



The Conrad Grebel Review

Volume 26, Number 2

Spring 2008

MENNONITES AND POLICING An Ongoing Conversation

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Community, Policing, and Violence

Andy Alexis-Baker

In his reply in this *CGR* issue to my article “The Gospel or a Glock? Mennonites and the Police” (*CGR* Spring 2007), Gerald Schlabach contends that by “policing” he meant a function that includes everything from “policing” of a conversation to congregations having norms for members. But that is not how he has used the term in his writings. His essay in *At Peace and Unafraid* appears in a section titled “Practicing Wisdom in Public Systems.” There he writes about “political leaders,” “police officials,” “police officers,” “arresting agents,” and “community policing.”¹ He notes how various pacifists have called for international police forces to deal with terrorism. In “Just Policing: How War Could Cease to be a Church-Dividing Issue,” he notes various differences between the mentality of a police officer and that required in warfare. In his essays he has focused on the difference between the police as an institution and war.

By trying to change the meaning of “policing,” Schlabach has undercut his argument that the police represent a model for international relations. If any conversation where we check one another’s definitions or call each other to account is “policing,” then the term has been stretched beyond its usefulness and cannot be a model for either dialogue or international relations.² If everything is policing, what is not policing? That is why Schlabach’s supporters, such as Jim Wallis and others, have called for an international police force. Indeed, in his latest book *Just Policing, Not War*, Schlabach publishes many of these responses and never suggests they have “misconstrued” him.

Schlabach claims that “the most prominent sign of Alexis-Baker’s serious misconstrual of the just policing project is that he studiously reserves the terms ‘police’ and ‘policing’ for the militarized ‘crime-fighting’ institutions,” and asserts that by doing so I have “demonized” those who “practice humane and accountable forms of ‘community policing.’” It is striking, however, that Schlabach has not really examined community policing either. In “Just Policing: How War Could Cease to be a Church-

Dividing Issue,” he says community policing is “a new name for an old strategy” that places police on foot patrols, into community meetings, and “integrated into the neighborhoods.”³ Community policing, on this view, provides an opportunity to “make policing less violent overall” through partnerships with the community and nonviolent methods.⁴ This, Schlabach maintains, can be a model for international relations because it allows: “(1) the sort of work on root causes of violence and conflict that pacifists advocate as basic for achieving real peace with justice, (2) a continued but modified role for apprehending criminals, and (3) ample room for developing less violent and nonviolent tactics for even that apprehension.”⁵

Though he has repeatedly republished the essay, Schlabach has not expanded on the concept beyond these tentative comments. However, in *Just Policing, Not War*, Catholic ethicist Tobias Winright expands a little on Schlabach’s suggestion.⁶ Beyond crime fighting, the police work with community members “to prevent and solve their problems.”⁷ Winright cites the “broken windows theory” upon which community policing is based, which claims that police can revitalize communities by confronting neighborhood nuisances that increase residents’ fears.⁸ It is striking that Schlabach and Winright have so little to write on such an important theory.

In this article I take up Schlabach’s challenge and examine community policing.⁹ I hope that by doing so I can encourage him to deepen his patience for a non-Constantinian and non-state based approach. I argue that since the theory promotes violence and uses the term “community” to mask political domination, it is not a good model for international policing. Finally, I indicate my willingness to attend to those in the police force who responded to “The Gospel or a Glock?” and I suggest that we miss opportunities for witness by not challenging their occupation.

Broken Windows and “Giuliani Time”

In 1994 New York City mayor Rudolph Giuliani initiated a community policing policy that directed police to aggressively pursue misdemeanors such as public intoxication, loitering, graffiti, and panhandling. New York’s strategy originated in James Q. Wilson and George Kelling’s “broken windows” theory.¹⁰ These authors argue that unaddressed disorders such as broken windows signal that nobody cares about the neighborhood and

eventually leads to serious crimes. Disorders cause residents to develop a “fear of being bothered by disorderly people. Not violent people, nor, necessarily, criminals, but disreputable or obstreperous or unpredictable people: panhandlers, drunks, addicts, rowdy teenagers, prostitutes, loiterers, the mentally disturbed.”¹¹ As these fears arise, people stay indoors more often, avoid strangers, and disengage from their neighborhood, all of which makes it vulnerable to crime. Under the crime-fighting model, according to Wilson and Kelling, laws and procedural rules hobbled police from chasing disorderly people out of neighborhoods because such actions violated individual rights.¹² To better prevent crime, they recommend that seemingly harmless behavior like loitering be outlawed because such conduct undermines community controls and invites crime. By tackling these disorders as early signs of crime, police could prevent the decay of healthy communities and revitalize degenerate ones.

Giuliani’s implementation of the theory exposed its sinister side. Several high profile cases revealed rampant violence perpetrated by the police. In one case, officers shot an unarmed African immigrant, Amadou Diallo, forty-one times when they mistook his wallet for a gun. In another, police arrested a Haitian immigrant named Abner Louima and raped him with a plunger. An officer involved in the brutal beating told Louima, “This is Giuliani time.”¹³ This chilling message signals the potential for community policing to escalate violence rather than reduce it. New York’s community policing initiative caused an upsurge in complaints of police violence and misconduct.¹⁴ In 1993, the Civilian Complaint Review Board received 5,597 allegations of police misconduct and 3,580 complaints. By 1996, allegations nearly doubled to 9,390 and complaints rose to 5,550. *The New York Times* reported that “from 1994 to 1996, the city paid about \$70 million as settlements or judgments in claims alleging improper police actions, compared with about \$48 million in the three previous years.”¹⁵ Even Amnesty International reported on the surge in police violence.¹⁶ Bob Herbert reported an exchange between investigators and a Bronx police officer:

“Did you beat people up who you arrested?”

“No. We’d just beat people in general. If they’re on the street,

hanging around drug locations. It was a show of force.”

“Why were these beatings done?”

“To show who was in charge. We were in charge, the police.”¹⁷

Giuliani, quick to take credit for crime reduction, denied any connection between the community policing policy and the steep rise in police violence.¹⁸ His administration argued the complaints were due to an increased number of officers who interacted more with the public. Bernard Harcourt refuted this argument. He demonstrated that the rise in complaints greatly outpaced the rise in police, so that the ratio of complaints to officers jumped significantly. And while police argued that their policies encouraged more complaints, Harcourt suggested the opposite: the highly publicized acts of extreme brutality and the reality of constant harassment may have discouraged people from complaining.¹⁹ In fact, the nurse who reported the abuse done to Louima also reported that the investigator did not take her seriously. A subsequent *New York Times* report found that the police did not even fill out a complaint form.²⁰ “Giuliani time” articulates the administration’s message to the police – or at least their interpretation of it – and that in turn was passed on to those arrested. They were effectively declared outsiders to the community with which the police were collaborating. While Giuliani’s attempts to purify the city and restore it to ‘the good old days’ comforted some people, those for whom ‘the good old days’ had never been safe, heard a terrifying message.

Unsurprised by police violence, Wilson and Kelling reported with apparent approval how one officer described community policing efforts: “We kick ass.”²¹ Kelling reported elsewhere that an officer in Chicago “described in similar terms how he dealt with gang members who would not follow his orders: ‘I say please once, I say please twice, and then I knock them on their ass.’ The officer meant it.”²² Though Wilson and Kelling note that “none of this is easily reconciled with any conception of due process or fair treatment” and would probably “not withstand a legal challenge,” they nevertheless advocate these tactics to restore community controls.²³

Community Policing and Paramilitary Units

Although Schlabach and Winright have sharply distinguished between

various policing models, they have overlooked that militarization and community policing exist in collaboration.²⁴ Superficially, community policing appears incompatible with police departments' militarized tactics, but in practice its proactive, preventative, geographically-focused emphasis is well-suited to the military model. The NYPD, for example, uses SWAT teams for routine patrols. One officer described their approach:

We conduct a lot of saturation patrols... We focus on "quality of life" issues like illegal parking, loud music, bums, neighbor troubles. We have the freedom to stay in a hot area and clean it up – particularly gangs. Our tactical enforcement team works nicely with our department's emphasis on community policing.²⁵

While flaunting a massive display of force, these units "target suspicious vehicles and people" and "stop anything that moves." Consequently, even a Midwestern officer boasts: "We usually don't have any problems with crack-heads cooperating."²⁶ Criminologists Peter Kraska and Victor Kappeler report that sixty-three percent of police officers responding to a survey agreed that paramilitary units "play an important role in community policing strategies."²⁷

The Violence Embedded in Community Policing Theory

Beyond the organizational compatibilities between community policing and paramilitary units, violence is deeply embedded in community policing theory as a result of a dichotomy between order and disorder. This dichotomy places many people outside of due process, fair treatment, and safety from state violence. Society used to view homeless people and beggars as objects of mercy or merely a nuisance. With community policing, the social meaning of disorders changes from harmless to harmful because it situates them on a continuum leading to heinous crimes. As Giuliani stated, "There's a continuum of disorder. Obviously, murder and graffiti are two vastly different crimes. But they are part of the same continuum, and a climate that tolerates one is more likely to tolerate the other."²⁸

This change in social meaning impacts how the police and "law-abiding" citizens see the homeless. Wilson and Kelling compare the homeless to inanimate objects: "The unchecked panhandler is, in effect, the

first broken window."²⁹ Since the homeless are akin to garbage left on the street in community policing theory, city policies direct police to move them into shelters or arrest them for loitering, sitting on the street, panhandling, or breaking other laws that criminalize these people's survival tactics.³⁰ By sleeping in a park or sitting on a bench too long, they have committed crimes, and this enables police to view them as a cause for, and an embodiment of, crime.

The next step increasing the potential for police violence is to change the social meaning of giving aid to the homeless from mercy to harm. In "The Regulation of Social Meaning," Lawrence Lessig examines a New York Transit Authority poster campaign designed to change the social meaning of almsgiving. Before the Authority began its campaign, refusing to give to a beggar signaled that the passenger was "coldhearted, or cheap, or uncaring"³¹ and entailed a social stigma. The poster campaign sought to change the stigma into a virtue:

The Authority told the public that it was wrong to give to panhandlers – that panhandlers were people who needed help, but that by giving to panhandlers, one made it less likely they would get help. To help the panhandlers ... one must not give to them.³²

The campaign made withholding charity an ambiguous action: it could signal either lack of charity or genuine concern for the panhandler's well-being. To reinforce this view, city councils across the US have passed laws that prohibit feeding the homeless. Groups such as Food Not Bombs have suddenly found themselves in jail.³³ In *The Irresistible Revolution*, Shane Claiborne relates that after Philadelphia passed such a law, Christians gathered in a park to celebrate the Eucharist with homeless people. After a few weeks, the police cracked down and made arrests.³⁴ The laws changed the social meaning of feeding the homeless from an act of almsgiving and charity to a criminal act that stigmatizes givers with an arrest record and causes them inconvenience, such as a night in jail. In the name of community, the homeless are stripped of their most powerful allies.³⁵

Since the homeless are seen as inanimate objects and criminals who cause heinous crimes, and since their few advocates are largely silenced, what prevents the police from freely committing violence? Wilson and

Kelling recognized this problem. “How do we ensure that the police do not become the agents of neighborhood bigotry?”³⁶ Disturbingly, they say that “We can offer no wholly satisfactory answer . . . except to hope that by their selection, training, and supervision, the police will be inculcated with a clear sense of the outer limit of their discretionary authority.”³⁷ This is a troubling answer for those who nonchalantly suggest that “We kick ass” is an appropriate response to disorder. Rather than decreasing the propensity for police violence, community policing increases it by dehumanizing, criminalizing, and scapegoating people.

Although Schlabach and Winright claim that an “us versus them” mentality, which leads to violence, is inherent in the military policing model but not in the community policing model, the broken windows theory explicitly sets up such a dichotomy.³⁸ Even if the police force were stripped of its military weapons and training, the problem of violence would remain because of the dichotomy and intolerance it advocates. Far from Schlabach’s view that community policing can be “abused,” the violence of community policing theory is systemic.³⁹

Whose Community? Which Order?

Although “community” is central to community policing, political theorists, police administrators, and theological ethicists who advocate community policing have not defined it. And “community” is a contested term. Marxists, anarchists, and republicans all cherish community but in incompatible ways. By “community,” community policing theorists do not mean “neighborhood,” since they tout social relationships as important for natural control of disorders. “Community” might signify that individuals are socially conditioned within a network of relationships they cannot completely escape. But community policing advocates use the term normatively, not descriptively. They portray reality in a way that favors their view, since community is a universally positive concept:

Community can be the warmly persuasive word to describe an existing set of relationships, or . . . an alternative set of relationships. . . . [I]t never seems to be used unfavorably, and never to be given any opposing or distinguishing terms.⁴⁰

Combining the loaded term “community” with “policing” has political implications. Leaving the word ambiguous is a political move that seeks to silence police opponents. Who, except maniacs and misfits, could be against “community”? And since the theory equates the police with community, who can be against the police?

The Complex Community and Police

The word “community,” however, is deployed against certain people. In community policing, it deflects awareness of the contested nature of community and emphasizes defending the community from outsiders. Thus Wilson and Kelling also create an insider-outsider dichotomy and an illusion of consensus that masks conflict. For example, community policing theorists claim African-American skepticism of the police results from crime and the breakdown of community. A report in *The New York Times* soundly refutes this claim. It found widespread suspicion of the police amongst Black people in Camden, New Jersey. Even for the most violent crimes, they are reluctant to talk to the police, not so much because criminals intimidate them but because they do not trust the police. The article quotes a Harvard professor:

A lot of white Americans from suburban communities can't understand why people wouldn't talk to law enforcement.... But in a lot of inner-city communities, there is so much hostility to the police that many people of color can't fathom why someone would even seriously consider helping them.⁴¹

Beyond mistrust between police and Black residents, the article reveals an even wider chasm. One woman, whose son's murderers are still at large, stated that “Snitching, telling on people, isn't something that I personally would involve myself with.... People don't want to talk to you if they think you're a snitch. If they were your friends, they're not your friends anymore. You're left totally all alone.”⁴² The people whom Camden residents are asked to surrender to the police are often their children, their friends, or someone they are connected with in a meaningful way. Recognizing this fact, the Deputy Attorney General over Camden claimed that “the number of witnesses who remain silent because they fear for their

safety is probably less than one-tenth the number who refuse to talk because they fear the social repercussions."⁴³ The problem for the police is that a socially complex community has created an obstacle for the simplified, bifurcated "community" of community policing. Community is not absent; rather it operates on another economic and social level than do affluent communities. Community policing, for these Camden residents, is a threat to their social networks.⁴⁴

The rise of the nation-state and its police contributed to the breakdown of tight-knit, self-sufficient communities. To the extent that older communities now exist, they generally have little interest in forming closer bonds with the police, as the Camden residents demonstrate.⁴⁵ While community policing theorists lament declining civic involvement in activities ranging from volunteer work to parent-teacher conferences, they doubt that communities can police themselves democratically. Thus Wilson and Kelling claim that the police must remain the primary policing institution. But if real communities are rare and uninterested in deeper police interactions, why do the police profess to act at the behest of shadowy uninterested communities? Sociologist Carl Klockars has suggested that

nonexistent and uninterested communities make perfect partners for the police.... [W]hile they lend their moral and political authority as communities to what police do in their name, they have no interest in and do not object to anything that might be done.⁴⁶

The favorable term "community" confers an affectation of citizen-police partnership and legitimacy on the police. It conceals that the police are a state agency with a monopoly on violence that historically hastened the atrophy of tight-knit communities. It is doubtful that community policing can reverse this trend.

Police-Citizen Forums

The common characteristic of community policing initiatives is that they have originated with the police, not with citizens. Consequently, the focus is state-centered. The police collaborate with the most cooperative groups, not those who are critical. Former Seattle police officer William Lyons points

out that the community-police councils in Seattle had a business group as the community's official voice. That group skewed the councils to concerns about crime control in commercial areas but typically ignored calls for broader representation in the councils and complaints of police misconduct. When the police needed more resources, they urged civilian participants in the forums to lobby city council or volunteer their own time. But whenever people raised concerns about police practices or misconduct, or suggested their own initiatives, the police rarely acted, thus encouraging "passive communities dependent on professional law enforcement agencies."⁴⁷ Similarly, Wesley Skogan's extensive study of Chicago's police-community meetings reveals that the wealthiest residents attend these meetings. Their interests rarely corresponded with the majority in their neighborhood, and their view of the police was more positive than that of most residents.⁴⁸ As a result of biases, community-police interactions tend towards one-way communication, with only a semblance of police accountability and receptivity to feedback.

Root Causes of Crime

For Gerald Schlabach, community policing is a suitable model for international relations partly because it addresses the "root causes of violence." Yet the present essay reveals the exact opposite. Community policing works well with paramilitary units, and it inscribes violence into policing through scapegoating and stripping people of their rights in the name of "community." The root causes of crime are not "disorders" but issues the police have no control over and cannot use to enhance their power: a declining economy, a woeful education system, and dwindling social services. Community policing theorists do not address why policies focus on "crimes" committed by young Black males, not those committed by affluent White males. Why are loiterers more threatening to community than unequal business practices, corporate polluters, or stock market fraud? The disparities in police stops and incarceration between people of color and whites reveal a significant bias that can only be described as racist. Far from getting at the "root causes" of crime, community policing relocates the causes to politically convenient targets and does not provide a basis for achieving "real peace" as Schlabach contends.

Christian Witness to Police Officers

My analysis of community policing in no way demonizes individual officers; it addresses a theory and a state institution. The Canadian police officers responding in this *CGR* issue and in our consultations are people who do not want to “kick ass” as the theory encourages. They attest that much of their work is mundane, and a lot of it is social work. Yet these Mennonite officers carry weapons, and in our consultations one officer admitted she would kill if necessary. If police work is really social work, why not become social workers? Nobody calls the police when they really want a social worker. When people call the police, they want a non-negotiable solution to a problem. The police can offer such a solution because they not only carry weapons but represent a monopoly on legitimate violence. Their solution has teeth, and on the streets officers cannot allow challenges to their authority (they must maintain a “command presence”). Even if they mostly do social work, they do it behind the threat of weapons and collective violence.⁴⁹

In “Policing Issues in the Anabaptist Faith” (see pages 19-23 of this issue), Morley Lymburner relates how the Russian Mennonites in Toronto embraced his work and claimed to have no problem with his carrying a gun. They were glad for police protection. However, in refusing to challenge him, the congregation missed an opportunity for a powerful witness. In our consultations, I asked Lymburner if he would have left his job had the congregation told him that, since they had experienced the horrors of violence, they would require him to leave his occupation but would support him financially as he found new work. To my surprise, he said he would have left his occupation so he could remain part of the congregation.⁵⁰ His congregation thus missed a golden opportunity for witness and transformation. Likewise, some responses in this issue that balk at asking police officers to leave their jobs are denying structural changes that restore some accountability and could help people in violent occupations find meaningful work elsewhere.

Conclusion

Though Schlabach asserts that I disregard community policing in “The Gospel or a Glock?” he has not substantially explored the subject himself. Unlike Schlabach and Winright, my sustained analysis suggests that community

policing is not a panacea for the ills of war.⁵¹ Problems inherent in it would only be magnified on the international scene, where “community” is more contested and complex, and where the dominant players exert their will even more forcibly. Unsurprisingly, the nation-state’s best attempts to do this have resulted in “low intensity warfare” and outright attacks on other nations. Violence is inherent in the theory itself, and it privileges those in power.⁵²

As noted, I do not want to demonize individuals working within the police force.⁵³ If anything, I agree with Stanley Hauerwas that the police are “in a quite compromised position, which means we should be all the more sympathetic towards them.”⁵⁴ By rejecting calls to vocational accountability and limits, I think we have not shown the few police officers in our midst the sympathy they deserve. Let us not offer them grace on the cheap, but grace that costs and is therefore precious.

Notes

¹ See Gerald Schlabach, “Just Policing and the Christian Call to Nonviolence,” in *At Peace and Unafraid: Public Order, Security, and the Wisdom of the Cross*, ed. Duane K. Friesen and Gerald Schlabach (Scottsdale: Herald Press, 2005), 409, 410.

² Similarly with Lowell Ewert’s response. I find it striking that he broadens the definition of policing to include activities like teaching, but then excludes the CIA and CSIS.

³ Gerald Schlabach, “Just Policing: How War Could Cease to be a Church-Dividing Issue,” in *Just Policing: Mennonite-Catholic Theological Colloquium*, 2002, ed. Ivan Kauffman (Kitchener: Pandora Press, 2004), 30.

⁴ *Ibid.*, 44.

⁵ *Ibid.*, 43-44.

⁶ Tobias Winright, “Community Policing as a Paradigm for International Relations,” in *Just Policing, Not War*, ed. Gerald Schlabach (Collegeville, MN: Liturgical Press, 2007), 130-52.

⁷ *Ibid.*, 142.

⁸ *Ibid.* Schlabach’s references all use the broken windows theory as a basis for their studies. See Schlabach, “Just Policing: How War...,” 71, n60.

⁹ I will respond only to the community policing issue, since it has come up previously. However, I want to explain how I categorized Schlabach in my article. In his “Just Policing” essay he described a SWAT team with recourse to lethal violence. He did not state who would participate in that team, but from the context it seemed clear he thought some Christians could do so. At a conference at EMU in 2006, I asked him about Christians killing as police.

(Prospect Heights, IL: Waveland Press, 1997), 472.

²⁶ *Ibid.*, 470.

²⁷ *Ibid.*, 472.

²⁸ Rudolph Giuliani, "The Next Phase of Quality of Life: Creating a More Civil City," Speech given on February 24, 1998, <http://www.nyc.gov/html/rwg/html/98a/quality.html>.

²⁹ Wilson and Kelling, "Broken Windows," 34. See also Robert Ellickson, "Controlling Chronic Misconduct in City Spaces: Of Panhandlers, Skid Rows, and Public-Space Zoning," *Yale Law Journal* 105.5 (1996): 1182.

³⁰ One critic asks whether Wilson and Kelling's article would have had the same impact had they titled it "Broken People." Jeremy Waldron, "Homelessness and Community," *University of Toronto Law Journal* 50 (2000): 386.

³¹ Lawrence Lessig, "The Regulation of Social Meaning," *University of Chicago Law Review* 62.3 (1995): 1040.

³² See *Ibid.*

³³ For example, see "Orlando: 'Don't feed homeless,'" *St. Petersburg Times*, July 26, 2006 and Michael Janofsky, "Many Cities In Crackdown On Homeless," *New York Times*, December 16, 1994.

³⁴ Shane Claiborne, *The Irresistible Revolution: Living as an Ordinary Radical* (Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 2006), 233-34.

³⁵ In our consultation Steve Brnjas said we treated "Peter," the drug addict at AMBS, coldly after we learned of his intentions. But my telling of the story was skewed by the purposes of the essay, which was to illustrate how using some kind of process, rather than knee-jerk reactions, could keep a violent police and justice system out of the mix. If I had told a longer story, I would have described how some students continued to give handouts to Peter and how they tried to interact with him compassionately even after the meeting. However, students all felt that sending him to services suited to help his addiction was far better than calling the police on him for interrupting our daily routines. Nevertheless, Brnjas's criticism should cause some discomfort and a re-examination of how we treat people with needs.

³⁶ Wilson and Kelling, "Broken Windows," 35.

³⁷ *Ibid.*

³⁸ See Schlabach, "Just Policing," 45 and Winright, "Community Policing as a Paradigm for International Relations," 139, 141.

³⁹ Schlabach, "Just Policing," 43.

⁴⁰ Raymond Williams, *Key Words: A Vocabulary of Culture and Society* (Glasgow: Fontana, 1976), 76.

⁴¹ David Kocieniewski, "So Many Crimes, and Reasons to Not Cooperate," *New York Times*, December 30, 2007.

⁴² *Ibid.*

⁴³ *Ibid.*

⁴⁴ Black mistrust of police is much broader than just in Camden, New Jersey. For example, a relatively small city outside of Philadelphia called Coaxeville, where the sheriff and a dozen men once lynched a Black man with impunity, has implemented a community policing program. Yet a local newspaper reported that one officer laments, "[Black people] have

their own little society, their own little culture,' Audette says, saying many blacks won't step forward when they witness crimes, even murders. 'I don't understand it.'" See Mark Fazlollah and Keith Herbert, "Old Town Tries New Approach," *Philadelphia Inquirer*, December 18, 2007.

⁴⁵ Modern universities, with their own security forces and disciplinary processes, are reluctant to turn their students and faculty over to the police for every infraction. Indeed, these forces and processes are meant to shield their members from the police rather than encourage more interaction. I worked as a dispatcher for Public Safety as an undergraduate at Wheaton College. When scuffles broke out or students were caught drinking under age, rather than handing students over to the police, public safety officers reported them to the dean's office, which handled the matters internally.

⁴⁶ Carl Klockars, "The Rhetoric of Community Policing," in *The Police and Society*, ed. Victor E. Kappeler (Prospect Heights, IL: Waveland Press, 1997), 435.

⁴⁷ William Lyons, *The Politics of Community Policing: Rearranging the Power to Punish* (Ann Arbor: Univ. of Michigan Press, 1999), 167.

⁴⁸ Wesley Skogan, "Representing the Community in Community Policing," in *Community Policing: Can It Work?*, ed. Wesley Skogan (Belmont, CA: Wadsworth, 2004), 65-67.

⁴⁹ One of the officers in our consultation even expressed willingness to shoot a person if necessary.

⁵⁰ Another officer in the group said that because of a "calling," this officer could probably not give up police work.

⁵¹ Winright references one article that is critical of community policing and may develop his own critiques in future. See Winright, "Community Policing as a Paradigm for International Relations," 151, n49. In addition, he is much more skeptical that any model of policing can completely displace violence at an international level, and critiques Schlabach for trying to include it as a form of pacifism. See Tobias Winright, "Peace Cops? Christian Peacemaking and the Implications of a Global Police Force," *Sojourners* 35.3 (2006): 20-24.

⁵² Schlabach recognizes that states have bungled community policing on an international level, but seems to hope they could fix the situation somehow. See Schlabach, "Just Policing," 72, n64.

⁵³ I do not, however, back away from calling the system itself demonic.

⁵⁴ Stanley Hauerwas, Personal correspondence August 24, 2006. Used with his permission.

Andy Alexis-Baker, a graduate of Associated Mennonite Biblical Seminary, is an adjunct professor of Peace, Justice and Conflict Studies at Goshen College in Goshen, Indiana.