with dominant, normative discourses and representations and in the active creation of oppositional analytic and cultural spaces. Resistance that is random and isolated is clearly not as effective as that which is mobilized through systematic politicized practices of teaching and learning. Uncovering and reclaiming subjugated knowledges is one way to lay claim to alternative histories. But these knowledges need to be understood and defined "pedagogically," as questions of strategy and practice as well as of scholarship, in order to transform educational institutions radically. And this, in turn, requires taking the questions of experience seriously.

To this effect, I draw on scholarship on and by Third World educators in higher education, on an analysis of the effects of my own pedagogical practices, on documents about "affirmative action" and "diversity in the curriculum" published by the administration of the college where I worked a number of years ago, and on my own observations and conversations over the past number of years.7 I do so in order to suggest that the effect of the proliferation of ideologies of pluralism in the 1960s, 1970s, and 1990s in the context of the (limited) implementation of affirmative action in institutions of higher education, and of the corporate transformation of the academy, has been to create what might be called the race industry, an industry that is responsible for the management, commodification, and domestication of race on American campuses. This commodification of race determines the politics of voice for Third World peoples, whether they/we happen to be faculty, students, administrators, or service staff. This, in turn, has long-term effects on the definitions of the identity and agency of nonwhite people in the academy. The race industry is also of course an excellent example of the corporatization of the academy—a visible if somewhat depressing site to explore in terms of the effects of capitalist commodity culture and citizenship on curricular, research and pedagogical priorities in the academy.

There are a number of urgent reasons for undertaking such an analysis: the need to assess the material and ideological effects of affirmative action policies within liberal (rather than conservative Bloom- or Hirsch-style) discourses and institutions that profess a commitment to pluralism and social change, the need to understand this management of race in the liberal academy in relation to a larger discourse on race and discrimination within the
neoconservatism of the United States, and the need for Third World feminists to move outside the arena of (sometimes) exclusive engagement with racism in white women’s movements and scholarship and to broaden the scope of our struggles to the academy as a whole.

The management of gender, race, class, and sexuality are inextricably linked in the public arena. The New Right agenda since the mid-1970s makes this explicit: busing, gun rights, and welfare are clearly linked to the issues of reproductive and sexual rights. And the links between abortion rights (gender-based struggles) and affirmative action (struggles over race and racism) are clearer in the 1990s and in the early 2000s. While the most challenging critiques of hegemonic feminism were launched in the late 1970s and the 1980s, the present historical moment necessitates taking on board institutional discourses that actively construct and maintain a discourse of difference and pluralism. This in turn calls for assuming responsibility for the politics of voice as it is institutionalized in the academy’s “liberal” response to the very questions feminism and other oppositional discourses have raised.

Black/Ethnic Studies and Women’s Studies: Intersections and Confluences

For us, there is nothing optional about “black experience” and/or “black studies”: we must know ourselves. —June Jordan, Civil Wars, 1981

The origins of black, ethnic, and women’s studies programs, unlike those of most academic disciplines, can be traced to oppositional social movements. In particular, the civil rights movement, the women’s movement, and other Third World liberation struggles fueled the demand for a knowledge and history “of our own.” June Jordan’s claim that “we must know ourselves” suggests the urgency embedded in the formation of black studies in the late 1960s. Between 1966 and 1970 most American colleges and universities added courses on Afro-American experience and history to their curricula. This was the direct outcome of a number of sociohistorical factors, not the least of which was an increase in black student enrollment in higher education and the broad-based call for a fundamental transformation of a racist, Eurocentric curriculum. Among the earliest programs were the black and African American studies programs at San Francisco State and Cornell, both of which came into being in 1968, on the heels of militant political organizing on the
part of students and faculty at these institutions. A symposium on black studies in early 1968 at Yale University not only inaugurated African American studies at Yale, but also marked a watershed in the national development of black studies programs. In the spring of 1969, the University of California at Berkeley instituted a department of ethnic studies, divided into Afro-American, Chicano, contemporary Asian American, and Native American studies divisions.

A number of women's studies programs also came into being around this time. The first women's studies program was formed in 1969 at San Diego State University. Over nine hundred such programs exist now across the United States (Sheftall 1995). Women's studies programs often drew on the institutional frameworks and structures of existing interdisciplinary programs such as black and ethnic studies. In addition, besides sharing political origins, an interdisciplinary project, and foregrounding questions of social and political inequality in their knowledge base, women's, black, and ethnic studies programs increasingly share pedagogical and research methods. Such programs thus create the possibility of a counterhegemonic discourse and oppositional analytic spaces within the institution. Of course, since these programs are most often located within the boundaries of conservative or liberal white-male-dominated institutions, they face questions of cooptation and accommodation.

In an essay examining the relations among ethnicity, ideology, and the academy (1987), Rosaura Sanchez maintains that new academic programs arise out of specific interests in bodies of knowledge. She traces the origins of ethnic and women's studies programs, however, to a defensive political move, the state's institutionalization of a discourse of reform in response to the civil rights movement:

Ethnic studies programs were instituted at a moment when the university had to speak a particular language to quell student protests and to ensure that university research and business could be conducted as usual. The university was able to create and integrate these programs administratively under its umbrella, allowing on the one hand, for a potential firecracker to diffuse itself and, on the other, moving on to prepare the ground for future assimilation of the few surviving faculty into existing departments. (86)

Sanchez identifies the pressures (assimilation and cooptation versus isolation and marginalization) that ethnic studies programs inherited in the 1990s.
In fact, it is precisely in the face of the pressure to assimilate that questions of political strategy and of pedagogical and institutional practice assume paramount importance.

For such programs, progress (measured by institutional power, number of people of color in faculty and administrations, effect on the general curricula, etc.) has been slow. Since the 1970s, there have also been numerous conflicts among ethnic, black, and women’s studies programs. One example of these tensions is provided by Niara Sudarkasa. Writing in 1986 about the effect of affirmative action on black faculty and administrators in higher education, she argues: “As a matter of record, . . . both in the corporate world and in higher education, the progress of white females as a result of affirmative action has far outstripped that for blacks and other minorities” (3–4). Here Sudarkasa is pointing to a persistent presence of racism in the differential access and mobility of white women and people of color in higher education. She goes on to argue that charges of “reverse discrimination” against white people are unfounded because affirmative action has had the effect of privileging white women above men and women of color. Thus, for Sudarkasa, charges of reverse discrimination leveled at minorities “amount to a sanction of continued discrimination by insisting that inequalities resulting from privileges historically reserved for whites as a group must now be perpetuated in the name of justice for the individual” (6). This process of individualization of histories of dominance is also characteristic of educational institutions and processes in general, where the experiences of different constituencies are defined according to the logic of cultural pluralism.

In fact, this individualization of power hierarchies and of structures of discrimination suggests the convergence of liberal and neoconservative ideas about gender and race in the academy. Individualization, in this context, is accomplished through the fundamentally class-based process of professionalization. In any case, the post-Reagan years (characterized by financial cutbacks in education, the consolidation of the New Right and the right-to-life lobby, the increasing legal challenges to affirmative action regulations, etc.) suggest that it is alliances among women’s, black, and ethnic studies programs that will ensure the survival of such programs. This is not to imply that these alliances do not already exist, but, in the face of the active corrosion of the collective basis of affirmative action by the federal government in the name of “reverse discrimination,” it is all the more urgent that our institutional self-examinations lead to concrete alliances. Those of us who teach
in some of these programs know that, in this context, questions of voice—indeed, the very fact of claiming a voice and wanting to be heard—are very complicated indeed.

To proceed with the first location or site, I move from one narrative, an analysis of the effect of my own pedagogical practices on students when I am teaching about Third World peoples in a largely white institution, to a second narrative, of decolonization—a story about a student project at Hamilton College. I suggest that a partial (and problematic) effect of my pedagogy, the location of my courses in the curriculum and the liberal nature of the institution as a whole, is the sort of attitudinal engagement with diversity that encourages an empty cultural pluralism and domesticates the historical agency of Third World people. This attitudinal engagement, or, rather, the disruption of it, is at the center of the student project I will discuss.

**Pedagogies of Accommodation/Pedagogies of Dissent**

How do we construct oppositional pedagogies of gender and race? Teaching about histories of sexism, racism, imperialism, and homophobia potentially poses very fundamental challenges to the academy and its traditional production of knowledge, since it has often situated Third World peoples as populations whose histories and experiences are deviant, marginal, or inessential to the acquisition of knowledge. And this has happened systematically in our disciplines as well as in our pedagogies. Thus the task at hand is to decolonize our disciplinary and pedagogical practices. The crucial question is how we teach about the West and its others so that education becomes the practice of liberation. This question becomes all the more important in the context of the significance of education as a means of liberation and advancement for Third World and postcolonial peoples and their/our historical belief in education as a crucial form of resistance to the colonization of hearts and minds.

As a number of educators have argued, however, decolonizing educational practices requires transformations at a number of levels, both within and outside the academy. Curricular and pedagogical transformation has to be accompanied by a broad-based transformation of the culture of the academy, as well as by radical shifts in the relation of the academy to other state and civil institutions. In addition, decolonizing pedagogical practices requires taking seriously the relation between knowledge and learning, on the one hand, and
student and teacher experience, on the other. In fact, the theorization and politicization of experience is imperative if pedagogical practices are to focus on more than the mere management, systematization, and consumption of disciplinary knowledge.

NARRATIVE I

I teach courses on gender, race, and education, on international development, on feminist theory, and on Third World feminisms, as well as core women's studies courses such as "Introduction to Women's Studies" and a senior seminar. All of the courses are fundamentally interdisciplinary and cross-cultural. At its most ambitious, this pedagogy is an attempt to get students to think critically about their place in relation to the knowledge they gain and to transform their worldview fundamentally by taking the politics of knowledge seriously. It is a pedagogy that attempts to link knowledge, social responsibility, and collective struggle. And it does so by emphasizing the risks that education involves, the struggles for institutional change, and the strategies for challenging forms of domination and by creating more equitable and just public spheres within and outside educational institutions.

Thus pedagogy from the point of view of a radical teacher does not entail merely processing received knowledges (however critically one does this) but also actively transforming knowledges. In addition, it involves taking responsibility for the material effects of these very pedagogical practices on students. Teaching about "difference" in relation to power is thus extremely complicated and involves not only rethinking questions of learning and authority but also questions of center and margin. In writing about her own pedagogical practices in teaching African American women's history (1989), Elsa Barkley Brown formulates her intentions and method in this way:

How do our students overcome years of notions of what is normative? While trying to think about these issues in my teaching, I have come to understand that this is not merely an intellectual process. It is not merely a question of whether or not we have learned to analyze in particular kinds of ways, or whether people are able to intellectualize about a variety of experiences. It is also about coming to believe in the possibility of a variety of experiences, a variety of ways of understanding the world, a variety of frameworks of operation, without imposing consciously or unconsciously a notion of the norm. What I have tried to do in my own teaching is to ad-
dress both the conscious level through the material, and the unconscious level through the structure of the course, thus, perhaps, allowing my students, in Bettina Aptheker’s words, to “pivot the center”: to center in another experience. (921)

Clearly, this process is very complicated pedagogically, for such teaching must address questions of audience, voice, power, and evaluation while retaining a focus on the material being taught. Teaching practices must also combat the pressures of professionalization, normalization, and standardization, the very pressures or expectations that implicitly aim to manage and discipline pedagogies so that teacher behaviors are predictable (and perhaps controllable) across the board.

Barkley Brown draws attention to the centrality of experience in the classroom. While this is an issue that merits much more consideration than I can give here, a particular aspect of it ties into my general argument. Feminist pedagogy has always recognized the importance of experience in the classroom. Since women’s and ethnic studies programs are fundamentally grounded in political and collective questions of power and inequality, questions of the politicization of individuals along race, gender, class, and sexual parameters are at the very center of knowledges produced in the classroom. This politicization often involves the “authorization” of marginal experiences and the creation of spaces for multiple, dissenting voices in the classroom. The authorization of experience is thus a crucial form of empowerment for students—a way for them to enter the classroom as speaking subjects. However, this focus on the centrality of experience can also lead to exclusions: it often silences those whose “experience” is seen to be that of the ruling-class groups. This more-authentic-than-thou attitude to experience also applies to the teacher. For instance, in speaking about Third World peoples, I have to watch constantly the tendency to speak “for” Third World peoples. For I often come to embody the “authentic” authority and experience for many of my students; indeed, they construct me as a native informant in the same way that left-liberal white students sometimes construct all people of color as the authentic voices of their people. This is evident in the classroom when the specific “differences” (of personality, posture, behavior, etc.) of one woman of color stand in for the difference of the whole collective, and a collective voice is assumed in place of an individual voice. In effect, this results in the reduction or averaging of Third World peoples in terms of individual person-
ality characteristics: complex ethical and political issues are glossed over, and an ambiguous and more easily manageable ethos of the “personal” and the “interpersonal” takes their place.

Thus a particularly problematic effect of certain pedagogical codifications of difference is the conceptualization of race and gender in terms of personal or individual experience. Students often end up determining that they have to “be more sensitive” to Third World peoples. The formulation of knowledge and politics through these individualistic, attitudinal parameters indicates an erasure of the very politics of knowledge involved in teaching and learning about difference. It also suggests an erasure of the structural and institutional parameters of what it means to understand difference in historical terms. If all conflict in the classroom is seen and understood in personal terms, it leads to a comfortable set of oppositions: people of color as the central voices and the bearers of all knowledge in class, and white people as “observers” with no responsibility to contribute and/or nothing valuable to contribute. In other words, white students are constructed as marginal observers and students of color as the real “knowers” in such a liberal or left classroom. While it may seem like people of color are thus granted voice and agency in the classroom, it is necessary to consider what particular kind of voice it is that is allowed them/us. It is a voice located in a different and separate space from the agency of white students.12 Thus, while it appears that in such a class the histories and cultures of marginalized peoples are now “legitimate” objects of study and discussion, the fact is that this legitimation takes place purely at an attitudinal, interpersonal level rather than in terms of a fundamental challenge to hegemonic knowledge and history. Often the culture in such a class vacillates between a high level of tension and an overwhelming desire to create harmony, acceptance of “difference,” and cordial relations in the classroom. Potentially this implicitly binary construction (Third World students vs. white students) undermines the understanding of coimplication that students must take seriously in order to understand “difference” as historical and relational. Coimplication refers to the idea that all of us (First and Third World) share certain histories as well as certain responsibilities: ideologies of race define both white and black peoples, just as gender ideologies define both women and men. Thus, while “experience” is an enabling focus in the classroom, unless it is explicitly understood as historical, contingent, and the result of interpretation, it can coagulate into frozen, binary, psychologistic positions.13

To summarize, this effective separation of white students from Third
World students in such an explicitly politicized women's studies classroom is problematic because it leads to an attitudinal engagement that bypasses the complexly situated politics of knowledge and potentially shores up a particular individual-oriented codification and commodification of race. It implicitly draws on and sustains a discourse of cultural pluralism, or what Henry Giroux (1988) calls “the pedagogy of normative pluralism” (95), a pedagogy in which we all occupy separate, different, and equally valuable places and where experience is defined not in terms of individual qua individual, but in terms of an individual as representative of a cultural group. This results in a depoliticization and dehistoricization of the idea of culture and makes possible the implicit management of race in the name of cooperation and harmony.

Cultural pluralism is an inadequate response, however, because the academy as well as the larger social arena are constituted through hierarchical knowledges and power relations. In this context, the creation of oppositional knowledges always involves both fundamental challenges and the risk of co-optation. Creating counterhegemonic pedagogies and combating attitudinal, pluralistic appropriations of race and difference thus involves a delicate and ever-shifting balance between the analysis of experience as lived culture and as textual and historical representations of experience. But most of all, it calls for a critical analysis of the contradictions and incommensurability of social interests as individuals experience, understand, and transform them. Decolonizing pedagogical practices requires taking seriously the different logics of cultures as they are located within asymmetrical power relations. It involves understanding that culture, especially academic culture, is a terrain of struggle (rather than an amalgam of discrete consumable entities). And finally, within the classroom, it requires that teachers and students develop a critical analysis of how experience itself is named, constructed, and legitimated in the academy. Without this analysis of culture and of experience in the classroom, there is no way to develop and nurture oppositional practices. After all, critical education concerns the production of subjectivities in relation to discourses of knowledge and power.

**NARRATIVE 2**

Stories are important. They keep us alive. In the ships, in the camps, in the quarters, field, prisons, on the road, on the run, underground, under siege, in the throes, on the verge—the storyteller snatches us back from the edge to hear the next chapter.
In which we are the subjects. We, the hero of the tales. Our lives preserved. How it was, how it be. Passing it along in the relay. That is what I work to do: to produce stories that save our lives.—Toni Cade Bambara, "Salvation is the Issue," 1984

In the intellectual, political and historical context I have sketched thus far, decolonization as a method of teaching and learning is crucial in envisioning democratic education. My own political project involves trying to connect educational discourse to questions of social justice and the creation of citizens who are able to conceive of a democracy which is not the same as "the free market." Pedagogy in this context needs to be revolutionary to combat business as usual in educational institutions. After all, the politics of commodification allows the cooptation of most dissenting voices in this age of multiculturalism. Cultures of dissent are hard to create. Revolutionary pedagogy needs to lead to a consciousness of injustice, self-reflection on the routines and habits of education in the creation of an "educated citizen," and action to transform one's social space in a collective setting. In other words, the practice of decolonization as defined above.

I turn now to a narrative in the tradition of Toni Cade Bambara, a story that "keeps me alive—a story which saves our lives." The story is about a performance by a student at Hamilton College. Yance Ford, an African American studio art major and feminist activist, based her performance, called "This Invisible World," on her three-plus years as a student at the college. She built an iron cage that enclosed her snugly, suspended it ten feet off the ground in the lobby of the social sciences building, she shaved her head and—barefoot and without a watch, wearing a sheet that she had cut up—spent five hours in the cage in total silence. The performance required unimaginable physical and psychic endurance, and it dramatically transformed a physical space that is usually a corridor between offices and classrooms. It had an enormous impact on everyone walking through—not mundane response was possible. Nor was business as usual possible. It disrupted educational routines—many faculty (including me) sent their classes to the performance and later attempted discussions that proved profoundly unsettling.

For the first time in my experience at Hamilton, students, faculty, and staff were faced with a performance that could not be "consumed" or assimilated as part of the "normal" educational process. We were faced with the knowledge that it was impossible to "know" what led to such a performance, and that the knowledge we had, of black women's history of objectification, of
slavery, invisibility, and so on, was a radically inadequate measure of the intent or courage and risk it took for Yance to perform “This Invisible World.”

In talking at length with Yance, other students, and colleagues, and thinking through the effects of this performance on the campus, I have realized that this is potentially a very effective story. Here is how Yance, writing in October 1993, described her project:

What is it? I guess or rather I know that it is about survival. About trauma, about loss, about suffering and pain, and about being lost within all of those things. About trying to find the way back to yourself. The way back to your sanity, a way to get away from those things which have driven you beyond a point of recognition. Past the point where you no longer recognize or even want to recognize yourself or your past or the possibility that your present may also be your future. That is what my project is about. I call it refuge but I really think I mean rescue or even better, survival, escape, saved. My work to me is about all the things that push you to the edge. Its about not belonging, not liking yourself, not loving yourself, not feeling loved or safe or accepted or tolerated or respected or valued or useful or important or comfortable or safe or part of a larger community. It's about how all these things cause us to hate ourselves into corners and boxes and addictions and traps and hurtful relationships and cages. It's about how people can see you and look right through you. Most of the time not knowing you are there. It is about fighting the battle of your life, for your life. And this place that I call refuge is the only place where I am sacred. It is the source of my strength, my fortitude, my resilience, my ability to be for myself what no one else will ever be for me.

This is most directly Yance's response and meditation on her three years at a liberal arts college—on her education. In extensive conversations with her, two aspects of this project became clearer to me: her consciousness of being colonized at the college, expressed through the act of being caged like “animals in a science experiment,” and the performance as an act of liberation, of active decolonization of the self, of visibility and empowerment. Yance found a way to tell another story, to speak through a silence that screamed for engagement. However, in doing so, she also created a public space for the collective narratives of marginalized peoples, especially other women of color. Educational practices became the object of public critique as the hege-
monic narrative of a liberal arts education, and its markers of success came under collective scrutiny. This was then a profoundly unsettling and radically decolonizing educational act.

This story illustrates the difference between thinking about social justice and radical transformation in our frames of analysis and understanding in relation to race, gender, class, and sexuality versus a multiculturalist consumption and assimilation into a supposedly “democratic” frame of education as usual. It suggests the need to organize to create collective spaces for dissent and challenges to consolidation of white heterosexual masculinity in academy.

The Race Industry and Prejudice-Reduction Workshops

In his incisive critique of current attempts at minority canon formation (1987), Cornel West locates the following cultural crises as circumscribing the present historical moment: the decolonization of the Third World that signaled the end of the European Age; the repoliticization of literary studies in the 1960s; the emergence of alternative, oppositional, subaltern histories; and the transformation of everyday life through the rise of a predominantly visual, technological culture. West locates contests over Afro-American canon formation in the proliferation of discourses of pluralism in the American academy, thus launching a critique of the class interests of Afro-American critics who “become the academic superintendents of a segment of an expanded canon or a separate canon” (197). A similar critique, on the basis of class interests and “professionalization,” can be leveled against feminist scholars (First or Third World) who specialize in “reading” the lives/experiences of Third World women. What concerns me here, however, is the predominately white upper-level administrators at our institutions and their “reading” of the issues of racial diversity and pluralism. I agree with West’s internal critique of a black managerial class, but I think it is important not to ignore the power of a predominantly white managerial class (men and women) who, in fact, frame and hence determine our voices, livelihoods, and sometimes even our political alliances. Exploring a small piece of the creation and institutionalization of this race industry, prejudice reduction workshops involving upper-level administrators, counselors, and students in numerous institutions of higher education—including the college where I used
to teach—shed light on a particular aspect of this industry. Interestingly, the faculty often do not figure in these workshops at all; they are directed either at students and resident counselors or at administrators.

To make this argument, I draw upon the institution where I used to teach (Oberlin College) that has an impressive history of progressive and liberal policies. But my critique applies to liberal/humanistic institutions of higher education in general. While what follows is a critique of certain practices at the college, I undertake it out of a commitment to and engagement with the academy. The efforts of Oberlin College to take questions of difference and diversity on board should not be minimized. However, these efforts should also be subject to rigorous examination because they have far-reaching implications for the institutionalization of multiculturalism in the academy. While multiculturalism itself is not necessarily problematic, its definition in terms of an apolitical, ahistorical cultural pluralism needs to be challenged.

In the last few decades there has been an increase in this kind of activity, often as a response to antiracist student organizing and demands or in relation to the demand for and institutionalization of “non-Western” requirements at prestigious institutions in a number of academic institutions nationally. More precisely, however, these issues of multiculturalism arise in response to the recognition of changing demographics in the United States. For instance, the prediction that by the year 2000 almost 42 percent of all public school students would be minority children or other impoverished children and that by the year 2000 women and people of color would account for nearly 75 percent of the labor force are crucial in understanding institutional imperatives concerning “diversity.” As Rosaura Sanchez suggests, for the university to conduct “research and business as usual” in the face of the overwhelming challenges posed by even the very presence of people of color, it has to enact policies and programs aimed at accommodation rather than transformation (Sanchez 1987).

In response to certain racist and homophobic incidents in the spring of 1988, Oberlin College instituted a series of “prejudice reduction” workshops aimed at students and upper- and middle-level administrative staff. These sometimes took the form of “unlearning racism” workshops conducted by residential counselors and psychologists in dorms. Workshops such as these are valuable in “sensitizing” students to racial conflict, behavior, and attitudes, but an analysis of their historical and ideological bases indicates their limitations.

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Briefly, prejudice reduction workshops draw on a psychologically based “race relations” analysis and focus on “prejudice” rather than on institutional or historical domination. The workshops draw on cocounseling and reevaluation counseling techniques and theory and often aim for emotional release rather than political action. The name of this approach is itself somewhat problematic, since it suggests that “prejudice” (rather than domination, exploitation, or structural inequality) is the core problem and that we have to “reduce” it. The language determines and shapes the ideological and political content to a large extent. In focusing on “the healing of past wounds” this approach also equates the positions of dominant and subordinate groups, erasing all power inequities and hierarchies. And finally, the location of the source of “oppression” and “change” in individuals suggests an elision between ideological and structural understandings of power and domination and individual, psychological understandings of power.

Here again, the implicit definition of experience is important. Experience is defined as fundamentally individual and atomistic, subject to behavioral and attitudinal change. Questions of history, collective memory, and social and structural inequality as constitutive of the category of experience are inadmissible within this framework. Individuals speak as representatives of majority or minority groups whose experience is predetermined within an oppressor/victim paradigm. These questions are addressed in A. Sivanandan’s incisive critique (1990) of the roots of racism awareness training in the United States (associated with the work of Judy Katz et al.) and its embodiment in multiculturalism in Britain.

Sivanandan draws attention to the dangers of the actual degradation and refiguration of antiracist, black political struggles as a result of the racism awareness training focus on psychological attitudes. Thus, while these workshops can indeed be useful in addressing deep-seated psychological attitudes and thus creating a context for change, the danger resides in remaining at the level of personal support and evaluation, and thus often undermining the necessity for broad-based political organization and action.16

Prejudice reduction workshops have also made their way into the upper echelons of the administration at the college. At this level, however, they take a very different form: presidents and their male colleagues do not go to workshops; they “consult” about issues of diversity. Thus, this version of “prejudice reduction” takes the form of “managing diversity” (another semantic gem that suggests that “diversity” [a euphemism for people of color] will be
Program in Conflict Management Alternatives: A team of applied scholars is creating alternative theoretical and practical approaches to the peaceful resolution of social conflicts. A concern for maximizing social justice, and redressing major social inequities that underlie much social conflict, is a central organizing principle of this work. Another concern is to facilitate the implementation of negotiated settlements, and therefore contribute to long-term change in organizational and community relations. Research theory development, organizational and community change efforts, networking, consultations, curricula, workshops and training programs are all part of the Program.

This passage foregrounds the primary focus on conflict resolution, negotiated settlement, and organizational relations—all framed in a language of research, consultancy, and training. All three strategies—conflict resolution, settlement negotiation, and long-term organizational relations—can be carried out between individuals and between groups. The point is to understand the moments of friction and to resolve the conflicts “peacefully”; in other words, domesticate race and difference by formulating the problems in narrow, interpersonal terms and by rewriting historical contexts as manageable psychological ones.

As in the example of the classroom discussed earlier, the assumption here is that individuals and groups, as individual atomistic units in a social whole composed essentially of an aggregate of such units, embody difference. Thus, conflict resolution is best attempted by negotiating between individuals who are dissatisfied as individuals. One very important ideological effect of this is the standardization of behaviors and responses so as to make them predictable (and thus manageable) across a wide variety of situations and circumstances. If complex structural experiences of domination and resistance can be ideologically reformulated as individual behaviors and attitudes, they can be managed while carrying on business as usual.

Another example of this kind of program is the approach of the company that was consulted for the report just quoted, which goes by the name Diversity Consultants: “Diversity Consultants believe one of the most effective ways to manage multicultural and race awareness issues is through assessment of individual environments, planned educational programs, and management
strategy sessions which assist professionals in understanding themselves, diversity, and their options in the workplace" (Prindle 1988, 8).

The key ideas in this statement involve an awareness of race issues (the problem is assumed to be cultural misunderstanding or lack of information about other cultures), understanding yourself and people unlike you (diversity—we must respect and learn from each other; this may not address economic exploitation, but it will teach us to treat each other civilly), negotiating conflicts, altering organizational sexism and racism, and devising strategies to assess and manage the challenges of diversity (which results in an additive approach: recruiting “diverse” people, introducing “different” curriculum units while engaging in teaching as usual—that is, not shifting the normative-culture-vs.-subcultures paradigm). This is, then, the “professionalization” of prejudice reduction, where culture is a supreme commodity. Culture is seen as noncontradictory, as isolated from questions of history, and as a storehouse of nonchanging facts, behaviors, and practices. This particular definition of culture and of cultural difference is what sustains the individualized discourse of harmony and civility that is the hallmark of cultural pluralism.

Prejudice reduction workshops eventually aim for the creation of this discourse of civility. Again, this is not to suggest that there are no positive effects of this practice—for instance, the introduction of new cultural models can cause a deeper evaluation of existing structures, and clearly such consultancies could set a positive tone for social change. However, the baseline is still maintaining the status quo; diversity is always and can only be added on.

So what does all this mean? Diversity consultants are not new. Private industry has been using these highly paid management consulting firms since the civil rights movement. When upper-level administrators in higher education inflect discourses of education and “academic freedom” with discourses of the management of race, however, the effects are significant enough to warrant close examination. There is a long history of the institutionalization of the discourse of management and control in American education, but the management of race requires a somewhat different inflection at this historical moment. As a result of historical, demographic, and educational shifts in the racial makeup of students and faculty in the last twenty years, some of us even have public voices that have to be “managed” for the greater harmony of all. The hiring of consultants to “sensitize educators to issues of diversity” is part of the post-1960s proliferation of discourses of pluralism. But it is also a specific and containing response to the changing social contours of the U.S.
polity and to the challenges posed by Third World and feminist studies in the academy. By using the language of the corporation and the language of cognitive and affectional psychology (and thereby professionalizing questions of sexism, racism, and class conflict), new alliances are consolidated. Educators who are part of the ruling administrative class are now managers of conflict, but they are also agents in the construction of race—a word that is significantly redefined through the technical language that is used.¹⁸

**Race, Voice, and Academic Culture**

The effects of this relatively new discourse in the higher levels of liberal arts colleges and universities are quite real. Affirmative action hires are now highly visible and selective; every English department is looking for a black woman scholar to teach Toni Morrison's writings. What happens to such scholars after they are hired, and particularly when they come up for review or tenure, is another matter altogether. A number of scholars have documented the debilitating effects of affirmative action hiring policies that seek out and hire only those Third World scholars who are at the top of their fields—hence the pattern of musical chairs in which selected people of color are bartered at very high prices. Our voices are carefully placed and domesticated: one in history, one in English, perhaps one in the sociology department. Clearly these hiring practices do not guarantee the retention and tenure of Third World faculty. In fact, while the highly visible bartering for Third World “stars” serves to suggest that institutions of higher education are finally becoming responsive to feminist and Third World concerns, this particular commodification and personalization of race suggests there has been very little change since the 1970s, in terms of either a numerical increase of Third World faculty or our treatment in white institutions.

In their 1988 article on racism faced by Chicano faculty in institutions of higher education, Maria de la Luz Reyes and John J. Halcon characterize the effects of the 1970s policies of affirmative action:

In the mid-1970s, when minority quota systems were being implemented in many nonacademic agencies, the general public was left with the impression that Chicano or minority presence in professional or academic positions was due to affirmative action, rather than to individual qualifications or merit. But that impression was inaccurate. Generally [institutions
of higher education] responded to the affirmative action guidelines with token positions for only a handful of minority scholars in nonacademic and/or “soft” money programs. For example, many Blacks and Hispanics were hired as directors for programs such as Upward Bound, Talent Search, and Equal Opportunity Programs. Other minority faculty were hired for bilingual programs and ethnic studies programs, but affirmative action hires did not commonly extend to tenure-track faculty positions. The new presence of minorities on college campuses, however, which occurred during the period when attention to affirmative action regulations reached its peak, left all minority professionals and academics with a legacy of tokenism—a stigma that has been difficult to dispel. (303)

De la Luz Reyes and Halcon go on to argue that we are still living with the effects of the implementation of these policies. They examine the problems associated with tokenism and the ghettoization of Third World people in the academy, detailing the complex forms of racism that minority faculty face today. To this characterization, I would add that one of the results of the Reagan-Bush years has been that black, women’s, and ethnic studies programs are often further marginalized, since one of the effects of the management of race is that individuals come to embody difference and diversity, while programs that have been historically constituted on the basis of collective oppositional knowledges are labeled “political,” “biased,” “shril,” and “unrigorous.” Any inroads made by such programs and departments in the seventies were slowly undermined in the eighties and the nineties by the management of race through attitudinal and behavioral strategies, with their logical dependence on individuals seen as appropriate representatives of their “race” or other equivalent political constituency. Race and gender were reformulated as individual characteristics and attitudes, and thus an individualized, ostensibly “unmarked” discourse of difference was put into place. This shift in the academic discourse on gender and race actually rolls back any progress that has been made in carving out institutional spaces for women’s and black studies programs and departments.

Earlier, it was these institutional spaces that determined our collective voices. Our programs and departments were by definition alternative and oppositional. Now they are often merely alternative, one among many. Without being nostalgic about the good old days (and they were problematic in their own ways), I am suggesting that there has been an erosion of the politics of
collectivity through the reformulation of race and difference in individualistic terms. By no means is this a conspiratorial scenario. The discussion of the effects of my own classroom practices indicates my complicity in this contest over definitions of gender and race in discursive and representational as well as personal terms. The 1960s and 1970s slogan “The personal is political” was recrafted in the 1980s as “The political is personal.” In other words, all politics is collapsed into the personal, and questions of individual behaviors, attitudes, and lifestyles stand in for the political analysis of the social. Individual political struggles are seen as the only relevant and legitimate form of political struggle.

There is, however, another, more crucial reason to be concerned about (and to challenge) this management of race in the liberal academy: this process of the individualization of race and its effects dovetail rather neatly with the neoconservative politics and agenda of the Reagan-Bush years and now the Bush-Cheney years, an agenda that is constitutively recasting the fabric of American life in the pre-1960s mold. The 1980s Supreme Court decisions on “reverse discrimination” are based on precisely similar definitions of “prejudice,” “discrimination,” and “race.” In an essay that argues that the U.S. Supreme Court’s rulings on reverse discrimination are fundamentally tied to the rollback of reproductive freedom, Zillah Eisenstein (1990) discusses the individualist framework on which these decisions are based:

The court’s recent decisions pertaining to affirmative action make quite clear that existing civil rights legislation is being newly reinterpreted. Race, or sex (gender) as a collective category is being denied and racism, and/or sexism, defined as a structural and historical reality has been erased. Statistical evidence of racial and/or sexual discrimination is no longer acceptable as proof of unfair treatment of “black women as a group or class.” Discrimination is proved by an individual only in terms of their specific case. The assault is blatant: equality doctrine is dismantled. (5)

Eisenstein goes on to analyze how the government’s attempts to redress racism and sexism are at the core of the struggle for equality and how, in gutting the meaning of discrimination and applying it only to individual cases and not statistical categories, it has become almost impossible to prove discrimination because there are always “other” criteria to excuse discriminatory practices. Thus, the Supreme Court decisions on reverse discrimination are
clearly based on a particular individualist politics that domesticates race and gender. This is an example of the convergence of neoconservative and liberal agendas concerning race and gender inequalities.

Those of us who are in the academy also potentially collude in this domestication of race by allowing ourselves to be positioned in ways that contribute to the construction of these images of pure and innocent diversity, to the construction of these managerial discourses. For instance, since the category of race is not static but a fluid social and historical formation, Third World peoples are often located in antagonistic relationships with one another. Those of us who are from Third World countries are often played off against Third World peoples native to the United States. As an Indian immigrant woman in the United States, for instance, in most contexts I am not as potentially threatening as an African American woman. Yes, we are both nonwhite and other, subject to various forms of overt or disguised racism, but I do not bring with me a history of slavery, a direct and constant reminder of the racist past and present of the United States. Of course my location in the British academy would be fundamentally different because of the history of British colonization, because of its specific patterns of immigration and labor force participation, and because of the existence of working-class, trade union, and antiracist politics—all of which define the position of Indians differently in Britain. An interesting parallel in the British context is the focus on and celebration of African American women as the “true” radical black feminists who have something to say, while black British feminists are marginalized and rendered voiceless by the publishing industry and the academy (“black” in Britain often refered to British citizens of African, Asian, or Caribbean origin, although this alliance has unravelled in recent years). These locations and potential collusions thus have an impact on how our voices and agencies are constituted.

Critical Pedagogy and Cultures of Dissent

If my argument in this essay is convincing, it suggests why we need to take on questions of race and gender as they are being managed and commodified in the liberal U.S. academy. One mode of doing this is actively creating public cultures of dissent where these issues can be debated in terms of our pedagogies and institutional practices. Creating such cultures in the
liberal academy is a challenge in itself, because liberalism allows and even welcomes “plural” or even “alternative” perspectives. However, a public culture of dissent entails creating spaces for epistemological standpoints that are grounded in the interests of people and that recognize the materiality of conflict, of privilege, and of domination. Thus creating such cultures is fundamentally about making the axes of power transparent in the context of academic, disciplinary, and institutional structures as well as in the interpersonal relationships (rather than individual relations) in the academy. It is about taking the politics of everyday life seriously as teachers, students, administrators, and members of hegemonic academic cultures. Culture itself is thus redefined to incorporate individual and collective memories, dreams, and history that are contested and transformed through the political praxis of day-to-day living.

Cultures of dissent are also about seeing the academy as part of a larger sociopolitical arena that itself domesticates and manages Third World people in the name of liberal capitalist democracy. They are about working to reshape and reenvision community and citizenship in the face of overwhelming corporatization. The struggle to transform our institutional practices fundamentally also involves the grounding of the analysis of exploitation and oppression in accurate history and theory, seeing ourselves as activists in the academy, drawing links between movements for social justice and our pedagogical and scholarly endeavors and expecting and demanding action from ourselves, our colleagues, and our students at numerous levels. This requires working hard to understand and to theorize questions of knowledge, power, and experience in the academy so that one effects both pedagogical empowerment and transformation. Racism, sexism, and homophobia are very real, day-to-day practices in which we all engage. They are not reducible to mere curricular or policy decisions—that is, to management practices. In this context we need to actively rethink the purpose of liberal education in antiracist, anticapitalist feminist ways.

I said earlier that what is at stake is not the mere recognition of difference. The sort of difference that is acknowledged and engaged has fundamental significance for the decolonization of educational practices. Similarly, the point is not simply that one should have a voice; the more crucial question concerns the sort of voice one comes to have as the result of one’s location, both as an individual and as part of collectives. The important point is that it be an active,
oppositional, and collective voice that takes seriously the commodification and domestication of Third World people in the academy. Thus cultures of dissent must work to create pedagogies of dissent rather than pedagogies of accommodation. And this is a task open to all—to people of color as well as progressive white people in the academy.
PART THREE

Reorienting Feminism
I write this chapter at the urging of a number of friends and with some trepidation, revisiting the themes and arguments of an essay written some sixteen years ago. This is a difficult chapter to write, and I undertake it hesitantly and with humility—yet feeling that I must do so to take fuller responsibility for my ideas, and perhaps to explain whatever influence they have had on debates in feminist theory.

"Under Western Eyes" was not only my very first "feminist studies" publication, it remains the one that marks my presence in the international feminist community. I had barely completed my Ph.D. when I wrote this essay; I am now a professor of women's studies. The "under" of Western eyes is now much more an "inside" in terms of my own location in the U.S. academy. The site from which I wrote the essay consisted of a very vibrant, transnational women's movement, while the site I write from today is quite different. With the increasing privatization and corporatization of public life, it has become much harder to discern such a women's movement from the United States (although women's movements are thriving around the world), and my site of access and struggle has increasingly come to be the U.S. academy. In the United States, women's movements have become increasingly conservative, and much radical, antiracist feminist activism occurs outside the rubric of such movements. Thus, much of what I say here is influenced by the primary site I occupy as an educator and scholar. It is time to revisit "Under Western Eyes," to clarify ideas that remained implicit and unstated in 1986 and to further develop and historicize the theoretical framework I outlined then. I also want to assess how this essay has been read and misread and to respond to the critiques and celebrations. And it is time for me to move explicitly from critique to reconstruction, to identify the urgent issues facing feminists at the
beginning of the twenty-first century, to ask the question: How would "Under Western Eyes"—the Third World inside and outside the West—be explored and analyzed almost two decades later? What do I consider to be the urgent theoretical and methodological questions facing a comparative feminist politics at this moment in history?

Given the apparent and continuing life of "Under Western Eyes" and my own travels through transnational feminist scholarship and networks, I begin with a summary of the central arguments of "Under Western Eyes," contextualizing them in intellectual, political, and institutional terms. Basing my account on this discussion, I describe ways the essay has been read and situated in a number of different, often overlapping, scholarly discourses. I engage with some useful responses to the essay in an attempt to further clarify the various meanings of the West, Third World, and so on, to reengage questions of the relation of the universal and the particular in feminist theory, and to make visible some of the theses left obscure or ambiguous in my earlier writing.

I look, first, to see how my thinking has changed over the past sixteen years or so. What are the challenges facing transnational feminist practice at the beginning of the twenty-first century? How have the possibilities of feminist cross-cultural work developed and shifted? What is the intellectual, political, and institutional context that informs my own shifts and new commitments at the time of this writing? What categories of scholarly and political identification have changed since 1986? What has remained the same? I wish to begin a dialogue between the intentions, effects, and political choices that underwrote "Under Western Eyes" in the mid-1980s and those I would make today. I hope it provokes others to ask similar questions about our individual and collective projects in feminist studies.

Revisiting "Under Western Eyes"

DECOLONIZING FEMINIST SCHOLARSHIP: 1986

I wrote "Under Western Eyes" to discover and articulate a critique of "Western feminist" scholarship on Third World women via the discursive colonization of Third World women's lives and struggles. I also wanted to expose the power-knowledge nexus of feminist cross-cultural scholarship expressed through Eurocentric, falsely universalizing methodologies that serve the nar-
row self-interest of Western feminism. As well, I thought it crucial to high-
light the connection between feminist scholarship and feminist political
organizing while drawing attention to the need to examine the “political
implications of our analytic strategies and principles.” I also wanted to chart
the location of feminist scholarship within a global political and economic
framework dominated by the “First World.”

My most simple goal was to make clear that cross-cultural feminist work
must be attentive to the micropolitics of context, subjectivity, and struggle,
as well as to the macropolitics of global economic and political systems and
processes. I discussed Maria Mies’s study of the lacemakers of Narsapur as a
demonstration of how to do this kind of multilayered, contextual analysis to
reveal how the particular is often universally significant—without using the
universal to erase the particular, or positing an unbridgeable gulf between the
two terms. Implicit in this analysis was the use of historical materialism as
a basic framework, and a definition of material reality in both its local and
micro-, as well as global, systemic dimensions. I argued at that time for the
definition and recognition of the Third World not just through oppression but
in terms of historical complexities and the many struggles to change these
oppressions. Thus I argued for grounded, particularized analyses linked with
larger, even global, economic and political frameworks. I drew inspiration
from a vision of feminist solidarity across borders, although it is this vision
that has remained invisible to many readers. In a perceptive analysis of my
argument of this politics of location, Sylvia Walby (2000) recognizes and re-
finesthe relation between difference and equality of which I speak. She draws
further attention to the need for a shared frame of reference among Western,
postcolonial, Third World feminists in order to decide what counts as differ-
ence. She asserts, quite insightfully, that

Mohanty and other postcolonial feminists are often interpreted as ar-

guing only for situated knowledges in popularisations of their work. In

fact, Mohanty is claiming, via a complex and subtle argument, that she

is right and that (much) white Western feminism is not merely different,

but wrong. In doing this she assumes a common question, a common set

of concepts and, ultimately the possibility of, a common political project

with white feminism. She hopes to argue white feminism into agreeing

with her. She is not content to leave white Western feminism as a situated

knowledge, comfortable with its local and partial perspective. Not a bit of

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it. This is a claim to a more universal truth. And she hopes to accomplish this by the power of argument. (199)

Walby's reading of the essay challenges others to engage my notion of a common feminist political project, which critiques the effects of Western feminist scholarship on women in the Third World, but within a framework of solidarity and shared values. My insistence on the specificity of difference is based on a vision of equality attentive to power differences within and among the various communities of women. I did not argue against all forms of generalization, nor was I privileging the local over the systemic, difference over commonalities, or the discursive over the material.

I did not write "Under Western Eyes" as a testament to the impossibility of egalitarian and noncolonizing cross-cultural scholarship, nor did I define "Western" and "Third World" feminism in such oppositional ways that there would be no possibility of solidarity between Western and Third World feminists. Yet, this is often how the essay has been read and utilized. I have wondered why such a sharp opposition has developed in this form. Perhaps mapping the intellectual and institutional context in which I wrote back then and the shifts that have affected its reading since would clarify the intentions and claims of the essay.

Intellecually, I was writing in solidarity with the critics of Eurocentric humanism who drew attention to its false universalizing and masculinist assumptions. My project was anchored in a firm belief in the importance of the particular in relation to the universal—a belief in the local as specifying and illuminating the universal. My concerns drew attention to the dichotomies embraced and identified with this universalized framework, the critique of "white feminism" by women of color and the critique of "Western feminism" by Third World feminists working within a paradigm of decolonization. I was committed, both politically and personally, to building a noncolonizing feminist solidarity across borders. I believed in a larger feminist project than the colonizing, self-interested one I saw emerging in much influential feminist scholarship and in the mainstream women's movement.

My newly found teaching position at a primarily white U.S. academic institution also deeply affected my writing at this time. I was determined to make an intervention in this space in order to create a location for Third World, immigrant, and other marginalized scholars like myself who saw themselves erased or misrepresented within the dominant Euro-American
feminist scholarship and their communities. It has been a source of deep satisfaction that I was able to begin to open an intellectual space to Third World/immigrant women scholars, as was done at the international conference I helped organize, “Common Differences: Third World Women and Feminist Perspectives” (Urbana, Illinois, 1983). This conference allowed for the possibility of a decolonized, cross-border feminist community and cemented for me the belief that “common differences” can form the basis of deep solidarity, and that we have to struggle to achieve this in the face of unequal power relations among feminists.

There have also been many effects—personal and professional—in my writing this essay. These effects range from being cast as the “nondutiful daughter” of white feminists to being seen as a mentor for Third World/immigrant women scholars; from being invited to address feminist audiences at various academic venues, to being told I should focus on my work in early childhood education and not dabble in “feminist theory.” Practicing active disloyalty has its price as well as its rewards. Suffice it to say, however, that I have no regrets and only deep satisfaction in having written “Under Western Eyes.”

I attribute some of the readings and misunderstandings of the essay to the triumphal rise of postmodernism in the U.S. academy in the past three decades. Although I have never called myself a “postmodernist,” some reflection on why my ideas have been assimilated under this label is important. In fact, one reason to revisit “Under Western Eyes” at this time is my desire to point to this postmodernist appropriation. I am misread when I am interpreted as being against all forms of generalization and as arguing for difference over commonalities. This misreading occurs in the context of a hegemonic postmodernist discourse that labels as “totalizing” all systemic connections, and emphasizes only the mutability and constructedness of identities and social structures.

Yes, I did draw on Foucault to outline an analysis of power/knowledge, but I also drew on Anour Abdel Malek to show the directionality and material effects of a particular imperial power structure. I drew too on Maria Mies to argue for the need for a materialist analysis that linked everyday life and local gendered contexts and ideologies to the larger, transnational political and economic structures and ideologies of capitalism. What is interesting for me is to see how and why “difference” has been embraced over “common-
ality," and I realize that my writing leaves open this possibility. In 1986 I wrote mainly to challenge the false universality of Eurocentric discourses and was perhaps not sufficiently critical of the valorization of difference over commonality in postmodernist discourse. Now I find myself wanting to reemphasize the connections between local and universal. In 1986 my priority was on difference, but now I want to recapture and reiterate its fuller meaning, which was always there, and that is its connection to the universal. In other words, this discussion allows me to reemphasize the way that differences are never just "differences." In knowing differences and particularities, we can better see the connections and commonalities because no border or boundary is ever complete or rigidly determining. The challenge is to see how differences allow us to explain the connections and border crossings better and more accurately, how specifying difference allows us to theorize universal concerns more fully. It is this intellectual move that allows for my concern for women of different communities and identities to build coalitions and solidarities across borders.

So what has changed and what remains the same for me? What are the urgent intellectual and political questions for feminist scholarship and organizing at this time in history? First, let me say that the terms "Western" and "Third World" retain a political and explanatory value in a world that appropriates and assimilates multiculturalism and "difference" through commodification and consumption. However, these are not the only terms I would choose to use now. With the United States, the European Community, and Japan as the nodes of capitalist power in the early twenty-first century, the increasing proliferation of Third and Fourth Worlds within the national borders of these very countries, as well as the rising visibility and struggles for sovereignty by First Nations/indigenous peoples around the world, "Western" and "Third World" explain much less than the categorizations "North/South" or "One-Third/Two-Thirds Worlds."

"North/South" is used to distinguish between affluent, privileged nations and communities, and economically and politically marginalized nations and communities, as is "Western/non-Western." While these terms are meant to loosely distinguish the northern and southern hemispheres, affluent and marginal nations and communities obviously do not line up neatly within this geographical frame. And yet, as a political designation that attempts to distinguish between the "haves" and the "have-nots," it does have a certain political value. An example of this is Arif Dirlik's formulation of North/South as a metaphorical rather than geographical distinction, where "North" refers to
the pathways of transnational capital and "South" to the marginalized poor of the world regardless of geographical distinction.10

I find the language of "One-Third World" versus "Two-Thirds World" as elaborated by Gustavo Esteva and Madhu Suri Prakash (1998) particularly useful, especially in conjunction with "Third World/South" and "First World/North." These terms represent what Esteva and Prakash call social minorities and social majorities—categories based on the quality of life led by peoples and communities in both the North and the South.11 The advantage of one-third/two-thirds world in relation to terms like "Western/Third World" and "North/South" is that they move away from misleading geographical and ideological binarisms.

By focusing on quality of life as the criteria for distinguishing between social minorities and majorities, "One-Third/Two-Thirds Worlds" draws attention to the continuities as well as the discontinuities between the have-nots within the boundaries of nations and between nations and indigenous communities. This designation also highlights the fluidity and power of global forces that situate communities of people as social majorities/minorities in disparate form. "One-Third/Two-Thirds" is a nonessentialist categorization, but it incorporates an analysis of power and agency that is crucial. Yet what it misses is a history of colonization that the terms Western/Third World draw attention to.

As the above terminological discussion serves to illustrate, we are still working with a very imprecise and inadequate analytical language. All we can have access to at given moments is the analytical language that most clearly approximates the features of the world as we understand it. This distinction between One-Third/Two-Thirds World and, at times, First World/North and Third World/South is the language I choose to use now. Because in fact our language is imprecise, I hesitate to have any language become static. My own language in 1986 needs to be open to refinement and inquiry—but not to institutionalization.

Finally, I want to reflect on an important issue not addressed in "Under Western Eyes": the question of native or indigenous struggles. Radhika Mohanram’s critique of my work (1999) brings this to our attention. She points out the differences between a "multicultural" understanding of nation (prevalent in the United States) and a call for a "bicultural" understanding of nation on the part of indigenous people in Aotearoa/New Zealand. She argues that my notion of a common context of struggle suggests logical alliances
among the various black women: Maori, Asian, Pacific Islander. However, Maori women see multiculturalism—alliances with Asian women—as under-mining indigenous rights and biculturalism and prefer to ally themselves with Pakeha (white, Anglo-Celtic people [Mohanram 1999, 92–96]).

I agree that the distinction between biculturalism and multiculturalism does pose a practical problem of organizing and alliance building, and that the particular history and situation of Maori feminists cannot be subsumed within the analysis I offer so far. Native or indigenous women’s struggles, which do not follow a postcolonial trajectory based on the inclusions and exclusions of processes of capitalist, racist, heterosexist, and nationalist domination, cannot be addressed easily under the purview of categories such as “Western” and “Third World.” But they become visible and even central to the definition of One-Third/Two-Thirds Worlds because indigenous claims for sovereignty, their lifeways and environmental and spiritual practices, situ-ate them as central to the definition of “social majority” (Two-Thirds World). While a mere shift in conceptual terms is not a complete response to Mohanram’s critique, I think it clarifies and addresses the limitations of my earlier use of “Western” and “Third World.” Interestingly enough, while I would have identified myself as both Western and Third World—in all my complexities—in the context of “Under Western Eyes,” in this new frame, I am clearly located within the One-Third World. Then again, now, as in my earlier writing, I straddle both categories. I am of the Two-Thirds World in the One-Third World. I am clearly a part of the social minority now, with all its privileges; however, my political choices, struggles, and vision for change place me alongside the Two-Thirds World. Thus, I am for the Two-Thirds World, but with the privileges of the One-Third World. I speak as a person situated in the One-Thirds World, but from the space and vision of, and in solidarity with, communities in struggle in the Two-Thirds World.

UNDER AND (INSIDE) WESTERN EYES:
AT THE TURN OF THE CENTURY

There have been a number of shifts in the political and economic landscapes of nations and communities of people in the last two decades. The intellectual maps of disciplines and areas of study in the U.S. academy have shifted as well during this time. The advent and institutional visibility of postcolonial studies for instance is a relatively recent phenomenon—as is the simultaneous rollback of the gains made by race and ethnic studies depart-
ments in the 1970s and 1980s. Women's studies is now a well-established field of study with over eight hundred degree-granting programs and departments in the U.S. academy. Feminist theory and feminist movements across national borders have matured substantially since the early 1980s, and there is now a greater visibility of transnational women's struggles and movements, brought on in part by the United Nations world conferences on women held over the last two decades.

Economically and politically, the declining power of self-governance among certain poorer nations is matched by the rising significance of transnational institutions such as the World Trade Organization and governing bodies such as the European Union, not to mention the for-profit corporations. Of the world's largest economies, fifty-one happen to be corporations, not countries, and Amnesty International now reports on corporations as well as nations (Eisenstein 1998b, 1). Also, the hegemony of neoliberalism, alongside the naturalization of capitalist values, influences the ability to make choices on one's own behalf in the daily lives of economically marginalized as well as economically privileged communities around the globe.

The rise of religious fundamentalisms with their deeply masculinist and often racist rhetoric poses a huge challenge for feminist struggles around the world. Finally, the profoundly unequal “information highway” as well as the increasing militarization (and masculinization) of the globe, accompanied by the growth of the prison industrial complex in the United States, poses profound contradictions in the lives of communities of women and men in most parts of the world. I believe these political shifts to the right, accompanied by global capitalist hegemony, privatization, and increased religious, ethnic, and racial hatreds, pose very concrete challenges for feminists. In this context, I ask what would it mean to be attentive to the micropolitics of everyday life as well as to the larger processes that recolonize the culture and identities of people across the globe. How we think of the local in/of the global and vice versa without falling into colonizing or cultural relativist platitudes about difference is crucial in this intellectual and political landscape. And for me, this kind of thinking is tied to a revised race-and-gender-conscious historical materialism.

The politics of feminist cross-cultural scholarship from the vantage point of Third World/South feminist struggles remains a compelling site of analysis for me. Eurocentric analytic paradigms continue to flourish, and I remain committed to reengaging in the struggles to criticize openly the effects
of discursive colonization on the lives and struggles of marginalized women. My central commitment is to build connections between feminist scholarship and political organizing. My own present-day analytic framework remains very similar to my earliest critique of Eurocentrism. However, I now see the politics and economics of capitalism as a far more urgent locus of struggle. I continue to hold to an analytic framework that is attentive to the micropolitics of everyday life as well as to the macropolitics of global economic and political processes. The link between political economy and culture remains crucial to any form of feminist theorizing—as it does for my work. It isn't the framework that has changed. It is just that global economic and political processes have become more brutal, exacerbating economic, racial, and gender inequalities, and thus they need to be demystified, reexamined, and theorized.

While my earlier focus was on the distinctions between “Western” and “Third World” feminist practices, and while I downplayed the commonalities between these two positions, my focus now, as must be evident in part 2 of this book, is on what I have chosen to call an anticapitalist transnational feminist practice—and on the possibilities, indeed on the necessities, of cross-national feminist solidarity and organizing against capitalism. While “Under Western Eyes” was located in the context of the critique of Western humanism and Eurocentrism and of white, Western feminism, a similar essay written now would need to be located in the context of the critique of global capitalism (on antiglobalization), the naturalization of the values of capital, and the unacknowledged power of cultural relativism in cross-cultural feminist scholarship and pedagogies.

“Under Western Eyes” sought to make the operations of discursive power visible, to draw attention to what was left out of feminist theorizing, namely, the material complexity, reality, and agency of Third World women’s bodies and lives. This is in fact exactly the analytic strategy I now use to draw attention to what is unseen, undertheorized, and left out in the production of knowledge about globalization. While globalization has always been a part of capitalism, and capitalism is not a new phenomenon, at this time I believe the theory, critique, and activism around antiglobalization has to be a key focus for feminists. This does not mean that the patriarchal and racist relations and structures that accompany capitalism are any less problematic at this time, or that antiglobalization is a singular phenomenon. Along with many other
scholars and activists, I believe capital as it functions now depends on and exacerbates racist, patriarchal, and heterosexist relations of rule.

FEMINIST METHODOLOGIES: NEW DIRECTIONS

What kinds of feminist methodology and analytic strategy are useful in making power (and women's lives) visible in overtly nongendered, nonracialized discourses? The strategy discussed here is an example of how capitalism and its various relations of rule can be analyzed through a transnational, anticapitalist feminist critique, one that draws on historical materialism and centralizes racialized gender. This analysis begins from and is anchored in the place of the most marginalized communities of women—poor women of all colors in affluent and neocolonial nations; women of the Third World/South or the Two-Thirds World. I believe that this experiential and analytic anchor in the lives of marginalized communities of women provides the most inclusive paradigm for thinking about social justice. This particularized viewing allows for a more concrete and expansive vision of universal justice.

This is the very opposite of "special interest" thinking. If we pay attention to and think from the space of some of the most disenfranchised communities of women in the world, we are most likely to envision a just and democratic society capable of treating all its citizens fairly. Conversely, if we begin our analysis from, and limit it to, the space of privileged communities, our visions of justice are more likely to be exclusionary because privilege nurtures blindness to those without the same privileges. Beginning from the lives and interests of marginalized communities of women, I am able to access and make the workings of power visible—to read up the ladder of privilege. It is more necessary to look upward—colonized peoples must know themselves and the colonizer. This particular marginalized location makes the politics of knowledge and the power investments that go along with it visible so that we can then engage in work to transform the use and abuse of power. The analysis draws on the notion of epistemic privilege as it is developed by feminist standpoint theorists (with their roots in the historical materialism of Marx and Lukacs) as well as postpositivist realists, who provide an analysis of experience, identity, and the epistemic effects of social location. My view is thus a materialist and "realist" one and is antithetical to that of postmodernist relativism. I believe there are causal links between marginalized social locations and experiences and the ability of human agents to explain and ana-
lyze features of capitalist society. Methodologically, this analytic perspective is grounded in historical materialism. My claim is not that all marginalized locations yield crucial knowledge about power and inequity, but that within a tightly integrated capitalist system, the particular standpoint of poor indigenous and Third World/South women provides the most inclusive viewing of systemic power. In numerous cases of environmental racism, for instance, where the neighborhoods of poor communities of color are targeted as new sites for prisons and toxic dumps, it is no coincidence that poor black, Native American, and Latina women provide the leadership in the fight against corporate pollution. Three out of five Afro-Americans and Latinos live near toxic waste sites, and three of the five largest hazardous waste landfills are in communities with a population that is 80 percent people of color (Pardo 2001, 504–11). Thus, it is precisely their critical reflections on their everyday lives as poor women of color that allow the kind of analysis of the power structure that has led to the many victories in environmental racism struggles.17 Herein lies a lesson for feminist analysis.

Feminist scientist Vandana Shiva, one of the most visible leaders of the antiglobalization movement, provides a similar and illuminating critique of the patents and intellectual property rights agreements sanctioned by the World Trade Organization (WTO) since 1995.18 Along with others in the environmental and indigenous rights movements, she argues that the WTO sanctions biopiracy and engages in intellectual piracy by privileging the claims of corporate commercial interests, based on Western systems of knowledge in agriculture and medicine, to products and innovations derived from indigenous knowledge traditions. Thus, through the definition of Western scientific epistemologies as the only legitimate scientific system, the WTO is able to underwrite corporate patents to indigenous knowledge (as to the Neem tree in India) as their own intellectual property, protected through intellectual property rights agreements. As a result, the patenting of drugs derived from indigenous medicinal systems has now reached massive proportions. I quote Shiva:

[T]hrough patenting, indigenous knowledge is being pirated in the name of protecting knowledge and preventing piracy. The knowledge of our ancestors, of our peasants about seeds is being claimed as an invention of U.S. corporations and U.S. scientists and patented by them. The only reason something like that can work is because underlying it all is a racist
framework that says the knowledge of the Third World and the knowledge of people of color is not knowledge. When that knowledge is taken by white men who have capital, suddenly creativity begins. . . . Patents are a replay of colonialism, which is now called globalization and free trade. (2000, 32)

The contrast between Western scientific systems and indigenous epistemologies and systems of medicine is not the only issue here. It is the colonialist and corporate power to define Western science, and the reliance on capitalist values of private property and profit, as the only normative system that results in the exercise of immense power. Thus indigenous knowledges, which are often communally generated and shared among tribal and peasant women for domestic, local, and public use, are subject to the ideologies of a corporate Western scientific paradigm where intellectual property rights can only be understood in possessive or privatized form. All innovations that happen to be collective, to have occurred over time in forests and farms, are appropriated or excluded. The idea of an intellectual commons where knowledge is collectively gathered and passed on for the benefit of all, not owned privately, is the very opposite of the notion of private property and ownership that is the basis for the WTO property rights agreements. Thus this idea of an intellectual commons among tribal and peasant women actually excludes them from ownership and facilitates corporate biopiracy.

Shiva’s analysis of intellectual property rights, biopiracy, and globalization is made possible by its very location in the experiences and epistemologies of peasant and tribal women in India. Beginning from the practices and knowledges of indigenous women, she “reads up” the power structure, all the way to the policies and practices sanctioned by the WTO. This is a very clear example then of a transnational, anticapitalist feminist politics.

However, Shiva says less about gender than she could. She is after all talking in particular about women’s work and knowledges anchored in the epistemological experiences of one of the most marginalized communities of women in the world—poor, tribal, and peasant women in India. This is a community of women made invisible and written out of national and international economic calculations. An analysis that pays attention to the everyday experiences of tribal women and the micropolitics of their ultimately anticapitalist struggles illuminates the macropolitics of global restructuring. It suggests the thorough embeddedness of the local and particular with the global and
universal, and it suggests the need to conceptualize questions of justice and equity in transborder terms. In other words, this mode of reading envisions a feminism without borders, in that it foregrounds the need for an analysis and vision of solidarity across the enforced privatized intellectual property borders of the WTO.

These particular examples offer the most inclusive paradigm for understanding the motivations and effects of globalization as it is crafted by the WTO. Of course, if we were to attempt the same analysis from the epistemological space of Western, corporate interests, it would be impossible to generate an analysis that values indigenous knowledge anchored in communal relationships rather than profit-based hierarchies. Thus, poor tribal and peasant women, their knowledges and interests, would be invisible in this analytic frame because the very idea of an intellectual commons falls outside the purview of privatized property and profit that is a basis for corporate interests. The obvious issue for a transnational feminism pertains to the visions of profit and justice embodied in these opposing analytic perspectives. The focus on profit versus justice illustrates my earlier point about social location and analytically inclusive methodologies. It is the social location of the tribal women as explicated by Shiva that allows this broad and inclusive focus on justice. Similarly, it is the social location and narrow self-interest of corporations that privatizes intellectual property rights in the name of profit for elites.

Shiva essentially offers a critique of the global privatization of indigenous knowledges. This is a story about the rise of transnational institutions such as the WTO, the World Bank, and the International Monetary Fund, of banking and financial institutions and cross-national governing bodies like the MAI (Multinational Agreement on Investments). The effects of these governing bodies on poor people around the world have been devastating. In fundamental ways, it is girls and women around the world, especially in the Third World/South, that bear the brunt of globalization. Poor women and girls are the hardest hit by the degradation of environmental conditions, wars, famines, privatization of services and deregulation of governments, the dismantling of welfare states, the restructuring of paid and unpaid work, increasing surveillance and incarceration in prisons, and so on. And this is why a feminism without and beyond borders is necessary to address the injustices of global capitalism.

Women and girls are still 70 percent of the world's poor and the majority of the world's refugees. Girls and women comprise almost 80 percent of dis-
placed persons of the Third World/South in Africa, Asia and Latin America. Women own less than one-hundredth of the world’s property, while they are the hardest hit by the effects of war, domestic violence, and religious persecution. Feminist political theorist Zillah Eisenstein says that women do two-thirds of the world’s work and earn less than one-tenth of its income. Global capital in racialized and sexualized guise destroys the public spaces of democracy, and quietly sucks power out of the once social/public spaces of nation-states. Corporate capitalism has redefined citizens as consumers—and global markets replace the commitments to economic, sexual, and racial equality (Eisenstein 1998b, esp. ch. 5).

It is especially on the bodies and lives of women and girls from the Third World/South—the Two-Thirds World—that global capitalism writes its script, and it is by paying attention to and theorizing the experiences of these communities of women and girls that we demystify capitalism as a system of debilitating sexism and racism and envision anticapitalist resistance. Thus any analysis of the effects of globalization needs to centralize the experiences and struggles of these particular communities of women and girls.

Drawing on Arif Dirlik’s notion of “place consciousness as the radical other of global capitalism” (Dirlik 1999), Grace Lee Boggs makes an important argument for place-based civic activism that illustrates how centralizing the struggles of marginalized communities connects to larger antiglobalization struggles. Boggs suggests that “[p]lace consciousness . . . encourages us to come together around common, local experiences and organize around our hopes for the future of our communities and cities. While global capitalism doesn’t give a damn about the people or the natural environment of any particular place because it can always move on to other people and other places, place-based civic activism is concerned about the health and safety of people and places” (Boggs 2000, 19). Since women are central to the life of neighborhood and communities they assume leadership positions in these struggles. This is evident in the example of women of color in struggles against environmental racism in the United States, as well as in Shiva’s example of tribal women in the struggle against deforestation and for an intellectual commons. It is then the lives, experiences, and struggles of girls and women of the Two-Thirds World that demystify capitalism in its racial and sexual dimensions—and that provide productive and necessary avenues of theorizing and enacting anticapitalist resistance.

I do not wish to leave this discussion of capitalism as a generalized site
without contextualizing its meaning in and through the lives it structures. Disproportionately, these are girls’ and women’s lives, although I am committed to the lives of all exploited peoples. However, the specificity of girls’ and women’s lives encompasses the others through their particularized and contextualized experiences. If these particular gendered, classed, and racialized realities of globalization are unseen and undertheorized, even the most radical critiques of globalization effectively render Third World/South women and girls as absent. Perhaps it is no longer simply an issue of Western eyes, but rather how the West is inside and continually reconfigures globally, racially, and in terms of gender. Without this recognition, a necessary link between feminist scholarship/analytic frames and organizing/activist projects is impossible. Faulty and inadequate analytic frames engender ineffective political action and strategizing for social transformation.

What does the above analysis suggest? That we—feminist scholars and teachers—must respond to the phenomenon of globalization as an urgent site for the recolonization of peoples, especially in the Two-Thirds World. Globalization colonizes women’s as well as men’s lives around the world, and we need an anti-imperialist, anticapitalist, and contextualized feminist project to expose and make visible the various, overlapping forms of subjugation of women’s lives. Activists and scholars must also identify and reenvision forms of collective resistance that women, especially, in their different communities enact in their everyday lives. It is their particular exploitation at this time, their potential epistemic privilege, as well as their particular forms of solidarity that can be the basis for reimagining a liberatory politics for the start of this century.

Antiglobalization Struggles

Although the context for writing “Under Western Eyes” in the mid-1980s was a visible and activist women’s movement, this radical movement no longer exists as such. Instead, I draw inspiration from a more distant, but significant, antiglobalization movement in the United States and around the world. Activists in these movements are often women, although the movement is not gender-focused. So I wish to redefine the project of decolonization, not reject it. It appears more complex to me today, given the newer developments of global capitalism. Given the complex interweaving of cultural forms, people of and from the Third World live not only under Western eyes but also within
them. This shift in my focus from "under Western eyes" to "under and inside" the hegemonic spaces of the One-Third World necessitates recrafting the project of decolonization.

My focus is thus no longer just the colonizing effects of Western feminist scholarship. This does not mean the problems I identified in the earlier essay do not occur now. But the phenomenon I addressed then has been more than adequately engaged by other feminist scholars. While feminists have been involved in the antiglobalization movement from the start, however, this has not been a major organizing locus for women's movements nationally in the West/North. It has, however, always been a locus of struggle for women of the Third World/South because of their location. Again, this contextual specificity should constitute the larger vision. Women of the Two-Thirds World have always organized against the devastations of globalized capital, just as they have always historically organized anticolonial and antiracist movements. In this sense they have always spoken for humanity as a whole.

I have tried to chart feminist sites for engaging globalization, rather than providing a comprehensive review of feminist work in this area. I hope this exploration makes my own political choices and decisions transparent and that it provides readers with a productive and provocative space to think and act creatively for feminist struggle. So today my query is slightly different although much the same as in 1986. I wish to better see the processes of corporate globalization and how and why they recolonize women's bodies and labor. We need to know the real and concrete effects of global restructuring on raced, classed, national, sexual bodies of women in the academy, in workplaces, streets, households, cyberspaces, neighborhoods, prisons, and social movements.

What does it mean to make antiglobalization a key factor for feminist theorizing and struggle? To illustrate my thinking about antiglobalization, let me focus on two specific sites where knowledge about globalization is produced. The first site is a pedagogical one and involves an analysis of the various strategies being used to internationalize (or globalize) the women's studies curriculum in U.S. colleges and universities. I argue that this move to internationalize women's studies curricula and the attendant pedagogies that flow from this is one of the main ways we can track a discourse of global feminism in the United States. Other ways of tracking global feminist discourses include analyzing the documents and discussions flowing out of the Beijing United Nations conference on women, and of course popular television and
print media discourses on women around the world. The second site of anti­
globalization scholarship I focus on is the emerging, notably ungendered and
deracialized discourse on activism against globalization.

**ANTIGLOBALIZATION PEDAGOGIES**

Let me turn to the struggles over the dissemination of a feminist cross­
cultural knowledge base through pedagogical strategies “internationalizing”
the women’s studies curriculum. The problem of “the (gendered) color line”
remains, but is more easily seen today as developments of transnational and
global capital. While I choose to focus on women’s studies curricula, my ar­
arguments hold for curricula in any discipline or academic field that seeks to
internationalize or globalize its curriculum. I argue that the challenge for
“internationalizing” women’s studies is no different from the one involved in
“racializing” women’s studies in the 1980s, for very similar politics of knowl­
edge come into play here.20

So the question I want to foreground is the politics of knowledge in bridg­
ing the “local” and the “global” in women’s studies. How we teach the “new”
scholarship in women’s studies is at least as important as the scholarship
itself in the struggles over knowledge and citizenship in the U.S. academy.
After all, the way we construct curricula and the pedagogies we use to put
such curricula into practice tell a story—or tell many stories. It is the way we
position historical narratives of experience in relation to each other, the way
we theorize relationality as both historical and simultaneously singular and
collective that determines how and what we learn when we cross cultural and
experiential borders.

Drawing on my own work with U.S. feminist academic communities,21 I
describe three pedagogical models used in “internationalizing” the women’s
studies curriculum and analyze the politics of knowledge at work. Each of
these perspectives is grounded in particular conceptions of the local and the
global, of women’s agency, and of national identity, and each curricular model
presents different stories and ways of crossing borders and building bridges.
I suggest that a “comparative feminist studies” or “feminist solidarity” model
is the most useful and productive pedagogical strategy for feminist cross­
cultural work. It is this particular model that provides a way to theorize a com­
plex relational understanding of experience, location, and history such that
feminist cross-cultural work moves through the specific context to construct
a real notion of universal and of democratization rather than colonization.

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It is through this model that we can put into practice the idea of “common differences” as the basis for deeper solidarity across differences and unequal power relations.

Feminist-as-Tourist Model. This curricular perspective could also be called the “feminist as international consumer” or, in less charitable terms, the “white women’s burden or colonial discourse” model. It involves a pedagogical strategy in which brief forays are made into non-Euro-American cultures, and particular sexist cultural practices addressed from an otherwise Eurocentric women’s studies gaze. In other words, the “add women as global victims or powerful women and stir” perspective. This is a perspective in which the primary Euro-American narrative of the syllabus remains untouched, and examples from non-Western or Third World/South cultures are used to supplement and “add” to this narrative. The story here is quite old. The effects of this strategy are that students and teachers are left with a clear sense of the difference and distance between the local (defined as self, nation, and Western) and the global (defined as other, non-Western, and transnational). Thus the local is always grounded in nationalist assumptions—the United States or Western European nation-state provides a normative context. This strategy leaves power relations and hierarchies untouched since ideas about center and margin are reproduced along Eurocentric lines.

For example, in an introductory feminist studies course, one could include the obligatory day or week on dowry deaths in India, women workers in Nike factories in Indonesia, or precolonial matriarchies in West Africa, while leaving the fundamental identity of the Euro-American feminist on her way to liberation untouched. Thus Indonesian workers in Nike factories or dowry deaths in India stand in for the totality of women in these cultures. These women are not seen in their everyday lives (as Euro-American women are) just in these stereotypical terms. Difference in the case of non-Euro-American women is thus congealed, not seen contextually with all of its contradictions. This pedagogical strategy for crossing cultural and geographical borders is based on a modernist paradigm, and the bridge between the local and the global becomes in fact a predominantly self-interested chasm. This perspective confirms the sense of the “evolved U.S./Euro feminist.” While there is now more consciousness about not using an “add and stir” method in teaching about race and U.S. women of color, this does not appear to be the case in “internationalizing” women’s studies. Experience in this context is assumed.
to be static and frozen into U.S.- or Euro-centered categories. Since in this paradigm feminism is always/already constructed as Euro-American in origin and development, women's lives and struggles outside this geographical context only serve to confirm or contradict this originary feminist (master) narrative. This model is the pedagogical counterpart of the orientalizing and colonizing Western feminist scholarship of the past decades. In fact it may remain the predominant model at this time. Thus implicit in this pedagogical strategy is the crafting of the "Third World difference," the creation of monolithic images of Third World/South women. This contrasts with images of Euro-American women who are vital, changing, complex, and central subjects within such a curricular perspective.

**Feminist-as-Explorer Model.** This particular pedagogical perspective originates in area studies, where the "foreign" woman is the object and subject of knowledge and the larger intellectual project is entirely about countries other than the United States. Thus, here the local and the global are both defined as non-Euro-American. The focus on the international implies that it exists outside the U.S. nation-state. Women's, gender, and feminist issues are based on spatial/geographical and temporal/historical categories located elsewhere. Distance from "home" is fundamental to the definition of international in this framework. This strategy can result in students and teachers being left with a notion of difference and separateness, a sort of "us and them" attitude, but unlike the tourist model, the explorer perspective can provide a deeper, more contextual understanding of feminist issues in discretely defined geographical and cultural spaces. However, unless these discrete spaces are taught in relation to one another, the story told is usually a cultural relativist one, meaning that differences between cultures are discrete and relative with no real connection or common basis for evaluation. The local and the global are here collapsed into the international that by definition excludes the United States. If the dominant discourse is the discourse of cultural relativism, questions of power, agency, justice, and common criteria for critique and evaluation are silenced.23

In women's studies curricula this pedagogical strategy is often seen as the most culturally sensitive way to "internationalize" the curriculum. For instance, entire courses on "Women in Latin America" or "Third World Women's Literature" or "Postcolonial Feminism" are added on to the predominantly U.S.-based curriculum as a way to "globalize" the feminist knowl-
edge base. These courses can be quite sophisticated and complex studies, but they are viewed as entirely separate from the intellectual project of U.S. race and ethnic studies. The United States is not seen as part of “area studies,” as white is not a color when one speaks of people of color. This is probably related to the particular history of institutionalization of area studies in the U.S. academy and its ties to U.S. imperialism. Thus areas to be studied/conquered are “out there,” never within the United States. The fact that area studies in U.S. academic settings were federally funded and conceived as having a political project in the service of U.S. geopolitical interests suggests the need to examine the contemporary interests of these fields, especially as they relate to the logic of global capitalism. In addition, as Ella Shohat argues, it is time to “reimagine the study of regions and cultures in a way that transcends the conceptual borders inherent in the global cartography of the cold war” (2001, 1271). The field of American studies is an interesting location to examine here, especially since its more recent focus on U.S. imperialism. However, American studies rarely falls under the purview of “area studies.”

The problem with the feminist-as-explorer strategy is that globalization is an economic, political, and ideological phenomenon that actively brings the world and its various communities under connected and interdependent discursive and material regimes. The lives of women are connected and interdependent, albeit not the same, no matter which geographical area we happen to live in.

Separating area studies from race and ethnic studies thus leads to understanding or teaching about the global as a way of not addressing internal racism, capitalist hegemony, colonialism, and heterosexualization as central to processes of global domination, exploitation, and resistance. Global or international is thus understood apart from racism—as if racism were not central to processes of globalization and relations of rule at this time. An example of this pedagogical strategy in the context of the larger curriculum is the usual separation of “world cultures” courses from race and ethnic studies courses. Thus identifying the kinds of representations of (non-Euro-American) women mobilized by this pedagogical strategy, and the relation of these representations to implicit images of First World/North women are important foci for analysis. What kind of power is being exercised in this strategy? What kinds of ideas of agency and struggle are being consolidated? What are the potential effects of a kind of cultural relativism on our understandings of the differences and commonalities among communities of
women around the world? Thus the feminist-as-explorer model has its own problems, and I believe this is an inadequate way of building a feminist cross-cultural knowledge base because in the context of an interwoven world with clear directionalities of power and domination, cultural relativism serves as an apology for the exercise of power.

The Feminist Solidarity or Comparative Feminist Studies Model. This curricular strategy is based on the premise that the local and the global are not defined in terms of physical geography or territory but exist simultaneously and constitute each other. It is then the links, the relationships, between the local and the global that are foregrounded, and these links are conceptual, material, temporal, contextual, and so on. This framework assumes a comparative focus and analysis of the directionality of power no matter what the subject of the women's studies course is—and it assumes both distance and proximity (specific/universal) as its analytic strategy.

Differences and commonalities thus exist in relation and tension with each other in all contexts. What is emphasized are relations of mutuality, co-responsibility, and common interests, anchoring the idea of feminist solidarity. For example, within this model, one would not teach a U.S. women of color course with additions on Third World/South or white women, but a comparative course that shows the interconnectedness of the histories, experiences, and struggles of U.S. women of color, white women, and women from the Third World/South. By doing this kind of comparative teaching that is attentive to power, each historical experience illuminates the experiences of the others. Thus, the focus is not just on the intersections of race, class, gender, nation, and sexuality in different communities of women but on mutuality and coimplication, which suggests attentiveness to the interweaving of the histories of these communities. In addition the focus is simultaneously on individual and collective experiences of oppression and exploitation and of struggle and resistance.

Students potentially move away from the “add and stir” and the relativist “separate but equal” (or different) perspective to the coimplication/solidarity one. This solidarity perspective requires understanding the historical and experiential specificities and differences of women's lives as well as the historical and experiential connections between women from different national, racial, and cultural communities. Thus it suggests organizing syllabi around social and economic processes and histories of various communities.
of women in particular substantive areas like sex work, militarization, environmental justice, the prison/industrial complex, and human rights, and looking for points of contact and connection as well as disjunctures. It is important to always foreground not just the connections of domination but those of struggle and resistance as well.

In the feminist solidarity model the One-Third/Two-Thirds paradigm makes sense. Rather than Western/Third World, or North/South, or local/global seen as oppositional and incommensurate categories, the One-Third/Two-Thirds differentiation allows for teaching and learning about points of connection and distance among and between communities of women marginalized and privileged along numerous local and global dimensions. Thus the very notion of inside/outside necessary to the distance between local/global is transformed through the use of a One-Third/Two-Thirds paradigm, as both categories must be understood as containing difference/similarities, inside/outside, and distance/proximity. Thus sex work, militarization, human rights, and so on can be framed in their multiple local and global dimensions using the One-Third/Two-Thirds, social minority/social majority paradigm. I am suggesting then that we look at the women’s studies curriculum in its entirety and that we attempt to use a comparative feminist studies model wherever possible.

I refer to this model as the feminist solidarity model because, besides its focus on mutuality and common interests, it requires one to formulate questions about connection and disconnection between activist women’s movements around the world. Rather than formulating activism and agency in terms of discrete and disconnected cultures and nations, it allows us to frame agency and resistance across the borders of nation and culture. I think feminist pedagogy should not simply expose students to a particularized academic scholarship but that it should also envision the possibility of activism and struggle outside the academy. Political education through feminist pedagogy should teach active citizenship in such struggles for justice.

My recurring question is how pedagogies can supplement, consolidate, or resist the dominant logic of globalization. How do students learn about the inequities among women and men around the world? For instance, traditional liberal and liberal feminist pedagogies disallow historical and comparative thinking, radical feminist pedagogies often singularize gender, and Marxist pedagogy silences race and gender in its focus on capitalism. I look to create pedagogies that allow students to see the complexities, singularities, and
interconnections between communities of women such that power, privilege, agency, and dissent can be made visible and engaged with.

In an instructive critique of postcolonial studies and its institutional location, Arif Dirlik argues that the particular institutional history of postcolonial studies, as well as its conceptual emphases on the historical and local as against the systemic and the global, permit its assimilation into the logic of globalism. While Dirlik somewhat overstates his argument, deradicalization and assimilation should concern those of us involved in the feminist project. Feminist pedagogies of internationalization need an adequate response to globalization. Both Eurocentric and cultural relativist (postmodernist) models of scholarship and teaching are easily assimilated within the logic of late capitalism because this is fundamentally a logic of seeming decentralization and accumulation of differences. What I call the comparative feminist studies/feminist solidarity model on the other hand potentially counters this logic by setting up a paradigm of historically and culturally specific “common differences” as the basis for analysis and solidarity. Feminist pedagogies of antiglobalization can tell alternate stories of difference, culture, power, and agency. They can begin to theorize experience, agency, and justice from a more cross-cultural lens.

After almost two decades of teaching feminist studies in U.S. classrooms, it is clear to me that the way we theorize experience, culture, and subjectivity in relation to histories, institutional practice, and collective struggles determines the kind of stories we tell in the classroom. If these varied stories are to be taught such that students learn to democratize rather than colonize the experiences of different spatially and temporally located communities of women, neither a Eurocentric nor a cultural pluralist curricular practice will do. In fact narratives of historical experience are crucial to political thinking not because they present an unmediated version of the “truth” but because they can destabilize received truths and locate debate in the complexities and contradictions of historical life. It is in this context that postpositivist realist theorizations of experience, identity, and culture become useful in constructing curricular and pedagogical narratives that address as well as combat globalization. These realist theorizations explicitly link a historical materialist understanding of social location to the theorization of epistemic privilege and the construction of social identity, thus suggesting the complexities of the narratives of marginalized peoples in terms of relationality rather than
separation. These are the kinds of stories we need to weave into a feminist solidarity pedagogical model.

ANTIGLOBALIZATION SCHOLARSHIP AND MOVEMENTS

Women's and girls' bodies determine democracy: free from violence and sexual abuse, free from malnutrition and environmental degradation, free to plan their families, free to not have families, free to choose their sexual lives and preferences.—Zillah Eisenstein, Global Obscenities, 1998

There is now an increasing and useful feminist scholarship critical of the practices and effects of globalizaton.29 Instead of attempting a comprehensive review of this scholarship, I want to draw attention to some of the most useful kinds of issues it raises. Let me turn, then, to a feminist reading of anti-globalization movements and argue for a more intimate, closer alliance between women's movements, feminist pedagogy, cross-cultural feminist theorizing, and these ongoing anticapitalist movements.

I return to an earlier question: What are the concrete effects of global restructuring on the “real” raced, classed, national, sexual bodies of women in the academy, in workplaces, streets, households, cyberspaces, neighborhoods, prisons, and in social movements? And how do we recognize these gendered effects in movements against globalization? Some of the most complex analyses of the centrality of gender in understanding economic globalization attempt to link questions of subjectivity, agency, and identity with those of political economy and the state. This scholarship argues persuasively for a need to rethink patriarchies and hegemonic masculinities in relation to present-day globalization and nationalisms, and it also attempts to retheorize the gendered aspects of the refigured relations of the state, the market, and civil society by focusing on unexpected and unpredictable sites of resistance to the often devastating effects of global restructuring on women.30 And it draws on a number of disciplinary paradigms and political perspectives in making the case for the centrality of gender in processes of global restructuring, arguing that the reorganization of gender is part of the global strategy of capitalism.

Women workers of particular caste/class, race, and economic status are necessary to the operation of the capitalist global economy. Women are not only the preferred candidates for particular jobs, but particular kinds
of women—poor, Third and Two-Thirds World, working-class, and immi-
grant/migrant women—are the preferred workers in these global, “flexible”
temporary job markets. The documented increase in the migration of poor,
One-Third/Two-Thirds World women in search of labor across national bor-
ders has led to a rise in the international “maid trade” (Parreñas 2001) and
in international sex trafficking and tourism. Many global cities now require
and completely depend on the service and domestic labor of immigrant and
migrant women. The proliferation of structural adjustment policies around
the world has reprivatized women’s labor by shifting the responsibility for so-
cial welfare from the state to the household and to women located there. The
rise of religious fundamentalisms in conjunction with conservative nation-
alisms, which are also in part reactions to global capital and its cultural de-
mands has led to the policing of women’s bodies in the streets and in the
workplaces.

Global capital also reaffirms the color line in its newly articulated class
structure evident in the prisons in the One-Third World. The effects of global-
ization and deindustrialization on the prison industry in the One-Third World
leads to a related policing of the bodies of poor, One-Third/Two-Thirds World,
immigrant and migrant women behind the concrete spaces and bars of pri-
vatized prisons. Angela Davis and Gina Dent (2001) argue that the political
economy of U.S. prisons, and the punishment industry in the West/North,
brings the intersection of gender, race, colonialism, and capitalism into sharp
focus. Just as the factories and workplaces of global corporations seek and
discipline the labor of poor, Third World/South, immigrant/migrant women,
the prisons of Europe and the United States incarcerate disproportionately
large numbers of women of color, immigrants, and noncitizens of African,
Asian, and Latin American descent.

Making gender and power visible in the processes of global restruc-
turing demands looking at, naming, and seeing the particular raced, and
classed communities of women from poor countries as they are constituted
as workers in sexual, domestic, and service industries; as prisoners; and as
household managers and nurturers. In contrast to this production of workers,
Patricia Fernández-Kelly and Diane Wolf (2001, esp. 1248) focus on commu-
nities of black U.S. inner-city youth situated as “redundant” to the global
economy. This redundancy is linked to their disproportionate representation
in U.S. prisons. They argue that these young men, who are potential workers,
are left out of the economic circuit, and this “absence of connections to a structure of opportunity” results in young African American men turning to dangerous and creative survival strategies while struggling to reinvent new forms of masculinity.

There is also increased feminist attention to the way discourses of globalization are themselves gendered and the way hegemonic masculinities are produced and mobilized in the service of global restructuring. Marianne Marchand and Anne Runyan (2000) discuss the gendered metaphors and symbolism in the language of globalization whereby particular actors and sectors are privileged over others: market over state, global over local, finance capital over manufacturing, finance ministries over social welfare, and consumers over citizens. They argue that the latter are feminized and the former masculinized (13) and that this gendering naturalizes the hierarchies required for globalization to succeed. Charlotte Hooper (2000) identifies an emerging hegemonic Anglo-American masculinity through processes of global restructuring—a masculinity that affects men and women workers in the global economy.32 Hooper argues that this Anglo-American masculinity has dualistic tendencies, retaining the image of the aggressive frontier masculinity on the one hand, while drawing on more benign images of CEOs with (feminized) non-hierarchical management skills associated with teamwork and networking on the other.

While feminist scholarship is moving in important and useful directions in terms of a critique of global restructuring and the culture of globalization, I want to ask some of the same questions I posed in 1986 once again. In spite of the occasional exception, I think that much of present-day scholarship tends to reproduce particular “globalized” representations of women. Just as there is an Anglo-American masculinity produced in and by discourses of globalization,33 it is important to ask what the corresponding femininities being produced are. Clearly there is the ubiquitous global teenage girl factory worker, the domestic worker, and the sex worker. There is also the migrant/immigrant service worker, the refugee, the victim of war crimes, the woman-of-color prisoner who happens to be a mother and drug user, the consumer-housewife, and so on. There is also the mother-of-the-nation / religious bearer of traditional culture and morality.

Although these representations of women correspond to real people, they also often stand in for the contradictions and complexities of women’s lives
and roles. Certain images, such as that of the factory or sex worker, are often geographically located in the Third World/South, but many of the representations identified above are dispersed throughout the globe. Most refer to women of the Two-Thirds World, and some to women of the One-Third World. And a woman from the Two-Thirds World can live in the One-Third World. The point I am making here is that women are workers, mothers, or consumers in the global economy, but we are also all those things simultaneously. Singular and monolithic categorizations of women in discourses of globalization circumscribe ideas about experience, agency, and struggle. While there are other, relatively new images of women that also emerge in this discourse—the human rights worker or the NGO advocate, the revolutionary militant and the corporate bureaucrat—there is also a divide between false, overstated images of victimized and empowered womanhood, and they negate each other. We need to further explore how this divide plays itself out in terms of a social majority/minority, One-Third/Two-Thirds World characterization. The concern here is with whose agency is being colonized and who is privileged in these pedagogies and scholarship. These then are my new queries for the twenty-first century.34

Because social movements are crucial sites for the construction of knowledge, communities, and identities, it is very important for feminists to direct themselves toward them. The antiglobalization movements of the last five years have proven that one does not have to be a multinational corporation, controller of financial capital, or transnational governing institution to cross national borders. These movements form an important site for examining the construction of transborder democratic citizenship. But first a brief characterization of antiglobalization movements is in order.

Unlike the territorial anchors of the anticolonial movements of the early twentieth century, antiglobalization movements have numerous spatial and social origins. These include anticorporate environmental movements such as the Narmada Bachao Andolan in central India and movements against environmental racism in the U.S. Southwest, as well as the antiagribusiness small-farmer movements around the world. The 1960s consumer movements, people’s movements against the IMF and World Bank for debt cancelation and against structural adjustment programs, and the antisweatshop student movements in Japan, Europe, and the United States are also a part of the origins of the antiglobalization movements. In addition, the identity-based social movements of the late twentieth century (feminist, civil rights, indige-
ous rights, etc.) and the transformed U.S. labor movement of the 1990s also play a significant part in terms of the history of antiglobalization movements.35

While women are present as leaders and participants in most of these antiglobalization movements, a feminist agenda only emerges in the post-Beijing “women's rights as human rights” movement and in some peace and environmental justice movements. In other words, while girls and women are central to the labor of global capital, antiglobalization work does not seem to draw on feminist analysis or strategies. Thus, while I have argued that feminists need to be anticapitalists, I would now argue that antiglobalization activists and theorists also need to be feminists. Gender is ignored as a category of analysis and a basis for organizing in most of the antiglobalization movements, and antiglobalization (and anticapitalist critique) does not appear to be central to feminist organizing projects, especially in the First World/North. In terms of women's movements, the earlier “sisterhood is global” form of internationalization of the women's movement has now shifted into the “human rights” arena. This shift in language from “feminism” to “women's rights” has been called the mainstreaming of the feminist movement—a successful attempt to raise the issue of violence against women on to the world stage.

If we look carefully at the focus of the antiglobalization movements, it is the bodies and labor of women and girls that constitute the heart of these struggles. For instance, in the environmental and ecological movements such as Chipko in India and indigenous movements against uranium mining and breast-milk contamination in the United States, women are not only among the leadership: their gendered and racialized bodies are the key to demystifying and combating the processes of recolonization put in place by corporate control of the environment. My earlier discussion of Vandana Shiva's analysis of the WTO and biopiracy from the epistemological place of Indian tribal and peasant women illustrates this claim, as does Grace Lee Boggs's notion of “place-based civic activism” (Boggs 2000, 19). Similarly, in the anticorporate consumer movements and in the small farmer movements against agribusiness and the antisweatshop movements, it is women's labor and their bodies that are most affected as workers, farmers, and consumers/household nurturers.

Women have been in leadership roles in some of the cross-border alliances against corporate injustice. Thus, making gender, and women's bodies and labor visible, and theorizing this visibility as a process of articulating a more
inclusive politics are crucial aspects of feminist anticapitalist critique. Beginning from the social location of poor women of color of the Two-Thirds World is an important, even crucial, place for feminist analysis; it is precisely the potential epistemic privilege of these communities of women that opens up the space for demystifying capitalism and for envisioning transborder social and economic justice.

The masculinization of the discourses of globalization analyzed by Mar-chand and Runyan (2000) and Hooper (2000) seems to be matched by the implicit masculinization of the discourses of antiglobalization movements. While much of the literature on antiglobalization movements marks the centrality of class and race and, at times, nation in the critique and fight against global capitalism, racialized gender is still an unmarked category. Racialized gender is significant in this instance because capitalism utilizes the raced and sexed bodies of women in its search for profit globally, and, as I argued earlier, it is often the experiences and struggles of poor women of color that allow the most inclusive analysis as well as politics in antiglobalization struggles.

On the other hand, many of the democratic practices and process-oriented aspects of feminism appear to be institutionalized into the decision-making processes of some of these movements. Thus the principles of nonhierarchy, democratic participation, and the notion of the personal being political all emerge in various ways in this antiglobal politics. Making gender and feminist agendas and projects explicit in such antiglobalization movements thus is a way of tracing a more accurate genealogy, as well as providing potentially more fertile ground for organizing. And of course, to articulate feminism within the framework of antiglobalization work is also to begin to challenge the unstated masculinism of this work. The critique and resistance to global capitalism, and uncovering of the naturalization of its masculinist and racist values, begin to build a transnational feminist practice.

A transnational feminist practice depends on building feminist solidari-ties across the divisions of place, identity, class, work, belief, and so on. In these very fragmented times it is both very difficult to build these alliances and also never more important to do so. Global capitalism both destroys the possibilities and also offers up new ones.

Feminist activist teachers must struggle with themselves and each other to open the world with all its complexity to their students. Given the new multi-ethnic racial student bodies, teachers must also learn from their students. The differences and borders of each of our identities connect us to each other,

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more than they sever. So the enterprise here is to forge informed, self-reflexive solidarities among ourselves.

I no longer live simply under the gaze of Western eyes. I also live inside it and negotiate it every day. I make my home in Ithaca, New York, but always as from Mumbai, India. My cross-race and cross-class work takes me to interconnected places and communities around the world— to a struggle contextualized by women of color and of the Third World, sometimes located in the Two-Thirds World, sometimes in the One-Third. So the borders here are not really fixed. Our minds must be as ready to move as capital is, to trace its paths and to imagine alternative destinations.
Introduction

1. I find the vision embodied in the old left notion of internationalism inspiring, and although I critique the use of the category "international" in social science discourse, preferring to use the term "transnational," I very much aspire to an internationalist vision of feminist commitments and struggle. For an important analysis of internationalism and solidarity, see Waterman 1998.

2. I refer to antiracist feminism rather than simply feminism, since in the context in which I write, racializing feminism is a political and epistemological act of great significance. Much of my early work has focused on racializing feminism. Antiracist feminism is simply a feminist perspective that encodes race and opposition to racism as central to its definition.

3. I find Zillah Eisenstein's use of Third World/South, and First World/North in Global Obscenities (1998b) very useful and choose to use those terms in a similar way.

4. While my vision of feminist transformation is not that different from a number of the feminist collectivities and organizations I draw inspiration from (such as Women Against Fundamentalism in the United Kingdom, DAWN, SEWA, WING [UK], Women's Eyes on the Bank, and the Center for Third World Organizing [CTWO] in the United States, among others), the two theoretical and pedagogical paradigms I choose to highlight and explore in this book are decolonization and anticapitalist critique. Interestingly enough, neither colonization/decolonization or capitalism/anticapitalist critique (nor, for that matter, solidarity) appear as entries in the recent Encyclopedia of Feminist Theories (Code 2000), suggesting that these concepts have been less than central to envisioning feminist transformation in the First World/North.


9. For the works of these feminist thinkers, see the bibliography.

10. I am thinking here of the appearance of such feminist gurus as Camile Paglia, Naomi Wolf, and Katie Roiphe on the U.S. media's favorite talk shows.

11. See the essays in Moya and Hames-Garcia 2000, for a useful, cogent theoretical
and political alternative to essentialist and postmodernist formulations of identity.

For instance, Fanon writes eloquently (in a clearly masculine language) about dreams of liberation: "The first thing which a native learns is to stay in his place, and not go beyond certain limits. This is why the dreams of the native are always of muscular prowess; his dreams are of action, and of aggression. I dream I am jumping, swimming, running, climbing; I dream that I burst out laughing, that I span a river in one stride, or that I am followed by a flood of motor-cars which never catch up with me" (1996, 40). The point is not that women do not or cannot dream of "muscular prowess" but rather that in the context of colonial practices of the emasculation of native men, muscular prowess gains a particularly masculine psychic weight.


In discussing the centrality of decolonization to envisioning feminist democracy we argued thus: "In fact, feminist thinking, here, draws on and endorses socialist principles of collectivized relations of production and organization. It attempts to reenvision socialism as a part of feminist democracy with decolonization at its center. However, while feminist collectives struggle against hegemonic power structures at various levels, they are also marked by these very structures—it is these traces of the hegemonic which the practice of decolonization addresses" (Alexander and Mohanty 1997, xxxvi). We went on to analyze Gloria Wekker's essay on Afro-Suninamese women's critical agency to illustrate an important aspect of decolonization: "Wekker ... explores what appears to be a different configuration of self, anchored in an 'alternative vision of female subjectivity and sexuality, based on West African principles' (Wekker, 339). Her analysis of Mati work in terms of alternative female relationships, ones that have simultaneous affectional, cultural, economic, social, spiritual, and obligational components, suggests a decolonized oppositional script for feminist struggle and for practices of governance. Decolonization involves both engagement with the everyday issues in our own lives so that we can make sense of the world in relation to hegemonic power, and engagement with collectivities that are premised on ideas of autonomy and self-determination, in other words, democratic practice. For the Creole working-class women Wekker speaks about, this is precisely the process engaged in. It creates what she calls a 'psychic economy of female subjectivity, (which) . . . induces working-class women to act individually and collectively in ways that counteract the assault of the hegemonic knowledge regime, which privileges men, the heterosexual contract, inequality and a generally unjust situation.' Here, the investment in the self (what Wekker calls "multiple self") is not necessarily an investment in mobility upward or in the maintenance of a masculinist, heterosexist, middle-class status quo" (Alexander and Mohanty 1997, xxxvii).

For interesting and provocative discussions about anti-capitalism, see the special issue "Anticapitalism" of the journal Socialist Review, 28:3, 2001. All chap-
Terms in part 1 have been previously published in the same or somewhat different form. See Mohanty 1984, Mohanty 1991, Martin and Mohanty 1986, and Mohanty 1987. Chapters 6 and 8 are substantially revised from their earlier publication—see Mohanty 1989–90 and Mohanty 1997.

Chapter One. Under Western Eyes: Feminist Scholarship and Colonial Discourses

1 Terms such as “Third World” and “First World” are very problematic, both in suggesting oversimplified similarities between and among countries labeled thus and in implicitly reinforcing existing economic, cultural, and ideological hierarchies that are conjured up in using such terminology. I use the term “Third World” with full awareness of its problems, only because this is the terminology available to us at the moment. Throughout this book, then, I use the term critically.

2 I am indebted to Teresa de Lauretis for this particular formulation of the project of feminist theorizing. See especially her introduction to her book Alice Doesn’t (1984).

3 This argument is similar to Homi Bhabha’s definition of colonial discourse as strategically creating a space for a subject people through the production of knowledge and the exercise of power: “[C]olonial discourse is an apparatus of power, an apparatus that turns on the recognition and disavowal of racial/cultural/historical differences. Its predominant strategic function is the creation of a space for a subject people through the production of knowledge in terms of which surveillance is exercised and a complex form of pleasure/unpleasure is incited. It (i.e., colonial discourse) seeks authorization for its strategies by the production of knowledge by coloniser and colonised which are stereotypical but antithetically evaluated” (Bhabha 1983, 23).

4 A number of documents and reports on the U.N. International Conferences on Women in Mexico City (1975) and Copenhagen (1980), as well as the 1976 Wellesley Conference on Women and Development, attest to this. El Saadawi, Mernissi, and Vajarathon (1978) characterize the Mexico City conference as “American-planned and organized,” situating Third World participants as passive audiences. They focus especially on Western women’s lack of self-consciousness about their implication in the effects of imperialism and racism, a lack revealed in their assumption of an “international sisterhood.” Euro-American feminism that seeks to establish itself as the only legitimate feminism has been characterized as “imperial” by Amos and Parmar (1984, 3).

5 The Zed Press Women in the Third World series is unique in its conception. I focus on it because it is the only contemporary series I have found that assumes that women in the Third World are a legitimate and separate subject of study and research. Since 1985, when I wrote the bulk of this book, numerous new titles have appeared in the series. Thus Zed Press has come to occupy a rather privileged position in the dissemination and construction of discourses by and about Third World women. A number of the books in this series are excellent, especially those that deal directly with women’s resistance struggles. In addition, Zed Press consistently publishes progressive feminist, antiracist, and anti-imperialist texts.
However, a number of the texts written by feminist sociologists, anthropologists, and journalists are symptomatic of the kind of Western feminist work on women in the Third World that concerns me. An analysis of a few of these works can serve as a representative point of entry into the discourse I am attempting to locate and define. My focus on these texts is therefore an attempt at an internal critique: I simply expect and demand more from this series. Needless to say, progressive publishing houses also carry their own authorizing signatures.

6 I have discussed this particular point in detail in a critique of Robin Morgan's construction of "women's herstory" in her introduction to *Sisterhood Is Global* (1984); (see Mohanty 1987, esp. 35–37).

7 Another example of this kind of analysis is Mary Daly's *Gyn/Ecology* (1978). Daly's assumption in this text, that women as a group are sexually victimized, leads to her very problematic comparison of attitudes toward women witches and healers in the West, Chinese foot-binding, and the genital mutilation of women in Africa. According to Daly, women in Europe, China, and Africa constitute a homogeneous group as victims of male power. Not only does this labeling (of women as sexual victims) eradicate the specific historical and material realities and contradictions that lead to and perpetuate practices such as witch hunting and genital mutilation, but it also obliterates the differences, complexities, and heterogeneities of the lives of, for example, women of different classes, religions, and nations in Africa. As Audre Lorde (1984) has pointed out, women in Africa share a long tradition of healers and goddesses that perhaps binds them together more appropriately than their victim status. However, both Daly and Lorde fall prey to universalistic assumptions about "African women" (both negative and positive). What matters is the complex, historical range of power differences, commonalities, and resistances that exist among women in Africa and that construct African women as subjects of their own politics.

8 See Eldhom, Harris, and Young 1977 for a good discussion of the necessity to theorize male violence within specific societal frameworks, rather than assume it as a universal.

9 These views can also be found in differing degrees in collections such as Wellesley Editorial Committee 1977 and *Signs* 1981. For an excellent introduction to WID issues, see *ISIS* 1984. For a politically focused discussion of feminism and development and the stakes for poor Third World women, see Sen and Grown 1987.

10 See essays by Vanessa Maher, Diane Elson and Ruth Pearson, and Maila Stevens in Young, Walkowitz, and McCullagh 1981; and essays by Vivian Mob and Michele Mattelart in Nash and Safa 1980. For examples of excellent, self-conscious work by feminists writing about women in their own historical and geographical locations, see Lazreg 1988; Spivak's "A Literary Representation of the Subaltern: A Woman's Text from the Third World" (in Spivak 1987, 241–68); and Mani 1987.

11 Harris 1983. Other *MRG* reports include Deardon 1975 and Jahan and Cho 1980.

For succinct discussions of Western radical and liberal feminisms, see Z. Eisenstein 1981 and H. Eisenstein 1983.

Amos and Parmar (1984) describe the cultural stereotypes present in Euro-American feminist thought: "The image is of the passive Asian woman subject to oppressive practices within the Asian family with an emphasis on wanting to 'help' Asian women liberate themselves from their role. Or there is the strong, dominant Afro-Caribbean woman, who despite her 'strength' is exploited by the 'sexism' which is seen as being a strong feature in relationships between Afro-Caribbean men and women" (9). These images illustrate the extent to which paternalism is an essential element of feminist thinking that incorporates the above stereotypes, a paternalism that can lead to the definition of priorities for women of color by Euro-American feminists.

I discuss the question of theorizing experience in Mohanty 1987 and Mohanty and Martin 1986.

This is one of Foucault's (1978, 1980) central points in his reconceptualization of the strategies and workings of power networks.

For an argument that demands a new conception of humanism in work on Third World women, see Lazreg 1988. While Lazreg's position might appear to be diametrically opposed to mine, I see it as a provocative and potentially positive extension of some of the implications that follow from my arguments. In criticizing the feminist rejection of humanism in the name of "essential Man," Lazreg points to what she calls an "essentialism of difference" within these very feminist projects. She asks: "To what extent can Western feminism dispense with an ethics of responsibility when writing about different women? The point is neither to subsume other women under one's own experience nor to uphold a separate truth for them. Rather, it is to allow them to be while recognizing that what they are is just as meaningful, valid, and comprehensible as what we are. . . . Indeed, when feminists essentially deny other women the humanity they claim for themselves, they dispense with any ethical constraint. They engage in the act of splitting the social universe into us and them, subject and objects" (99–100). This essay by Lazreg and an essay by Satya P. Mohanty (1989b) suggest positive directions for self-conscious cross-cultural analyses, analyses that move beyond the deconstructive to a fundamentally productive mode in designating overlapping areas for cross-cultural comparison. The latter essay calls not for a "humanism" but for a reconsideration of the question of the "human" in a posthumanist context. It argues that there is no necessary incompatibility between the deconstruction of Western humanism and such a positive elaboration of the human, and that such an elaboration is essential if contemporary political-critical discourse is to avoid the incoherencies and weaknesses of a relativist position.

Notes
Chapter Two. Cartographies of Struggle: Third World Women and the Politics of Feminism

1 The epigraph to this chapter is from an unpublished poem by Audre Lorde, quoted in her commencement address to Oberlin College, 29 May 1989.

2 Anderson 1983, esp. 11-16.


4 I argue this point in detail in chapter 4.


7 Moraga and Anzaldúa 1981.

8 My use of Hurtado’s analysis is not meant to suggest that the state does not intervene in the “private” sphere of the white middle and upper classes; merely that historically, people of color and white people have a differential (and hierarchical) relation to state rule.

9 A number of white feminists have provided valuable analyses of the construction of “whiteness” in relation to questions of gender, class, and sexuality within feminist scholarship. See especially Biddy Martin’s work on lesbian autobiography (1988); and Spelman 1989, King 1990, and Frankenberg 1993 and 1997 on the social construction of whiteness. For an impressive history of feminism, see Freedman 2002.

10 See S. P. Mohanty’s discussion of this (1989a, 21-40).

11 Perhaps a brief intellectual history of “race” as an organizing social construct would be useful here. Consciousness of race and racism is a specifically modern phenomenon, arising with post-fifteenth-century territorial colonialism. Interpretation and classification of racial differences was a precondition for European colonialism: human beings (Europeans) had to be differentiated from “natives” to allow for the colonizing practices of slavery and indentured labor, the denial of political rights, the expropriation of property, and, of course, the outright extermination of the colonized. For racism to be fully operational, “race” had to function as a naturalized concept, devoid of all social, economic, and political determinations. Race had to be formulated in terms of innate characteristics, skin color and physical attributes, and/or in terms of climatic or environmental variables. Richard Popkin identifies the philosophical roots of modern racism in two theories developed to justify Christian European superiority over nonwhite and
non-Christian groups during the Spanish and Portuguese conquest of America and colonization of Indians in the sixteenth century, and later during the British and British-American institution of slavery in North America (Popkin 1974). The first theory explains the "naturally inferior" state of Indians and Africans as the result of a degenerative process caused by climate or environmental conditions, isolation from the "civilized" Christian world, or biblical "divine action." The second, the polygenetic theory, attributes the inferiority of nonwhite peoples to the fact that they were pre-Adamite peoples who were the result of a separate and unequal creation. Thus, while the degeneracy theory identifies "common origins" and posits that people of color can ostensibly "rise" to the level of Europeans by acquiring the "civilization" of white peoples (a version of contemporary cultural liberalism), pre-Adamite polygenetic theory is the precursor of the nineteenth-century "scientific" justification of racism and of slavery in America and apartheid in South Africa.

12 See essays in Reiter 1975 and in Etienne and Leacock 1980.


14 The two preceding paragraphs are adapted from our review, Mohanty and Mohanty 1990.

15 Connell 1987, esp. 125-32; and Connell 1989. For a radical feminist analysis of the state, see Catharine MacKinnon 1989; see also Sylvia Walby 1985; Burton 1985; Ferguson 1984; Charlton, Everett, and Staudt 1989; Anthias and Yuval-Davis 1990. See also chapters 7 and 9 for discussions of state and citizenship.

16 Omi and Winant 1986. See also Winant 1990. For similar discussion of racial formation in the British context, see Gilroy 1987.

17 This discussion of Asian immigration to the United States is based in part on Asian Women United of California 1989.

18 See Eisenstein 1988a, esp. ch. 4, for a discussion of the pluralist nature of the U.S. state.


20 Sivanandan 1981; see also Sivanandan 1990.

I develop this argument in detail in chapter 6.

Spivak's work also addresses similar questions. See especially Spivak 1987.

For a comprehensive analysis of these questions, see Moore 1988. Two particularly influential (self-critical) texts that develop the notion of the politics of interpretation and representation in the constitution of anthropology as a discipline are Marcus and Fischer 1986 and Clifford and Marcus 1986. For a feminist critique of these texts and their premises, see Mascia-Less et al. 1989.

Doris Sommer makes this point in her excellent essay in Brodzki and Schenck 1988. My discussion of testimonies draws on Sommer's analysis. For a theoretical extension of these issues, see Stone-Mediatore.

Sistren with Ford-Smith 1987. Another text that raises similar questions of identity, consciousness, and history is Menchu 1984.

For texts that document the trajectory of Third World women's consciousness and politics, see also the recent publications of the following feminist publishers: Firebrand Press, Crossing Press, Spinsters/Aunt Lute, Zed Press, South End Press, Women's Press, and Sheba Feminist Publishers.

Chapter Three. What's Home Got to Do with It?

See, for example, Reagon 1984 and Smith's introduction, both in Smith 1983; and Moraga 1984.

Of course, feminist intellectuals have read various antihumanist strategies as taking a similar line about the turn of the last century and the future of this one. In her contribution to a Yale French Studies special issue on French feminism, Alice Jar­dine argues against an "American" feminist tendency to establish and maintain an illusory unity based on incorporation, a unity and centrism that relegate differences to the margins or out of sight. "Feminism," she writes, "must not open the door to modernity then close it behind itself." In her Foucauldian critique of American feminist/humanist empiricism, Peggy Kamuf warns against the assumption that she sees guiding much feminist thought, "an unshaken faith in the ultimate arrival at essential truth through the empirical method of accumulation of knowledge, knowledge about women" (Kamuf 1982, 45). She goes on to spell out the problem of humanism in a new guise: "There is an implicit assumption in such programs that this knowledge about women can be produced in and of itself, without seeking any support within those very structures of power that—or so it is implied—have prevented knowledge of the feminine in the past. Yet what is it about those structures that could have succeeded until now in excluding such knowledge if it is not a similar appeal to a 'we' that has had a similar faith in its own eventual constitution as a delimited and totalizable object?" (Kamuf 1982, 45)

For incisive and insistent analyses of the uses and limitations of deconstruc-
tive and poststructuralist analytic strategies for feminist intellectual and political projects, see in particular the work of de Lauretis 1984 and Jardine 1985.

4 This notion of a female “true self” underlying a male-imposed “false consciousness” is evident in the work of cultural feminists such as Daly (1978) and Brownmiller (1978 and 1981).

5 For analyses and critiques of tendencies to romanticize lesbianism, see essays by Carole Vance, Alice Echols, and Gayle Rubin in Vance 1984, on the “cultural feminism” of such writers as Griffin, Rich, Daly, and Gearheart.

6 Feminist theorists such as Chodorow (1978), Gilligan (1983), and Rich (1976) have focused exclusively on the psychosocial configuration of mother/daughter relationships. Jessica Benjamin (1986) points to the problem of not theorizing “the father” in feminist psychoanalytic work, emphasizing the significance of the father in the construction of sexuality within the family.


8 For a discussion of the relevance of Foucault’s reconceptualization of power to feminist theorizing, see Martin 1982.

9 One good example of the numerous narratives of political awakening in feminist work is the transformation of the stripper in the film Not a Love Story (directed by Bonnie Klein, 1982) from exploited sex worker to enlightened feminist. Where this individual’s linear and unproblematic development is taken to be emblematic of problems in and feminist solutions to pornography, the complexities of the issues involved are circumvented and class differences are erased.

10 For a historical account of the situation of lesbians and attitudes toward lesbianism in NOW, see Abbot and Love 1972.

11 For writings that address the construction of colonial discourse, see Bhabha 1983, 18-26; Fanon 1970; Memmi 1965; C. T. Mohanty 1985; Said 1979; and Spivak 1982.

12 See especially the introduction in de Lauretis 1984.

13 For an excellent discussion of the effects of conscious and unconscious pursuits of safety, see Vance’s introduction to Pleasure and Danger (1984), in which she elaborates upon the obstacles to theorizing embedded in such pursuits.
‘As a woman I have no country; as a woman my country is the whole world.’ Magnificent as that vision may be, we can’t explode into breadth without a conscious grasp on the particular and concrete meaning of our location here and now, in the United States of America” (162).

I address in some depth one version of this, the management of race and cultural pluralism in the U.S. academy in chapter 8.

Two essays develop the point I am trying to suggest here. Jenny Bourne (1987) identifies the problems with most forms of contemporary identity politics, which equalize notions of oppression, thereby writing out of the picture any analysis of structural exploitation or domination. In a similar vein, Satya P. Mohanty uses the opposition between “History” and “histories” to criticize an implicit assumption in contemporary cultural theory that pluralism is an adequate substitute for political analyses of dependent relationships and larger historical configuration. For Satya Mohanty (1989a), the ultimate target is cultural and historical relativism, which he identifies as the unexamined philosophical “dogma” underlying political celebrations of pure difference. This is how he characterizes the initial issues involved: “Plurality [is] thus a political ideal as much as it [is] a methodological slogan. But . . . a nagging question [remains]: How do we negotiate between my history and yours? How would it be possible for us to recover our commonality, not the humanist myth of our shared human attributes which are meant to distinguish us all from animals, but more significantly, the imbrication of our various pasts and presents, the ineluctable relationships of shared and contested meanings, values, material resources? It is necessary to assert our dense particularities, our lived and imagined differences. But could we afford to leave unexamined the question of how our differences are intertwined and indeed hierarchically organized? Could we, in other words, really afford to have entirely different histories, to see ourselves as living—and having lived—in entirely heterogeneous and discrete spaces” (Mohanty 1989b, 13).

For instance, some of the questions that arise in feminist analyses and politics and that are situated at the juncture of studies of race, colonialism, and Third World political economy pertain to the systemic production, constitution, operation, and reproduction of the institutional manifestations of power. How does power operate in the constitution of gendered and racial subjects? How do we talk about contemporary political praxis, collective consciousness, and collective struggle in the context of an analysis of power? Other questions concern the discursive codifications of sexual politics and the corresponding feminist political strategies these codifications engender. Why is sexual politics defined around particular issues? One might examine the cultural and historical processes and conditions under which sexuality is constructed during conditions of war. One might also ask under what historical conditions sexuality is defined as sexual violence, and investigate the emergence of gay and lesbian sexual identities. The discursive organization of these questions is significant because they help to chart and shape collective resistance. Some of these questions are addressed by contributors in two collec-

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6 Linda Gordon discusses this relation of female to feminist in “What’s New in Women’s History” (Gordon 1986).

7 The title to this section is from Rich 1986, 212.

8 In chapter 1 I attempt a detailed analysis of some recent Western feminist social science texts about the Third World. Focusing on works that have appeared in an influential series published by Zed Press of London, I examine this discursive construction of women in the Third World and the resultant Western feminist self-representations.

9 For a similar analysis in the context of feminist and antiracist pedagogy, see chapters 8 and 9.

10 See chapter 5 for an analysis of my own political choices and their potential consequences.

11 For an analysis that develops the basis for claiming “common interests” and a common context of struggle see chapter 6.

12 I develop this argument in some detail in the context of pedagogies of globalization in chapter 9.

13 The quotation in the title to this section is from Reagon 1983, 359.

14 See chapter 3 and chapter 6.

15 For a rich and informative account of contemporary racial politics in the United States, see Omi and Winant 1986. Surprisingly, this text erases gender and gay politics altogether, leading me to wonder how we can talk about the “racial state” without addressing questions of gender and sexual politics. A good companion text that emphasizes such questions is Moraga and Anzaldúa (1981). Anzaldúa (1990) continues some of the discussions begun in This Bridge Called My Back.


Chapter Five. Genealogies of Community, Home, and Nation

1 I became a U.S. citizen in 1998, in order to adopt my daughter Uma Talpade Mohanty from Mumbai. Now I no longer hold an Indian passport, although of course my designation as NRI (Nonresident Indian) remains the same.

2 An earlier version of this chapter, entitled “Defining Genealogies: Feminist Reflections on Being South Asian in North America,” was published in Women of South Asian Descent Collective (1993). This chapter is dedicated to the memory of Lanubai and Gauribai Vijaykar, my maternal grandaunts, who were single, educated, financially independent, and tall (over six feet), at a time when it was against the grain to be any one of these things; and to Audre Lorde, teacher, sister, friend, whose words and presence continue to challenge me.
Chapter Six. Women Workers and the Politics of Solidarity

1 The epigraph to this chapter is taken from Hossfeld 1993b, 50–51.

2 See Dribble 1994. The Support Committee for Maquiladora Workers promotes cross-border organizing against corporate impunity. This San Diego–based volunteer effort of unionists, community activists, and others assists workers in building autonomous organizations and facilitating ties between Mexican and U.S. workers. The committee, which is coordinated by Mary Tong, also sees its task as educating U.S. citizens about the realities of life, work, and efforts for change among maquiladora workers. For more information, write the Support Committee at 3909 Centre Street, Suite 210, San Diego, CA 92103.

3 See chapter 2, p. 57 “Cartographies of Struggle,” where I identify five provisional historical, political, and discursive junctures for understanding Third World feminist politics: “decolonization and national liberation movements in the third world, the consolidation of white, liberal capitalist patriarchies in Euro-America, the operation of multinational capital within a global economy, . . . anthropology as an example of a discourse of dominance and self-reflexivity, [and] storytelling or autobiography (the practice of writing) as a discourse of oppositional consciousness and agency.” The chapter treats one part of this project: the operation of multinational capital and the location of poor Third World women workers.

4 See the excellent analysis in Amott and Matthaei 1991, esp. 22–23.

5 See Bagguley 1990.

6 Joan Smith (1994) has argued, in a similar vein, for the usefulness of a world system theory approach (seeing the various economic and social hierarchies and national divisions around the globe as part of a singular systematic division of labor, with multiple parts, rather than as plural and autonomous national systems) that incorporates the notion of the “household” as integral to understanding the profoundly gendered character of this systemic division of labor. While her analysis is useful in historicizing and analyzing the idea of the household as the constellation of relationships that makes the transfer of wealth possible across age, gender, class, and national lines, the ideologies of masculinity, femininity, and heterosexuality that are internal to the concept of the household are left curiously intact in her analysis—as are differences in understandings of the household—in different cultures. In addition, the impact of domesticating ideologies in the sphere of production, in constructions of “women’s work,” is also not addressed in Smith’s analysis. While I find this version of the world systems approach useful, my own analysis attempts a different series of connections and theorizations.


8 See my discussion of “relations of rule” in chapter 2. There has been an immense amount of excellent feminist scholarship on women and work and women and multinationals in the last decade. In fact, it is this scholarship that makes my argu-
Without the analytic and political insights and analyses of scholars such as Aihwa Ong, Maria Patricia Fernandez-Kelly, Lourdes Beneria and Martha Roldan, Maria Mies, Swasti Mitter, and Sallie Westwood, among others, my attempt to understand and stitch together the lives and struggles of women workers in different geographical spaces would be sharply limited. My essay builds on arguments offered by some of these scholars while attempting to move beyond particular cases to an integrated analysis that is not the same as the world systems model. See especially Nash and Fernandez-Kelly 1983, Ward 1990, Review of Radical Political Economics 1991, Bradley 1989, and Brydon and Chant 1989.

9 See Shohat and Stam 1994, esp. 25–27. In a discussion of the analytic and political problems involved in using terms like “Third World,” Shohat and Stam draw attention to the adoption of “Third World” at the 1955 Bandung Conference of “nonaligned” African and Asian nations, an adoption that was premised on the solidarity of these nations around the anticolonial struggles in Vietnam and Algeria. This is the genealogy of the term that I choose to invoke here.

10 My understanding and appreciation of the links among location, experience, and social identity in political and intellectual matters grow out of numerous discussions with Satya Mohanty. See especially Mohanty 1995, 108–17. See also Moya’s essay in Alexander and Mohanty 1997 for further discussion of these issues.

11 Sacks, introduction to Sacks and Remy 1984, esp. 10–11.

12 For examples of cross-national feminist organizing around these issues, see the following: Sahgal and Davis 1992; Moghadam 1994; Institute for Women, Law and Development 1993; Rowbotham and Mitter 1994; and Peters and Wolper 1995.

13 Aihwa Ong’s discussion (1987) of the various modes of surveillance of young Malaysian factory women as a way of discursively producing and constructing notions of feminine sexuality is also applicable in this context, where “single” and “married” assume powerful connotations of sexual control.

14 Hossfeld states that she spoke to workers from at least thirty Third World nations including Mexico, Vietnam, the Philippines, Korea, China, Cambodia, Laos, Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia, India, Pakistan, Iran, Ethiopia, Haiti, Cuba, El Salvador, Nicaragua, Guatemala, and Venezuela, as well as southern Europe, especially Portugal and Greece (1990, 149). It may be instructive to pause and reflect on the implications of this level of racial and national diversity on the shop floor in the Silicon Valley. While all these workers are defined as “immigrants,” a number of them as recent immigrants, the racial, ethnic, and gender logic of capitalist strategies of recolonization in this situation locate all the workers in similar relationships to the management as well as to the state.

15 Assembly lines in the Silicon Valley are often divided among race, ethnic, and gender lines, with workers competing against one another for greater productivity. Individual worker choices, however imaginative or ambitious, do not transform the system. Often they merely undercut the historically won benefits of the metropolitan working class. Thus, while moonlighting, overtime, and job hopping are
indications of individual modes of resistance, and of an overall strategy of class mobility, it is these very aspects of worker's choices that support an underground domestic economy that evades or circumvents legal, institutionalized, or contractual arrangements that add to the indirect wages of workers.

16 Hossfeld 1990, 149: "You're paid less because women are different than men" or "Immigrants need less to get by."

17 The epigraph to this section is from Westwood and Bhachu (1988, 5 [introduction]). See also, in the same collection, Phizacklea 1988, Bhachu 1988, Westwood 1988, and Josephides 1988.

18 For a thorough discussion of the history and contemporary configurations of homework in the United States, see Boris and Daniels 1989, especially the introduction, 1-12; Fernandez-Kelly and Garcia 1989; and Allen 1989.


Chapter Seven. Privatized Citizenship, Corporate Academies, and Feminist Projects


2 I began working on privatization because of the grassroots organizing and analysis by the members of Grassroots Leadership of North Carolina, a group of community organizers I was privileged to work with for six years in the 1990s. Much of the analysis of privatization, and the urgency in fighting it, comes from the work of Grassroots Leadership, as well as the work of economists such as Pamela Sparr and Marlene Kim, labor studies scholars such as Frank Emspak and Laurie Clemens, and organizers such as Si Kahn, and Rinku Sen. See Emspak 1997 and Starr 1987.

3 For instance, at the California State University at Dominguez Hills, the employment statistics break down in this way: the majority of faculty at CSUDH are part-time (408 compared to 289 full-time faculty). Of the full-time faculty and staff, 60 percent of the faculty and administrators are male (higher pay, with more job security), and 40 percent female. Conversely, 60 percent of the staff are women and 40 percent male. Over 70 percent of the faculty and full-time administrators are white. On the other hand, almost 70 percent of staff are minority (lower pay, less job security). With regard to part-time faculty, 73 percent are white, 27 percent are minority. Of these, 62 percent are female, 38 percent male. For part-time staff, the numbers are almost equally divided among male/female and minority/non-minority. Thus, the "core" group of workers with higher pay and benefits are predominantly white and male—the "peripheral" contract workers in this case are women of color and white women. While there have been clear improvements in the profile of faculty of color at CSUDH over the last few years, the overall patterns of labor follow the restructuring of higher education that scholars such as
Slaughter and Currie analyze. (Information from Davis 1998.) I have used here the language of the report (“minority” is not a designation I use).


5 This postscript is a revised version of my preface to Roman and Eyre (1997).

Chapter Eight. Race, Multiculturalism, and Pedagogies of Dissent

1 See especially chapters 1 and 4. This chapter continues the discussion of the politics of location begun in chapter 4.

2 I am referring here to a particular trajectory of feminist scholarship in the 1970s and 1980s. While scholarship in the 1970s foregrounded gender as the fundamental category of analysis and thus enabled the transformation of numerous disciplinary and canonical boundaries, on the basis of the recognition of sexual difference as hierarchy and inequality, scholarship in the 1980s introduced the categories of race and sexuality in the form of internal challenges to the earlier scholarship. These challenges were introduced on both political and methodological grounds by feminists who often considered themselves disenfranchised by the 1970s feminism: lesbian and heterosexual women of color, postcolonial, Third World women, poor women, and so on. While the feminist turn to postmodernism suggests the fragmentation of unitary assumptions of gender and enables a more differentiated analysis of inequality, this critique was prefigured in the earlier political analyses of Third World feminists. The historical trajectory of the political and conceptual categories of feminist analysis can be traced by analyzing developments in feminist journals such as Signs and Feminist Studies, feminist publishing houses, and curriculum “integration” projects through the 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s.

3 For instance, Bernard (1987) codifies difference as the exclusive relation of men to women, and women to women: difference as variation among women and as conflict between men and women.

4 It is clear from Lazreg’s reliance on a notion like intersubjectivity that her understanding of the issue I am addressing in this essay is far from simple (Lazreg 1988). Claiming a voice is for her, as well as for me, a complex historical and political act that involves understanding the interrelationships of voices. The term “intersubjectivity,” however, drawing as it does on a phenomenological humanism, brings with it difficult political programs. For a nonhumanist, alternative account of the question of “historical agencies” and their “imbrication,” see Mohanty 1997, esp. the introduction and ch. 6. Mohanty discusses the question of agency and its historical imbrication (rather than “intersubjectivity”) as constituting the fundamental theoretical basis for comparison across cultures.

5 In spite of problems of definition, I use the term “Third World,” and, in this particular context (the U.S. academy), I identify myself as a “Third World” scholar. I use the term here to designate peoples from formerly colonized countries, as well
as people of color in the United States. Using the designation "Third World" to identify colonized peoples in the domestic as well as the international arena may appear reductive because it suggests a commonality and perhaps even an equation among peoples with very diverse cultures and histories and appears to reinforce implicitly existing economic and cultural hierarchies between the "First" and the "Third" World. This is not my intention. I use the term with full awareness of these difficulties and because these are the terms available to us at the moment. In addition, in the particular discursive context of Western feminist scholarship and of the U.S. academy, "Third World" is an oppositional designation that can be empowering even while it necessitates a continuous questioning. For an elaboration of these questions of definition, see chapters 2 and 9.

See especially the work of Paulo Freire, Michael Apple, Basil Bernstein, Pierre Bourdieu, and Henry Giroux. While a number of these educational theorists offer radical critiques of education on the basis of class hierarchies, very few do so on the basis of gender or race. However, the theoretical suggestions in this literature are provocative and can be used to advantage in feminist analysis. The special issue of Harvard Educational Review (1988) is also an excellent resource. See Freire 1973, Freire and Macedo 1985, Apple 1979, Bernstein 1975, Giroux 1983 and 1988, and Bourdieu and Passeron 1977. For feminist analyses of education and the academy, see Bunch and Pollack 1983, Minnich et al. 1988, Schuster and Van Dyne 1985, Cohee et al 1998, and Minnich 1990. See also back issues of the journals Women's Studies Quarterly, Women's Studies International Forum, Radical Teacher, and Frontiers: A Journal of Women's Studies.

I am fully aware that I am drawing on an extremely limited (and some might say atypical) sample for this analysis. Clearly, in the bulk of American colleges and universities, the very introduction of questions of pluralism and difference is itself a radical and oppositional gesture. However, in the more liberal institutions of higher learning, questions of pluralism have had a particular institutional history, and I draw on the example of the college I taught at to investigate the implications of this specific institutionalization of discourses of pluralism. I am concerned with raising some political and intellectual questions that have urgent implications for the discourses of race and racism in the academy, not with providing statistically significant data on U.S. institutions of higher learning nor with claiming "representativeness" for the liberal arts college I draw on to raise these questions.

For analyses of the intersection of the race and sex agendas of the New Right, see essays in the special double issue of Radical America (1981). I am indebted to Zil­lah Eisenstein for sharing her 1990 essay with me and for our discussions on this subject.

Some of the most poignant and incisive critiques of the inscription of race and difference in scholarly institutional discourses have been raised by Third World scholars working outside women's studies. See West 1987, Sivanandan 1985, and Mohanty 1989b.
Information about the origins of black studies is drawn from Huggins (1985). For provocative analyses and historic essays on black studies in the 1960s and 1970s, see Blasingame 1973.

For documentation of this conference, see Robinson, Foster, and Ogilvie 1969.

As a contrast, and for an interesting analysis of similar issues in the pedagogical context of a white woman teaching multicultural women's studies, see Pascoe 1990.

For a provocative and productive critique of these binaries in feminist pedagogical theory see Sanchez-Casal and Macdonald, introduction to their edited collection (2002). See also the discussion of feminist pedagogies in chapter 9.

Yance has given me permission to use her words and to analyze her performance. She was a student at Hamilton College for about three years, and she had great presence at the college as a black lesbian feminist and performance artist. Thus her work had the kind of effect that someone less visible may not command. For an important theorization of the significance of stories and storytelling, see Stone-Mediatore.


This discussion of the ideological assumptions of “prejudice reduction” is based on DeRosa 1987.

From a document prepared by the associate director of personnel and affirmative action officer at Oberlin College (Prindle 1988, 1).

Hamilton College has followed a similar route in inviting the “prejudice reduction” workshops of the National Coalition Building Institute (NCBI) on to campus, and in sponsoring the training of some faculty and staff members at the college.

This marginalization is evident in the financial cutbacks that such programs have experienced in recent years. The depoliticization is evident in, for instance, the shift from “women's” to “gender” studies—by all measures, a controversial reconstitution of feminist agendas.

Gloria Watkins (bell hooks) and I attempted to do this at Oberlin College in a college-wide faculty colloquium called “Pedagogies of Gender, Race, and Empire” that focused on our practices in teaching and learning about Third World people in the academy. While the effects of this colloquium have yet to be thoroughly examined, at the very least it created a public culture of dialogue and dissent where questions of race, gender, and identity were no longer totally dismissed as “political” and thus extraneous to academic endeavor; nor were they automatically ghettoized in women's studies and black studies. These questions came to be seen (by a substantial segment of the faculty) as important, constitutive questions in revising a Eurocentric liberal arts curriculum.
Chapter Nine. "Under Western Eyes" Revisited: Feminist Solidarity through Anticapitalist Struggles

1 This chapter in its present form owes much to many years of conversation and collaboration with Zillah Eisenstein, Satya Mohanty, Jacqui Alexander, Lisa Lowe, Margo Okazawa-Rey, and Beverly Guy-Sheftall. Thanks also to Sue Kim for her careful and critical reading of "Under Western Eyes." Zillah Eisenstein's friendship has been crucial in my writing this chapter; she was the first person to suggest I do so.

2 "Under Western Eyes" has enjoyed a remarkable life, being reprinted almost every year since 1986 when it first appeared in the left journal Boundary 2. The essay has been translated into German, Dutch, Chinese, Russian, Italian, Swedish, French, and Spanish. It has appeared in feminist, postcolonial, Third World, and cultural studies journals and anthologies and maintains a presence in women's studies, cultural studies, anthropology, ethnic studies, political science, education and sociology curricula. It has been widely cited, sometimes seriously engaged with, sometimes misread, and sometimes used as an enabling framework for cross-cultural feminist projects.

3 Thanks to Zillah Eisenstein for this distinction.

4 Here is how I defined "Western feminist" then: "Clearly Western feminist discourse and political practice is neither singular or homogeneous in its goals, interests, or analyses. However, it is possible to trace a coherence of effects resulting from the implicit assumption of 'the West' (in all its complexities and contradictions) as the primary referent in theory and praxis. My reference to 'Western feminism' is by no means intended to imply that it is a monolith. Rather, I am attempting to draw attention to the similar effects of various textual strategies used by writers which codify Others as non-Western and hence themselves as (implicitly) Western." I suggested then that while terms such as "First" and "Third World" were problematic in suggesting oversimplified similarities as well as flattening internal differences, I continued to use them because this was the terminology available to us then. I used the terms with full knowledge of their limitations, suggesting a critical and heuristic rather than nonquestioning use of the terms. I come back to these terms later in this chapter.

5 My use of the categories "Western" and "Third World" feminist shows that these are not embodied, geographically or spatially defined categories. Rather, they refer to political and analytic sites and methodologies used—just as a woman from the geographical Third World can be a Western feminist in orientation, a European feminist can use a Third World feminist analytic perspective.

6 Rita Felski's analysis of the essay (Felski 1997) illustrates this. While she initially reads the essay as skeptical of any large-scale social theory (against generalization), she then goes on to say that in another context, my "emphasis on particularity is modified by a recognition of the value of systemic analyses of global disparities" (10). I think Felski's reading actually identifies a vagueness in my essay. It is this point that I hope to illuminate now. A similar reading claims, "The very
structure against which Mohanty argues in ‘Under Western Eyes’—a homogenized Third World and an equivalent First World—somehow remanifests itself in ‘Cartographies of Struggle’” (Mohanram 1999, 91). Here I believe Radhika Mohanram conflates the call for specificity and particularity as working against the mapping of systemic global inequalities. Her other critique of this essay is more persuasive, and I take it up later.


8 I have written with Jacqui Alexander about some of the effects of hegemonic postmodernism on feminist studies; see the introduction to Alexander and Mohanty 1997.

9 To further clarify my position—I am not against all postmodernist insights or analytic strategies. I have found many postmodernist texts useful in my work. I tend to use whatever methodologies, theories, and insights I find illuminating in relation to the questions I want to examine—Marxist, postmodernist, postpositivist, and so on. What I want to do here, however, is take responsibility for making explicit some of the political choices I made at that time—and to identify the discursive hegemony of postmodernist thinking in the U.S. academy, which I believe forms the primary institutional context in which “Under Western Eyes” is read.


11 Esteve and Prakash (1998, 16-17) define these categorizations thus: The “social minorities” are those groups in both the North and the South that share homogeneous ways of modern (Western) life all over the world. Usually, they adopt as their own the basic paradigms of modernity. They are also usually classified as the upper classes of every society and are immersed in economic society: the so-called formal sector. The “social majorities” have no regular access to most of the goods and services defining the average “standard of living” in the industrial countries. Their definitions of “a good life,” shaped by their local traditions, reflect their capacities to flourish outside the “help” offered by “global forces.” Implicitly or explicitly they neither “need” nor are dependent on the bundle of “goods” promised by these forces. They, therefore, share a common freedom in their rejection of “global forces.”

12 I am not saying that native feminists consider capitalism irrelevant to their struggles (nor would Mohanram say this). The work of Winona La Duke, Haunani-KayTrask, and Anna Marie James Guerrero offers very powerful critiques of capitalism and the effects of its structural violence in the lives of native communities. See Guerrero 1997; La Duke 1999; and Trask 1999.

13 In fact, we now even have debates about the “future of women’s studies” and the “impossibility of women’s studies.” See the Web site “The Future of Women’s Studies,” Women’s Studies Program, University of Arizona, 2000 at http://infocenter.ccit.arizona.edu/~ws/conference; and Brown 1997.

14 See, for instance, the work of Ella Shohat, Lisa Lowe, Aihwa Ong, Uma Narayan,
See the works of Maria Mies, Cynthia Enloe, Zillah Eisenstein, Saskia Sassen, and Dorothy Smith (for instance, those listed in the bibliography) for similar methodological approaches. An early, pioneering example of this perspective can be found in the "Black Feminist" statement by the Combahee River Collective in the early 1980s.

See discussions of epistemic privilege in the essays by Mohanty, Moya, and Macdonald in Moya and Hames-Garcia 2000.

Examples of women of color in the fight against environmental racism can be found in the organization Mothers of East Los Angeles (see Pardo 2001), the magazine ColorLines, and Voces Unidas, the newsletter of the South West Organizing project, Albuquerque, New Mexico.


In what follows I use the terms "global capitalism," "global restructuring," and "globalization" interchangeably to refer to a process of corporate global economic, ideological, and cultural reorganization across the borders of nation-states.

While the initial push for "internationalization" of the curriculum in U.S. higher education came from the federal government's funding of area studies programs during the cold war, in the post–cold war period it is private foundations like the MacArthur, Rockefeller, and Ford foundations that have been instrumental in this endeavor—especially in relation to the women's studies curriculum.

This work consists of participating in a number of reviews of women's studies programs, reviewing essays, syllabi, and manuscripts on feminist pedagogy and curricula, and topical workshops and conversations with feminist scholars and teachers over the last ten years.

Ella Shohat refers to this as the "sponge/additive" approach that extends U.S.-centered paradigms to "others" and produces a "homogeneous feminist master narrative." See Shohat 2001, 1269–72.

For an incisive critique of cultural relativism and its epistemological underpinnings see Mohanty 1997, chapter 5.

It is also important to examine and be cautious about the latent nationalism of race and ethnic studies and of women's and gay and lesbian studies in the United States.

A new anthology contains some good examples of what I am referring to as a feminist solidarity or comparative feminist studies model. See Lay, Monk, and Rosenfelt 2002.

See Dirlik, "Borderlands Radicalism," in Dirlik 1994. See the distinction between "postcolonial studies" and "postcolonial thought": while postcolonial thought has much to say about questions of local and global economies, postcolonial studies has not always taken these questions on board (Loomba 1998–99). I am
using Ania Loomba's formulation here, but many progressive critics of postcolonial studies have made this basic point. It is an important distinction, and I think it can be argued in the case of feminist thought and feminist studies (women's studies) as well.

27 While I know no other work that conceptualizes this pedagogical strategy in the ways I am doing here, my work is very similar to that of scholars like Ella Shohat, Jacqui Alexander, Susan Sanchez-Casal, and Amie Macdonald.


29 The epigraph to this section is taken from Eisenstein 1998b, 161. This book remains one of the smartest, most accessible, and complex analyses of the color, class, and gender of globalization.

30 The literature on gender and globalization is vast, and I do not pretend to review it in any comprehensive way. I draw on three particular texts to critically summarize what I consider to be the most useful and provocative analyses of this area: Eisenstein 1998b; Marchand and Runyan 2000; and Basu et al. 2001.


32 For similar arguments, see also Bergeron 2001 and Freeman 2001.

33 Discourses of globalization include the proglobalization narratives of neoliberalism and privatization, but they also include antiglobalization discourses produced by progressives, feminists, and activists in the antiglobalization movement.

34 There is also an emerging feminist scholarship that complicates these monolithic "globalized" representations of women. See Amy Lind's work on Ecuadorian women's organizations (2000), Aili Marie Tripp's work on women's social networks in Tanzania (2002), and Kimberly Chang and L. H. M. Ling's (2000) and Aihwa Ong's work on global restructuring in the Asia Pacific regions (1987 and 1991).

35 This description is drawn from Brecher, Costello, and Smith 2000. Much of my analysis of antiglobalization movements is based on this text, and on material from magazines like ColorLines, Z Magazine, Monthly Review, and SWOP Newsletter.


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